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The European Nation?

For many people, the necessity of establishing the European Union was explained by the increasingly evident inadequacy of nation-states to tackle the challenges posed by globalization, where globalization means the ever more complicate and dense system of interstate relations, here and now. The nation-state that not so long ago used to be the primary (or even sole) form of political organization of humanity, seems to be more and more inadequate for embarking upon tasks such as regulation of nuclear proliferation, decreasing the deepening global economic and financial instability, subduing the powers of multinational companies and capital, halting massive migration, pacifying the conflict zones, and avoiding the global environmental disaster. Popular views suggest that these issues could only be regulated by regional powers – if at all – as the EU had been envisaged to become by its founders.

Thus, among the many other aspects, the EU could be perceived as a modern alternative of a system of nation-states, an endeavor to overcome the inadequacy of nation-states through a new political form of organization, a new political “body”. Indeed, sovereignty transfer in Europe has become more and more visible after World War II, having as direct “beneficiaries” the political institutions of the EU: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, and as “losers” the nation-states. Albeit the EU initially had not been envisaged to be more than a steel and carbon industry community encompassing a few states only, that is, an economic community with the primary goal of preventing – through economic interdependence – the revival of nationalism that covered the entire Europe in blood twice in the 20th century, by today, the institutionalization of the EU has by far exceeded the initial economic objective.

Otherwise, the functionalistic conception of political integration that practically accompanied the EU institutionalization from start, has proven to be true in terms of its basic assumption: the need for creating – and logically, controlling – a common economic market indeed lead to the birth of

the common European governance institutions. In this regard, the birth of institutions indeed followed the scenario first elaborated in theory: by the acquisition of real and independent power by these institutions, a new center and a new form of power and governance was created in Europe. However, the nature of this new form has become quite intangible, and moreover, the legitimacy of the governing institutions created in the meanwhile has proven to be extremely disputable. The Europe-wide form of governance has not turned out to be as transparent, accountable and accessible – not even visible for the European citizens – as its predecessors, the governing bodies of European nation-states were. Moreover, the more power these institutions acquire, the more evident their democratic deficit becomes.

Similarly, the nature or character of the EU as a political form of organization hasn't turned out unequivocal either. The EU is not merely an international organization as the UN or the NATO, but it isn't a nation-state either. Albeit the motives of power and sovereignty transfer in Europe were mostly geopolitical, the EU has not become an alliance of nations either, as the EU norms are institutionalized through rules and practices all over Europe, deeply penetrating into social life: neither the Delian League, nor the Hanseatic League had such a claim on transforming social life. Perhaps the closest resemblance could be drawn with a federation; yet, the common control and influence instruments of a federal government are missing. The American political scientist Michael Mann is justified in his irony when he says that by creating the EU, the political legacy of the Greek language is finally superseded, and probably the best term for describing the institutional character of the EU is just "euro".¹

Regardless of what the correct description and classification of the European Union as a state organization is, indisputably, it is a justified question to ask, as in case of every form of political organization and government: whom does it represent? Are there any, and if there are, who are the people who comprise the European nation, the European *demos*? – If today the issue of the European constitution is the primary subject of disputes in Europe, we must take into account that a constitution does not only set out the methods and limits of exercising power (in the future), but also approaches the person of the legislator. Creating a constitution must be seen

¹ See Michael Mann: Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State? (in: Review of International Political Economy 4:3, 1997, 472-496, 487.

as an act whereby the legislator, that is, the “nation” shapes itself and also submits itself to the power it created. Therefore, creating a constitution does not only assume the existence of a legitimate and limited power, but also that of a “political body”, that is, the existence of the people themselves. A political community is created by the “people” submitting themselves to the political power they themselves created.

Thus, the question arises involuntarily: is there a European *demos* which could serve as basis for European governance and constitution? – which is practically the same as asking: is there a pan-European political identity or at least some feeling of togetherness – more vague and intangible – in the European people. Can we justly say today that “we, the people of Europe”?

I believe that the answer to this question – at least for now – is negative. In this regard, it is worth taking a look at the Eurobarometer data: to what extent the inhabitants or citizens of European nation-states stated they were Europeans or rather Europeans than nationals of a certain nation (around 12%, of which only 4% declared they were Europeans), and what did that actually mean for them?² It seems that albeit the political elites of some nation-states tend to see – and accordingly, treat – the EU as an independent and specific political institutional system based on its own law, the citizens of the same nation-states have a completely different view on

² See also the books penned by Michael Bruter, Neil Fligstein and Heikki Mikkeli (Michael Bruter: *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005; Neil Fligstein: *Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2008, especially chapter *Who are the Europeans?*, 123-164; Heikki Mikkeli: *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, Palgrave, Macmillan, 1998 – the first ones are more useful), and two collections. One of them is edited by Jeffrey Checkel (Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein: *European Identity*, Cambridge University Press, 2009), the other one by Joe Andrew, Malcolm Crook and Michael Waller (Joe Andrew, Malcolm Crook and Michael Waller: *Why Europe? Problems of Culture and Identity*, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2000). For the European *demos*, see the studies by Michael Th. Graven and Claus Offe (Michael Th. Graven: *Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy*, in: Michael Th. Graven and Louis W. Pauly (eds.): *Democracy beyond the State*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, 35-62; Claus Offe: *The Democratic Welfare State in an Integrating Europe*, in: Michael Th. Graven and Louis W. Pauly (eds.): *Democracy beyond the State*, 63-90), and Étienne Balibar's book (Étienne Balibar: *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2004).

it. Aside from the small, almost insignificant group of Europe fans, even today most citizens identify themselves primarily with their own national community. They see the European governance as part of the international relations of their own national governments, which indeed concerns some of their national interests, but is not by itself a political institutional system based on its own law. The positive approach of most Europeans to the EU, reflected in the Eurobarometer data, is of little significance in this regard. Surveys polling the voters about their approach to the EU essentially differ from elections, when voters are asked to resolve their priorities and undertake issues in order to cast that one vote they have in a coherent way. The visible difficulty of identification with the EU probably emerges from the “abstractness” of European political goals: as of today, citizens don’t consider the problems of taxation and social benefits or normative issues such as abortion or immigration regulation to be within the EU’s competence.

Similarly, albeit the official documents and treaties of the EU utilize the concept “European citizen” – moreover, there is even an EU passport –, none of these documents can be said to possess a real operational value. Indeed, ultimately one has to be a citizen of a nation-state in order to get a European passport, and the passport is issued by the competent authorities of the nation-states, just as before. That is, while the governance institutions and organizations of the Union acquired independent and autonomous powers, European citizenship remained merely a derivate of national regulation. The term European citizen creates the false impression that citizens living in the EU acquired a specific and new political status, which is far from reality – it is merely a symbolic status. The only real political substance that could be paired with this status is that European citizens, at least at the local levels of European elections, are entitled to elect or be elected under certain conditions. Yet, the parties operating in certain countries, that usually dominate the process of nomination, rarely nominate foreign national candidates. Thus, if we are to seek some closer form of European identity – able to serve as basis for political community –, the analysis of Eurobarometer data or the examination of the effective, operational value of Union treaties and documents lead to fairly skeptical conclusions.

As for the feeling of togetherness: Europeanism and the sense of belonging to Europe indeed have some historical and cultural roots, yet this sense of togetherness will hardly be sufficient for stimulating – for instance – a stronger feeling of solidarity that would be necessary for operating the

European welfare system (welfare state). (The failure of the French referendum on the draft constitution pointed out this very fact in 2005.) As a matter of fact, discussions on the issue of European cultural identity *per se* – and of the political implications of this cultural legacy – could only bear tangible results if we manage to surpass the usual generalities.

Theoretically, the “common” European cultural tradition has a double root: the Hellenist one and the Judaic-Christian one. Greek tradition produced the most important elements of our democratic political culture, but this “culture” has undergone quite many changes during the transmission process, and our political thinking and practice today is determined much more strongly by the quasi-institutionalized theoretical legacies of Hobbes and Locke or Montesquieu and Rousseau than by the world of Aristotelian ideas. Today, our democracies bear resemblance to the democracies of Greek city-states only in their names.

In principle, Christian tradition does not have such political implications. By referring to the Christian roots of Europe, we mostly think of the fact that Christian values penetrated European culture. At most, we habitually – and incorrectly – consider the democratic principle of equality to be originating in the Christian doctrine of equality of all human beings before God. Nevertheless, there are political philosophers – such as Pierre Manent³, to name one –, who claim that the typical European form of political community and identity, the nation, could not have developed without Christianity, and that it is rooted in Christianity: Christianity spiritualized the political community, and through Reformation, it nationalized it. Thus, it might be worth analyzing the political significance of Christianity from this point of view, in another context.

Thus, we may summarize that the common European identity (today) is by no means an actually existing fact; it is, at best, a desideratum; and the basis for creating it could hardly be given in reminiscences or reminders of the common European cultural tradition. The typical European form of political community and identity has remained until this day the nation, and as they say: things that separate European nations are much more numerous than those that unite them. After these, the task for the EU – should it want to validate itself as a specific and independent form of governance – is

³ See Pierre Manent: What is a Nation? In: Pierre Manent: Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in Europe, ISI Books, Wilmington, Delaware, 2007, 87-103.

evidently to create such an identity (a political body), and indeed there are express aspirations within the Union in this regard, primarily relying on the instruments of education and communication.⁴

Yet, if we look beyond these – quite hesitant and often contingent-looking – aspirations of the Union, and also take into account the important theoretical debates that are still taking place in this field, we shall see that the leading political theoreticians themselves push for the creation of a common European political identity – naturally, except for those who do not believe it is possible. (The latter group includes the afore-mentioned Pierre Manent whose views shall be analyzed later herein.) Beyond doubt, the leading voice is Habermas, who advocated the necessity of a common European constitution and a common European loyalty in several of his books and studies.⁵

After World War II – Habermas points out – the entire Europe witnessed the appearance of a strong demand for a pluralist and tolerant society similar to the United States of America – this hope continues to animate his vision of a “post-national” Europe, but also the gradually institutionalizing political project of the European Union itself. However, he suggests that the “transnational” political community which could act as a sort of a “body” for the post-national Europe could only be created if the cultural differences that divide the groups – even nations – from each other were confined to the social (or, in certain cases, the private) dimension, and if we recognized that particular identity did not bear a public or political significance. The common – political – identity must be built on the universal values of a civil constitution based on the principle of guaranteeing individual rights, and the demand for the political validation of particular identity (the so-called politics of recognition) cannot compromise the universal basic values of the constitution. Therefore, the hallmarks of Habermas’s theory are transnational political community, civil nation, common constitutional

⁴ See Jonna Johanson’s book: *Learning to Be(come) a Good European. A Critical Analysis of the Official European Discourse on European Identity and Higher Education*, Linköping University, Linköping, 2007.

⁵ Jürgen Habermas: *Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe*, in: *Praxis International*, 1992, vol. 20, 1-19; Jürgen Habermas: *Why Europe needs a Constitution?* In: Ralph Rogowski and Charles Turner: *The Shape of the New Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 25-45; See also: Jürgen Habermas: *The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization*.

values, citizen loyalty, constitutional patriotism (and its instruments, social publicity and consultative democracy).⁶

As it is not my purpose (nor do I have sufficient space) for discussing Habermas's theory in more detail, I shall confine myself to making two short comments on the problems he raised. One of them is the fact that sovereignty transfer towards the EU undoubtedly erodes the powers of nation-states (albeit not their legitimacy), and as the nation-state is not only a beneficiary of a national type of identity, but also a promoter thereof, we can by all means speak of a gradual erosion of existing national identities, although only in a very limited way. Thus, it is indeed worth considering the possibility of a transnational (or even if not a transnational, but at least post-national) political identity. Nevertheless, the visible erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states does not automatically lead to a similar erosion of national communities and national identity. Such a conclusion would be legitimate – as the well-known researcher into nationalism, John Hutchinson, claims – only if we put the sign of equality between nation-state and nation, which is not really justified either from historical, or from methodological point of view.⁷

My second comment refers to the fact that Habermas – as he himself mentions – considers the American constitution to be exemplary, and envisages a key role of the future European constitution in the development of European constitutional patriotism. Ever since Tocqueville, we indeed have seen the Americans as being characterized by a particular form of collective

⁶ Obviously, Habermas is not alone with this view. Other representatives of the alternative of transnational identity, albeit not necessarily on the grounds of constitutional patriotism, are Michael Zürn and Edgar Grande with their studies (Michael Zürn: *Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State*, in: Michael Th. Graven and Louis W. Pauly (eds.): *Democracy beyond the State*, 91-114; Edgar Grande: *Post-National Democracy in Europe*, in: Michael Th. Graven and Louis W. Pauly (eds.): *Democracy beyond the State*, 115-138), or Peter A. Kraus with his book (Peter A. Kraus: *A Union of Diversity. Language, Identity and Policy-Building in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2008). The same position is adopted also by most authors published in the book edited by Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw, including the three editors (see: Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw (eds.): *Making European Citizens*, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006).

⁷ John Hutchinson: *Enduring Nations and the Illusions of European Integration*, in: Anna Triandafyllidou and Willfried Spohn (eds.): *Europeanisation, National Identities, and Migration*, Routledge, London and New York, 2003, 36-51.

political loyalty which he identified as a reflected form of patriotism (that is, not merely one rooted in the hearts) and contrasted it with the French nationalism (which at that time was actually already typical of the entire Europe). Yet, as opposed to the fashionable theory of constitutional patriotism, Tocqueville did not attach a particular significance either to the so-called civil sphere (and social dialogue entertained within it) or to the constitution in the evolution of American patriotism or public spirit. He did mention civil organizations as bastions of culture and as products of civil initiative spirit, but he attributed much more importance to the decentralization of public administration in the evolution of public spirit. Administrative centralization, he suggested, robbed the people who accepted it of their power, because the state's omnipotence weakens public spirit in the citizens; however, decentralization, as it makes people interested in exercising power at the local level, arouses genuine concern and care for the future of the state (and not of the nation!). – I believe it is a much more tangible proposal to base the possibility of patriotism and love of country on the decentralized forms of power than on a social deliberation and communicative action which is not given as a fact or perhaps not even as a possibility, and which, even so, could only have very slim chances besides the strongly centralized and bureaucratized forms of power.

Nevertheless, Habermas's theory is much more complex than to treat it so unjustly shortly. Yet, it is not the purpose of this study to explore his work, or to even consider the possibility of a transnational European political identity more seriously. Instead, I would like to ask ourselves: can the community of European citizens be envisaged as a national type of community? Or to put it plainly: can something like the European nation ever be created, at least in theory?

Such a question assumes from start that EU intends to become a nation-state, although such an aspiration is not that clear at all. Nevertheless, there are signs (such as the common European flag, the anthem, and generally other symbols meant to consolidate European identity) which point to the existence of some intention – albeit not always conscious and coherent in practice – to shape the European demos as a national type of community. Another argument for the approach I opted for is the fact that national political identity – regardless of how harmful European nationalism proved to be and of the damages it caused during the last two centuries – turned out a very stable and popular form of community identity,

to such extent that today one can hardly find an example of non-national political communities in Europe. And many consider this to be more than just a side-effect of historical coincidence. Rather, it shows – and some authors looking into political identity see it this way, too – that the nation has proven to be a form of political community which was the most capable of carrying the achievements of modernity, thus also the most adequate agent of modernity.⁸

There is no other better known and recognized authority in this manner of discussing the issue than Habermas. Albeit several available titles promise an examination of European identity from the perspective of national ideology, in most cases this correlation of European and national identity conceals merely a skeptical and pre-assumed conclusion. That is, those authors most often don't believe in the possibility of a European identity and intend to emphasize the durability and unchallengeable nature of existing national identities, against the common European identity. Thus, for instance, an older volume handling this subject-matter, edited by Brian Jenkins, warns about the increasing presence of nationalism in Europe.⁹ At the same time, another one, edited by Mikaelaf Malmberg and Bo Stråth, reveals that the various national discourses associate extremely different ideas with Europe.¹⁰ A similar mindset underlies Anthony Pagden's approach from the perspective of the history of ideas, deducing from the analysis of various historical forms of the Europe idea that the European concept propagated in the various historical periods only served for concealing the European hegemonist aspirations of various states and empires, and nothing changed in case of the EU either, where the Europe ideal is just a camouflage of the German-French desires of hegemony.¹¹ This issue is approached in a very concrete manner and on a similarly skeptical tone in John Hutchinson's afore-mentioned study, but also in an

⁸ See, for example: Miklós Bakk: Politikai közösség és identitás (Political community and identity), Komp-Press Kiadó, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, 144. (Especially sub-chapter *A nemzet mint a modernitás egyetlen formája* (The nation as the only form of modernity))

⁹ Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos (eds.): Nations and Identity in Europe, Routledge, London and New York, 1996.

¹⁰ Mikaelaf Malmberg and Bo Stråth (eds.): The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations, Berg, Oxford and New York, 2002.

¹¹ Anthony Pagden: The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

older text by Anthony D. Smith, another emblematic figure of studies on nationalism.¹²

The approach I am proposing, albeit its basis in examining the issue of European identity is also served by the national ideology, brings into play another methodology and objective: that is, my intention is not necessarily to emphasize the durability and unchallengeable nature of existing national identities against the common European identity, but to inquire into the possibility – even if confined to the level of an intellectual experiment – of whether a national identity could be extended to the community of European citizens? (I reckon we should not be averse to such theoretical approaches *ab ovo*: let us remember that the birth of American constitution was accompanied by debates on such theoretical issues as the possibility – if any – of a republic of many people covering a large geographical area.) Evidently, my approach should eventually reach some conclusion regarding the possibility of European identity (or at least its certain modalities), but this conclusion does not by all means have to be a skeptical one; or, if it so, the supporting arguments should not be based necessarily on the primacy of existing national identities.

The method I selected is a historic analogy whereby I endeavor to see to what extent our historic knowledge acquired about the shaping of the nations and the evolution of the national ideology entitles us to speak of the possibility of shaping a pan-European national community. Briefly, my position is that one has to analyze the process of creating a national political community in certain European states (on a large scale), focusing especially on the beginnings of the process, France and the French Revolution, and one also has to see whether some analogy could be drawn between the evolution or shaping of the national identity and the European identity.

At a first, superficial approach, it will seem that the process of the evolution of national ideology, of the genesis of the nation does contain moments which could fuel our hopes, and at least apparently, could entitle us to envisage optimistically the evolution of a common, national type of European identity.

¹² Anthony D. Smith: National Identity and the Idea of European Unity, in: International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1, 1992, 55–76.

First of all, it is a fact that the nation is an ideal. That means, it is an “abstract concept” (as Benjamin Constant said once), and not a real thing.¹³ Unlike family, relatives or tribes, the nation is not a tangible form of community, and national identity – compared to other forms of identity – is a very abstract form of collective community identity to begin with. Therefore, its further extrapolation faces no theoretical hindrances. National identity was “created” – first in France, then elsewhere too, using the French example – by “separating” the individuals from their earlier particular forms of identity – manors, parishes, guilds, provinces –, then the individuals thus “freed” were reunited under the nation as the most comprehensive form of political community. Therefore, there is no theoretical hindrance to separating individuals again from their existing national forms of identity, and reuniting them in the supranational nation encompassing all the citizens of Europe.

However, as this form of identity is based not on direct blood relations and the ties of kindred, but has a predominant *conscious* nature, a nation-building process could only expect success if a clear conscience of this new, comprehensive identity is implanted in the minds of people: a nation only “exists” if members of a given group of humans *know* themselves to be part of the same nation. This also entails – and Ernest Renan saw this quite clearly in his notable-notorious essay on the nation – that a preliminary condition to the existence of a national identity is not a common language, as the nation is predominantly or primarily not a linguistic, but a “spiritual” community: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle”.¹⁴ (Renan’s finding remains valid even if he simply *had to say this* in the debate on the French nation he held with German historians because of the separation of Alsace. He couldn’t say that the French nation was a linguistic community, considering that most Alsatians were speakers of German.)

Equally, belonging to the same ethnicity is not a precondition of a common national identity, nor is the historic remembrance of a common ethnical origin; but much rather – as Renan suggested – the forgetting

¹³ Benjamin Constant: A hódító szellem és a bitorlás az európai civilizáció tükrében (*On the spirit of conquest and on usurpation*), in: Benjamin Constant: A régiek és a modernek szabadsága (*The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns*) (Hungarian translation by Zsuzsa Kiss), Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest, 1997, 33-72, 61, 65.

¹⁴ Ernest Renan: What Is A Nation? http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html on 13 February 2011.

of a distinct origin is. If the French had faithfully preserved the remembrance of their distinct – Gallic or Frankish – origin, the French nation could have never emerged. Thus, the conscience of national identity arises not from a carefully preserved memory of a common origin, but on the contrary: from collective historical oblivion and amnesia – and that’s the only way it could arise.

Yet, the success of “nation-building” does not only depend on whether a clear conscience of the new identity can be created in individuals, but also on the ability to awaken in them a *feeling* of belonging to a nation. That is, the creation of a nation-like community is conditioned not only by national identity and its conscience, but also a strong emotional loyalty towards the nation. The fact that the nation is an ideal or an abstract, does not mean that emotions towards the nation and the individual’s emotional identification with the nation is not (or could not be) very real.

For this very reason, the French Revolutionaries, faithfully following Rousseau’s proposals on the national religion, attempted to spiritualize the national idea, through the mandatory religion of the Supreme Being introduced through Robespierre’s decree. That is, they tried – and today we know they succeeded – to transform the nation concept into the object of religious or quasi-sacred reverence. Albeit the object of spiritual adoration in Robespierre’s state religion was the concept of the Supreme Being, this concept of the Supreme Being – as he himself emphasized in several speeches – was actually expressing the character of the “French people”.¹⁵ Rousseau’s proposal – which Robespierre quoted literally in the reasoning of the first festival of the Supreme Being, recorded in the decree – reveals even more evidently the final intentions of the state religion: “With liberty, wherever abundance reigns – Rousseau writes – well-being also reigns. Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square; gather the people together there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Maximilien Robespierre: A vallási és erkölcsi eszményekről, kapcsolatukról a köztársasági elvekkel, és a nemzeti ünnepekről (*On Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles, and on National Festivals*) (Hungarian translation by Géza Nagy), in: Maximilien Robespierre: Elveim kifejtése (*My Principles*), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1988, 443-470.

¹⁶ Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *Letter to D’Alembert and Writings for the Theater*, University Press of New England, 2004. About Robespierre’s state religion and its relation to nationalism,

Thus, at the festival of the nation's religion, each sees and loves himself in the others, so that all will be perfectly united. – Obviously, that doesn't mean that this is the only way to arouse emotional loyalty towards the nation concept; but indeed it draws attention to the necessity of emotional loyalty towards the nation and towards the significance of symbols (anthems, flags), rites, etc. in shaping the nation-type identity. National identity is unconceivable without the common symbols which awaken this emotional loyalty, and fill the hearts with pride and sentiment.

Accordingly, we can draw the conclusion from the above that the nation is merely a “community imagined”, a powerfully conscious form of community identity, which does not assume either the historic remembrance of a common origin, or a common language. What it does require is the clear conscience and definite feeling of togetherness. From this perspective, it seems that the creation of a pan-European national identity is not facing any particular theoretical hindrances.

And still: thinking over the possibility of this, I do remain skeptical. For several reasons.

First, because – and perhaps this is the most evident reason of all – the EU has so far obtained very little success in reviving the emotional loyalty of its citizens. This fact is so obvious that it is not worth demonstrating it in more detail.

Secondly, still at the level of emotional and spiritual reasons, also because the boundaries of the “imaginary community” of the nation cannot be extended indefinitely, for the above reasons. The nation – Pierre Manent writes – which was actually made possible by the ideas of Christianity and Reformation, served as the first durable solution to the disconcerting dilemma that had preoccupied Europe since the Roman republic. The dilemma referred to what was an adequate framework of the political existence of European humanity: a small, clearly delimited city-state republic, or a monarchist empire, that is a huge, limitless *corpus politicum*. The historic answer

see: Demeter M. Attila: Rousseau és a polgári vallás dicsérete (*Rousseau and the Praise of the Civil Religion*), in: Demeter M. Attila: Írástudók forradalma (*Revolution of the Scholars*), Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, Miercurea Ciuc, 2004, 123-143; Demeter M. Attila: A nemzet modern eszményének kialakulása a francia forradalom idején (*Evolution of the Modern Ideal of Nation during the French Revolution*), in: Demeter M. Attila: Republikanizmus, nacionalizmus, nemzeti kisebbségek (*Republicanism, Nationalist, National Minorities*), Pro Philosophia, Cluj Napoca, 2005, 37-72.

to this question was the emergence of European nations, of these large but well delimited political entities which could only be created because Christianity had first spiritualized the political community, or at least persuaded the European humans to accept some sort of a spiritual community which ultimately had some political relevance attached. However, with Reformation, the Christian universe broke to pieces, and a new political form was born: the Christian nation. However, from the perspective of the nation's birth, it was at least equally important that the Christian king – voluntarily or under constraint, maintaining or losing its function – later surrendered its role to an impersonal, secular or, as Hobbes put it, “abstract” state. Yet, if Europe was formed of political communities of Christians, the sovereign, neutral, abstract state also needed a Christian political community, the Christian nation.

Of the above aspects, what is essential for our purposes is that the nation meant a sort of a “midway” between the strongly limited and the unlimited forms of political existence. However, today we are at the about same position as in the Roman ages, because after the failure of the nationalist and imperialist ideals, we again must tackle the question of what actually European nation means to us. On the one hand, we are attracted by the familiarity of the smaller nation-state framework, even if our nations have already lost a considerable part of their political sovereignty; on the other hand, we experience the imperial urge and wonder whether we should continue to walk on the path that leads to an unlimited European empire based on the universalistic feeling of togetherness. Manent points out that “we are fast losing the middle dimension, with its inseparable physical and spiritual aspects, on which we predicated everything worthy of still being cherished in our several national histories as well as in our common European history.”¹⁷ Far from us to say that we, the illuminated Europeans, grew out of the national frameworks. Instead, we rather visibly lost our sense for the fragile balance between the small things and grand things.

Finally, I am skeptical also because – as our historical experiences shows – creating the nation was possible only because the individuals could be separated from the earlier particular forms of identity. In 1789, this process – as we have seen – did not only entice with the hope of liberation, but also contained gradual *individualization*, the liquidation of former social binds: therefore, until this day, nation has been a community of *individuals*,

¹⁷ Pierre Manent, op. cit., 102.

and nationalism and individualism are interdependent. This claim, albeit astounding, is not paradoxical, nor is it unsustainable.

Such a claim appears to be paradoxical today, because after the age of revolutionary nationalism, we have also known the strongly collectivist forms of nationalism that contrasts the aspirations of liberty and is hostile towards the individual, and it seems to us today that this collectivism is hostile towards individualism. Nevertheless, as Hannah Arendt demonstrated, as soon as – starting the French Revolution- the individual appeared on stage as a completely independent being with inherent rights and dignity, who does not require any larger order encompassing it, it instantly disappeared and was transformed into one of the people. And, because after the French Revolution, humanity has been pictured as a family of people, indeed it is valid statement until today that the true form of man is not the individual, but the nation.¹⁸

Thus, the individualism of nationalism and its powerful collectivism were born in the same time; not only that the two are not mutually exclusive, but they actually mutually assume each other. Of all these aspects, here and now the only one that bears importance for us is that the nation is a community of individuals, and this calling into existence of the nation required gradual individualization, the “liberation” of the individual from the social bonds inherited. However, today this would mean that the individuals must be liberated from the inherited bonds of their national existence, and reunited in the European nation as a new, even more comprehensive form of political identity. – And personally, I see very slim chances for this.

Not necessarily because I were in the bonds of my own limited – Hungarian – nationalism. And not even because, like others, I see the nation-state – and the frameworks of national existence, for that matter – as some sort of historical necessity, a necessary framework of modernity or something like that. On the contrary: I fully agree with Elie Kedourie,¹⁹ who in his debates with his younger colleague, Ernest Gellner, kept emphasizing that he considered the nation to be nothing more than a simple historical accident. (Another argument for why the nation is not a necessary framework

¹⁸ Hannah Arendt: A törzsi nacionalizmus (*Tribal Nationalism*) (Hungarian translation by Magdolna Módos), in: Hannah Arendt: A totalitarizmus gyökerei (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*), Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1992, 275-291, 278.

¹⁹ Elie Kedourie: Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. (Fourth edition) [1960]

of modernity is the fact that modernity occurred also in political communities which were organized along non-national principles: perhaps the best example is the United States of America. The United States is not a nation-state, its citizens do not form a nation, or at least not in the European sense of nation: nationalism, as we know it over here in Europe, is practically unknown over there.)

Albeit Gellner and Kedourie both were “modernists”, that is, they considered the nation to be a modern phenomenon, still one could hardly imagine two theories that propose so distinct concepts about the origins of the nation. Gellner, especially in the works written in his last years²⁰ was stronger and stronger in the view that the nation was a necessary element of modernity: processes taking place in modernity (such as industrialization) called the nation into existence, and for this very reason, modernity cannot even be conceived without the nation. However, Kedourie argued that albeit the nation was a modern phenomenon, it was nothing more than a historical accident. In its essence, it was nothing more than an “ideological” construction, and responsible for the creation and propagation of the idea of the nation, more precisely, of national sovereignty, were philosophers such as Kant, but even more so his follower, Fichte. The explanatory scheme that is typical of sociologists, and characterizes Gellner’s books so pronouncedly, tends to present this process in the light of historical necessity, particularly because it seeks the origins of the nation and nation-state in impersonal effect mechanisms (modernization, industrialization, spreading of standardized high culture, etc.). Yet, through the eyes of a historian of ideas, it is obvious that the nation and the nation-state is nothing else but ideology embodied – again: a simple historical accident. (Of course, this doesn’t mean that – as Manent’s afore-quoted words show – that the appearance of the nation did not have certain given historical conditions to begin with, and that these could not be explained using the regular methods of historical explanation. Demand for social equality, which is perhaps the most essential element of the national ideal, was called into existence by absolutism, as stated already by Tocqueville. The same way, the ideal of a spiritual political community could of course originate somehow in Christian tradition.)

²⁰ See, for example: Ernest Gellner: *Nationalism*, New York University Press, New York, 1997.

However, I repeat, I am convinced that the nation is nothing else but a historical accident which was brought into existence by certain given conditions and the ideology of national sovereignty. Yet, this certainly does not mean that today we could simply step out from the frameworks of national existence. No matter how theoretical nation is and regardless of the fact that it is a historical product of an ideological construction, the idea – once embodied and taken an institutional form and dominating human thoughts – is very hard to cast off. (This is why Isaiah Berlin, the excellent scholar of the history of nationalist ideas, said that the activity of a bookworm scholar of ideas is by no means just a harmless, professor-like occupation: it is better – he suggests – to eradicate dangerous thoughts as early as in the scholar's study room, before they gain an ideological armor.)

Reiterating, I don't see any particular signs that the conscience-shaping effect of the national idea or the intensity of the national feeling diminished considerably. And I also don't see that the visible lessening of the nation-state's power and sovereignty could lead to the erosion of nation itself and the legitimating power of the national idea. On the contrary: together with the afore-mentioned Michael Mann, I too believe that the decline of the nation-state in the era of globalization does not point to the creation of bigger, multinational state constructions, but rather to the disruption of the existing ones: the ethno-politics, which intensifies in parallel with the decline of nation-states, results in nation-states newer, smaller, but seen more authentic.²¹ (The most recent example of this is obviously Kosovo.)

Based on the above, it may seem as if I were contrasting the possibility of a European political identity solely with the somber reality of existing nationalism. However, we have another political experience at hand, which inclines me to have at least the same skeptical view. Albeit it is true that the nation is an abstract, an "imagined community", still there are a series of *political effect mechanisms* which do not only assume, but also consolidate the conscience of national belonging and national cohesion. Thus, it is worth evoking – and István Bibó never forgot to do so – that nationalism and "democratism" are so-called "blood-brothers", that is, the national ideal's gaining ground in France was accompanied by the introduction of the republican governance; and that the linguistic assimilation was urged also for

²¹ Michael Mann, op. cit, 155.

basically republican considerations in France.²² That is, if the French Revolutionaries considered – and some indeed did – that the dialects spoken on France’s territory at that time (Breton and Basque, but also Italian or German) simply had to be annihilated, then it was not because they were just irritated by linguistic diversity, as are our days’ nationalists, but because they considered that the ideal of liberty (the republican ideal) claimed this sacrifice from linguistic minorities.

The clearest reasoning of linguistic homogenization during the Revolution was phrased by Barère, who otherwise was convinced that French was “Europe’s most beautiful language”, called to “mediate the highest thoughts of liberty to the world”. In his proposal made on the 8th of pluviôse year II (27 January 1794), he enounced before the National Convention that “it is impossible to destroy federalism which is based on not communicating thoughts”.²³ “We revolutionized governance – he said –, the laws, the customs, the morals, the costume, trade and even thinking; let us revolutionize language which is the common means of the latter one. You ordered that the laws be sent to all the villages of the Republic; but this good deed is in vain for the counties which I referred to. Clarity, which is delivered to the margins of the country at great cost, vanishes by the time it reaches the destination, as those places don’t even understand the laws.”²⁴ Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us smash these harmful and faulty instruments.”²⁵

That is, linguistic assimilation is warranted by the propagation of the idea of liberty, i.e. constitutionality and the idea of the Republic. Uniformity is justified by universalism; assimilation is vindicated by the urge for freedom: “man”, in its own interest, *can be compelled to liberty* – even by smashing his particular, national identity. Thus, the purpose of linguistic homogenization is not cultural, but political, and is related to the necessity of politi-

²² It should be noted that less than half of France’s citizens spoke only French during the time of the French Revolution.

²³ In Revolutionary rhetoric, federalism designated separatism.

²⁴ Barère exaggerates: the justice minister created an office for translating laws and decrees to German, Italian, Catalan, Basque and low Breton as early as December 1792.

²⁵ József Eötvös: A XIX. század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az államra (*Influence of the Dominant Ideas of the 19th Century on the State*), Magyar Helikon, Budapest, 1981, Vol I, Chapter III, 126. (notes)

cal consultation (and the optimization of central administration). Linguistic homogeneity is not necessary because diverse linguistic and cultural identities are irritating or disruptive per se and therefore should be smashed, but because political significance is attached to language and communication in the Republic.

The most effective means serving this goal – as Edmund Burke noticed already – during the Revolution were the Parisian newspapers distributed in the provinces, as promoters of the revolutionary ideals and the revolutionary language, Parisian French. Yet, these means eventually turned out inadequate, the time available to the Revolutionaries way too brief for achieving the goal, and France's linguistic unity was created solely later, by the educational policy of the Third Republic, with extremely drastic methods. Nevertheless, even if the French Revolution did not eradicate France's linguistic diversity, it indeed terminated the French people's indifference towards the linguistic diversity of their country.²⁶

Of course, not even today do all these mean that republican governance is unconceivable without national community, but rather that the French Revolution introduced a form of democratic systems in Europe which equally assumes and reproduces the nation-type political community. It assumes it because, according to Rousseau's logic, it conventionally legitimates itself as a nation-state, based on the principle of "national sovereignty", and is compelled to constantly reproduce because, being a strongly centralized and bureaucratized state structure, it is functional only as long as its citizens as a community speak the same official language which ensures the standard and undisturbed functioning of administration, justice and public education.

However, there are some contemporary authors who deduce a general conclusion from this historic experience – specifically related to the birth of European nation-states –, and take it as truth generally valid for the republican state structure that it cannot function in a multilingual social environment. Thus, Will Kymlicka, perhaps the most well-known contemporary representative of the theory of multiculturalism, argued in his attempt to

²⁶ A similarly oriented analysis of the genesis of national identity is found in the work of a less known figure of nationalist studies, Chimène Keitnernek: *The Paradoxes of Nationalism. The French Revolution and its Meaning for Contemporary Nation Building*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2007.

dissipate the state's ethno-cultural neutrality shared by even some of today's liberals (such as Habermas) that linguistic identity has a particular political importance in republican political systems, considering that language is an instrument of democratic politics.²⁷

Whatever the liberals may think, he says, political institutions cannot be separated from culture or language as it once happened with religion and state alike. And, he adds, this is so because liberalists generally tend to assume an analogy between the situation of ethnic communities or national minorities and the situation of confessions.²⁸ And as the state's spiritual neutrality was ensured by the separation of state and church, the state's ethnic neutrality should be ensured by the consistent separation of state and ethnicity. As the state does not recognize and support any confession, the same way, it shouldn't recognize any ethnicity and language either. Yet, while the state-church separation was possible through the laicization of state, as secular politics does not necessary need religious legitimacy (Christianity itself supports the separation of faith issues from secular authority), the central element of national identity, language, is also a necessary instrument of democratic politics. The state does not have to support certain confessions (even if it does so in several European states, such as Germany, England, Romania, but also elsewhere); however, when it decides on the language to be used in public offices, education, then it involuntarily confirms the legal and public status of a given language. And if it supports majority culture by making its language the language of public offices and education, it cannot deny official recognition to minority languages by invoking the breach of the principle of state-ethnicity separation.

Of all these, what concerns us, here and now, is not necessarily Kymlicka's conclusion, but the initial premise of his argumentation: the thought that the central element of national identity, language, is also the major instrument of democratic politics. This is so because, he says, democratic politics is a *vernacular* politics. For the average citizen, it is convenient to have the political issues raised in his own language, and democratic deci-

²⁷ See e.g. Will Kymlicka: *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Will Kymlicka: *Multicultural Citizenship*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; Will Kymlicka – Christine Strachle: *Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature*, in: *European Journal of Philosophy*, 1999, vol. 7, no. 1, 65-88.

²⁸ Will Kymlicka: *Multicultural Citizenship*, 111.

sion-making is legitimized only if each citizen of the state participates (or is able to participate) in the public debates preceding the decisions. Thus, the nation-state's demand for a common national language can be construed as a requirement of robust *consultative* democracy.

If we think of Barère's afore-mentioned enunciation, we can say that this thought is not that new: it was evident already for the French Revolutionaries that the requirement of participation in the republican decision-making process assumed linguistic homogeneity. France's linguistic diversity was not unpleasant as long as the third order did not feel the need to participate in governance: it became a bothersome factor only with the introduction of the republican system. Yet, while recognizing the political importance of language led Kymlicka to infer the necessity of multicultural and multinational states which would institutionalize minority languages just as the majority language, Barère pushed for the assimilation of linguistic minorities on the grounds of uniformity, based on the same logic. The premise, the starting point indeed permits both.

And this is why we haven't been able to decide until now which position the most known representative of national liberalism, John Stuart Mill, represented in 1861, in the famous lines of his work on *Representative Government*: "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. [...] For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."²⁹ Evidently, this may also lead to the conclusion that an independent government must be set up to lead each nationality, but also that smaller nationalities are "civilizationally obliged" to merge into the bigger ones: a sacrifice to be made for the sake of liberty.

In a way or another, the premise remains valid regardless of the conclusions. Albeit Renan could have been right in claiming that the nation was primarily a linguistic community and not a spiritual one, the daily functioning of a centralized nation-state and representative governance requires that citizens of the nation-state are shaped into a linguistic community. The na-

²⁹ John Stuart Mill: Considerations on Representative Government, in: A. D. Lindsay (ed.): Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, J. M. Dent, London, 1954, 361, 362

tion could exist without a common language, but the nation-state could not. The linguistic homogenization policy of the nation-state obeys this very logic when forcing the official language on those who do not speak it.

However, if we interpret these words by Mill not as a call of a vehement nationalist to linguistic assimilation and civilizational rising (albeit it is difficult not to construe them this way, considering the Mill himself, a few lines below, speaks of a Highlander “sulking on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times” who should, instead of “revolving in his own little mental orbit”, become English), then these words convey the sincere concern of the representative government and followers of the republic. They indeed draw attention to the fact that each republic assumes a “mutual sympathy” between citizens to begin with, and national feeling is only one, yet undoubtedly very efficient form of it. Regardless of this, the remark remains valid: each representative government form – whether or not functioning within the frameworks of a nation-state – assumes something common, something that connects citizens with each other, something that creates political cohesion between them, and for which the best term is perhaps “common political space”.

Now the question arises: to what extent can we speak of such a common political space within the EU, of “mutual sympathy” between the citizens? To what extent is the EU government system *representative*? – And this question concerns not only the possibility of a European *national* identity in the narrow sense, but *generally* the possibility of European *political* community and representative governance.

If we attempt to see the EU political system not only as a government with pertaining institutions, but as a common – European – political space, “a political body”, then we must notice at once that the “political body” of this system or government comprises not only the citizens, but also the members of political and administrative elite. The latter one can be divided into two groups. One consists of the representatives of national governments who sit in various Councils, while the other one includes the “Eurocrats”, that is, the politicians and bureaucrats who serve the own institutions of the EU (including the Commission and the European Court mostly, and to lesser extent, the members of the so-called European Parliament).

Members of the first group find themselves in a somewhat paradoxical situation. Albeit they are active in EU institutions too and as such, they

could often be in a situation where they should overlook their narrower national interests for the sake of deepening integration, their own co-nationals (and if they are interested at all, the citizens of the other nation-states) still see them as national representatives. The other group, especially members of the Commission, who exercise executive power in effect, are in the opposite position: they are barely known to citizens of nation-states. The work of the European Court, hardly known to others besides the narrow group of legal and academic experts, and the activity of the European Parliament are practically unknown and unseen for the large masses of citizens.

Citizens of the individual nation-states are not primarily citizens of the Union either – they are that only insofar as they are citizens of the individual nation-states. They are merely subjects of European regulation and norms, without having the slightest possibility to participate effectively in the creation of European laws and norms. Thus, if the EU is a political body, it does not actually have a “body” – it does not have actual citizens.

We see the same situation if we inquire into other dimensions of political bodies and political communities, such as a common political space based on communication. The EU communication system, especially its communication regarding various “policies” is evidently very complex – but it is at the same time structured in a very fragmented way. In the truest sense of the word, European communication takes place solely between the members of the political and administrative elite, those who participate directly in European governance or are at least close to it. Another, fairly different, example of European-level communication could be communication within European researches – to which some seem to attach importance in shaping the so-called European “spirituality” or even the European “creed” – and the communicational relations of the different political, cultural and economic dimensions. Indeed, many see this system of communication networks gradually built across Europe – to which an increasing number of national organizations, companies and recently, for the purpose of a better coordination of their activities, social movements and civil organizations connect – as being a gradually developing “civil society” of the EU.

However, I believe this conclusion to be unfounded and hasty. Indeed, as opposed to the common civil societies, very few citizens participate effectively in this one. As there is no common political space above the nations, social movements and groups of voluntaries can rarely exercise their potential to mobilize and act (such as demonstrations, civil disobedience

movements, etc.), and they rely on some “internal” professional help from Brussels in order to make an efficient appearance. Thus, albeit trade unions have been trying for long to coordinate negotiations, talks and strikes, they still haven’t reached some coordination and integration of their efforts at the European level, and they are quite far from reaching it. Generally, their strikes could be seen successful if the national media “amplifies” their sound, and if citizens properly resonate with these sounds in their own countries. In other aspects, the most they could count on is some sort of local answer or one from Brussels or Strasbourg.

Of course, based on the above examples of actions, interactions and communication, we could claim even that some common political space has been created in the EU after all. And similarly to every political space, this one is limited and often exclusive. But even if there is such a thing in the EU, this political space (and communication within) is semi-public at best, as opposed to communication taking place in the political space of democratic states.

If we take as example the government itself, it is striking the main governing body of the EU, the European Council, does not meet, debate and decide publicly as a rule. (The same applies to other Councils consisting of the appropriate ministers of nation-states, operating in the various fields of the political sphere.) Of course, this is a natural consequence of the fact that these are actually intergovernmental bodies. It is therefore a legitimate expectation to see their activities as are seen international talks usually. Yet, as opposed to international talks, the results of the Council’s activity are often determinant for European legislation. And while the Councils, as being formed by members of national governments, indeed may have authorization for the governmental activity and therefore exercise it legitimately, they have no authorization whatsoever to act as legislative bodies. As European governing bodies they do have some legitimacy, but none whatsoever as legislative bodies.

Similarly, the system of communication and networking across Europe is only semi-public. In practice, most information is available solely to experts and specialists. Even if the communication channel is fully public, interpretation and processing of information requires expert knowledge and relations: a possibility to access networks and regular contact with European agencies and the local ministry in charge of EU relations. Not to mention that the communication system is structured in a very fragmented way, certain channels only cover partial areas of the political sphere, and for now,

there is no sign of an integrated communication network that covers all the partial fields which could organize Europe-wide public speech along some defined political agenda.

Thus, it would be more correct to speak of a fragmented information network manageable only by few, targeting the various fields of the political sphere, that operates on European levels and nation-state levels at the same time, than of a common, European, public, comprehensive political space and communication. Beyond all this, a European political space which could integrate and control all these and that could organize the information networks related to the various fields of politics around a standard political agenda, simply doesn't exist. Europeans who are not members of the elite and have limited access to the semi-public European communication networks, only see European politics and EU through the eyes of the national media. Because European media, again, does not exist.

However, one of the main reasons why we cannot speak of a fully public European political space is that social communication is even today of *linguistic* nature primarily. A political community and body is able to maintain a public political space if the "political body" it consists of meets certain linguistic criteria; and a minimum requirement to this is for the language of communication to be comprehensible for everyone. Thus, the question from this perspective is how the EU could tackle the linguistic diversity of its citizens.

Albeit the EU has an official language policy,³⁰ here too, as in so many other aspects, it is worth taking a look at the actual political practice rather than the enounced principles. The European political elite seemingly bridges this troublesome diversity of European language by either relying on translators (especially in case of documents), or by using some *lingua franca*, an intermediary language; most often, it mixes these two solutions. Indeed, pursuant to the official language policy of the EU, the language of each member state is also an official language of the EU. Therefore, in practice the elite members usually resort to English as an intermediary language, but they translate every document into all of the official languages. The latter one normally takes months, and documents are translated into the smaller languages most often by the time the experts have long lost their interest

³⁰ See: Monica Shelley and Margaret Winck (eds.): *What is Europe? Aspects of European Cultural Diversity*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995

for the concerned issue. (Public opinion itself rarely follows up European events.)

Albeit using English as an intermediary language largely facilitates communication between the members of the European elite, the same thing does not apply in case of citizens: the constant translation of information and the related difficulties of passing on information pose serious challenges on the path of a full-value democratic participation. Thus, it is indeed questionable whether a representative government – one that effectively makes civil participation possible – could function efficiently in a multilingual social environment.

Those who see this concern to be unfounded usually contrast it with the counter-example of multicultural and multilingual societies such as Belgium, Canada and especially Switzerland – considering that the latter one has four official languages. However, in the case of Switzerland, political communication between the citizens is based on what we could call “passive multilingualism”. (Even if this multilingualism only covers three large official languages and most often does not include Rhaeto-Romanic, albeit it possesses an official status as well.) The Swiss educational system indeed guarantees at least the comprehension of the other two languages, besides the native language. Theoretically, the Canadian education system functions according to similar requirements, but it is indeed questionable whether the official position of the Canadian government in this matter could stand the test of practice.

Yet, no matter how successful the political practices and educational models targeting multilingualism are, they cannot serve an example for creating the European political space. For most European citizens, even if benefiting from full support from the domestic educational system, no more than one or two foreign languages could become accessible – including English, of course. Obviously, a solution in this situation could only be provided by recognizing English as an official intermediary language, yet such a decision seems hopelessly utopist against the backdrop of cultural and political realities currently dominating the Union, considering also the intention of further expansion.

Assuming of course that this solution would not prove to be insufficient in itself. Indeed, there is something irresistible in our liberal and progressionist illusions about the power of “communication”, an attractive charm which most often prevents us from assessing its power realistically.

We so keenly put a sign of equality between communication and political community, and we keep on quoting Aristotle who, based on the Greek political experiences – called man a speaking and a social being at the same time. Thus, if one of the oldest and most convincing definitions of man presented man to be someone with a *logos*, capable of articulate speech and therefore of political association, then it is legitimate to expect that the increasing number of various communication channels and the global spreading of communicational desires would bind people closer together and extend the sphere of the known forms of human associations.

Nevertheless, this thesis bears some covert ambiguity. Albeit the relation between human speech and human association is very close, it is not symmetrical: the two terms are not synonymous. It was not speech that created community, but the community created and maintains speech. – I believe that we often attach excessive importance to means of communication, especially to the role of intermediary language in creating the common space. If let's say tomorrow we all spoke English, this would not bring us a single step closer to political unity, in my opinion. Israeli and Palestinian delegations usually speak a very acceptable level of English, not to mention Indian or Pakistani diplomats; and still, the common language visibly fails to help them communicate any better. Mutual understanding indeed assumes that the interlocutors are parts of the same political community, or at least they belong to political communities whose political systems and political experiences resemble. And we, the Europeans, already know that even this prerequisite is so far from being sufficient: how many nations have fought each other in Europe, even if their political systems and experiences were similar?

Thus, the common language is only one condition of creating the common political space. It is of at least the same importance – and perhaps, Switzerland serves the most relevant example – to have a common political culture; the common cultural and political field of meanings in which everybody attaches the same meaning to the same phenomenon, and shares the accepted political practices and symbols, and which is based on common institutions and traditions (common history). – Albeit the European nation-states themselves share to some – a very broad – extent a common cultural and historical tradition, they still hosted so very different “cultures”, and what matters most: their political culture largely differs. This cultural diversity resulted in largely differing institutional and justice systems, lead to

striking differences in constitutionality, and concepts of democracy in the first place. Thus, if we take a look around Europe, we see very dissimilar taxation systems, insurance systems, health care services, educational systems and pension systems.

Undoubtedly, the Union, if it wants to create the so very needed common political space, must accept and assert a form of multicultural politics which will be capable of integrating this visible diversity of political cultures, and ensure the common institutional background, as well as the “mutual sympathy” which are indispensable for creating and maintaining the common political space. However, all this time, the EU faces such a troublesome diversity of local and national political cultures and languages that none of the federal systems ever had to tackle.

Albeit our historical experiences show that the federal systems were indeed capable of bearing with the wide difference of their internal institutional and justice systems (and thus, the ideal of federation could bring some hope for the supporters of Europe), it is possible solely if they also have “something” in common, something that keeps them together as political bodies and creates in them the common political space. Thus, if “we, the Europeans” indeed want a republic, even if a federal one (and indeed, no other order than the political order of the republic is possible or desirable if we want liberty for ourselves and for others), then we must focus on an order which makes actual political cohesion possible, and creates a *real* political community, namely by “connecting our feelings for ourselves and for others effectively”.³¹ And, Pierre Manent claims, this is possible only where “people in the given political order have something in common, namely the political order, the political body, the republic which is a *public thing*”: *res publica*. Thus, it is possible solely where citizens truly see and feel that the political order of the republic is theirs.

I am not saying this is unconceivable in Europe today. But I am indeed certain that if there will be one, the order of the European federal republic, as any other republican order, will be limited for emotional and spiritual reasons to being with. We would be able to see and feel that this order is ours only if we clearly see its limits. In other words: we must finally decide who “we, the Europeans” are. We cannot just submit a preferen-

³¹ Pierre Manent: *Politikai filozófia felnőtteknek (Cours familier de philosophie politique)* (Hungarian translation by Péter Kende), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, 330-331.

tial number of communities with different political cultures under the same government. Besides all other reasons, also because commitment to the common order (formerly known as patriotism), this human feeling which Rousseau considered to be “the source of supreme virtues”, could only gain durable strength if it is focused on a particular human community. If we try to extend this feeling to communities of increasingly large numbers, theoretically we could hope for a much more just order, as nobody would be excluded from the order of the republic and liberty, however, this feeling will also gradually lose its intensity: eventually, it will be so weak that it would be unable to create a fairly just and happy association of humans.

Translated by Annamária Ámik

TAMÁS VALASTYÁN

Europe and Modernity.
Europe Interpretations as Proposed
by Kant, Novalis and Nietzsche

Europe – A Synonym for Modernity

Our opinion about Europe and our philosophical approach to it is becoming what Augustine thought about time: if we are not asked what it is, we know it, and if we are asked about it, we don't. But what is actually behind non-asking and asking? If we don't ask about something, it does not necessarily mean that we are not interested in it, not even that we think we know what it is about. The thing is simply surrounded by a tacit surmise, and we are part of this surmise. This is what the Greeks called *doxa*. This doxical notion of Europe, the entity that appears as the subject of surmise, can be defined today roughly as a geopolitical and geographical constitution with a very colorful historical tradition, full of continuities and ruptures. However, if we ask about the thing itself, in our case about Europe as a notion, then we face the problem whether Europe should be construed as a geographical or a geopolitical entity, as the absolute name of a historical space-time of a historical period long gone, or contrarily, as the contingent name of our living world. On the other hand, it is not quite obvious what should be considered as the direction of sense or accumulation point of the multi-faceted conceptuality of Europe. Of course, asking is already a direction and the philosophical direction of inquiry is perspectival, it is aware of its own contingency and its linguistic conditionality.

In this paper, I am identifying the cumulative activity or direction of sense of the philosophical concept of Europe in the unfinished trend of modernity. Europe is the synonym for modernity *pars pro toto*. This Europe concept – Europe as the name of the elements or components of modernity – is, in Gilles Deleuze's words, necessarily processual and modular. This means that it reflects on itself as a process and as a transition. However, another impelling French philosopher, Michel Foucault, considered that

modernity was less of a historical age and more of an attitude:

“by ‘attitude,’ I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an *ethos*.”¹

Two main aspects arise out of the fact that we perceive belonging to the present as a task: the first one is the intensification of the critical activity and the second one is “a patient labor”, “work on our limits”.² More precisely, being European this way means nothing else but a continual openness and readiness for the critical activity to be performed on things, on others and on ourselves.

Immanuel Kant, Novalis and Friedrich Nietzsche offered different interpretations of the processes of modernity, and in particular, of the notion and role of Europe. However, in terms of the ethos of the critical activity and the patient labor on ourselves, they indeed stood on the same ground. In the philosophical modernity discourses, the dual concept of unity and diversity is attached significantly to the notion of Europe: mainly in terms of what it represents as unity and what it refers to as diversity. Is it possible that unity is the structure of the One, of the Whole, shaped, born and rising in many ways out of the womb of metaphysical legacy, while diversity is the critique of unity in the same sense? If we accept this, then Europe today is one of the names of the Platonic tradition which is the political and geo-philosophical embodiment of ontological difference and critical-ironical potential. Metaphysics and the critique of metaphysics *in politics*. At any rate, a reading of the relevant texts of the three above-mentioned authors seems to prove that the concept of Europe as a synonym for modernity is shaped in the cumulative vivacity of unity and diversity. In this regard, we should take a closer look at the notion of antagonism in Kant, to enthusiastic poetical structure and the image of

¹ Michel Foucault: “What is Enlightenment?” (“Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?”), in Rabinow (P), éd., *The Foucault Reader*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 32-50.

² Id.

pluralistic religion in Novalis, and the peculiar asymptote of the *future* European soul in Nietzsche.

Europe's Death

Thomas Bernhard, having deep and many ties to the German philosophical tradition, once wrote:

“fairy tales are over, the fairy tales about cities and states and all the scientific fairy tales, and all the philosophical ones... Europe, the most beautiful, is dead; this is the truth and the reality. Reality... is no fairy tale and truth has never been a fairy tale”³

Europe appears here indeed in a philosophical context which is relevant for several reasons. Reading this necrology of Europe while recollecting Kant allows me to feel that a rather pessimistic reaction to Kant's political teleology can be found in it. Looking at these lines as to a paraphrase of Nietzsche makes Bernhard seem like a worthy fine-tuned radicalization of the ‘dynamite’ philosopher, albeit he didn't share the other one's fairy-tale concept on metaphysical tradition, more precisely, he didn't join Nietzsche in his affirmation on myths: should we point out that speaking of Europe's death after God's death provokes an unfair pain because Nietzsche, in a certain sense, had confidence in the European soul?... But Bernhard thought that that too was gone. Then, if we are listening to Bernhard's words as to a rhyme to Novalis' death vision, we again find a center point of the tension of philosophical thought, because the *death* of Europe as the most beautiful fairy-tale in the universe is actually a negation of Novalis' inverse death myth. Indeed, this way death in Bernhard's thought is not a name or simulacrum of another possibility – as was with Novalis – but the name of a final state, an epitaph.

The situation is even more morbid and absurd – something not at all unusual for Bernhard – as the Austrian author calls this state: existence.

³ Thomas Bernhard, Prize speech on being awarded the Bremen Prize, <http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2011/01/bernhard-austria-prize-comic> downloaded on 17 June 2011.

“Living without fairy-tales is more difficult, which is why it is difficult to live in the twentieth century. Besides, we now do nothing more than *exist*; we don’t live, no one lives any more. But it is lovely to exist in the twentieth century; to move ahead; *whereto?* (...) We are dizzy and cold. (...) We are horrified by the light *out of which our world*, this science world of ours *is from, at once*; we are cold in this light.”⁴

While Novalis lived in the shadow of death, and tried to warm himself at the fire of the sidereal light of this shadow, Bernhard was cold in the boreal existence. While with Kant, the event of death was overcome by the law of nature’s transcendentality, with Bernhard this law fell off the cold fact of Europe’s death and broke into pieces. And Nietzsche’s actual physiological context which constituted the space-time of the future European soul was put in parentheses *en block* by the “more and more terrifying coldness” diagnosed by Bernhard.

But actually what is there in Bernhard’s words from the mid-sixties that seems to disappear and freeze forever?⁵ Did indeed the philosophical force generated in Kant’s, Novalis’s and Nietzsche’s texts vanish in the cold death of Europe as another name for modernity proclaimed by Bernhard? Or contrarily, did the tension distribution of the accumulating force change pace?

⁴ <http://www.thomasbernhard.org/cousineautbintro.shtml>

⁵ The mid-sixties is a peculiar period concerning the contemporary European official, infrastructural and everyday life. Indeed, it represents roughly the middle of the ripening time interval which started with the Schumann statement issued in 1950, and ended – or ended, marking the beginning of another period – with the initiative activity targeting the organization of the European Union in the contemporary sense hallmarked by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Thus, Bernhard’s speech can be seen as a thanatic gesture between the two essential initiatives.

Kant and antagonism

The actual meaning of Kant's transcendental political teleology is that the possibility of existence of human communities is organized according to the model of natural laws. His text entitled *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* is worthy of mention because, so to say, in it, the a priori idea derived idealistically or transformed in the critical abstraction appeared *in politics*. For our purposes, from this political activity that was being organized, or more correctly, was following the rational order of nature in a harmonic manner, I am emphasizing only the idea of antagonism.⁶ In his study, Kant spoke of the development of the destiny of human creatures as a species – that is, not as individuals – as created out of itself and organized by reason; this process, as a “regular progress in the constitution of states”, eventually leads to the political formation of civil unification which respects and intends to validate civil liberty, or, as Kant called it, to the league of nations or union of states.

For Kant to even be able to conceive all this, share his view with others and speak of the “consoling view” of the distant future of this world, and not just hope for another world on the hazy and swampy grounds of “blind chance”, he had to refer his readers back to the heart of his critical philosophy, to the capacity of reason and to the principle that sets the pace and direction of vivacity, namely reasonableness. Without becoming at least reflectively aware of Kant's confidence in the efficiency of the capacity of reason and in the actual (historical) materialization of reasonableness, it would be difficult to tackle this concept in any way whatsoever. And through the reflectivity of this confidence, we can see that reasonableness was an efficient performing act with Kant which made possible the creation of harmony. Kant was often criticized for his distinction regarding the “class of rational beings each of whom dies while the species is immortal”.⁷ The concept considering man as a being of a species, which

⁶ The political philosophical applicability of Kant's “European idea” was discussed most recently by Brigitta Balogh, albeit expressly in the light of Hegel's thoughts on the issue. Cf. Brigitta Balogh: *Hegel kontra Hegel avagy Európa az örök béke és az örök háború között [Hegel versus Hegel or Europe Between Eternal Peace and Eternal War]*. In: Idem: *Talpalatnyi univerzum [A Foothold in the Universe]* (Studies on the practical philosophies of Kant and Hegel). Pro Philosophia, Cluj-Napoca, 2009. 81-82.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1784).

thus tends to ignore the diversity of humans determined in their individual being, carries some un-lifelike force which may overrule the world of small men in the name of the big Man. However, in my opinion we cannot speak of such a thing at the core of Kant's political philosophical concept which is indeed fragmentary and much less elaborate than other subject fields of critical philosophy. Let us see whether there was a movement in Kant's work which created a vivid, mutually supportive connection between these clearly distinguishable formations of unity and diversity. Or, in other words, let us see how unity and diversity were able to organize themselves into a still effective philosophical form *in politics* in the Kantian concept.

Kant's concept of antagonism covers particularly this quality of movement. Indeed, it signifies the tendency to associate and the elementary resistance to it at the same time. This is what the philosopher called unsocial sociability. In fact, this means that inclination to sociability, to associate with others arises from being part of a species, as suggested by the following words: "Man has an inclination to *associate with others*, because in society he feels himself to be more than man, i.e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities."⁸ On the other hand, unsociability, that is, resistance to association with others, is a result of individualization, because – Kant argues – man at the same time has the characteristic of "wishing to have everything go according to his own wish. Thus he expects opposition on all sides because, in knowing himself, he knows that he, on his own part, is inclined to oppose others".⁹ Kant did not intend to eliminate this essential and insoluble contradiction, but rather to maintain it, taking it as basis and appealing to it in elaborating his theory of freedom. According to Kant, the antagonism was not a posterior construction of explanations, it was not a moment of statement, but a par excellence performing act which shaped the pace of the formability of human existence, of the historicity of this forming, and of the linguistic representations about all this.

The concept antagonism as a driver of the theory of liberty has two main components: the space left open for man by creation and to be filled in with political activity and the force that continually stretches and there-

Translation by Lewis White Beck. From Immanuel Kant, "On History," The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963, 14.

⁸ Op. cit. 15.

⁹ Op. cit. 15.

fore stimulates new activities. The existential possibility and functioning mechanism of these two components represent the system of transcendental-metaphysical premises for every civil association, for the “regular progress in the constitution of states”, and *in concreto*, for the “perfectly just civic constitution”, regarding which – Kant suggested – Europe would act as a model also on other continents.¹⁰

The plurality of religion

The study *Christianity or Europe* signed by Novalis stirred quite different reactions in the contemporary and posterior readers. Goethe was appalled by the text, Schleiermacher, whose tractate *On Religion* was actually the main inspirer of Novalis's thoughts, also opposed the Europe discourse, for example because of its uncritical treatment of the papal class. Friedrich Schlegel welcomed the study on Europe, not lastly because their correspondence contributed to the emergence of the idea of Christianity as basis and creative power.¹¹

Wilhelm Dilthey took an ambivalent position, albeit he was more appreciative of Novalis's Christian Europe vision. Without elaborating, Dilthey refers to the fact that this was the first instance where the “real unity of interest” of states, “created by embourgeoisement”, and its holy league organized according to Christian ideology became distinguished most clearly, and also, this latter “concept occurs first in German protestant literature in this rough sketch by Novalis”.¹² Dilthey omitted the fact that at this point Novalis was situated in a sharp contradiction with Kant, who, as we have seen above, considered the cosmopolitan-civic constitution to be the final political goal of historical perfection.

Well, while Dilthey presented the Europe discourse in a highly emphasized initial position, he did comment: “No praise, judgment or explanation

¹⁰ Op. cit. 16, 64. On the political-philosophical applicability of space, see: Alpár Losoncz: *Populista volt-e Arendt? [Was Hannah Arendt A Populist?]* In: László Levente Balogh, Éva Biró-Kaszás (eds.): *Fogódzó nélkül. Hannah Arendt Olvasókönyv. [No Holdfasts. Hannah Arendt Reading Book]* Kalligram, Pozsony, 2008. 213-234. “The secular space is a sphere where liberty may appear and gain visibility” – Losoncz wrote, Op. cit. 225.

¹¹ Cf. e.g.: Novalis' letter to Friedrich Schlegel in Berling, Freiberg, 20 January 1799 [Sunday] (Hungarian translation by István Magyar). In: Péter Bálint (ed.): *Önfaggatások és szembesítések [Cross-examinations and Confrontations with the Self]*. Didakt, Debrecen, 2003. 55.

¹² Wilhelm Dilthey: *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, 192.

can be given here. We couldn't even answer the question to what extent was that a paradox and to what extent it was a conviction –only if we understand Novalis's situation in the philosophical and poetical trends of those ages.”¹³ In fact, the status of this text in Novalis's opus is impossible to decide; it could well be a rough sketch, or a religious or political philosophical metamorphosis of Hardenberg's absolute poetry. Nevertheless, Dilthey's historical-contextual method of inquiry provided an opportunity to consider that the basic nature of the Christian motif – emphasized later by Ranke, as Dilthey pointed out – was explained by the “Islamic advancement”, on the one hand, and it allowed us to situate and rethink the Christian European voice in Novalis, in the “region of poetic dream world”, on the other hand.¹⁴

By intending to reread the Europe discourse as an overt manifestation of Novalis's absolute poetry, I indeed do not mean to ignore the political or religious political weight of the occasional direct comments in the text that referred to its own period. At the same time, I find it much more important and of much bigger hermeneutical relevance to put this direct referential stratum of the study in parentheses, and build on its rich rhetorical structure in order to phrase a few conclusions. “The formal character of this text lies in its similarity to speech, in its rhetorical structure” – Ernst Behler wrote.¹⁵ Based on this, indeed it could be seen as a successful agitating performance of a good political orator or a preacher. However, if we take a look at the rhetorical pattern of the Europe discourse, we can see that it rather looks like a revival of the mature Heinrich's lines from *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. The basic characteristic of the rhetorical pattern of the absolute poetry – which also carries a revolutionary philosophy of history and a religious or spiritual renewal – is that it stages the allegorical-anamorphic movement and pictorial-linguistic representation of unity and breach.

In this system of movements, Christianity did not appear as a form of monotheistic religion, but, if we may say so, as a pluratheistic model. The text never mentioned redemption, for instance; but Novalis spoke of God in the plural number on several occasions,¹⁶ and mentioned the metamorphically allegorized Redeemer, believed to be a true genius, who

¹³ Op. cit. 193

¹⁴ Cf Op. cit. 192, 194

¹⁵ Ernst Behler: *Frühromantik*. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1992. 147.

¹⁶ Novalis: *Christianity or Europe*, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/37340095/Novalis-Christianity-or-Europe>, downloaded on 18 June 2011.

“who, like a true genius, will be at home with men, believed but not seen. He will be visible to the believer in countless forms: consumed as bread and wine, embraced as a lover, breathed as air, heard as word and song, and *as death* received into the heart of the departing body with heavenly joy and the highest pains of love.”¹⁷

Here, this divine corporeal configuration, allegorized and anamorphized as magnificent death, offers us the clearest presentation of Europe’s political, religious and poetical body, represented by unity and diversity.

On the coming European soul

Nietzsche’s thematic visions of Europe fit in his super-evaluating hammer-like philosophical concepts in an organic manner. Europe carried and embodied the reactive values and forces that the philosopher of free spirit destroyed, but it was also the androgen (male-female) body,¹⁸ in or on which “an immense *physiological* process goes on”, expressing the shaping trends of the motional energies of active power.¹⁹ This is what Nietzsche called the shaping of the European process which was specifically asymptotical, that is, “always *coming*”.²⁰ Thus, this notion of Europe implied both that which had to be destroyed and that which destroyed it.

Nietzsche expressed this in various forms and with a multifaceted – political, topographical, musical, etc. – applicability. To take a concrete example, the philosopher’s thought process reads as follows: Europeanization means democratization and the formation of tyrants at the same time:

“the democratizing of Europe will tend to the production of a type prepared for *slavery* in the most subtle sense of the

¹⁷ Op. cit. 6.

¹⁸ See the thoughts on European nations characterized according to the principle of female engendering [Schwangerschaft] and male fructification [Befruchtung] in Fragment 248 of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Friedrich Nietzsche: *Beyond Good and Evil*, Planet Pdf eBook (Trans. Helen Zimmern), 230.

¹⁹ Op. cit. 217.

²⁰ Op. cit. 224.

term: the strong man will necessarily in individual and exceptional cases, become stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been before – owing to the unprejudicedness of his schooling, owing to the immense variety of practice, art, and disguise. I meant to say that the democratizing of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of *tyrants* – taking the word in all its meanings, even in its most spiritual sense.”²¹

In this passage, the so-called intuitive intentionality of the Nietzschean thinking was expressed clearly (also) at the level of active speech. Indeed, it was expressed in a particularly powerful tension which was created between the “I wanted to say” and “also involuntary” idioms. The power potentials of the forces of speech, rhetoric and politics, as well as action were placed side by side and maintained mutually: persuasion and happening. The activity of the will resulted in the reactivity of the merely “it happens”-like unintendedness, and the interesting element in this phenomenon was that a reflected and motivated relationship could be assumed between the figurativeness and rhetoricity of speech, as well as between the real or apparent course of history.²²

Nietzsche’s immense physiological process, interpreted in a specific manner, was actually shaped in a metaphorical, metonymical and synecdochical vivacity with a tropical transitional and comparative function. A geopolitical, migrating, and musical mimicry and assimilative process was taking place, an immense transgression that involved the characteristics of individuals and nations. A complicated net of historical, economic, climatic, geographical and cavernous tropes was being woven and torn, then tied back again.²³ This is the nomadic migration of signs, characteristics and properties, bearing the name Europe. In Nietzsche’s words, the physiological process staged with these exceptionally diverse tropes is nothing else but

²¹ Op. cit. 219.

²² Cf. Paul de Man: *Allegories of Reading*, Yale University Press, 1979.

²³ See e.g. what he wrote about the German spirit or about the differences in musical mentality of the North and South: F. Nietzsche: *Beyond Good and Evil*, Op. cit. 242.

“the process of the assimilation of Europeans, their increasing detachment from the conditions under which, climatically and hereditarily, united races originate, their increasing independence of every *definite* milieu, that for centuries would fain inscribe itself with equal demands on soul and body, ... the slow emergence of an essentially super-national and nomadic species of man, who possesses, physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art and power of adaptation as his typical distinction.”²⁴

The assimilating-transitioning, transgressive movement of Europe as an immense physiological trope could be characterized best, again, based on the mutual relationship between unity and diversity. While “*Europe wishes to be one*” and the “real general tendency of the mysterious labor” of the future European soul points to synthesis, Europe’s soul is multifaceted, it is a fanatic of expression – of course, most intensely through its artists – and is attracted to “all that seduces, allures, constrains, and upsets; born enemies of logic and of the straight line, hankering after the strange, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, and the self-contradictory”.²⁵

Coda

Is Europe dead? Is Europe alive? Does Europe exist? These are questions that each (European) man in each age should ask and struggle to answer, in the Foucaultian sense of the word (interpreting cognition and feeling, actions and behavior in the context of the critical task). Well, what could these authors hope for regarding Europe? That a time would come and there would be a space where the grave, liberating joy of reflection and thought would not be mixed with the guileful white poison of incomprehension and thoughtlessness. Let us share these hopes!

²⁴ Op. cit. 217-218.

²⁵ Op. cit. 246.

BEÁTA KASSAI

The European Cultural Identity

1. Is there a European cultural identity or not?

The first and most important issue is the clarification of the topic regarding the existence or non-existence of the European cultural identity, as well as – if there is one – the identification of its basis. Whether we examine the topic of cultural identity in the context of national states, its definition is a simple task as the knowledge of the common historical past, and the language, traditions and customs, are all elements reflecting the cultural identity, while the individual is born and socializes in their ensemble. As a result, the cultural identity is closely connected to the national identity, and this is also a viable fact (in numerous cases, more than that) when somebody has to live far from his native land, either because of political circumstances, or because of existential or other types of reasons. The experience indicates the fact that in such cases the national and cultural identity becomes more and more intensive, providing the individual with a stable point in the definition of one's personal identity, and this fact often manifests simultaneously with an “over-compensation,” or the exaggerated emphasis of the national and cultural identity, and mostly with their public presentation (manifestation). The definition of the European identity, and implicitly – in its context – of the European cultural identity, represents a special case, as in this case we deal neither with a common language, traditions and customs, nor with a really common historical past, excepting the wars among different states and empires, defined as such. Despite all these, we use expressions such as “common European traditions,” and “European culture,” we consider them relevant in the definition of our own identity. Therefore, we should analyze what these expressions can rely on.

As we had mentioned, the common historical past and language are missing, consequently, the basis must be sought somewhere else. In other cultures, the European man is identified with the white race, Christian religion and its artistic tradition (musical, literary, related to fine arts etc.),

which had become common. Whether we refer strictly to these “criteria,” we cannot consider the descendants of the African immigrants born in France or the Arab Muslim migratory people as European and consequently the adepts of the European culture, which might suggest a rather extremist and discriminatory attitude, it wouldn’t express a “European” point of view at all. That’s because the element, which mostly characterizes that European culture, which we try to acquire, is the diversified and multi-faceted culture, based on liberty and human dignity, on the continuous discourse about this. And if something is based on liberty, in this case there is always the possibility of questioning, deconstructing and reconstructing, while these effects can be noticed in “our common culture.”

“*The European culture is militant, pluralist and diversified*” – states Ágnes Heller, who relies her statements regarding the militant nature of Europe on the wars fought by different European states during the history, and her conclusion referring to pluralism and diversity on the fact that there is no other basic element the European identity can rely on than liberty. The possibility of differences also derives from this fact: “*The European identity started concomitantly with the assertion of differences, the differentiation of the culturally accepted languages, by means of the conscious variations, produced in the context of the artistic even philosophical styles. [...] The European culture ... is a continuous discourse about the European culture,*” as “*Europe represents the sum of stories about Europe.*” (Heller, 1997)

What kind of stories do we tell about Europe? To what extent is culture, in its modern sense, or the “high culture” transmitted as heritage to the future generations? These topics are studied by John Gross when he examines the European cultural identity together with the historical memory.¹ According to Gross, the historical memory is a factor producing the identity, more exactly, it is not oriented towards the past, but rather to the future. This doesn’t certainly mean the relativization of the past. The author thinks that the moral duty of any nation consists in its respect for its historical past, as well as its transmission as heritage to the next generations. This heritage also includes, besides the national past, the European cultural identity. According to the author, in all this process focused on the

1 See John Gross: “Knocking about the ruins. The feature of the European past.” In: *The New Criterion*. Vol. 15, No. 4. 1996 Dec. 28–42. In his study, Gross presents, while taking England as an example, the close connection between two important elements of modernity, the historical imagination and identity.

transmission and production of identity, the most serious danger is expressed by globalization, as this can drive to the loss of historical memory in the case of the European man, who will no longer pay the same importance to the historical past, or to the preservation of traditions, thus culture itself is going to experience a certain decay. However, the loss of historical memory means the loss of culture. (Gross, 1996) Gross uses the notion of culture in its so-called “anthropological” acception, emphasizing its ethnocentric character, as underlined by Ágnes Heller in the already specified work.² The notion of “anthropological” culture is identical with national culture. A European, whose cultural identity is based on liberty, can decide to ignore his own culture by replacing it with another one anytime he wishes. His liberty consists in this fact too. And because the European culture is based on liberty, anybody, regardless of his national affiliation, geographical placement, his level of knowledge regarding the language etc., can make this choice. And the identification with culture also creates the European identity in individuals. The essential question is the following one: Does anyone want to identify with the European culture, and to what extent, if he does?³

As a result of globalization, nowadays most of the people (especially those belonging to the younger generations) rather identify with the American and West-European culture. Yet globalization is specific, it also induces contradictory processes. It is enough for us to only follow the intensification of the national conscience in the most general, publicly European way of thinking in order to notice the localizing character, which can be, undoubtedly, interpreted as a process opposing to the process of globalization. Similarly, on the European continent (and the others), one can also observe the presence of integration and fragmentation, centralization

² In her essay named “Európai identitás, modernitás és történelmi emlékezet / European identity, modernity and historical memory” (In: *Lettre International*, the Hungarian edition, Autumn, Vol. 26. 1997. www.c3.hu/scripta/lettre26/heller.htm), Ágnes Heller formulates her reflections regarding the study of John Gross, by gradually examining his assumptions concerning the European cultural identity, the historical imagination and the effect of the American culture on Europe.

³ The third part of the present work approaches the cultural identification generally, yet the actuality of the theme is also indicated by the fact that the everyday press furnishes a great deal of articles related to it. The study of the measure of this identification is firstly justified by the religious pressure, yet the deficient knowledge of the language, especially in the case of migratory people, is also a problem.

and decentralization, homogenization and heterogenization. (Rostoványi, 1999) Furthermore, these contradictory processes are amplified by the mass-media too. The mass-media, especially the news programs, provide immediate information about almost all the important (or considered like that) events. The task of the receiver is to select and interpret the news, which gets more and more difficult in the avalanche of news, he does not have the time to process the information, as he gets newer and newer information all the time. And, undoubtedly, the quantity is to the detriment of quality given the fact that – as we had already noticed in the communication of teenagers nowadays – the dialogues are limited to simple sentences, abbreviations, words composed of abbreviations, which also damage the complex role of the production of identity, owned by means of culture, or they simply suggest another dimension of this role.

Zsolt Rostoványi thinks that the supranational unions should not be afraid of globalization since – in spite of the fact that the national identity will keep decreasing – the “*cultural identities connected by the actors situated «above» the nations and «under» nations*” are going to become stronger. That’s because globalization does not destroy the regional, national or local identities, but constructs some new ones to replace these. Therefore, globalization modifies the local identities qualitatively, yet it does not eliminate them. According to Rostoványi: “*Multiculturalism extends more and more, yet this cannot have the effect of exclusion, only the one regarding the acceptance and toleration of alterity.*” (Rostoványi 1999 b: 39) There has been more than a decade since the publication of Rostoványi’s work and the situation he refers to has been more and more complicated. Due to its main characteristics mentioned above, the European culture is capable of tolerating and intercepting other cultures yet, as the historical and actual (political and sociological) experience proves, only if this fact does not go beyond a certain limit. When a minority had already demanded more rights to exist according to its own identity than the state (or, in the case of migratory people, the adoptive state) thinks that it should provide when the conflicts intensify (see, for instance, the present situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia). These conflicts can be solved only and exclusively by means of the political agreement. And in this sense we find examples in Europe. At the beginning of the 90s, for example, there were a powerful repugnance and attitude of exclusion regarding the Hungarians from Romania, expressed by the Romanian population. This fact was also political as during the previous period of time the simple people used to live (more) peacefully together, regardless of the

language they were speaking or their culture. Of course, it is important to mention that historical turning point too, which had provided the basis of this conflict, as it is about the period of time in which the states belonging to the former communist bloc are set free from the bonds of the totalitarian social and political system, consequently they begin to think in the democratic context. And the agitated atmosphere had also stirred animosities. During the last twenty years this situation had changed radically. Today someone, who utters something in Hungarian in a Romanian locality, must not be afraid of physical or verbal atrocities because of this; he does not have to go to Hungary if he wishes to attend the high-school or academic courses in Hungarian etc. The positive example signals the fact that the political treaties, the harmonizing treaties, and the common cultural and scientific programs can produce benefic transformations at all the levels of the society regarding the approach of the problems occurred.

2. The cultural policy of the EU and its afferent directives

As follows, we shall take a look at the stages emphasizing the elaboration of the cultural policy of the European Union. The general historical retrospective refers only to the most important moments of the process, without aiming to offer a detailed general image.

After the Second World War, the national states in Europe could be motivated by means of the democratic perspective and economic progress to choose the integration, which was firstly economic, not cultural. The objective of the European Economic Community was the common trade, the common agrarian policy, the legislative harmonization, and the free circulation of the capital and labour, as this union truly becomes more competitive than the national states during the previous periods of time.

In 1954 they founded the European Cultural Convention, which laid the basis of the European cultural activity. The Convention confirmed the decision regarding the cultural collaborations of the Council of Europe, yet there were no concrete measures in this respect. Later, in 1970 and 1974, at the UNESCO conferences from Venice and Helsinki, they held some negotiations at the ministerial level regarding the cultural collaborations among the member states, whose final objective was the creation of a common supra-national cultural background. Despite all these, the main role of the cultural collaboration, needed in the creation of democratic and

stable relationships, was emphasized only in 1993, at Vienna, at the main meeting of the presidents and Prime-Ministers in the context of the Council of Europe.

Yet they also took other measures in the meantime. In 1973 they elaborated a report concerning the European identity, whose idea was based on a conception, "Europe's civilians," formulated by the Belgian Prime-Minister, Leo Tindemans, who had militated for the necessity of the firstly cultural and educational solidarity among the member states. At mid-80s, the issue was approached again by the so-called Adonnio Board, yet neither the initial conception, nor its reconsideration drove to concrete results. However, in the context of the union, they had highlighted the necessity for a cultural policy of the member states to be added with a common "basic norm" in the domain of cultural policy. In this sense, the European Parliament had urged the member states to perform a more intense common activity in the cultural area. The Single European Act, signed in the 80s, proved that culture had to compel recognition in the circumstances of the unitary market. In 1985, the ministers in culture launched a program, the Cultural Town of Europe, which already represented a concrete result of the previous treaties. During the same period of time, they start organizing more cultural events, such as the European competition for sculptors or the organization of the audiovisual exhibitions reflecting the European culture in external countries. In 1987, the Council of Europe decides the translation of books, the very special works organically connected to the European culture. In 2000, the Board of Ministers, associated with the Council of Europe, adopted a document, "*Declaration about the cultural variety*," in which they state that, through the peaceful cohabitation and the concern for the cultural customs and traditions, they manifest and express the cultural variety and differences. In the document they also emphasize the importance of the cultural policy, which can contribute to the preservation of diversity.

The concrete objectives of the European cultural policy are defined by Article 128. of the Maastricht Treaty (later, in 1997, by Article 151. of the Amsterdam Treaty). According to these, the Union must support the preservation of national cultures so that they should not encroach the respect for the other national or regional cultures. Subsequently, the slogan, which had become the motto of the EU, "Unity in diversity," derived from this objective which assumes a multicultural yet unitary union. According to Article 151., the Community must encourage the collaboration among the member states and, according to necessities, they must complete the activity

in the following domains: the popularization of the knowledge regarding the European culture and history, the protection of the cultural patrimony, the stimulation of the cultural exchange, the support of the artistic and literary creation (including the audiovisual sector). In order to fulfill these objectives, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe adopts stimulating measures in the process of co-decision. (Horváth, 2001)

By excluding the judicial harmonization, the cultural policy refers only to the launching of programs and initiatives, thus the member states can stay independent in this domain. The task of the EU is the facilitation of collaboration. In their turn, the member states care about their sovereignty at this level, an idea also indicated by the fact that the initiatives are elaborated after the decisions are taken by means of an agreement. The task of the community programs is to facilitate the cultural agreements with a larger scale of action, the multiannual ones (cultural networks, partnerships), as well as the projects and symbolical initiatives in their context.⁴

One of the most successful actions of the community programs developed among the member states is the *Rute Culturale Europeene* project, launched in 1987. Its objective is to express the European identity visually, by emphasizing the diversity of cultures, to intensify the cultural exchange and cooperation among regions and nations. The program highly contributes to the development of cultural tourism, as it urges the European citizens to discover those ways which supported the formation of the European identity. The already established routes can be grouped around some artistic, theological, philosophical and technical themes evoking the origins of the European civilizations. The program aims to highlight the European common cultural identity. Each way has a distinct profile, the route is proposed by the national authorities of the involved countries, which in their turn take the advice of the local and regional organs, of the local cultural institutions.⁵

⁴ <http://www.euro.hu/pages/almenugenerator.asp?submenu=34&kategoria=22#5>

⁵ http://www.culture-routes.lu/php/fo_index.php?Ing.

3. Inclusion and/or exclusion

As we had seen, the European Union does not have a common cultural policy, necessarily viable in all the member states; starting with the Maastricht Treaty, culture is declaratively a competence of the member states. Moreover, the cultural activity of the Union has developed for only a decade and a half. Declaratively, the basis of the European cultural identity is defined by the following articles, which can be strongly considered as its foundation, which every member establishes its own cultural policy on:

“The nation is based both on the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, rights, and on the respect for the human rights. These values are shared by the member states in a society defined by pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination.”

(Article I. 2. of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union)

According to this article, the member states define their cultural identity themselves – taking the measure of cultural identification into account – their connection to their own minority group and their migratory people. In the context of the Union there are the so-called *indifferent* countries (France, for instance), where the strategy is represented by indifference, which is equally exclusive, yet there are also the so-called *neutral* countries (England, for example), in which the attitude of equal inclusion is the characteristic one. However, the categorization of countries is no longer that simple if we study the topic from more concrete viewpoints. Regarding the migratory people, in the member states most of the pressure is caused by the fact that the language and religious “differences” are not known. There are more and more politicians (for example, Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel, David Cameron and others) who emphasize the failure of the multicultural dream in the European Union. They see the cause of the phenomenon not in the intolerant or discriminative attitude of the adoptive state at all the levels, but in the migratory people’s references. Most of the politicians and nations they represent (this majority is justified by sociological studies) agree that cultures can’t be correlated, approached in the same way, as expected in a multicultural society. The migratory people (and, in some cases, the minorities choosing the voluntary isolation) are not willing to assimilate the culture of the adoptive country, they do not even want to learn the language (although, from their viewpoint, they might have more practical advantages), they are not inclined to respect the religion of the

adoptive country either. The last aspect can be explained from more points of view. Let's just take one single example: in Europe there are more and more Muslim immigrants and we think their number is going to keep growing. The phenomenon can be explained, on the one hand, through demographic reasons, and on the other hand, it is caused by the radicalization of the conflicts in the Arabian states. The majority of the Muslim immigrants is inclined towards the cultural integration, yet only if this fact does not harm the laws of their faith. A Muslim, who trusts his faith and beliefs, can't obey a Christian, whom he considers faithless, regardless of the latter's social position. This is what he learns from the holy book of his religion, the Koran ("*Don't listen to the faithless ones, and fight with him against them, in continuous fight!*", the Koran 25,52)⁶ Starting from this statement, we can also notice that although a Muslim, who trusts his beliefs (even a fundamentalist one), can consider himself European from many perspectives, can even identify with the European culture, his option is put in brackets when it is about the religious tolerance. In the Muslim culture the religious identity is the supreme value, which is also a permanent source of pressure in the future, as while the European culture, based on liberty, tolerates the Muslim religion, for example, the latter does not tolerate Christianity, the dominant religion on this continent. Some researchers consider this theory an element stirring useless fears, like Hellyer: "*During the latest 10-15 years, most of the Europeans have undergone a serious crisis of identity, while there were very many immigrants among them who, in exchange, were endowed with an extremely powerful identity conscience. Those occidentals who were not capable of dealing with this crisis feel that the Muslims aim to destroy their civilization.*" (Hellyer, cited by Arató, 2010)⁷ I personally do not agree with Hellyer's opinion and state – counting on the incidental example – that the two cultures (the Christian and Muslim ones) can be reconciled, and this fact will keep being an obstacle in the integration of immigrants.⁸

⁶ The *Koran*. Translation by George Grigore. <http://altafsir.com/ViewTranslations.asp?Display=yes&SoraNo=1&Ayah=0&Language=20&LanguageID=2&TranslationBook=12>

⁷ Dr. H. A. Hellyer is a well-known socio-political writer and analyst, an international specialist of the Muslim communities in the Occident.

⁸ I do not say that there is no solution for the peaceful cohabitation, but that there will always be religious conflicts between the two cultures; one of the causes of this fact is that both religions declare their exclusiveness, yet while Christianity tolerates the practice and principles of the Muslim religion, this does not happen in the other context.

In the national states of Europe the emphasis of national identity is more and more intense. Besides the fact that the European civic status suggests a number of advantages both politically and economically, for the citizens in most of the member states – a fact noticed in the methods applied to solve the economic crises too – the gain of independence is more and more striking regarding the culture and civilization. The intensification of the conscience of national identity, after (or during) an economic crisis or problem, does not represent something new, as there are numerous historical examples revealing the reasons of this phenomenon. However, what is new in this respect, even in the present modern democracy, is the combination of the national and religious identity in an ideology (see the Hungarian right extreme, the Muslim fundamentalism etc.).

Not even the regions of the European Union represent a unitary platform: the necessity of dissensions is more powerful – especially because of some historical and political abuses –, than that of cohesion. The question is whether the role of regions in the ensemble of the connections between the national and European identity can be modified, and if that is possible, in what way.

In order to understand the basis of the amplification of the conscience of national identity, I believe we must examine – by avoiding the common places and stereotypes – the environmental, religious, ethnic specific features in order to create – at least theoretically – the possibility of a real discourse among the national cultures. (I am using the notion of culture in the most comprehensive interpretation)

Seyla Benhabib states that in any national states there are groups which the majority society does not accept. This non-acceptance imposes interesting questions: does this mean the support/tolerance of those thinking in this way, do they live according to other customs, or their conscious non-inclusion, instinctive or conscious cultural exclusion? One of the main elements of the European identity might be the cosmopolitanism which, according to Benhabib, is compatible with pluralism only whether three conditions are fulfilled: the egalitarian reciprocity, the right to self-definition (religion, culture), and the liberty both to belong and leave that group. (Benhabib, 1996) All these should not represent a problematical matter in the community of some states organized on some modern democratic basis, yet they are. The proper question is: what happens to the status of immigrants, their civic rights and religious tolerance? To what extent should,

for instance, the measure regarding the process of inclusion (acceptance) extend in the case of an immigrant? Can the necessity of security and safety mix up with the religious tolerance in the case of a migratory member who expresses fundamentalist conceptions in an open way? What kind of judicial and political means does the European Union have in the context of inclusion and exclusion?

Fukuyama believes that the process of history is determined by the dispute among people, carried out for the sake of acknowledgement (appreciation). The final point of this conflict is a State form, which creates a social context, to satisfy the essential and most profound needs of mankind. According to Fukuyama, this form of government is nothing but the liberal democracy which, for the benefit of its citizens, assures the highest degree of liberty, compared to the previous political systems. As a result, the end of history means the end of the conflict among contradictory ideologies, not the end of mankind's history, Fukuyama uses history as a notion referring to the progress of mankind towards modernity. Consequently, his expression, "the end of history," suggests that modernity has reached its ultimate goals, as the liberal democracy and capitalism had been created, history (the process of progress) had reached its objectives, development is no longer needed.

Yet, when he stated this, Fukuyama still believed that the liberal democracy was going to spread all over the world, as the most appropriate political regime, the nations and national states were not going to involve in disputes regarding great ideas and concepts, while the people were supposed to be preoccupied with the topics referring to the post-modern era: the economic, technical, scientific issues, and the experiments to solve the problems. (Fukuyama, 1994)⁹

According to one of the notorious statements in the book, the millions of immigrants from the underdeveloped sides of the world vote with

⁹ In his book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (the Hungarian edition: the Európa Publishing House, Budapest, 1994), Fukuyama writes about his theory and emphasizes that the liberal democracy had brought the end of history with it, however in his subsequent writings (such as, for example, *Our posthuman future. The consequences of the biotechnological revolution*. The Hungarian edition: the Európa Publishing House, Budapest, 2003, transl.: Tomori Gábor) he denies these ideas. Today he rather states, rendering justice to his critics, that history can't end when in the domain of natural sciences and technology the process of development continues, as this fact brings newer and newer challenges in politics and the political regimes.

their feet when they look for a new country in one of the occidental societies. According to Fukuyama, migration represents the justification of a personal theory – as the philosopher assumes – given the fact that the immigrants choose their own country exactly because the liberal democracy provides them with the best possibility to be successful in life. Moreover, the progress recorded by democracy and the free market, for example in the regions of eastern or southern Asia or Latin America, seemed to certify his hypothesis too. Fukuyama states that in this process one can notice that the organizational principles of democracy and the free market are promoted intensely in the world, as neither the liberal democracy nor capitalism is provided with theoretical or practical alternatives. Fukuyama also states – a fact I polemically relate to – that the immigrants are trying hard to be assimilated by the occidental societies' system of values by identifying the liberal democracy with their unique guarantee of success in life.¹⁰

According to Fukuyama's theory, the immigrants vote with their feet when they select their place of residence in countries where the occidental liberal democracy is settled. What does their vote really refer to? Is it really about the acceptance of liberal democracy, or they are motivated by the assurance of their existence and the possibility of a much easier way of life? Does the acceptance of formalities and ostentatious facts also express the annulment and transformation of identity, connected to one's personal civilization? To what extent is an immigrant loyal to the political regime, and the constitution and customs of the adoptive country, and when does that identity overlap all these aspects related to civilization (using this notion in the interpretation of Huntington)?¹¹

¹⁰ In the meantime, Fukuyama had also reconsidered this theory, and noticed the failure of multiculturalism and the influence of the fundamentalist Islamism in the European societies. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama: *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (the Hungarian edition: the Európa Publishing House, Budapest, 2007, transl.: Somogyi Pál László).

¹¹ Huntington's most well-known work, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, was published in 1996, as a detailed presentation of his article, published with a similar title in 1993 in the American magazine *Foreign Affairs*, stirring a huge controversy. Both the article and the book analyze the political and ideological situation after the cold war, distributing the nations in eight blocks of civilization. The author thinks that in the future these civilizations will share permanent disputes, creating the new world order.

Criticizing the theory regarding the “end of history” formulated by his disciple, Fukuyama, Huntington draws the conclusion that we have to deal with the formation of a new world order. In this sense, the turning point is represented by the end of the cold war, after which the various religions and cultures grouped in civilizations. From the perspective of the author, the notion of civilization suggests:

“Accordingly, the civilization is the cultural high-leveled organization of people, while also being the largest level of cultural identity, making abstraction of those characteristics which make it more different than other races. [...] A civilization can be defined objectively, on the one hand, by means of common elements such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and subjectively, on the other hand, through the self-identification of people. [...] Civilization is our largest «we»; in this context we are overwhelmed by the sensation of cultural familiarity, we make ourselves more different than all the other people.” (Huntington, 1998: 53)

Thus the rules of the new world order are no longer provided by the politics of the national states, but by cultural identities. Moreover, people also subordinate the policy concerning the definition of their own identity.

Huntington distinguishes eight civilizations: the Chinese, Japanese, Hindi, Islamic, the Orthodox Christianity, the occidental Christianity, the one in Latin America and the African one. These civilizations include more countries, nations and ethnic groups, and their borders are not similar with the country borders. Therefore it is possible for a country to be traversed by a rupture line among civilizations, such as Ukraine, whose eastern part is related to the Orthodox Christianity, and western one, to the occidental civilization.¹² The conflicts are going to be the most significant along the rupture line, which means we should also expect conflicts in the contexts of some countries too.

12 Huntington also distributes the civilizations in sub-categories such as: member states, nucleus states (the dominant state, which is not present in each civilization), split states (traversed by a rupture line among civilizations, such as Ukraine), solitary states (for example, Japan or Haiti) and seceding states (states which transform the civilization, for example, Turkey – from an Islamic to an occidental one, or from an occidental into an Islamic one). In the global policy of civilizations the conflicts of the nucleus states and the rupture line type wars are significant. The author states that until the end of the 20th century they develop more and more centres in power (for example, the Saudite Arabia, Iran, Algeria), which compete against each other, yet not because of economic or political interests, but because of more and more powerful religious divergences.

By polemizing with Fukuyama, Huntington believes that the occidental liberal democracy is not going to spread all over the world, yet we have to prepare for the fact that the cultures and civilizations based on different thus incompatible values will always be in competition, they will always share a permanent conflict. The fundamental cause of these conflicts is that different cultures and civilizations think differently about essential elements such as man's place in the world, the relationship between divinity and man, the connection between the individual and the group, or man and woman, they associate more and more contents with a great deal of notions such as liberty, right, obligation, responsibility, power etc. And these differences can't be annulled, therefore the conflicts and – in certain cases – armed altercations will be inevitable in future too, as numerous examples in history indicate. According to Huntington, the future will be also defined by this, not through the fight of great ideologies.

"I assume that in this new world the main source of conflicts does not mainly have an ideological or economic character. The immense discrepancy, which divides the mankind and the conflictual source, is going to be cultural. The national states will preserve their decisive role in the world policy [...], yet the latter will be determined by the conflict among civilizations. The rupture lines among civilizations will develop in the front lines of future." (Huntington, 1993: 34)

Although, unquestionably, the civilizations had experienced transformations during the history, influencing each other, we can't assume – Huntington states –, that a global civilization might develop once. Its impossibility is given by that indissoluble antithesis, which is connected to the conception about world and mentalities, preserved among civilizations.

As a result, we wonder if the creation of the European "artificial" identity above the national states is possible, connecting them in a way, without dealing with these latent inner problems as relevant and approached by the community. What kind of chances are there to strengthen the European identity by means of a certain inclusion, the "preservation through cancellation" of national identity, so that the conflict management should not raise unlikely questions politically or legally?

By examining these issues we might better understand the interpretation and practical approach of the European cultural identity and, in this context, the reglementation of inclusion and exclusion.

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ZOLTÁN ZAKOTA

Region, Regionalism, Regionalization

The approach of terms

Region and *regionalism* represent notions used with multiple meanings, in different domains such as geography, political and administrative sciences, European studies, with special connotations even in the methodology of socio-human sciences. The *region* term is currently used in the analysis, planning or administration of various programs at different levels: national, international or sub-national. *Regionalism* is the ideological correspondent of the concept, designating the identity related to a certain region, with numerous historical, political, social and cultural connotations.

The *region* word derives from the Latin *regio*, *regionem*, indicating the direction, limit, district, country; implicitly, the cognate *regere* means to direct, to rule [OED]. In the context of social sciences, the *region* term designates a contiguous area, which is homogeneous from the perspective of the selected criteria of definition, which can be differentiated by the neighbour regions on the basis of those criteria [EB]. It represents a mental construct created through the selection of some relevant properties in a private matter and the rejection of some others, considered irrelevant. The frontiers of the region are determined by the homogeneousness and contiguity of the accomplished selection.

The *region* notion can be limited under no circumstances, at least not according to the actual acceptations, to the simplistic idea of a technical category emphasizing a certain type of prefabricated container, a place of some social processes whose actors are represented by simple individuals. It is rather an expression of some spatio-temporal connections and societal structures as a result of a process suggesting an organic development. The space itself is, from the perspective of regionalism, a social construct provided with a material basis (nature, economy...) and a symbolical dimension. The ways in which it is understood, organized and used are determined by the social action or, if formulated in a much easier way, the space repre-

sents a social product. The region is an abstractization of the connection between the individual action and the social structure, a category provided with an explicit collective dimension, representing the institutional practice, and implicitly the history of the region, which in the everyday life appears in the form of some symbols that all the inhabitants of the region are familiar with.

Considered a spatial structure, the region can be *nodal*, highlighting a discrete and discontinuous character, when the defining phenomenon is organized around a centre, or *uniform*, emphasizing a continuous character, when this is distributed homogeneously in the context of the region. The region can be defined in the terms of a single or more characteristics, or can be approached in the light of the complexity of the human existence within the delimited perimeter. The most frequently used criteria are the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, climatic or topographic, urban industrial or rural and agricultural ones, the economic specialization, the administrative units and the international political zones.

Given the fact that it is also provided with a temporal dimension, the region can be perceived as a process which, once developed, is continuously reproduced, with gradual transformations, by means of individual and institutional practice. Approached at a given moment, the region can be interpreted as a temporal section, a “snapshot” of the society’s historical, cultural, economic development. The region is a form of the society’s long-term institutional organization (*long durée*). One of the most renowned researchers in the domain, Anssi Paasi, also emphasizes that the process concerning the construction of regions and territories is related to a continuous transformation of the spatial system, a process he names the *institutionalization of the region*. This process is meant to provide the territorial unit with a well-defined status in the spatial structure, according to which it can be identified in the political, economic, cultural and administrative practice. He makes an analytic distinction of the four simultaneous aspects of the process:

- the territorial formation,
- the symbolical formation,
- the institutional formation,

– the substantiation of the region as an entity in the spatial system and the social conscience of the social group in question.

Classifications

Paasi also constructs a system of classification structured on more levels suggesting different interpretations of the term meant to clarify all the aspects connected to its usage [Paasi 2000]:

- *the pre-scientific concept* of the region: the region is understood as a practical choice of a given space, accomplished without any profound analysis; it is a context of research, yet it has no special function in its definition;

- *interpretations based on disciplines:*

- the region as *object*: an interpretation which is specific to the geography of the landscape (*Landscape / Landschaft*), at the very outside it is regarded as a “living” organism;

- the region as a *landscape painting* (*Landschaftsbild*): typical in the landscape studies;

- the region as an *instrument of formal classifications*: the regions are used as methodological tools in the classification of natural or cultural phenomena, facilitating the creation of some divisions based on one or more natural or cultural characteristics;

- the region as an *instrument of functional classifications*: the regions are used to describe the functional spatial structures of the society, especially to express the relationships between the centre and the outskirts;

- the region as a *community*: it marks endemical spatial units, in the way people perceive them;

- the region as a *perceptual unit*: it marks spatial units constructed by researchers, relying on the perception of some subjects;

- *the critical conceptions* of the region:

- the region as a *constituent of the living context* (*Lifeworld*): it denotes a humanistic interpretation, which starts with the human experience, emphasizing the perspective of those situated „in the inside;”

- the region as a manifestation of the *accumulation of capitals*: it is a Marxist interpretation of the term, usually emphasizing the inequitable spatial development;

- the region as a *place of social practice*: it underlines the role of the region as a medium of social interactions;

- the region as a *contingent historical process*: it is regarded as a dynamic category in a perpetual evolution;

- *the historical regions*: spatial units seen as the result of social and

cultural processes, which had become the constituent parts of the territorial system; they persist for a while not only in the social practice and discourse, but also in the cultural one, then they vanish in the regional transformations which keep developing.

In politics and the political theory, the *region* term is usually used with two meanings:

- a step in the administrative structure of a state, situated between the central and local levels, practically an intermediary administrative unit of the territory;

- an entity created by more states, or parts of some states, by means of which they cooperate to reach some mutual objectives, usually relying on the existence of some mutual traditions.

The regional structure of a state can be analyzed from more viewpoints [Petschen 1993]:

1. the district point of view:

- *natural region*: a category based on strictly geographic notions;

- *economic region*: defined on the basis of some economic characteristics and potentialities;

- *sociologic region*: a territory containing a societal unit provided with distinctive characteristics;

- *administrative region*: a territorial unit defined by the subordination to a system of external political conditions;

2. the synthetic point of view:

- *the region, as an object of territorial arranging*: this is a global concept, which takes the region from all viewpoints (human, economic, technical, town-planning, etc.) into account;

- *the political region*: as an intermediary territory between the state-controlled and local levels – in order to reach this phase, the region must have an autonomous power of decision;

3. the structural point of view:

- a. the regions of the deconcentrated state*: the region owns powerfully limited competences;

- b. the regions of the decentralized state*: the region is defined by the centralized administration;

- c. the federative regions*: they have their own constitution in the context of the federal constitution.

Lately, given the process of globalization and the transformations

induced by the European extension, one may notice some accentuated mutations in the role and functioning of the regions, they become decisive factors in the economic, political, social and cultural life, giving up their status as territorial and geographic entities and adopting the one of social constructs. Consequently, their borders rather represent the geometric place of some zones of contact and exchange among different social practices [Böröcz 2002]. Thus, the notion of regionalization itself gives up the “classical” connotation suggesting the spatial and territorial organization, it gets a more general meaning. Benedek József draws our attention to the fact that the *space* is a relative notion which can be operated only through a process of regionalization, by delimiting some regions and their analysis. He proposes more types of approach [Benedek 2000]:

- *the normatively formal regionalization*: it refers to the institutional network of regionalization; the most suggestive example from this viewpoint is represented by the administrative territorial distribution of a state;

- *the symbolically informal regionalization*: a regionalization which develops at the level of collective mentality, of the subjects, highlighting a pronounced cultural group character;

- *the positive scientific regionalization*: it refers to the regionalization practised in the context of science and spatial structures obtained in this way.

Investigations and results

Whether, not long ago, the regions were considered stable entities, bounded by natural borders, modelled by the economic compulsions of the productive process, making up the country of some groups provided with some temporary cultural identity, at present they are rather seen as open constructs, undergoing the process of transformations. Jorge Tuñón proposes, for the study of this dynamic complex, a context with four approach dimensions, from the perspectives of four different groups of social sciences, which are still juxtaposed to a certain degree [Tuñón 2010]. These are the following ones:

- the theories of international connections;
- the urban geography and sociology;
- the economy and economic sociology;
- the political disciplines and political sociology.

The topic regarding the region and regionalism practically invades the area of international connections after the end of the Cold War. Although after the Second World War one notices the continuous presence of a powerful globalizing trend, it appears that regionalization is a characteristic which is at least as conspicuous as in the case of the decades following the decay of communism. It is the start of an impressive number of inter-governmental and trans-national regional institutions provided with a real power of decision. Without any doubt, the most elaborated one is the European Union, however we are aware of some functional examples, even if more extended from the perspective of their surface, in many other places in the world. These are mostly some zones dealing with the free trade, yet they're also provided with some real power in the political domain such as: the North America Free Trade Area – NAFTA and its South-American (MercadoComúndel Sur – MERCOSUR) and Latin-American counterparts (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración – ALADI), the Association of the Nations in the South-East of Asia (Association of South EastAsianNations – ASEAN) or the African Economic Community of the states belonging to the African Union (African Economic Community – AEC).

Seen in the reconsidered form of the new regionalism, we notice a spectacular increase of the number of models and the intensity of regional interactions. The novelty of this concept, as George Howard Joffé states in his foreword, „*Regionalism – A New Paradigm?*” [Teló 2007], consists in its potential to represent an alternative of the hegemonic stability defining its forerunning global context. Thus the region becomes the context of activity both at the state and superstate levels. Without bringing the existence of the state and its associated cultural specific features forward, regionalism connects the states to each other through their voluntary derogation from the complete exercise of sovereignty, into a collective economic project, which can continue, if the states in question wish that, by means of a political project, so that the community can seize upon a significant economic and political autonomy in the context of the structures created by the economic globalization.

One of the key subjects of regionalism is its connection to globalization. The “classical” approach is related to Immanuel Wallerstein and is connected to his attempts to explain why the process of modernization has long-term yet diverse effects. In his famous *world system* he parcels the world in four large regions: the centre, semi-outskirts, outskirts and the external

zones [Wallerstein 1974]. Two decades after the appearance of the model, Kenichi Ohmae writes about the inevitable undermining of the nation-state and the rise of the regional economies as a result of the process of continuous integration of the global economy [Ohmae, 1996]. The main arguments are, on the one hand, a certain flexibility of the regional structures from the perspective of economic scalability, and on the other, the more reduced fixation, compared to the nation-state, onto the issue of population and borders. Admitting that the regions, which broke loose from the equitable control, mainly from the national redistribution, can be more productive, Eric Kaufmann, a sociologist at London School of Economics and Political Science, reproaches Ohmae with the fact that he proposes no alternative method for the preservation of fairness, more exactly, for the reduction of the afferent social costs.

Gordon MacLeod presents the urban and regional renewal and writes about the increasing interest in the contemporary re-territorialization of the activity of political economy, through which the regional level becomes the functional space dedicated to the economic planning and political governing [MacLeod 2001]. Brenner draws our attention to the possibilities provided by the constructivist perspective in order to enclose the cultural, economic and political processes making up the local and regional entities in a much larger painting [Brenner 2004]. He demonstrates that the proliferation of the entrepreneurial approaches in the urban administration in the West of Europe developed simultaneously with the re-differentiation, decomposition and rescaling of the space of the national state. In this new configuration the national governments modified not only their regulating capacity, they had also tried to institutionalize the competitive connections among the sub-national administrative units, as some means of strategic positioning in the case of local and regional economies in the context of the global capital circuits. Yet, even in this large process focused on the re-evaluation of the traditional national relationships and institutions, the nation-states tried to preserve their control over the great subnational economic and political spaces, by integrating them in rescaled operative strategies, yet they're still coordinated at the national level.

In his urban sociology approach analyzing the topic of regionalization, Tuñón distinguishes two fundamental directions, the one regarding the regional productive models and the one referring to the postmodern/postindustrial development of global towns, the metropolitan zones and

urban mass agglomerations in the era of globalization. Le Galès, one of the theoreticians belonging to the first direction, states that the European life-style is more different than the American one, firstly because of its social hierarchy and regional borders. [Le Galès2002]. America is characterized by a more limited hierarchy, and some more increased equality, mobility and some affinity for the modern technology, while in Europe the affiliation to a community based on the connections to the land, local roots and cultural traditions were always important. This fact, which is more related to the rural sphere, has major consequences in the urban area, determining the development and persistence of the European medieval town, as a common place of the public space and social groups, local administration and the government of the community. In their turn, these features of the urban structure induce the particularities of the integration and globalization processes.

The most well-known representative of the second direction, Manuel Castells, favours the role of the regional economies and urban metropolis in the transition occurred in the general welfare, in an interconnected society [Castells 1996]. David Harvey considers that towards the end of last century the urban government became more and more interested in some new ways, through which the local development and the formation of jobs should be encouraged by promoting a new type of entrepreneurial attitude which used to contrast with the managerial practice during the previous decades, focused on the assurance of some local tender of services, on the facilities and benefits of the urban population.

The approach based on the economic sociology pays more attention to the social conditions which permit the regions to assure collective public goods by allowing the small companies to win in the scale economies traditionally associated with the large companies. This represents a serious defiance for the vision according to which the territory will be subordinated to the function, since at the moment we perceive the functional systems as integrated in the territory, without being separated by the context [Keating 2004]. The topic is analyzed from a totally different viewpoint by John Lovering, who considers the new regionalism a weak context used to underline the regionalization of the economy and government and the role transformations in the case of the state. It does not provide a sufficient frame to a real analysis, it represents a propaganda means and is used as an excuse by other governments in order to get rid of their responsibilities [Lovering 1998].

The most substantial contribution in the study of regionalism derived from the context of political sciences starting with the 80s last century. The classical figure of the domain is Stein Rokkan, who studied the formation of European states and the persistence of the territorial divisions in time [Rokkan 1980]. Michael Keating states that the new regionalism appeared and developed in the context suggesting the state's transformation and administration, the loss of some abilities and the investigation of some others, the demistification of the state, produced after the Cold War, and a more thorough understanding of the historical contingency. Starting with the mid-90s, the impetuous development of the informational and communicational techniques, the emergence of the Internet and mobile telephony, influence the regional studies. There are more and more studies regarding the "borderless world" and the "wired society;" one of the many promoters of the new theories is Manuel Castells [Castells 1996].

Bertrand Badie writes about the agony of the territory, as an organizational principle of the political societies and a functional reference element of the international society [Badie 1995]. We are familiar with the mentality that the territory is something given, a universal category, yet if compared to the political factor, it is a historical and intellectual construct, which is provided with a moment of birth, a development, which can gradually undergo some moments of crises. Beyond the surface structure of a homogeneous state, well-defined from a territorial point of view, we notice some other types of logic, which gain sufficient enthusiasm to defy the functioning of the state institutions. More and more often and in more and more places, the territorial logic, which is deeply rooted in the occidental conception, especially in the French one, is opposed to the logic of some policy traversing multiple spaces and identities, which can't be limited to the territorial geography. The territory, demanded by its inhabiting communities, returns against its own universal logic. The territory agonizes since it is no longer the place of sovereignty and the measures meant to assure its defence are no longer organized in connection to an "external" side delimited according to territorial criteria. A phenomenon, which joins this agony, is the relativization of the territory as this loses its absolute frame of reference.

Regional identity

Tuñónface's quadridimensional frame of analysis does not take the cultural aspect of the matter into account, thus it misses the fact that the formation of regional identities can produce remarkable results in its turn. The European regionalist movements at the end of the 19th century and the first half of last century were opposed to the avant-garde movements in their attempt to reform the so-called "high culture." The regionalist art and the endemic architecture were very appreciated until the Second World War. Unfortunately, the study of regionalism and regional movements during this period of time is done, even nowadays, in a national context, without sufficiently appealing to the compared studies.

The *regional identity* is a theoretical concept related to the multidimensional essence of a region, which reproduces daily through the actions of individuals and the activity of institutions. This connects the two aspects of the region, both the physical/material (nature, culture, economy etc.) and the subjective/symbolical (individual and collective representations) one. The significant elements of the process regarding the institutionalization of regions are combined in *expectative structures*, structures meant to organize the knowledge about the world and use them for the generation of new interpretations and connections, when new experience and information arise. The construction of such structures joins the region's process of formation and institutionalization, as this is represented, relatively permanently, in the form of some specific spatio-temporal schemes of perception, thinking and action, incorporated in the institutional structure of the region and related to its territory. These structures can be applied both in the material and symbolical components of the region.

Analyzing the regional identity term, we have to make the distinction among different meanings of the term. Starting from Paasi's classification criteria we have:

- the *regional identity of a region's inhabitants* as "regional conscience" and
- the *identity of the region*, as its image.

We can firstly refer to the *identification with the regional group* or the regional community, an identification which can also be *factual*, referring to the relationships among the individuals connected by the region through different participative means, or *ideal*, referring to the image, which is communicated and represented through the institutional practice of the region

and society. A second meaning of the regional conscience refers to the role played by the region in a hierarchy of regional consciences, thus to the *identification with a certain region*.

Secondly, we can get in touch with subjective or objective images. The *subjective images* belong to the regional conscience or can be made on the basis of some scientific classification, which is more or less objective, based on the criteria of medium, culture, landscape etc. The *objective images* can develop on the basis of some objective criteria, which permit the difference from other regions. Analyzing the topic from another perspective, we might make the difference between the *internal images*, which aim to differentiate the inhabitants and characteristics of the region, and the *external images*, which represent the “facade” of the region, with the possibility to be manipulated by the institutional sphere.

The third meaning of the regional identity might be constructed on the notion of *spatial image* (Raumbild) introduced by Detlev Ipsen [Ipsen 1997]. According to him, there are three qualities, which condition the identification with a place transforming it into a region:

- *contour*, which delimits the interior from the exterior by means of a regional characteristic;
- *complexity*, which describes the number and quality of “personal” and “special” places in the region, where social activities are developed;
- *coherence*, which represents the mutual basis that makes the region seem an entity, which the regional solidarity and cohesion can be constructed on.

Major actors and themes

In the actual context when, due to the process of globalization, on the one hand, and to the European integration, on the other one, regionalism has become a central notion, one can enumerate several large domains related to the topic of regionalism in the western specialized literature, such as the regional/regionalist movements and parties, the regional autonomy, the topic of sovereignty and self-determination, the regional civic networks and obviously their interactions with the process of globalization [Szabó 2003].

–The issue related to the *autonomy of regions* and the cultural and linguistic one is connected to the emergence of the regional movements in the 20th century in the West of Europe, which is also related to the arduous

topic of the cultural and ethnic minorities. Nowadays these try to take the transformations in the structure of the states induced by the affiliation to the EU into account. The territorial and culturally-linguistic autonomy, both individual or collective, can mix up in the process of regionalization, however this does not necessarily happen.

–The *regionalistic parties* represent an important element of the conflictual model of the political cleavages, more exactly, of the conflictual couple centre-outskirts, being an expression of the regional sub-cultures in the context of nation-states [Lipset 1967]. The European political space assures multiple possibilities of participation and expression of movements, parties, groups of interests and local minorities. Thus the developing institutional frame of the promotion of regional interests contributes to the densification of the social and political networks, in agreement with certain policies, campaigns and union programs.

–The *regionalist movements* are movements known as having existed in the local, regional and/or national policy, especially in the west, for a long time. However, in the 70s, we notice a significant transformation in their context, while their predominantly conservatively-separatist character gradually transforms into a civic one, which pleads for the social integration and cultural identity of the region, institutionalizing in the form of some groups of interests and parties. The militant groups, which continue their existence, or the recently formed ones, are organized in the form of some subcultures, which are usually illegal and aggressive.

–The *structure of the state and sovereignty* were practically approached simultaneously, from two directions: “from above” by the process of globalization and Europeanization, and “from the bottom” by the process of regionalization, and the result of the two actions made them accept the regional and local autonomies. We are the witnesses of some processes such as the devolution (the authorization of power), regionalization, or decentralization both in the political life and in administration. The transformation of the internal structures of the nation-state, which drove to the limitation of the internal field of action, coincide with the opening of new directions for the sub-state and regional structures. The dynamic process of the Union’s deepening and alternative extension is in a permanent interaction with the regional economy, policy and civil society.

–The *regional civic networks* interconnect non-profit organizations, the activists and volunteers from a region. Their level of development and den-

sity depends on more factors, among which: the population's degree of mobilization, the organizational degree of the parties and groups of interests, the accessibility of the European structures, as well as their capacity to amplify the regional and local initiatives. Due to the global info-communicational infrastructure the role of these networks as some intermediaries between the region and the global system has increased considerably.

Glocalization

All these actors must cope with a complex of contrary forces: centrifugal, such as globalization and integration, and centripetal, such as localization and regionalization. They proposed the approach of *glocalization* [CERFE 2003] as an attempt to find the balance among these divergent processes. The term is not deprived of ambiguity, it is used to designate either a social process, project or policy, or a system of ideas.

Glocalization must not be mixed up with the related notions of *localization*, suggesting the allowance of power and independence to the local communities, and *multi-localization*, highlighting the creation of partnerships and horizontal networks exclusively with the participation of some local subjects. The glocalization is based on the action of some local actors, who are usually urban, interconnected in networks, with the capacity to connect and interact with global actors (international organizations or the global private sector). The aim is to induce a considerable reform of globalization in order to connect the benefits provided by the global dimension (technology, information, economy) and the local reality, on the one hand, and the elaboration of a global governing system from the bottom level to the upper one, based on an equitable distribution of the planets' resources and an authentic social and cultural renewal of the disadvantaged groups. The approach demands the simultaneous satisfaction of four requirements:

- the identification of those principles through which glocalization can raise the level of a tender with wide-spreading political and cultural effects;
- the concentration on the actors who can become key figures/partners in the process of glocalization, representing the sources of information, experience and intuition of what must be done;
- the practice of the organizational and political innovation in the non-trivial sectors of the international collaboration;

– the practical translation of the political recommendations which can conduct the actions of different categories of actors.

The real value of the glocalist approach consists in its intrinsic characteristics related to its contents, among which the following principles can be enumerated:

– the acknowledgement of the local actors' crucial importance in the processes meant to develop and establish peace;

– the acknowledgement of the endemic connection between poverty and war, the most destabilizing factor of the present world crises;

– the construction of peace must become the main axis of the development strategy;

– the acknowledgement of the established relationship – the reduction of poverty – and of the fact that the reduction of poverty represents a precondition, not a consequence of the process of development;

– the acknowledgement of the role of towns, perceived as the engines of development, centres of culture and innovation, centres of organizational reforms responsible for the formation of the civil society;

– the contribution to a more pluralist and integrated global governing in order to bring the benefits of glocalization to the local level and to make the participation of the local level in the global decisional process possible;

– the development and usage of the global knowledge basis including the local actors in the circuit of the knowledge, communications and learning exchange.

Glocalization represents only one of the possible answers replied to the complexity of the actual world. The complexity induced by the process of globalization and integration cannot be controlled from the central level, as the regionalization and localization are absolutely necessary in an efficient functioning of the global society.

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MÁRTON ATTILA DEMETER

Multiculturalism

Causes of the emergence of multiculturalism

Thanks to globalization, that is the cross-border movement of goods, cultural products, workforce and capital, the rapid spreading of ideas and information and emergence of global communication networks, our societies have all grown culturally *heterogeneous* to some extent. This observation is valid even for the most introverted and traditionalist societies, as they are equally exposed to the effects of new ways of life, styles, and ways of thinking.

However, *cultural heterogeneity* as the break of the self-evident unity of beliefs, opinions and ideas dominating a society should not be confused with *multiculturalism* which denotes the *reality* of cultures co-existing in a given society. Therefore, a society can be called *multicultural* only if it encompasses several cultures with roughly the same level of organization, whose internal cohesion is ensured by the system of generally accepted beliefs, opinions and norms regarding individual and social life.

Multiculturalism in the above sense of the word is not a modern phenomenon. Several pre-modern societies had been multicultural, suffice it to think about the Roman Empire or the Ottoman empire. In both of them, several cultures (religious communities, ethnical groups, etc.) co-existed, and the Ottoman empire even created a specific institutional system (millet system) for the institutional sustaining and protection of cultural (or religious) differences.¹ Yet, we could say that the multicultural societies of modern

1 Vernon Van Dyke sees the millet system particularly as an important historical precedent able to establish the grounds for the modern form of minority rights. See: *Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination*, Greenwood, Westport, 1985, 74-75. On the other hand, Michael Walzer, in his book on toleration (*Five Regimes of Toleration*, in: Michael Walzer.: *On Toleration*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1997, 14-36), compares the millet system and the system of autonomies operated by ancient or modern multi-national, autocratic empires with the other systems of tolerance, such as those applied in nation-states or immigrant societies, and reaches the conclusion that an

times are outstanding. There is a good reason why *multiculturalism* as an *ideology* promoting the recognition and inclusion of cultural diversity has grown into one or possibly the dominant ideology of Western societies only by the end of the 20th century.

The fact that the strong demand for *recognition* raised by the various cultures turned into a generally spread ideological claim only by the end of the 20th century has very complex causes. One cause is undoubtedly the fact that in our societies, cultural differences are deeper than those experienced in earlier societies.² No matter how considerable the differences between pre-modern cultures were, they all were cultures controlled by religious beliefs and religious rules, where social practice was often based on very similar moral convictions and norms that arose from the religion itself. Moreover, “minority” cultures were often subordinated to the majority or dominant culture or society, and generally, they willingly accepted the separate social (or even geographical) place appointed for them. – Albeit the Turkish millet system was indeed generous with minorities and allowed their autonomy primarily in cultural issues, this state of the affairs never queried the Muslim nature of the Ottoman society and empire.

The other cause is related to globalization itself. Globalization is indeed a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, it spawns the homogenization of ideas, ideals, trends, institutions, moral and social practices; on the other hand, it still confirms the conscience of difference. While it allows the migration of individuals or even entire groups, through this immigration it brings about social and cultural diversity or even division somewhere else. The export of ideas and cultural models can indeed trigger the attitude of cultural resistance and stimulate many people to rise and try to protect national cultures against the “McWorld” or “Americanization”.

But the main cause that led to the emergence of the ideology of multiculturalism was the newfangled democratic demand for *recognition*. In his excellent analysis of the politics of recognition, the Canadian Charles Taylor, a dominant and well-known figure in the theoretical discourse of

essential difference exists between the pre-modern and modern forms of toleration: the first one refers to communities, while the latter one concerns the individuals. An equally detailed analysis of the millet system is found in Will Kymlicka’s work *Multicultural Citizenship*: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, 156-158.

² Bhikhu Parekh: A Commitment to Cultural Pluralism, <http://kvc.minbuza.nl/uk/archive/commentary/parekh.html>

multiculturalism, claimed that the demand for recognition was triggered by the emergence of the political framework system of *democracy* and the gradual process of social emancipation that occurred in parallel with it. "In those earlier societies, what we would now call identity was largely fixed by one's social position. That is, the background that explained what people recognized as important to themselves was to a great extent determined by their place in society, and whatever roles or activities attached to this position."³ Per se, the democratization of society, the spreading of the egalitarian spirit, the gradual eradication of rigid differences between castes, estates, social classes, genders would not have disrupted this practice, as people still can and most often, they do determine themselves through their social roles. But these social roles are no longer appointed unequivocally or quasi-institutionally as they were in earlier times. And if social roles, that is, the identities themselves are no longer protected by customary right, representational institutions, privileges and by the system of rigid social prejudices, then these social roles and identities, or at least the part of them, which the equality-oriented democratic politics is able to encompass, must be confirmed again – *their recognition must be procured*.

The main cause for this is the fact that – contrary to any counter-opinions – human identity, including group identity, is of *dialogical* nature, which means that it depends on recognition by others.⁴ Of course, one could challenge this assertion by saying that basically everybody shapes their own identity as they like it, but Taylor suggests that this contradicts the essentially dialogical character of human life. "But in the nature of the case, there is no such thing as inward generation, monologically understood. In

³ Charles Taylor: The Politics of Recognition, in: Amy Gutmann (ed): Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, [1992] 25-73. Valuable reflections on Taylor's text, by Susan Wolf, Michael Walzer and others, have been added to the 1994 edition which also contained Jürgen Habermas's commentary translated from German into English. Taylor also provides a detailed analysis of the constitution of modern identity in his book *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.

⁴ In his article *Nationalism and Modernity*, which among others, again details this issue, Taylor claims that these statements are valid even for national identity. Nationalism is actually nothing else than a form of the politics of identity. For details, see: Charles Taylor: *Nationalism and Modernity*, in: Ronald Beiner (ed): *Theorizing Nationalism*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, 219-245.

order to understand the close connection between identity and recognition, we have to take into account a crucial feature of the human condition that has been rendered almost invisible by the overwhelmingly monological bent of mainstream modern philosophy. This crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally *dialogical* character.”⁵ Identity is shaped through interaction with the “significant others”, that is, it depends on recognition by others. Taylor suggests that this is why “Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and of genders”.⁶

Various meanings of the notion of culture in multiculturalism discourses

One of the regular objections to multiculturalism, a rather nominal one, concerning the term itself, is that quite different meanings are attached to the term in the political discourses of multiculturalism, depending on what the various speakers mean by the notion culture. Apart from the ambiguous use of the notion *culture*, if the significance of the notion culture is considered to be given and evident, the definition of multiculturalism is simple, too: multiculturalism is the ideology promoting the recognition of culture in a given sense or another and the inclusion of demands raised in the name of identities in a given sense or another.

Approaching the issue of multiculturalism nominally, starting with the meaning of the notion culture, we see that multiculturalism discourses use the term culture at least in two clearly distinct senses. On the one hand, they utilize it in a very broad “integrative” sense, referring to the practice of *self representation, attribution of meaning* rooted in a specific group identity. From this perspective, cultures are defined equally as practices of attaching meaning and significance that pertain to racial or gender identity, various occupational categories or sexual preferences. Iris Marion Young, one of the early and influential theoreticians of multiculturalism and women’s rights, in her work *Polity and Group Difference*, defines group identity and the specific

⁵ Charles Taylor: *The Politics of Recognition*, 32.

⁶ Idem, 27.

culture notion residing in group identity as follows: “A social group involves first of all an affinity with other persons by which they identify with one another, and by which other people identify them. A person’s particular sense of history, understanding of social relations and personal possibilities, her or his mode of reasoning, values, and expressive styles are constituted at least partly by her or his group identity. Many group definitions come from the outside, from other groups that label and stereotype certain people. In such circumstances the despised group members often find their affinity in their oppression.”⁷

Thus, Young suggests that group cohesion is called into existence by the mutual *affinity* existing between group members, but quite often also by external social *oppression*, therefore these groups generally assert or claim social *emancipation*. However, group identity, regardless of being a result of external social oppression, deeply determines the cultural identity of those belonging to the group, if the individual’s sense of history, values, expressive styles, etc. are rooted in group identity. Thus, this broad notion of culture or cultural identity related to the attachment of meaning, insight or attribution of sense could be related equally to group identities held by gender affiliation and roles, sexual preferences, racial affiliation or certain occupational categories. Multiculturalism as movement means the aspiration of the above cultures or group identities for legal confirmation, and rarely, for political recognition.

The general confusion related to multiculturalism is also fuelled by the fact that various particular identities, social subgroups and cultures raise different types of claims and even intend to assert them on totally different levels of the broadly interpreted social sphere. These claims could equally refer to the educational sphere (e.g. the introduction of special discipline modules such as “gender studies” or “black studies” in high-school education), the economic sphere (typically, claiming affirmative action for some particular community) or the political sphere itself (such as demand for special representation which is urged by Young herself in the name of women’s rights movements). This confusing diversity of claims is what mostly explains the puzzlement related to multiculturalism today.

⁷ Iris Marion Young: Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in: *Ethics*, 1989, vol. 99, no. 2, 250-274, 259.

These aspirations and claims led – first in the United States, but not too much later, after '68, also in Europe – to the emergence of the so-called *identity politics*, or “new social movements”, that is: human rights movements, feminism, gay movements, etc. In each case, the claims were raised by particular groups that were organized by racial or gender identity, sexual preferences, class affiliation, and demanded a distinguished treatment and extra rights in order to eliminate the disadvantages arising out of their own identities. These are also called “single issue” movements, because they practically have a single political objective: the emancipation of the given social group and legal affirmation of its specific identity, and they rarely or only indirectly express opinion in other political, economic and social aspects.

In the first phase, the existence of these movements raised the awareness of Western political theoreticians on the fact that society was not a community of individuals as effortlessly assumed earlier by liberal philosophy and state theory, but – to use a term that has by now grown famous – “a community of communities”. On the other hand, the rights movements also drew attention to the fact that the law and order, educational policy, linguistic policy, etc. of the state considered to be neutral practically reflected the specific set of values of the “white European male”. Basically, this is the explanation for the emergence of the American-originated *multiculturalism* as a movement.

However, there is another commonly utilized notion of culture in multiculturalism discourses which poses a strong challenge against *national* identity interpreted as being homogeneous, namely the notion of “societal” or socialized culture introduced by Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka characterizes it as follows: “By a societal culture, I mean a territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life – schools, media, law, economy, government, etc. – covering the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life. I call it a *societal culture* to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles.”⁸ Societal culture is thus a *territorial* culture where common identity is conveyed through the common *language*, and in using the attribute societal,

⁸ Will Kymlicka: Nation-building and minority rights: comparing West and East, in: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2000, vol. 26, no. 2, 183-212, 185.

Kymlicka emphasizes the very fact that the issue here is a language which is institutionalized and used on every level of the social sphere, and not just a common religious conviction or familial customs, etc.

Then again, societal culture itself could only give rise to different claims, and Kymlicka associates these demands with two distinguished types of ethno-cultural communities: partially with the so-called “national minorities”, but partially also with “ethnic communities” or “ethnic categories”. He defines national minorities as being communities assimilated by a certain state, but which had enjoyed some form of local government or autonomy or perhaps the experience of independent statehood and national existence or sovereignty before. Typically, he suggests, these communities strive to remain separate communities within the larger society and culture, and for this purpose, they demand local government and various forms of autonomy for themselves. Conversely, by ethnic categories he means the groups of immigrants. These were created through the immigration of individuals and families on the territory of a given state, and usually aspire to integration and acceptance by the larger society.⁹

The politics of “recognition”

In the light of the above, it seems quite evident that the general confusion related to multiculturalism is mostly fuelled by the fact that the collective notion of multiculturalism includes largely different social and political aspirations. But, as for the sustainability or acceptability of multiculturalism as an ideology, it is at least equally important to point out that the final theoretical legitimacy of these movements faces many problems. Obviously, there could be large differences between the claims of various movements and it is difficult to conciliate them in terms of their final legitimacy, because they could equally strive to create conditions enabling the group’s self-organization and the emergence of a specific group conscience, political representation, legal or economic affirmative action, etc. However, essentially they demand the structural and substantial reform of education. As the afore-mentioned Charles Taylor suggests, referring to the learnings from the American canon debate, “the main locus of this debate – is the world of

⁹ Idem, 187-191. See also: Will Kymlicka: *Multicultural Citizenship*, 10.

education in a broad sense. One important focus is university humanities departments, where demands are made to alter, enlarge, or scrap the “canon” of accredited authors on the grounds that the one presently favored consists almost entirely of “dead white males.” A greater place ought to be made for women, and for people of non-European races and cultures. A second focus is the secondary schools, where an attempt is being made, for instance, to develop Afrocentric curricula for pupils in mainly black schools. The reason for these proposed changes is not, or not mainly, that all students may be missing something important through the exclusion of a certain gender or certain races or cultures, but rather that women and students from the excluded groups are given, either directly or by omission, a demeaning picture of themselves, as though all creativity and worth inhered in males of European provenance. Enlarging and changing the curriculum is therefore essential not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone as in order to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded. The background premise of these demands is that recognition forges identity.”¹⁰

Nevertheless, as the American canon debate demonstrated,¹¹ even such a seemingly or apparently inoffensive claim could pose a theoretical challenge which shakes the grounds of the philosophical assumptions of liberal democracy. Indeed, besides the fact that the canon debate raised the question of comparability of various cultures, which could be considered a purely hermeneutical or cultural philosophical issue, it also evidenced that the demand for the reorganization of the college curriculum and the introduction of the so-called “cultural studies” were underlain by the conviction that certain cultures were entitled to recognition based on their inherent rights and their simple *existence*. What formed the core of this demand was that each culture, by virtue of its simple existence, should receive equal appreciation, regardless of its “value”. – Saul Bellow’s infamous rhetorical question “Where is the Tolstoy of the Zulus? If you could find him, I would be happy to read him” is nothing else than the expression of the uncoined cultural arrogance of the white race.

On the other hand, Taylor suggests, presumably correctly, that there

¹⁰ Charles Taylor: *The Politics of Recognition*, 65-66.

¹¹ See Zsolt Farkas’s excellent study: *Kánonvita és kultúrháború az Egyesült Államokban* [Canon Debate and Cultural War in the United States], in: *Magyar Lettre Internationale*, 1997-98 winter, 27., 72-77.

is more to this issue than the purely hermeneutical question of the commensurability or equality of cultures. Indeed, it is one thing to speak of the presumable universal *ability* of culture and identity formation of each man and each group, and it is another thing to speak of identities and cultures themselves. – The politics of equal recognition could indeed be justified by the universal or universally presumable ability of culture formation, because we could easily say that we must have equal respect for the ability of cultures or individuals to shape and determine their identity; „the demand for equal recognition extends beyond an acknowledgment of the equal value of all humans potentially, and comes to include the equal value of what they have made of this potential in fact”.¹²

However, as we are going to see, this claim entails serious problems both in terms of its assumptions and consequences, and these issues will appear in similar forms in case of each identity politics. Indeed, all of them share the same internal argumentative and legitimating logic, and we realize this fact immediately once we ask ourselves: what is actually truly worthy of respect and recognition: the *ability* of individuals and groups to shape their identities, or the *identity* they have chosen?

Taylor claims that after Kant, classical 19th century liberalism indicated the individuals' *dignity*, that is a specific metaphysical and moral quality of humans, as the object of respect. “The politics of equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect. [...] For Kant, whose use of the term *dignity* was one of the earliest influential evocations of this idea, what commanded respect in us was our status as rational agents, capable of directing our lives through principles. Something like this has been the basis for our intuitions of equal dignity ever since, though the detailed definition of it may have changed. Thus, what is picked out as of worth here is a universal human potential, a capacity that all humans share. This potential, rather than anything a person may have made of it, is what ensures that each person deserves respect.”¹³

Identity politics offers an alternative vision as the ideological ground for the politics of recognition, which radically changes our ways of thinking about human dignity. Human dignity, at least according to Kant, arises out of man's *human* nature: that is, while it derives from human *nature*, it is

¹² Charles Taylor: The Politics of Recognition, 66-67.

¹³ Idem, 41.

independent from the concrete identity of the concrete person, from their natural needs, desires, but even from their moral customs. Pierre Manent wrote: “human dignity exists by virtue of the fact that the human being may be driven by a cause completely independent from his or her nature and superior to it, by a sort of a spiritual causality.”¹⁴ Classical, basic human liberties such as the freedom of speech, of thought or freedom of conscience protected and satisfied the *spiritual* needs of man as a spiritual being. Their scope was the state of intellectual or rather spiritual “freedom” unfettered from natural bonds, and this ability of freedom, as construed in Kant’s philosophy, indeed must be assumed in case of every human being.

However, today, at least according to the testimony of identity politics, we obviously strive to lessen this tension between the spiritual and the *sensual* dimension, to merge the idea of dignity with our needs arising out of the particular identity, racial or gender affiliation and sexual orientation. Evidently, this implies the radical transformation of the Kantian doctrine, nay, even its downright rejection, and this is barely concealed by our maniacal insistence to use the Kantian terminology, “respect for human dignity”. Today, respecting another human’s dignity no longer means respecting his human, purely human quality, but rather respecting the decisions which this man makes in “creating” his own identity – regardless of what these decisions are. For Kant, respect for human dignity was a respect entertained for the “form” of humanity as such; for contemporary political and moral thinking, respect for human dignity means respect for the “life contents” of the other human, regardless of what they are like. Words remained, but have completely changed their meanings.

The politics of recognition requires that each lifestyle be recognized as being equal to the other ones. “This endeavor is indeed very understandable, but it faces serious moral and political challenges. The Kantian formula seems strict, excessively harsh, and unrealizable, while this present formula sounds generous, liberal and realizable.”¹⁵ However, it is likely that both formulae are excessive in their own ways. The Kantian one is too strict, and identity politics demonstrates that it does not offer the individuals the

¹⁴ Pierre Manent: *Politikai filozófia felnőtteknek (Cours familier de philosophie politique)* (Hungarian translation by Péter Kende), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, 310.

¹⁵ Idem, 311-12.

vivid experience of the recognition of their concrete identity.¹⁶ However, another fact is that respecting every life content and every identity equally is simply impossible. Life contents or chosen identities can be approved or condemned, one can be indifferent or baffled by them; to put it simply, at this point, all the feelings and judgments stirred in us by life appear naturally. “An advantage of the contemporary formula is that it is concrete; but this is also its disadvantage. It requires us to respect every life content, every choice of way, every lifestyle. However, this doesn’t actually make sense, or its sense is that we must approve, appreciate and applaud every life content, every choice of way, every lifestyle. But this is impossible.”¹⁷

If indeed everybody must approve of every choice of way, then life becomes unbearably boring and even uncomfortable, because it also results in our personal decisions not having any significance. My decisions have any significance even for myself only if others actually react to them: some approve of them, others disapprove or even revolt against them, then others seem perplexed; briefly, this significance requires that my choices carry some risk, because this risk, no matter how small, is inseparable from freedom. Thus, Manent suggests that identity politics, while they appear as acting in the name of human dignity, i.e. by theoretically gaining their final legitimacy in respecting liberty in the Kantian sense and in demanding this respect, in terms of their final consequences they actually result in the gradual erosion of the value of human *freedom*.

¹⁶ See: Seyla Benhabib’s essay: The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg – Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, in: Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.): *Feminism as Critique*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, 77-95. Also, about the same issue see Will Kymlicka: *Feminism*, in: Will Kymlicka: *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, 377-430. A very sensitive analysis of the above dilemma is provided by Anthony Appiah in his well and nicely written book: *Kwame Anthony Appiah: Ethics of Identity*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005. Appiah, one of last apologists of “old fashion” liberalism, who mostly follows Mill’s arguments in his book, indeed acknowledges that Mill and others discuss the individual by discarding its concrete identity, or at least several elements of it, but he claims that this gesture was deliberate and targeted. An its goal was – he says – to allow for the respect for the persons which assumes a constant abstraction: abstraction from the others’ identity and also from ours. Idem, xv.

¹⁷ Pierre Manent, op.cit. , 310.

Consequences of multiculturalism

In terms of its consequences, the politics of recognition leads to “results” that stir thoughts at least this serious. Undoubtedly, identity politics, fighting against social and political oppression and against the very subtle forms of this oppression at times, carries a very strong message of emancipation. Thus, it finds its final legitimacy in the demand for liberation, in the very value of freedom, which is unquestionably compatible with the spirit of liberal democracies, and as such, the goals of such movements can only be approved. But, it is also beyond contestation that liberal democracies and modern political communities must pay a high price for the liberation of various oppressed social groups, and if this price proves to be much too high, then it must encourage the supporters of liberal democracies to consider alternative modes of social and political emancipation.

Thinking about the foreseeable or known consequences, it is worth paying attention to the fact that while new social movements generally become or appear from start as vindicating movements due to the logic of liberation operating within them, these rights are no longer connected to the “spiritual” needs of “man”, but to man’s “natural” needs, i.e. in some way they are related to class and gender affiliations or sexual preferences of certain individuals. They *take out* these demands from the private dimension or the strict social dimension and transform them into open, public and political issues – let us just think about the famous motto of feminism: private is public. One of the results is that public debates tend to focus more and more on private and personal issues. We become – and actually, already are – obliged to participate in public debates on issues like: can the homosexuals marry, raise children, join the army, lead scouts groups? How long, for what reasons, how and in what hospitals may women abort their embryos? Does the assumed father have anything to say about this? This results in constant and acute debates and a plethora of laws which lead to the organization of passionate lobby groups and the emergence of “cultural wars”.¹⁸

This wouldn’t be a problem per se, as we could easily say that any repulsion against such debates is simply a matter of taste. But, for the very reason that these rights or legitimacies are related to concrete, “natural” de-

¹⁸ See Michael Mann: Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State? (in: Review of International Political Economy 4:3, 1997, 472-496.

mands, and identity politics claims full recognition of the very *identity* chosen, they actually narrow down the space for intelligent social and political debates in an excessive manner. Indeed, where the “politics of recognition” steps up, it is no longer the *convictions* that enter into the debate, but *identities*. The huge difference between the two is that while convictions argue and can be confuted, identities simply exist, and as such, they are beyond contestation. “An argument can always meet a better argument, an opinion can always face a truer one, but there is no such thing as a better identity. Contesting the validity of an identity means questioning the existence of the carrier of this identity – that is, an attack at its humanity. Either gay marriage or homophobia; either recognition or sin: this relentless alternative leaves space for no other feelings in the debate than hatred.”¹⁹ Thus, Alain Finkielkraut, the author of the above quote, suggests that the politics of recognition will probably make human relations fiercer in the long term.

On the other hand, identity politics, precisely by taking out particular identity from the private sphere and making it an open and public issue, forces the state to regulate identity-related issues just like other fields of the public dimension, and sanction, if necessary, any breaches of identity, provided that it surrounded identity with rights. It shall be the government’s task to create laws for protecting identity, i.e. practically to confirm this identity through codification. The political extension of the private dimension requires the punishment of breach of particular identity (discrimination, hate speeches, religious instigation) by law, as it used to require punishment against the breach of the private dimension and basic liberties. Therefore, this logic of freedom and liberation results in a plethora of laws and sanctions, of new criminal categories, i.e. paradoxically, the logic of liberation exercises a negative impact on freedom. Of course, all this does not mean that hate speeches or religious instigation could be laudable from a moral point of view, but the legal sanction against hate speeches will hardly eliminate xenophobia, racism, chauvinism or anti-Semitism from our societies. At most, it would result in a pan-social hypocrisy and fake morality enforced by legal means. Thus, the paradox of the matter is that albeit most of the new laws are adopted not for limitative purposes, but to extend the protection of per-

¹⁹ Alain Finkielkraut: A hálátlanság [Ingratitude] (Hungarian translation by Benedek Várkonyi), Európa Kiadó, Budapest, 2001, 180. [Translated from Hungarian]

sonal liberties, they do lead to the limitation of freedom.²⁰ Homosexuals can practice their lifestyles openly; women may abort their unwanted children. However, this does not result from the Neoliberal absence of state regulation. On the contrary: the modern state gains competency over the private lives of its citizens, regulates their everyday behavior and verbal manifestations by law, and uses the means of legal constraint to enforce the mandatory norms of moral conduct.

This situation has two serious and interrelated consequences. On the one hand, it comes as a radical break with the form of liberal government established in the 19th century and with the old liberal requirement of the *neutrality* of political community; on the other hand, it leads to unreasonable *excessive codification*, resulting in the gradual erosion of tolerance as a social regulatory function.

The American political scientist Michael Mann wrote that the modest nation-state established during the 19th century²¹ did not have its own moral considerations yet. Its emergence began particularly with distancing itself from the dimensions of social life that were considered “private”. “The household was especially sacred, and states stayed outside the family life of all but the very poor. Secular states generally lacked their own moral concerns, taking over moral conceptions from religion”.²² Their legal systems could indeed prohibit certain forms of personal conduct, but the countries aspired to stimulate the voluntary adoption of morality by citizens rather than to enforce it. The apparent exceptions – such as the prohibitions of child and female labor in the 19th century – were attributable generally to the contemporary conviction that these would have violated the private sphere of the patriarchal household and the Christian norms of sexual behavior. In the twentieth century, everything changed along with the new political

²⁰ See the excellent analysis authored by the American expert in constitutional law Elisabeth Price Foley: *Liberty for All. Reclaiming Individual Privacy in a New Era of Public Morality* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006), where she argues that America switched from being a land of individual freedom and tolerance to a land of public morality and intolerance.

²¹ Here Mann refers to the Western European government model emerging in the 19th century, which was characterized by efficient administration, a functioning national legitimacy principle, monopoly over violence and harmonized population regulatory, educational and health policy.

²² Michael Mann, *op.cit.*, 155-156.

movements and once the welfare state penetrated the private sphere: today, we expect the government to regulate and “enforce” the moral behavior in areas that used to be seen as being private.

On the other hand, it is a fact also that the great political *equalization* agenda of the 19th century was fuelled by the conviction that the private lives of citizens could be separated from public life, that the particular, confessional or any other identity of the citizens could be referred clearly to the private sphere or the social sphere, and that this state could be codified using the means of civil law and constitutional law. Thus, it was the requirement of equal political rights of the citizens that was embodied in the constitutional article, which stipulated that citizens of the state were equal regardless of gender, race or confession. This also implied the *neutrality* of the citizens’ *political* community, i.e. the conviction that gender, race or confessional differences did not matter in the political community. As a matter of fact, John Stuart Mill’s work on *The Subjection of Women*²³ still voiced this classic, 19th century suffragette version of feminism, urging the full legal participation of women in the political community.

The neutrality of civil community and citizens’ equality required that the state was neutral in terms of *world view*, that is, it involved the requirement that the state could not appreciate or review the individual – political, philosophical or religious – convictions of its citizens, as they were private aspects. At the same time, it demanded citizens to be mutually *tolerant* with each others’ convictions – for the same reason. This did not mean that citizens could not contest each others views or convictions (what else could have been the subject of political publicity and debate?), but they were not entitled to deprive each other from the right of free choice of conviction and liberty of opinion. In its 19-century form that could actually be traced back to the times of religious wars in the 16th-17th century, the politics of tolerance only required citizens to respect each others’ *freedom*. – But it was completely evident that being a devout Catholic meant that one could not approve Protestantism, as the salvation of one’s soul was at stake: Protestantism could not be for such a person an equally true religion or confessional system as Catholicism, because religious truth, as any truth for that matter, was exclusive: one of them was necessarily the path of salvation, while the other one was that of damnation. However, the principle of toler-

²³ John Stuart Mill: *The Subjection of Women*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1988

ance obliged one to respect the freedom of conscience of even the Protestant fellow citizens, i.e. not to deprive them from the possibility of damnation chosen by them. Therefore, tolerance is a sort of an *indifference*,²⁴ which of course does not exclude the possibility to contest and to be allowed to contest the truthfulness of others' faith, if necessary. Tolerance is not the proper regulatory rule for the politics of recognition particularly because, after all, it is not nothing else than indifference or perhaps rejection towards the others' chosen paths. I.e. it does not offer the experience of active recognition.

Equally, as I mentioned, 19th century liberalism also required the state to be *neutral* towards the beliefs and convictions of its citizens. Obviously, neutrality is not equal to tolerance, as it does not allow for debating, valuating, classifying, disapproving or supporting the beliefs and convictions of the state's citizens, but it does resemble it in that it can be conceived as a sort of an indifference. For this reason – as David Miller, professor of political philosophy at Oxford, suggests – the nature of the politics of recognition *transcends* tolerance and the requirement of state neutrality. “One of the most prominent features of contemporary politics is that various cultural groups claim political expression and political recognition of their different identities.”²⁵ “The politics of recognition transcends tolerance in its traditional sense in liberal societies. The basis of politics of tolerance is to let cultural communities display and express their own cultural values in the private sphere, perhaps through organizations created by the association of their members. The government played a primarily negative role in this context: it had to refrain from forcing minority groups to catch up with the majority culture or even from placing technical obstacles in their pursue of happiness. [...] This is not sufficient for the followers of the politics of recognition, as group identity is relegated to the private sphere, and this identity does not receive public confirmation. For this reason, they say, the public sphere is driven by norms which are apparently universal and culturally neutral, but actually reflect the cultural values of the dominant social

²⁴ These are the literal words of Chandran Kukathas in the study *Liberalism and Multiculturalism*, in: Colin Farrelly (ed.): *Contemporary Political Theory. A reader*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2004, 288-294.

²⁵ David Miller: *Group Identities, National Identities and Democratic Politics*, in: David Miller: *Citizenship and National Identity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, 62-80, 62.

categories.”²⁶ Miller also adds that what the followers of the politics of recognition actually demand is the transformation of the political sphere.²⁷

And if this is so, the real question that arises is how far can we stretch in transforming the political sphere? It is quite evident and Miller is indeed right in saying that as members of various social groups, we could acquire this recognition for our demands only if we are members of a large *political community* to begin with, which contains a system of beliefs and convictions about the shared lifestyle, that provides a source of ethical standards, as well as a common interpretation framework under which people are able to justify their decisions before each other by making reference to the criterion of *justice*. I.e. a common interpretation framework which is ethical and political at the same time. In most cases, we do not claim – and cannot claim – recognition from *foreigners*. Thus, the politics of recognition makes sense only if we assume that there is a form of *community* identity – one that can be sustained in spite of our demands – which is able to integrate all the particular identities and serve the means for their active recognition. Recognition from “others” “matters only if these people are »significant others« – that is, if they are people whose appreciation of my habits and lifestyle influences my own ability to attribute values”.²⁸ We cannot demand recognition from outsiders; we can merely demand them to respect our basic rights, and especially our right to get along in life as we wish. Separated groups living in each other’s neighborhood, such as the religious communities of medieval Europe, did not demand mutual recognition (in the sense we attach to the word), but only tolerance. Yet, we claim recognition from all with whom we identify ourselves to begin with, as members of a larger group – such as the nation – and similarly, we tend to guarantee recognition only for those with whom we have some bonds. Yet, Miller adds, the current state of the affairs is that the only form of political community which is able to integrate these particular identities is the *nation* – whatever it means for us. “Thus, the common national identity serves the only background adequate for the various groups to define their own differences.”²⁹ Therefore, if we are to encourage the diversity of groups and also promote a democratic politics which pur-

²⁶ Idem, 63.

²⁷ Idem

²⁸ Idem, 76.

²⁹ Idem, 78.

sues social justice, then instead of attempting to dissipate national identities, we should aspire to consolidate them.

Yet, the main problem with identity politics is that the demand for emancipation is announced using the language of claims of rights, which leads to unnecessary excessive codification which can be seen almost everywhere in the Western world. Claim for rights undoubtedly does not challenge the internal legitimating principles of liberal democracies, moreover, it even arises from the coercive power of these principles, because, according to the principles of doctrinaire liberalism, being free means having rights – liberalism indeed tends to define the *substance* of freedom from the perspective of rights. However, what changed radically and perhaps is worth more attention, is the *legitimacy* and *function* of these very rights. Classic liberties, which constituted the substance of private freedom, were somehow related to the individual's "*spiritual*" demands and their basic function was to *limit* government power. The best way the government was able to secure them was to distance itself from the private lives of citizens. Social and moral rights presented by the various international declarations of human rights, that are increasingly codified, confirm the concrete individual identity and are related to "man's" *natural* needs. They force the state to *collaborate* actively in creating the conditions for exercising the rights and to punish any breaches thereof, that is, to secure and guarantee the rights claimed by certain individuals through obligations residing with other individuals. I.e. exercising these rights assumes the *intervention* of the state – eventually, its unacceptably large intrusion in the private lives of citizens. For this very reason, these rights are unable to supply the classical function of liberties – the limitation of power – as the creation of the conditions for exercising them assumes the government's collaboration *ab ovo*.

All these issues related to excessive codification necessitate the phrasing of two interrelated questions to which Western liberal democracies have until now failed to provide even a ballpark answer.

The first one is: if rights gain their final legitimacy from the natural needs of humans, then what are the natural needs which can legitimately constitute grounds for claiming rights, and which are the ones that cannot? The theoretical infinity of the process of extending rights was highlighted as early as in the 18th century, by the Benedictine monk Léger Marie Deschamps in his communist utopia bearing the stylish title *True System*, which says that the state may stipulate that "ugly women should be embraced too, as the

satisfaction of sexual desires is our natural right and the state is obliged to secure the equal supply of natural needs”.³⁰ If it is my right to be loved, then it is your obligation to love me.

In order to solve this dilemma, Miller proposes an alternative that may be considered Republican in the classical sense of the word, according to which the functions of the *political community* should be redefined essentially. Instead of the practice of liberal codification, which intends to satisfy the need for social emancipation by codifying new basic rights all the time, considering these rights to be residing with *man ab ovo* based on his human dignity, the entire political community should be endowed with the right to confirm or reject rights or privileges through public debate. He says “the difference between liberalism and republicanism is not the fact that liberals recognize basic rights, while republicans don’t, but that liberals attach a prepolitical legitimacy to these rights, while the republicans would confirm them through a public debate.”³¹

The second question is: if basic human rights have by today lost their classical function of primarily limiting government power, then what are the possibilities for drawing a new rigid line between private life and public life, i.e. for protecting citizens against governmental discretion and violence? The fact that in theory, the number of human rights could be extended endlessly in the name of our natural needs, claims or particular identities, does evidently not mean that this course could not be curtailed in the concrete process of codification and legislation. However, this requires what Michael Mann has also mentioned, namely the existence of a mutual consensual basis for defining what is public and what is private, and what extent of human behavior can or cannot fall within governmental regulation. Indeed, the classical, age-long liberal technique of separation should be put to practice again; yet, this is difficult particularly because the boundaries of private life were traditionally defined by the individual’s liberties.

³⁰ La vrai système ou le mot de l’énigme métaphysique et morale. Quoted by: Mária Ludassy: Benjamin Constant, a modernnek szabadságának szószólója (*Benjamin Constant, Advocate for the Liberty of Moderns*), in: Benjamin Constant: A régiek és a modernnek szabadsága [*Hungarian translation of The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns*], 7–31, 26.

³¹ David Miller, op.cit. , 59–60.

BRIGITTA BALOGH – GUSZTÁV MOLNÁR

The Theory of Recognition

While the main concern for the narrative theories of identity is how sense is created in the interpretation of ourselves, of the world and generally of events, theories of recognition focus more on the intersubjective conditions of the creation of sense (and together with it, identity). They also have a moral charge insofar as the issues related to identity and its intersubjective nature are discussed in the context of their moral implications.

This article provides a sketchy presentation of the archetype of every contemporary theory of recognition, Hegel's thoughts in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*,¹ followed by an overview of two paradigmatic contemporary theories, namely Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as stated in his work *Kampf um Anerkennung* [Struggle for Recognition], and Charles Taylor's relevant insight. We advise that Hegel's ideas are not traced back exactly in the spirit of the contemporary authors presented, because – albeit both are connected to Hegel in several ways – they did not leverage the potential in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* with regard to the theory of recognition.²

¹ On the role of the theory of recognition in Hegel's system, see Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: The Problem of Identity in Hegel's Philosophy. In B. Balogh – K. Bernáth – I. Bujalos – A. Hatos – I. Murányi (ed.): *Európai, nemzeti és regionális identitás – elmélet és gyakorlat* (European, National and Regional Identity). Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó, Debrecen, 2011.

² Taylor authored a monograph on Hegel's social philosophy (*Hegel and Modern Society*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979), but that work focuses mainly on the advanced system, and his work discussing the emergence of modern identity (*Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001) mentions Hegel only briefly, in connection with expressivism.

1. The original model: Hegel

Approaching the core of theories of recognition from the direction of narrativity, we could say they are based on the insight that narratives – even the apparently entirely private ones, if there are any³ – are shaped essentially in a common space, meaning (in a Hegelian manner, by the way) that they become real in this common space. However, the notion also carries – besides this quasi-ontological semantic nuance – a certain practical intentionality, because recognition in principle does not mean solely acceptance, but also affirmation. Indeed, this could not be said about each use of it, because recognizing something does not yet mean affirming it. However, if we recognize not *something*, but *someone*, indeed the affirmative aspect is very difficult to separate from the cognitive one. Not coincidentally: happenings in the intersubjective practical space are always decisions and evaluations and their consequences, *that is*, they are never pure facts.

This mode of operation of recognition was first described by Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, more precisely in his analysis of the mode of being of self-consciousness where he stated that self-consciousness exists in being acknowledged.⁴ Even at a first glance, this thesis implies more than mere acknowledgement, because due to the intermediated nature of self-consciousnesses, acknowledgement becomes creation, more precisely, participation in creation: *there is something that can be acknowledged at all because of the affirmation that takes place*. The ingeniousness of Hegel's model lies partially in his very understanding that no action in the social sphere is atomistic, and no action is mechanical in the sense of being foreseeable or unilateral.⁵ Of course, Hegel's intention was not to judge the Kantian doctrine of absolute human dignity, but neither did he leave it as it was. Indeed, what is the formal meaning of the recognition of the other as self-consciousness? The fact that "consciousness is consciousness of the object, and on the other hand, it is

³ According to Charles Taylor, there aren't any: even the solitary artist or hermit turns to an ideal interlocutor, an addressee. Charles Taylor: *The Politics of Recognition*. In Amy Gutmann (ed.): *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, 25–73.

⁴ Hegel, G. W. F.: *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Transl. by A.V. Miller. Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998, 111.

⁵ Op. cit. 111.

consciousness of itself”,⁶ that is, the act of recognition basically recognizes that the other person is not a thing, but a “self” just as we are. In other words: recognition is a kind of a circular acknowledgement, affirmation and discovery of the other person’s being similar to us – in stricter words, the other person’s being identical with us (as a self) – and thereby the materialization thereof. Yet, if recognition never happens, that does not mean the other person is not similar to us – indeed, that would be a unilateral, mechanical determination of the state of facts –, but only that he who refuses to recognize, shuts himself away from a state of facts which he should actually face. In this regard, negating the possibility of unilateral action does not belittle but absolutizes the responsibility for each other (and for ourselves): if I refuse recognizing someone as self-consciousness – as an autonomous self and responsible shaper of our common world – I am not committing this in my name only, but indirectly, I am trying to determine him to negate himself. Indeed it is so, because the thesis of indirectness states that my judgment is valid only if validated by the other one in himself.⁷

Naturally, once we speak of recognizing the other person as a self, we reach a neuralgic point in the problematics of recognition which comes back in multiple theoretical levels and whose basic form could be called the dialectic of the individuality and generality of the selves. We are speaking of the insight that being a self is the most personal and most general thing at the same time,⁸ therefore the question arises that when I acknowledge the other by affirming him or affirm him by acknowledging him, that is, I *recognize* the other one’s being a self, I recognize him to be identical with me *ultimately in his humanity*, as an individual, concrete, unrepeatable human in his own factual identity.

Coincidentally or not, this question spreads through social and political philosophy as a main subject of debate in contemporary recognition discourses, and by no means on a general level, but closely connected to our historically changing self-interpretation, more precisely, to the way we interpret modernity.

⁶ G. W. F. Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Transl. by Terry Pinkard, http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/About_Me_files/Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20-%28entire%20text%29.pdf, 81.

⁷ Op. cit. 109–110.

⁸ See e.g. G. W. F. Hegel: *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. Part Three; Philosophy of Spirit*.

2. Historical conditions: recognition and modernity

The issue of recognition in its current form is a specifically modern issue, both according to Honneth and Taylor, being related to the radical modern transformation of our world. Both authors identified the main factors in the collapse of social hierarchies considered to be pre-given and in modern individualization, albeit they attached different degrees of importance to the latter one.

Both pointed out that the transformation of social orders also caused a transformation in its central ethical category, the concept of honor,⁹ yielding to the universal and egalitarian concept of dignity.¹⁰ As Taylor pointed out, this is the only notion of dignity which is compatible with democratic society, albeit it also means that the forms of equal recognition are essential for a democratic culture.¹¹ If indeed there is no *pre-given* social order with a sacral legitimacy, and all men are equal, humans can only attain their dignity from each other, that is, their dignity shall depend on their mutual recognition.¹² In the emergence of modern individuality, the neutrality of the notion of dignity is furthered by the individualization of the concept which states who are those who contribute to the accomplishment of societal goals, and this will definitely entail the openness of concepts on social values to various forms of personal self-realization.¹³ Henceforward, Honneth says, the relative pluralism of values shall set the cultural background for directions on values.¹⁴ Therefore everything depends on what we define as this general horizon of values which we assume to be open to various forms of self-realization and to stand as a general framework for appreciation.¹⁵

Thus, when the unrepeatable individuality acknowledged to be valuable is paralleled by theoretical equality and broad indefiniteness of possible goals, the confirmation of individual identity and hence its formation shall depend on others at all times.

⁹ Charles Taylor: *The Politics of Recognition*. Id. kiad. 27; Honneth, Axel: *The Struggle for Recognition. Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Transl. by Joel Anderson. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, 123–125.

¹⁰ Taylor: id., Honneth: Op. cit. 125.

¹¹ Taylor: id.

¹² Cf. Honneth: Op. cit. 123.

¹³ Op. cit. 125.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Op. cit. 126.

3. Recognition and integrity. Axel Honneth

The purpose of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition profiled in his work *Kampf um Anerkennung* [Struggle for Recognition] was to set the ground for a "normative social theory", based on a model of the struggle for recognition borrowed from the young Hegel.¹⁶ The stake of this undertaking is not modest, because – just as Hegel's theory of recognition proposed a non-atomistic societal model opposing the self-centeredness of Hobbes' contract theory, where motives are not driven solely by interest, but also by morality – he also presents his own efforts in opposition with the almost dominant Darwinist-utilitarian explanations of academic social sciences (which derive social conflicts from the struggle for material resources).¹⁷

According to the worthy Hegelian model, the subjects' struggle for recognition acts as a drive in the development of morality, towards an even more inclusive recognition of individuality. Three levels of struggle for recognition can be distinguished: a) a relationship of recognition based on a loving relationship of the "natural moral life", b) legal recognition regulated by contracts, regulating the relationships of exchange between owners, and c) the brotherhood of the political community of "absolute morality", where every individual "recognizes himself in the other".¹⁸ As Honneth's purpose was to develop the Hegelian model, he goes on with attempting to demonstrate the theses of the theory with non-metaphysical means. In his undertaking, he calls upon the conclusions of contemporary psychology, legal theory and social science.

The social-psychological justification of the model is found in George Herbert Mead's theory, which attaches hopes to the notion of the objectified self ("me") against the unobjectifiable spontaneous self ("I"), on the one hand,¹⁹ and to Mead's discoveries on the acquisition of moral norms. According to these discoveries a) the morally important personal

¹⁶ Honneth: Op. cit. 1.

¹⁷ Op. cit. 160. At the same time, Honneth emphasizes that it was not at all his intention to state that *every* social struggle was morally driven. On the contrary, economic and moral drives must be distinguished. In the first case, the struggle is for insufficient goods, while in the second case, for the intersubjective conditions of personal integrity, and the second model was not meant to replace, but to complement the first one (Op. cit. 165.)

¹⁸ Op. cit. 18–24.

¹⁹ Op. cit. 73.

“self” emerging during the acquisition of norms represented by the “generalized other” becomes recognized – hence, dignified – in the community by recognizing others, and b) the subject acquires the sense of obligation and right at the same time.²⁰ Another important insight Honneth found in Mead was the need to develop another concept of recognition which stated that the individual was confirmed not only as a member of a community, but also as a subject with an individual life story.²¹ However, Mead did not elaborate the details of this form of recognition,²² but solely his ideas on the importance of participation in the social division of labor contributed a little to the materialization of this concept.²³ As Honneth pointed out, this laconic attitude was most likely caused by Mead’s intention to separate personal recognition from any value premises of the given particular community.²⁴ Yet, the problems he hoped to solve in this manner came back in another form, because – Honneth pointed out – the social value of individual goals was determined indeed by the common idea of good life, and thus, the functional division of labor could not be considered a value-neutral system either.²⁵

Nevertheless, Honneth leaves no doubt about the fact that his own theory based on Hegel is a third type of recognition (not an emotional or legal one, but personal, yet societal); in other words, its success depends on the possibility of social solidarity. Quite a hard task, considering that the solution would have to maintain the value-neutral nature of post-traditional society and the common horizon of goals and values which is a prerequisite to valuation in the first place.²⁶

The underlying thesis in this theory is that the reproduction of societal life takes place according to the imperative of mutual recognition, because the subjects can only establish a practical relationship with themselves if they learn how to see themselves from the normative perspective of their interacting partners, as the societal addressee thereof.²⁷ This is the partial basis of the three-part typology borrowed from Hegel, according to

²⁰ Op. cit. 79.

²¹ Op. cit. 80.

²² Op. cit. 88.

²³ Op. cit. 89.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ Op. cit. 91.

²⁷ Op. cit. 92.

which the basic forms of recognition are love, legal recognition and social appreciation.²⁸

Honneth makes use of the psychoanalytical object-relations theory to empirically demonstrate the distinction of the love relationship in the theory of recognition,²⁹ while the development of the problem of legal recognition refers to social theory models which distinguish the various forms of social respect, namely legal recognition and social appreciation (pl. Rudolph von Ihering, Stephen L. Darwall). The basis of distinction between the two is the precise characteristic that we respect in human beings in this or that case. In case of legal recognition, respect is given to general characteristics by which they are persons in the first place, while in case of social appreciation, the object of respect is the particular characteristics which distinguish them from other persons. Therefore, the relevant question for legal recognition is how one could define the constitutive characteristic of persons, while social appreciation raises the question of how one could define the reference framework for evaluation based on which the value of typical characteristics could be appreciated.³⁰

In Honneth's view, these competing goals create tension in the modern organization of social appreciation, because the values attached to the various forms of self-realization (moreover, even the definition of relevant features and abilities) will depend in each case on the dominant definition of societal goals. And as the latter one depends on the social group which is more successful in propagating its own performances and way of life in the public space, this "secondary interpretive practice" could be conceived as a cultural conflict.³¹ At the same time, under the circumstances of modern society, not only legal recognition, but social appreciation takes an individualized form and requires "symmetry", which means that under the circumstances of social solidarity, everybody is protected against the risk of collective humiliation, and therefore everybody is given the chance to experience themselves as being recognized as valuable for society, according to their performances and abilities.³²

²⁸ Op. cit. 93.

²⁹ Op. cit. 96.

³⁰ Op. cit. 113.

³¹ Op. cit. 126–127.

³² Op. cit. 130.

Albeit Honneth did not manage to definitively consolidate the criteria of social appreciation against the particularities of legal recognition, he stated the primary importance of distinguishing the two, because that would be the only effective guarantee of the post-traditional nature of the normative theory to be elaborated. We could add that one strength of stating this distinction – provided that the deficiencies of its definition could be eliminated – is that it allows the language of social theory to define the recognition deficits which fall outside the scope of legal codification, yet cause serious problems to modern societies and their members.

Besides, these deficits become particularly important in explicating the *modus operandi* of various forms of recognition. As the basic thesis stated that modern subject separated from any other identity-shaping background structure so that it could only create a healthy relationship with itself according to the recognition relations established with others, these recognition relations become integrated in his identity so structurally that they could hardly be identified when working successfully. At the opposite pole, there are the much more inevitable damages caused by the lack, negation or active breach of these relations. Therefore, in order to define the operating modes of the types of recognitions, Honneth takes use of the forms of disrespect (*Missachtung*). These – namely, violence, disfranchisement and disesteem or robbery of dignity (*denigration of ways of life*, *Entwürdigung*) – are not solely damages or injustices, but intoxicate the other person's relation with himself,³³ causing, in severe cases, injuries that could collapse the identity of the injured as a whole.³⁴

The first form – violence – challenges man's essential confidence (learned through love) in being able to coordinate his own body autonomously – that is, his essential self-confidence.³⁵ The second form, disfranchisement imperils man's moral self-esteem, as a sign of the fact that the disfranchised person is not attributed the same degree of moral reliability as the other members of society. Therefore, it typically results in loss of self-esteem, of the ability to relate to oneself as to a rightfully equal interlocutor of the fellow beings.³⁶ The third form, denigration (*Entwürdigung*)

³³ Id.

³⁴ Op. cit. 131–132.

³⁵ Op. cit. 132–133.

³⁶ Op. cit. 133–134.

depreciates the societal value of individuals or social groups, of individual or collective forms of self-realization, resulting in the loss of personal self-appreciation.³⁷

Moreover, all this means that the refusal of recognition could call forth symptoms which could somewhat raise the awareness of the subjects on their own situation,³⁸ making the experience of disgrace become a moral drive in the struggle for recognition. Indeed, the tension experienced after humiliation could only be dissolved by reacquiring the possibility of active rapport.³⁹

At the same time, the question remains as to what causes the experience of disgrace to lead to moral resistance in some cases and not lead to that in others.⁴⁰ Yet, it is evident that for disgrace to become such a drive, it is necessary to interpret the individual experiences of disgrace as typical key experiences of the entire group,⁴¹ that is, to have a shared semantics that “enables personal experiences of disappointment to be interpreted as something affecting not just the individual himself or herself, but also a circle of many other subjects”.⁴² Honneth specifically emphasizes the role of this semantics primarily *within the group*, in light of the process during which a social movement is organized around vindicating a certain type of recognition. However, the shared semantics is certainly at least as important during the *outward* vindication of the need for recognition.

Honneth places his approach between Kant’s universalism and substantive communitarian theories, endeavoring to offer an answer to how the tension between individualist value-neutrality and the necessity of a set of values enabling appreciation could be transcended. Accordingly, the morality as principle of universal respect becomes one of the protective measures which serve the feasibility of good life. However, this notion of good should not be interpreted as the expression of the values of an actual community, but rather as having to do with the structural elements of moral life.⁴³ Indeed, this notion of good has to be sufficiently abstract to meet the

³⁷ Op. cit. 134.

³⁸ Op. cit. 135.

³⁹ Op. cit. 138.

⁴⁰ Id.

⁴¹ Op. cit. 162.

⁴² Op. cit. 163.

⁴³ Op. cit. 172.

requirements of universality, but also to have more substantive substance than the Kantian reference to individual autonomy.⁴⁴ These are the requirements to be met by the model which sees the basis of the valuation of social relations in the forms of healthy self-rapport made possible by the three types of recognition relations – the possibility of basic self-confidence, legal safeguarding of individual liberty and autonomy, and promotion of man's healthy ascertainment of his own value.

We have to add that in spite of his equalizing endeavors, Honneth does not seem entirely impartial, not even when seeking a middle way between Kantian liberalism and substantive communitarianism. Indeed, the three types of recognition relations distinguished by him do not form at all a symmetric relationship with each other in terms of social relations and social competence, but practically the other two gain social relevance through the forms of legal recognition. For example, the love relationship which is in control of the emergence and sustenance of essential self-confidence turns out to be the more clear of distortion and constraint the higher the number of rights shared by the partners.⁴⁵ Then, while he interprets legal recognition as “[...] carrying a moral potential which could develop towards the broadening of generality and sensitivity to context, through social conflicts”,⁴⁶ he distinguishes the third sphere only by stating that the formal concept of post-traditional ethics would not be complete without the definition of the place of substantive values, and therefore it had to include the social solidarity recognition model which could only arise from common shared goals.⁴⁷

4. Recognition and identity. Charles Taylor

The injuries suffered because of the omission or denial of recognition play an important part of Charles Taylor's recognition theory too. In his essay *The Politics of Recognition*, he defines the thesis which makes the notion of recognition impossible to ignore in contemporary theories: “[...]

⁴⁴ Op. cit. 173.

⁴⁵ Op. cit. 176.

⁴⁶ Op. cit. 176–177; Cf. id: *Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Mit einem neuen Nachwort.* Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, o. J., 282–283.

⁴⁷ Honneth: *Struggle for Recognition.* Edition quoted. 178; Cf. *Kampf um Anerkennung*, op. cit. 285.

our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.⁴⁸ In this sense – Taylor points out – the absence of recognition does not solely mean the lack of due respect, but could inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. “Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.”⁴⁹

Taylor shows that the basis for this special importance of recognition is the dialogical nature of human life, the fact that our identities – not only in terms of their genesis, but also as processes – are shaped through dialog or occasional struggles with “significant others”.⁵⁰ This is the background against which we could define our position and attitude – eventually, our freedom.

However, Taylor points out that the principle of recognition could mean two very different principles in contemporary societal discourses. One of them is the principle of equal dignity, represented by the movement called “politics of universality”, the other one is the principle of respect for particular identities, proclaimed by the “politics of difference”. The two principles can be derived from each other to a certain extent; more precisely, the second one could be justified based on the first one, to a certain degree, but only to the extent to which the goal of social-political action is not the preservation and conveyance of some difference, because in that very moment, the neutrality of the dignity principle would be affected.⁵¹

According to Taylor, there are different concepts of value underlying the two different interpretations: more precisely, two radically different views on what is respectable in man. While the dignity principle refers to rationality potentially shared by every human being,⁵² the reference point for the difference principle is the individual or collective ability of identity shaping and therefore it demands equal respect for cultures already established. The two rival concepts of value tend to reproach each other, because the dignity principle sees a strong tendency to discriminate in the followers of

⁴⁸ Taylor: *The Politics of Recognition*. Edition quoted 25.

⁴⁹ Op. cit. 26.

⁵⁰ Op. cit. 32–33.

⁵¹ Op. cit. 40.

⁵² Op. cit. 41.

the difference principle, while the principle of difference accuses the adepts of the dignity principle of attempts of standardization and veiled endeavors of cultural hegemony.⁵³

Taylor attaches the two conflicting systems of values to two philosophical paradigms, namely to the social philosophical models hallmarked by Rousseau and Kant. Rousseau's model is based on perfect equality between the citizens, which could only be materialized in a society characterized by the strict sharing of goals. On the other pole, the Kantian model disregards goals and focuses instead on the equal rights of citizens. Taylor disproves the accusation that the Kantian model does not allow for the recognition of difference, because according to this model, no individual or community could deny freedom in the sense of autonomy for the other.⁵⁴ At the same time, the legal codification of difference could imply such a degree of support for a certain culture or lifestyle that it would restrict the individuals' freedom of choice; and this connects the politics of difference to Rousseau's homogenizing model of shared goal which was supposed to be contrary to the recognition of difference.⁵⁵

However, Taylor interprets the politics of difference *within* the broadly interpreted liberalism, insofar as he emphasizes that it solely makes sense if maximum respect is granted to a certain set of rights, even if in some cases it favors the survival of a culture against the principle of equal treatment.⁵⁶ Taylor makes no doubt about finding this type of approach to be the only chance for the ever more so heterogeneous and hence disrupted societies of our days, even more so as we have good reasons to doubt the liberal intellectuals' belief that liberalism is acceptable for everyone and offers a neutral ground for social communication. One should admit, he says, that in the multicultural societies of our days liberalism itself is a fighting creed,⁵⁷ and this takes us back to the problem of recognition, to the struggle for a dignified self-esteem fought by culturally oppressed communities. Henceforward, the stake for them is not being left alone, but for others to recognize the value of their culture.⁵⁸

⁵³ Op. cit. 43–44.

⁵⁴ Op. cit. 58.

⁵⁵ Op. cit. 59.

⁵⁶ Op. cit. 61.

⁵⁷ Op. cit. 62.

⁵⁸ Op. cit. 65.

Analyzing the possible premises underlying the expectation, Taylor reaches the following conclusions: a) In order to form a *stricto sensu* judgment on the value of certain cultures, we would have to know them to such an extent that it would mean the merging of cultural horizons, and this shows that the premise stipulates a non-actual judgment.⁵⁹ b) At the same time, the premise cannot be interpreted as an extension of the dignity principle, because in this case it would have to be difference-blind. And then this suggests that we still demand actual judgments on account of dignified recognition.⁶⁰ And albeit this approach is fully separable from a claim of inclusion (according to which we recognize a culture because it is somebody's culture), the pro arguments are usually put in words of judgment.⁶¹ Yet, Taylor suggests, judgments cannot be prescribed, because even if we did so, acceptance could not be distinguished from patronizing. This way, it is proven again that the exclusive politics of difference is paradoxically homogenizing.⁶²

Thus, Taylor reaches a similar conclusion as Honneth: there has to be a middle way and this middle way should be sought beyond legal codification, but besides the inviolable nature of basic rights. They agree, albeit place different focus on the elements, that the question is ultimately about morality (too), or, using the words of Honneth's English rendition, about a "foothold of morality within social reality".⁶³

⁵⁹ Op. cit. 67.

⁶⁰ Op. cit. 68.

⁶¹ Id.

⁶² Op. cit. 70.

⁶³ Honneth: *Struggle for Recognition*, op. cit. 138.

FLOARE CHIPEA – MELINDA DINCĂ

Identity from the Perspective
of Symbolic Interactionism**Preamble**

In the analysis of the relationship between individuals and ethnical groups which they are part of and which are assigned groups, a special relevance is attributed to the concept of *social identity*, defined as “the conscience of the individual who is part of a certain social group, together with a certain axiological and emotional signification due to the fact that he/she is a member of the group” (M.A. Hogg and D.Abrams, 1990, p. 7, apud Chelcea, S. 1998, p. 11). It is relevant to note that the identity’s process and assertiveness are performed through the processes of *identization* (by which the social actor is differentiated, he/she tends to become autonomous and to assert his/her individuality) and *identification* (which is the reverse process, by which the actor tends to get integrated into an ampler assembly – social group, community, social class, nation) – (Chelcea, S., 1998, p. 11).

We consider that the theme we have proposed to approach within the research regarding the building of neighborhood relationships between Romanians and Hungarians follows the explanatory framework of social identity theories, namely the one called *inter-group social identity*, issued by Henri Tajfel (1972, 1979, 1981) and that of *self-categorization*, issued by John C. Turner (1982, 1984, 1987), both of them observing the perspective of symbolic interactionism.

Identity approach from the perspective of symbolic interactionism

The identity theories are always incorporated into a more general interpretation of reality: they are “included” in the symbolic universe and in its theoretical rightfulness and vary together with the latter’s character (Berger și Luckman, 1999, p. 207).

Interactionism focuses on *the relationships between socio-cultural structure and individuals, who internalize their social prescriptions and then express them through specific identitary patterns*. Determinations are weak in this case, they exceed “natural” conditionings which are more susceptible to explain the dynamics of the real social game. General interest themes of symbolic interactionism are dominant for micro-sociology and social psychology. They focus around several distinct issues: self, social interaction, social behavior and social movements. Among major concepts and ideas promoted by this theoretical current and which are actively present in the current specialized language, there are: *sign interpretation community, self building through others’ appreciation, action’s pre-eminence in knowledge, situation defining, impression management, reflected self, total institution*. Interactionism is being promoted as sociologic orientation by the Chicago School. The current’s promoters are: William Isaac Thomas, Robert Ezra Park and George Herbert Mead.

A disciple and continuator of Mead, *Herbert Blumer* is the one who has introduced the notion of *symbolic interactionism* and has summarized the theory of the Chicago School up to year 1937 (in Vlăsceanu and Zamfir (coord.), 1998, p. 304), formulating the premises below:

(1) individuals relate to social world based on the significations it has for them;

(2) significations are constituted and developed during the process of social interaction;

(3) the interpretations attributed to significations vary according to the concrete situations in which individuals are involved.

The author emphasizes the interaction and the significations of the symbols transmitted within interaction. Symbolic interaction implies social actors, the significations they transmit about things and other individuals, the interpretations they attribute to these significations and the negotiations in which they are involved in social situations. Society, institutions, social classes or collective consciousness do not exist apart from social interactions (Larousse dictionary, 1996, p. 140).

As for the analysis of the symbolic interactionism, he states that the *identity is elaborated based on a dynamic relationship with other identities, within a psychologically, socially, culturally and historically determined context* (Barth, 1969, p. 117). Interactionist theory intends to reveal internal mechanisms of identity by exceeding the opposition between individual and collective.

Symbolic interactionism has associated identity achievement with self esteem and self acceptance. Self esteem is the evaluation of the own person: any action or reason developing the person's social identity shall implicitly improve the person's self image. The works of Blumer (1969), Cooley (1902), Mead (1934) and those of other founders of the interactionism bring to light the essentially social nature of the self.

The consciousness (*cum-scio* – together with) – for self and others – involves leaving the unconsciousness, the impulsions, the “natural” frameworks and self objectification through dispassion. Through consciousness, the individuals know themselves again and are differentiated one from the others. “I perceive myself and I identify myself by perceiving the other at the same time – beyond me and yet, inside my being. (...) I am no longer alone, I am *together with* (*cum-scio*): I decide together with, I act together with. (...) The phenomenon of consciousness would not be possible if there was not another self beyond each self” (Mircea, 1995, pp. 32-33). The appreciations of others build, modify and maintain the self perception. Therefore, there is a permanent interaction between our image and the others' image on us. In the work called “Human Nature and the Social Order” (1902), *Charles Horton Cooley* approaches the theme “of the interaction with others” by promoting the notion of “reflected self” which defines the self conception in the following phases:

- (1) Building the self image considering the individual's fears as well as his/her character features;
 - (2) using others' reactions to interpret their image on us;
 - (3) developing self perception, starting from these interpretations.
- The self perception may suffer modifications depending on the conclusions we adopt for each such evaluation (Yeung and King-To, 2003, pp. 843 – 879).

According to Cooley, *individuals evaluate any social phenomenon as a symbol of his/her own representations, this is why the society should be studied by taking into consideration perceptions, appreciations and individual representations*. The reflected self is built by imagining the understanding which the others have of us (the specialized literature has then called this process “empathic introspection”).

„*The looking glass*” or the metaphor of the reflected self may be summarized in the collocation: *we are what the others think we are*. Gradually, the individual becomes aware of the fact that the one who he/she is actually a reflection of what others think he/she is. Before becoming aware of himself/herself, the individual becomes aware of the “others’ self” (Bădescu, Dungaciu and Baltasiu, 1996, p. 321). “Within the group, each individual, consciously and unconsciously, opens himself/herself towards another one in order to know himself/herself. Therefore, self consciousness involves communication: (my) common positioning (with the others’ self). I am what I am (myself), only as opposed to another one. Reflection individualizes me” (Mîrcea, 1995, p. 70).

At the same time, a significant part within the theoretical clarifications aiming the understanding of identity was played by the theory of “interactional self” formulated by *Geroge Herbert Mead*, where social interaction is at the basis of individual awareness by reporting to “another generalized one”. Mead’s work derives from the theory of pragmatism (James, 1970). Considering these premises, Mead defines the self as being entirely a social product which is both a purpose creator and purpose oriented. The author makes a distinction between “I”, the progress moment for the constitution of a unique individuality and “me”, others’ significant interiorized attitudes. Consequently, Mead focuses on building and developing the individual self in the society, indicating that social institutions are only possible to the extent to which each integrated individual can take over the general attitudes of the other individuals. Social action results from the exchanges of symbols within interactions, taking the form of habits, rituals, rules, usuallu of institutions. The self does not occur at birth and does not represent a necessary consequence of biologic development. *Personality is entirely built by continuous social interaction processes within which individuals define themselves and continuously redefine themselves and the others along their life*.

Like Mead, whose contemporary he has been at the Chicago School (during 1894–1910), *William Isaac Thomas* proves that any human activity is social as it is performed in a socially determined situation. The analysis of the situation cannot be absent from the analysis of the [social] activity, of facts or social phenomena. The individual defines the situation through a selection process of an option which he/she considers optimal out of a range of available possibilities within a given social context. For this purpose, Thomas’ theory: *a social situation is real through the consequences of having it*

defined as being real, remains one of the main postulates in interactionism. (Thomas, 1928).

In his dramaturgical theory on social life, *Erving Goffman* states that individuals play various parts, manipulate rules, costumes, symbols in order to establish advantageous interactions which generate the self's positive valorization. Social actions are defined as human interactions on the "stage of social life". *Social stage is an assembly of objects, symbols and events given to the individual, but which the latter brings to life while interpreting different prescribed parts of "social drama"* (Goffman, 1959).

For the authors of symbolic interactionism, the metaphysical and experimental source of identities is the symbolic interaction. Priority is provided by the available and interpretable empirical interactions and is based on the assumption that we are social beings only through the social experience of the "others". Interactionists understand social reality as a negotiated order which permanently builds social identities which transcend the immediate situation and the individual's biography. *The manifestation of social identity is behaviorally limited by abilities and disabilities, structurally limited by the number and quality of socializing agents and dialectically limited by the social context which prefixes the set of socio-cultural expectations of the reference historic period.* These identity limitations are conceptualized as identity sources and are socially built by symbolic interaction. Consequently, territorial borders, ethnicity, gender or occupation are both limitations and social identity sources (Weigert, 1986, p. 170).

In symbolic interactionist perspective, sociology has for purpose the interpretative understanding of social action. At birth, we acquire starting coordinates from which the world of each individual develops through interpretative processes. From the perspective of the other one, the individual does not only ensure the action's origin point, but the inclusive final point as well, which the other one relates his/her identity to. A basic interpretative level is the evaluation of own senses which orient the individual from a social point of view. The physical body is transformed into an "appearance" which, from a social point of view, is full of meaning (Goffman, 1959). Once the individual has made his appearance, regardless if it is for the first time or not, he/she shall be predefined by the concrete social context. The appearance is implicitly accompanied by meanings for the others. A person is an *anthropos phenomenon* or a "human being through appearances" (Weigert, 1986, p. 165-183). The society protects identity

through mechanisms of social control. Doubting embodied identities generated by someone's presence means testing the entire balanced system of the person's self. Personal identity is achieved as follows: at the interface between social and physic and it transforms the "body" into "self".

The social structure may impose identity patterns on its members, to a large extent, apart from their will. It operates interactionally through the intentions, expectations and interests of the others and through the self awareness. Compliance, harmonization within cognitive, behavioral, individual and institutional structures represents the central objective of interpretative action. This cannot be about an absolutely neuter interpretation of the social structure or structural identity. Thus, identity should be understood as a process generated by the interactive relationship through which an individual builds a certain self representation with the others.

A. Mucchielli says that talking about identity implicitly means situating within social sciences and immediately within the subjectivist or interpretative paradigm. The approach of this epistemological position opposes to those of the positivist paradigm in natural sciences. The principles of interpretative paradigm have been systematized by E. Morin (Mucchielli, 1986, pp. 5-12) in his theory about complexity, in particular for human sciences, as follows:

(1) there is no given objective reality: human reality is a meaning reality and is built by social actors;

(2) there is not "one reality", but several realities built by different actors which coexist at the same time, none of them being "more true" than others (they do not exclude or deny each other through coexistence);

(3) a meaning reality does not have a cause or several causes, but several causality assemblies between which the reference reality itself has a contribution (denying the positivist principle of linear causality).

Consequently, identity cannot be a sum of psychological or cultural characteristics and cannot be achieved only due to direct causes or influences, but to an assembly of variable meanings depending on the actors' social situations.

**Psycho-sociologic perspective:
Theory of social identity and Theory of self-categorization**

Theory of social identity

The theory of social identity is intended as a socio-psychological theory of group relationships, of group processes and social self. It originates in Henri Tajfel's work on the perception of social factors, on cognitive aspects and social beliefs towards racism, prejudice and discrimination, but it has developed from a complex and complete theory issued from the collaboration with John Turner and other important authors of Bristol University, at the end of year 1970 (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Since 1980, many researchers in social sciences from Europe, North America and Australia have subscribed, through their field researches and published works, to the theory of social identity. The increased popularity of this theory lead to an impressive number of reference scientific works, to rigorous field researches, generating at the same time productive controversies in the specific scientific community (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995, pp. 255 – 269). In the early and mid 80's, John Turner has initiated a continuous effort for the epistemic development of the theory of social identity and for laying the basis of the theory of self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987). Although deliberately distinct from the theory of social identity in certain aspects, the theory of self-categorization may be considered as part of the same theoretical and meta-theoretical enterprise as that of social identity.

The development of the theory of social identity has intersected with the development of the European school of social psychology. At the end of 1960, European psycho-sociologists have postulated a socio-theoretical agenda visibly different from that of North-American psycho-sociologists (Jaspars, 1980; Tajfel, 1984), an agenda which recognizes the conceptual limitations of theoretical reductionism and intends to formulate a new framework to articulate the individual psychological processes with greater special forces (Doise, 1986; Lorenzi-Cioldi and Doise, 1990). Naturally, these new objectives have been projected upon the theory of social identity and upon the recently formed theory of self-categorization.

After 1980, the study of social identity has also involved the analysis of "subjective" references to the identification categories. Analyses differ-

ent from those of statistic data begin to appear, as well as other interpretative measures and other issues focused on the identification processes as defined by social identity (Dubar, 2003, p. 17).

The central idea of the theory of social identity is conceived around the concept of *social category* (nationality, political appurtenance, sports team, life style, gender, elderly group or work team, etc.). The category which the individual belongs to or the reference category which the individual wants to accede to, offers him/her a delimitation of the self in terms of defining features of the respective category – a self-defining to be constituted as an integral part of the conception on the self. People operate a set of such distinctive appurtenance categories and the importance of each of them on the influence of self conception varies. Each of these appurtenances is represented in the individual's mind under the form of an identity image which describes and, at the same time prescribes the attributes which the individual should possess as a member of the social category. Thus, when a salient social identity becomes active and at the same time a basis for self-orientation within a particular context, self-perception and orientation become normative stereotypes for the in-group and the inter-group behaviors acquire competitive and discriminatory properties at various levels, depending on the nature of group relationships. Social identities are not only descriptive and prescriptive, but evaluative as well. Identities deliver an appreciation (generally widely shared or consensual) about a social category of its members and of other relevant social groups. As social identities have these important self and hetero-evaluative consequences, the groups and their members are strongly motivated to adopt behavioral strategies in order to obtain or maintain in-group / out-group comparisons which favor the in-group and, naturally, the self.

Tajfel and Turner formulate in 1979 their approach on social identity through the following theoretical principles (Doise, Deschamps and Mugny, 1999, pp. 42-45):

(1) individuals search to maintain or to accede to a positive social identity;

(2) positive social identity is based, to a large extent, on favorable comparisons which can be made between the appurtenance group and other certain pertinent groups. The appurtenance group should be perceived as positive and distinct from other relevant groups;

(3) when social identity is not satisfying, the individuals shall seek to

leave the group which they belong to, in order to enter a positive group and/or to act so that their own group to become positive.

In order to explain the identity social phenomenon, the theory of social identity invokes the action of two socio-cognitive processes:

(1) *categorization* emphasizes the inter-group borders generating perceptions and stereotype normative actions, distributing individuals, self included, to contextually relevant categories. Categorization is a basic cognitive process which operates both on social and non-social stimulus to underline and focus on those aspects of the experience which have a subjective meaning within a particular context.

(2) *self intensification* orientates the process of the social categorization in favor of the in-group by means of stereotypes and inter-group normativity. The starting point is that individuals have the basic need of perceiving themselves positively in relationship with the others (to have a positive evaluation on the self conception) and the self intensification can be obtained by favoring the in-group as a result of the comparisons between the relevant in-groups and out-groups. For example, the object of comparisons shall be formed by those stereotypes which are favorable to the in-group rather than those which would not advantage him/her (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995).

The theory of social identity explains the social behavior through the relationship between the socio-cognitive processes of categorization and through the self intensification with the structure of subjective beliefs. This concept refers to the beliefs generated by the relationships between the in-group and significant out-groups. Beliefs – which should not necessarily be accurate pictures of reality and which are frequently only ideological constructions generated by the subjective perception of reality – aim the stability and legitimacy of the group's status relationships and the possibility of social mobility (psychological passing from one group to another) or the social change (psychologically changing the result of the self-perception evaluation as a consequence of the appurtenance to the in-group). The structure of subjective beliefs determines the adoption of some behaviors for the intensification of the self through positive evaluations of social identity.

Theory of self-categorization

The theory of self-categorization (in Turner, 1985; Turner and colab., 1987; Oakes and colab., 1994; Turner, 1991) is a development of the theory of social identity which profoundly analyzes the categorization's process as a cognitive basis of group behavior. The categorization process emphasizes both the perceptions of similarity between stimulus (physical objects or people) belonging to the same category and the perceptions of the differences between the stimulus belonging to distinct categories. The emphasizing effect occurs in the dimensions where categorizing beliefs are correlated with categorization. For example, when a football fan considers that the favorite football team is disadvantaged by referees, he/she shall have the tendency to exaggerate the inequity in the behavior of all football referees and consequently shall uniformly perceive both the out-group's members and the in-group's members, including himself/herself in this last category (all referees discriminate all the football players of the favorite team and all the football players of the favorite team together with their fans are victims of discrimination). The process of emphasized categorization indicates inter-group discontinuities, interprets social experience through subjective meanings and identifies those aspects which become relevant for action in particular contexts.

The categorization of the self and of the other in-groups' or out-group's members defines the social identity of individuals and emphasizes the perception of similarities (between groups' defining features) used for building social representations. Thus, individuals are "*depersonalized*": they shall be perceived as embodiment of the in-group member prototype rather than individual persons and shall react accordingly. Self depersonalization is the basic process activated by the group phenomenon – e.g. social stereotype, ethno-centrism and group cohesion, cooperation and altruism, emotional influence and empathy, collective behavior, shared norms and independence processes. The *depersonalization* concept keeps us away from the negative implications of other concepts, such as "dehumanization" and "deindividuation" and refers to a change process at the identity level (from the individual's uniqueness to his capacity of group member) which does not automatically mean the loss of identity. Through depersonalization, the self-categorization and behavior become compatible with the relevant contextual prototype of the in-group and transform the individuals into group members and individuality into group behavior.

According to the theory of self-categorization, individuals have representations of the social groups in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a subjective representation about the defining attributions (beliefs, attitudes, behavioral manifestations) of a social category, actively built representation from relevant social information in immediate or long-term concrete contexts.

The members of a social group are generally placed within the larger framework of the same social area (they are exposed to a set of similar information issued by a common source) and consequently, their prototypes become alike and socially shared. Prototypes do not usually represent lists of concrete attributes, but they are imprecise assemblies of orientating frameworks, made of contextually dependent features of the group members.

Prototypes define the group as an entity different from other groups. They are dynamic balances between competitive cognitive impulses inclining towards the minimization of intra-category differences and towards the maximization of inter-category differences – a process governed by the *principle of meta-contrast*. Prototypes are thus influenced by the out-group with the highest salience for the in-group. The modification of prototypes and thus of the self conception resides mostly in modifications of the comparisons with the out-group or changes in the out-group's salience during a determined period of time. Such changes are transitory due to the fact that they are related to the modification of the out-groups' salience for the in-group. Consequently, we can say that social identity is very dynamic: it reacts to the type and content of the in-group size related to the comparative social context in the immediate proximity (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995, pp. 255-269). This reaction of the social identity to the immediate social context is the main assumption of the theories of social identity and self-categorization. The cognitive system tends to maximize the meanings of each particular social context, engaging the available categorization with the highest relevance for the explanation or justification of similarities and differences between individuals. For example, the "woman" or "man" category shall not be enabled to provide the fundamental basis of self-categorization and depersonalization unless the differences and similarities created based on this categorization are important for the reference context. Once the categories are fully enabled based on the stimulus acting the differences and similarities, they are organized around the contextually relevant prototypes and shall be used as a fundament for emphasizing the intra-group

similarities and the inter-group differences. Therefore, maximizing and clarifying the inter-group segregation, the self-categorization, in the terms of in-group categories, shall depersonalize the behavior of individuals and shall model it according to the in-group prototypes.

The subjective salience of social categories is governed not only by the mechanic compliance of the category – stimulus couple, but by the motivated availability of the social category as well. Individuals try to renegotiate the reference framework in order to obtain the most favorable self conception in the respective context.

Theory of social identity and theory of self-categorization. Intersections

The theory of social identity and the pattern of self-categorization have the following fundamental characteristics:

(1) they are general theories of the social groups which do not apply depending on the group size, the psycho-social characteristics and the dispersion of members or other such specific features of the investigated group;

(2) they claim their appurtenance to the socio-cognitive theoretical framework;

(3) they incorporate the immediate context and at the same time they try to consider larger social structures, such as the analyzed social categories and the explanation of group behavior;

(4) they explain the register of group behaviors (such as: conformity, stereotype, discrimination, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, marginalization, social integration, social inclusion/exclusion phenomena, etc.) by formulating integrating theoretical principles;

(5) they approach an explanatory tactic for the source of group processes without appealing to interpersonal processes, a vision which diverges the two explanatory theories from the anchoring initially supported in psychology.

The process of self-categorization depersonalizes perception, feelings and action in the terms of contextual relevant prototype from the perspective of self defining through the in-group (as a result of the appurtenance to and the activism into the in-group). Consequently, the behavior is influenced by the category structure of society through the action of social identity and of the self-categorization implicit process. The context-

tual salience of certain particular social identities resides in the power of transmitting significations towards the concrete social context claiming them, and the contextual factors influence the form of cognitive-behavioral manifestations of identity. Due to the fact that social identity is attached to a value or to a set of values, a strong dynamic social complex occurs where groups try hard to obtain a positive social identity. Therefore, as Hogg and his collaborators have shown, inter-group relationships and social identity act interdependently.

The theory of social identity and the theory of self-categorization have stimulated the research in the field of social group processes, still having an important place within the field's heuristic theories. The prolific results of these field studies are now proving provoking hypotheses detached from the theory of social identity. Thus, prestigious researches, such as those of Worchel, Morales, Paez and Deschamps (1998, p. 228) indicate that social identity has a stronger influence upon the individuals in collectivist societies and in socio-centric cultures as compared to individualist and egocentric societies. On the other hand, dominant social groups and individualist cultures reflect an enhanced attention and a stronger valorization of individual resources, emphasizing the importance of the particular and individuality in the disadvantage of social identity. In groups with a dominant social status in the social hierarchy, personal identity aspects come first as well as the perception of group individuality and its differentiation from other groups. Dominated groups develop a self image centered on the roles participating to the development of the group, emphasizing the group homogeneity similarly to the groups which are part of collectivist societies. Generally, social groups have a positive self image and perceive themselves as superior to other groups for the aspects which are considered as group defining and group specific by members and they have the tendency to perceive out-groups as being more homogeneous than they really are. The authors also explore the relationship between the group social status and social identity: the individuals perceive the in-group as being superior to out-groups regarding the aspects which provide specificity to the in-group, even if they generally have a negative image on the in-group. General favoritism, which covers all the aspects, is more often met in groups with a high social status in the social network. Similarly, the individuals tend to have a heterogeneous perception on the in-group as compared to the out-group. The groups with a low statute or prestige may show favoritism for out-

groups whereas they perceive themselves as superior only due to the in-group specific dimensions, especially for attributes as sociability or expressivity of their own members.

Other researches have focused on the study of inter-group differentiation mechanisms. Deschamps shows that, when the dichotomous categorization condition is fulfilled, the differentiation is much stronger than when this condition does not exist. The co-variation pattern seems to apply differently: not only that the differences between intra-group homogeneity and inter-group homogeneity should not occur at the same time, but also the differentiation variations within the in-group and between groups depend to a great extent on the social status of the respective groups. Instead of considering inter-individual and inter-group differentiations as two extremes of a continuum, where they are mutually exclusive, we consider that, in concrete situations, the strongest the group identification is, the more important become the inter-individual differentiations within the group. In 1975, Codol (1975, pp. 475-501) has emphasized this assumption through the phenomenon called “self superior conformity” (*Primus inter pares*): the more an individual complies with group standards and the more he/she complies with the group, the more he shall have the tendency to perceive himself/herself as being different from the other group members, considering that his/her actions comply more with group standards than the behavior of the other members.

Therefore, the individuals have a cognitive centrism when they are being induced a representation of a dichotomous world, divided into two mutually exclusive categories, classes or groups. When this dichotomous representation exists, the favoritism to the own group shall be correlatively increased, as well as group differentiation (socio-centrism) and self-favoritism or inter-individual differentiation within the in-group between the self and the others (egocentrism) (Worchel et al., 1998).

Sociologic perspective: theory of identity

The theory of identity describes social behavior in terms of reciprocity relationships between the self and society. The theory of identity is associated with the interactionist-symbolic perspective according to which the society determines social behavior through the influence exerted on the

self (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969) and has also been partly developed to strengthen the central assumptions of symbolic interactionism through a set of empirically measurable proposals (Stryker, 1980). The theory of identity keeps back from the symbolic interactionism concerning the approach of society as “relatively undifferentiated whole” and proposes us to look at society as a “differentiated, yet organized complexity” (Stryker and Serpe, 1982, p. 206). This collocation is the basis of the whole theoretical approach: the self, as a reflection of the society should be considered as a multi-face and organized construct. The multiple self components are considered identities, more precisely, role identities. The notions of *salient identity* and *attachment* are used to describe the influence level of role identities upon the social behavior.

The theory of identity has its sources in the work of George Herbert Mead who presents numerous sociologic and psycho-social analyses. In a simplified form, Mead's work proposes the following formula: “*Society shapes self shapes social behavior*”. The theory of identity starts from the attempt of reciprocally substituting the terms society and self from Mead's formula. Thus, the theory of identity proves the utility of Mead's theory, but at the same time it keeps back from it, adopting an approach compatible with the contemporary sociologic metaphor which supports the idea that society is a mosaic of interaction patterns and relatively stable relationships, distinct, yet organized, inserted in group, organizational, community or institutional order, intersected by transversal borders such as class, nationality, age, gender, religion and other variables. The individuals live in networks of relatively reduced and specialized social relationships, through roles which ensure their participation to these networks. The patterns of interactions and social relationships bring to attention one of the arguments of symbolic interactionism: the probability of entering a concrete social network is influenced by larger social structures which this social network is part of. Therefore, social structures provide the networks with the role of borders for potential new participants. Back to Mead's formula, we can replace “social behavior” with the collocation: “role prescribed social behavior”. The theory of identity insists on finding an answer to the question: *Why a person, who can choose from several social roles related to the positions he/she occupies in a given network and who has several available behavioral options, makes a certain choice and not another one?* (Stryker and Burke, 2000, pp. 284-297; Stryker and Serpe, 1982, pp. 199-218).

Although the theory of identity is indissolubly related to the name of Sheldon Stryker (Stryker 1968, 1980, 1987; Stryker, Serpe, 1982; Stryker and Burke, 2000), the term is used as a reference in all similar theoretical works which admit the direct relationship between the multi-face self and social structure. This wide perspective, even if it is tributary and detached from the symbolic interactionism, it is not homogeneous. There are differences of nuance and interpretation between the works of the authors who subscribe to this theoretical approach (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995, pp. 255 – 269).

The general perspective of the theory of identity provides a valid theoretical framework for numerous works of the micro-sociologic literature oriented towards the analysis or role behavior. Thus, the theory of identity has most often focused on the individual consequences of identity processes.

As shown by the founders of the current themselves, Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, in 2000, the theory of identity has evolved in two complementary directions. Both of them subscribe to the theoretical and investigative direction of the symbolic structural interactionism (Stryker, 1980), whose objective is to understand and explain the ways in which the self influences the social behavior. The two main development directions of the theory of identity are:

- (1) –structural – the one which emphasizes the social structure as a source of identity and the relation between identities;
- (2) – cognitive – the one which focuses on the internal, cognitive processes of identity.

The two components are met on the analysis field of the behavior which represents the manifestation form of identities, often in interaction with the others. The first approach reaches the behavior research, transferring its attention from social structures to the relationships between salient identity and behavior. The second starts from the internalized social identity and the significations of the self for the individual. (he/she follows the “revert” evolution of the identity construction: the individuals focus first on their internalized identity and on the own perceptions about the significations of the self, then the two components being submitted by the individual to a comparative analysis whose result shall be either the confirmation of standard identity or the shaping of a discrepancy; and shall finally reach the option for a behavior which shall adjust the discrepancy by

modifying the situation, by leaving the context or by creating new situations). The structural approach explains the identity in cognitive terms and proves that the identity is confirmed, re-affirmed by finding situations or creating situations where it can be manifested. Cognitive approach proves that identities are built and determined by structural social contexts. Both approaches have understood that identities are related to social roles or to behavior manifestations by means of significations. The first approach argues that salient identities are cognitive schemas of the individual, by which he/she can define concrete social situations and, depending on which he/she may opt for the behavior which best fits his/her identity. The second approach indicates that the first connection between identity and behavior is given by common significations which are decoded similarly (Stryker and Burke, 2000, pp. 284 – 297).

Whereas most of the investigations have tried to prove the influence of social structure on identities, certain studies try to prove that the social structure may also be conditioned by the functionality of identities. Burke and Stets validate the hypothesis according to which when several individuals interact in a common situation, reaffirming their identities, the commitment degree for the activity they develop is increased. Thus, group relationships are solidified, interpersonal cohesion is emphasized, creating a new group social structure. Contrarily, when several individuals are involved in a common activity, but they cannot confirm their identities, interpersonal relationships are dissolved and group social structure is compromised, sometimes even dissolute. For example, Cast and Burke show that divorce is often imminent when the two partners cannot affirm their husband and wife identity (Stryker and Burke, 2000).

The theory of identity. Conclusions and future openings

To conclude, the theory of identity postulates the idea that the self reflects the wide social structure to the extent to which we consider the self as a collection of identities derived from the role positions (statuses) held by an individual. The society, seen as a whole of social status roles provides the individuals with the awareness of self-evaluation, self-positioning and influence the social behavior by inculcating role prescriptions as constitutive components of the self. Thus, the society's impact upon human behavior is

mediated by the individual's salient role identities. Further on, the theory of identity makes a distinction between various identity types according to the criterion of hierarchical arrangement in the identity structure of the self – a distinction used to explain the behavior differences and the affective experiences resulted. The relative salience of certain identities as compared to others is generated by the number and the intensity of the relationships generated by the particular social roles. Briefly, the central characteristics of the theory of identity are (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995):

- (1) the theory of identity represents an explanatory pattern of the self's construction where the social factors have a defining role;
- (2) it claims that the social nature of the self derives from the roles held by individuals in the social world;
- (3) widely, a distinction cannot be made between the role identities depending on their salience;
- (4) although the authors of the theory of identity research the interdependence connections between the self and the society, they are rather preoccupied with the individual results of identity processes.

The main challenge of the researchers of the theory of identity has been to understand and explain the ways the identities are manifested through behaviors. The authors have found the answer in the classical theory of the symbolic interactionism which considers that identities are self meanings developed from the meanings of the prescriptions attached to the social and counter-social roles (Stryker, 1980). From the symbolic-interactionist perspective, behaviors have significations and the connection between identities and behavior manifestations consists in the significations shared.

The implementation of these ideas requires measuring procedures, applicable both to behaviors and social identities. Thus, measuring methodologies have been developed for the semantic differential reflecting the signification's perspective as an internal and bipolar answer to the stimulus. Using the semantic differential, Burke and Reitzes show that the significations shared represent the connection between identity and behavior: the identities anticipate the behavior only when the signification of the identity corresponds to the signification of the behavior. The question "How do internalized definitions and significations relate to the social significations of behavioral manifestations?" has generated the development of a cybernetic pattern for the perceptual control. In the theory of identity, this pattern follows four central components synthesized in a graphic form in Fig. no. 1.




Fig. no. 1. Cybernetic pattern of perceptual control

The behavior described by this pattern is organized so that it modifies the social situation and the perceptive significations on the self in order to make them comply with those of the standard identity. If the behavior is a function of the relationship between the individual's perceptions in a concrete social situation and the significations of the self, then the behavior may be considered as a purpose oriented manifestation: the behavior changes the social situation to make it comply with the significations generated by the self-perception in the concrete social situation with the significations inculcated in the individual's standard identity. Through their behavior, individuals *adjust* their situational reality according to the available perceptive grid and to the defining significations of the standard identity which they have previously acquired. This explanatory pattern reveals the fact that, in a new social context, we shall enable the role identity corresponding to the actual situation (standard identity), but this implementation of the role prescriptions acquired is not enough.

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GÁBOR FLÓRA

Paralelism, contradicție și complementaritate în geneza identităților și ideologiilor naționale din Transilvania

Introducere

Transilvania, o regiune istorică a cărei evoluție s-a caracterizat prin interacțiunea permanentă pe teritoriul ei a mai multor identități culturale, are importante tradiții de multiculturalitate și autoguvernare regională. „În Evul Mediu a făcut parte din statul maghiar, bucurându-se însă, datorită așezării ei geografice îndepărtate, de un grad ridicat de autonomie administrativă și politică.”¹ După căderea Ungariei independente în 1541, regiunea a devenit un principat autonom sub suzeranitate turco-otomană, menținându-și acest statut mai mult de 150 ani, până la începutul secolului al 18-lea, când a fost inclusă în Imperiul Habsburgic ca o unitate administrativă autogovernată. Începând din 1867, regiunea a aparținut Ungariei în cadrul Monarhiei Austro-Ungare, devenind parte a României după disoluția statului dualist la sfârșitul primului război mondial.

În privința libertăților religioase trebuie menționat că Edictul de la Turda din 1571 a fost primul document legal din Europa care a garantat deplina egalitate și autonomie pentru o serie întreagă de confesiuni, incluzând bisericele catolică, reformată, luterană și unitariană. O excepție majoră a constituit-o confesiunea ortodoxă, care în limbajul juridic al vremii a avut doar statutul de „tolerat” în loc de „receptat”, ceea ce înseamnă că autonomia ei a fost recunoscută, fără însă a se bucura de statutul politic privilegiat oferit celorlalte patru comunități religioase.²

Dat fiind că în Transilvania diversitatea etnică era strâns legată de diferențierea religioasă, consacrarea drepturilor comunităților bisericești avea

¹ R.W. Seton-Watson, *Transylvania: a Key-Problem*. Oxford University Press, 1943, pp. 2–3.

² Asupra acestei subiect vezi: Paul Chiș (2009), *Bisericele Protestante în spațiul românesc. Scurt istoric*. <http://clujulevanghelic.ro/2009/06/19/bisericele-protestante-in-spatiul-romanesc-scurt-istoric-paul-chis/>

importanță și din perspectiva recunoașterii drepturilor comunitar-etnice. În același timp, reglementarea statutului diferitelor comunități etnice poate fi regăsită chiar în instituțiile politice medievale ale regiunii. În mod similar cu alte structuri politice feudale din vestul și centrul Europei dreptul participării în viața publică a Principatului a fost limitat la membrii clasei nobiliare.

Ceea ce este specific însă pentru sistemul politic transilvan este, pe de o parte, existența a trei ordini („natio”) nobiliare, în loc de unul, iar pe de altă parte, structurarea celor trei „națiuni” de-a lungul unor linii despărțitoare având și o semnificație etno-regională. Deciziile politice importante trebuiau luate prin consensul celor trei *natio*, care aveau un statut egal și coparticipativ, atât la nivel central, prin reprezentanții lor aleși, cât și în cadrul subregiunilor care le-au fost alocate spre autoguvernare. Sașii au primit partea de sud a regiunii unde au format așa numitul Universitas Saxorum care le-a fost oferit prin edictul regal *Andreanum*.³ Secuii au avut ținutul lor autonom în părțile estice.⁴ Restul principatului a fost administrat de nobilimea din comitate. Celelalte comunități care s-au stabilit în regiune – cele mai importante fiind cea armeană și cea evreiască – au primit dreptul de așezare, însă nu și cel de teritorialitate, care era rezervat în exclusivitate secuilor și sașilor. Edictul regal din 1224 le-a garantat acestora din urmă drepturi teritoriale, ceea ce a devenit principala garanție a structurii sociale a ținuturilor pe care le-au populat.

În atari particularități ale dezvoltării istorice pot fi regăsite rădăcinile timpurii ale puternicelor tendințe autonomiste care au influențat evoluțiile politice moderne și mentalitățile din regiune. O parte a „moștenirii transilvane” în această privință este și tendința spre o anumită moderație politică, spre o atitudine cumpătată și flexibilă, menită să asigure perpetuarea existenței statale – și implicit identitare – în condiții istorice dificile, exprimată poate cel mai elocvent prin cuvintele contelui Teleki Mihály, cancelarul principelui Apafi: „Noi niciodată nu facem ceea ce ar fi necesar, ci totdeauna numai ceea ce este posibil.”⁵

Deși avea asemenea tradiții de autoguvernare și de instituționalizare a pluralismului etnic și religios care îi confereau o identitate regională distinctă, și parcă o „predestinau”, să perpetueze în splendoarea diversității ei, „Țara

³ Georg Eduard Müller, *Die sächsische Nationsuniversität*. Hermannstadt, 1928.

⁴ Bodor György, ‘Az 1562 előtti székely nemzetségi szervezetről’ *Történelmi Szemle*, 1983, pp. 281–305.

⁵ Gyula Sándor, ‘Hívás és felelet’ *Háromszék*, 17 noiembrie 1994.

de Dincolo de Păduri” nu a putut deveni totuși o „Elveție a Estului”. Nu există o „națiune transilvăneană”, și nicio națiune nu-și limitează noțiunea de patrie la Transilvania. Ideea „patriei transilvănene” a fost (...) înlăturată de pe scena istoriei(...) de ideologiile statelor naționale maghiară și română, rivale și la fel de exclusiviste în privința Transilvaniei.”⁶

Sacralizarea „teritoriului național” și politizarea intensă a identității teritoriale, ca expresie a competiției celor două identități naționale mutual exclusive și opuse, a făcut ca dezbaterea pe acest subiect să capete treptat o puternică încărcătură simbolică și ideologică. Într-adevăr – așa cum remarcă A.D.Smith – „dacă popoarele aflate în contact au o reprezentare mentală colectivă diferită a teritoriului geografic și istoric folosit în comun, a situației politice, respectiv simbolizează în mod diferit evenimentele trecutului, conștiința națională și/sau etnică diferită implică atitudini sau acțiuni sociale diferite.”⁷

Pornind de la aceste premise, în prezentul studiu ne propunem o succintă analiză a semnificațiilor conceptuale fundamentale – legate îndeosebi de legitimarea istorică, teritorială și etnodemografică – în procesul formării și dezvoltării ideologiilor naționale în Transilvania:

– În ce context și cu ce rezultate argumentul dreptului istoric, al celui teritorial și al celui demografic au fost utilizate de către diferitele ideologii naționale?

– Care a fost natura soluțiilor și strategiilor politice folosite în cursul integrării regiunii în cadrul teritorial și politic al statului național?

– Ce rol au avut factorii istorici, teritoriali și etno-demografici în acest proces ?

Studierea semnificațiilor – trecute, dar mai ales prezente – ale unor astfel de aspecte esențiale, care au marcat profund dezvoltarea paralelă și adeseori opusă a celor două ideologii naționale – cea românească și cea maghiară – poate reprezenta, dincolo de relevanța științifică, și un pas în direcția reconcilierii interetnice, printr-un efort îndreptat spre depășirea preconcepțiilor și atitudinilor partizane în cercetările din domeniu. În acest sens, lucrarea noastră se dorește a fi bazată pe o reconstrucție și analiză a faptelor și ideilor cât mai obiectivă cu putință. Considerăm că o schimbare

⁶ Molnár Gusztáv, 'Regionalism civic (1)' *Provincia*, 28 iunie 2000.

⁷ A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin, 1991 apud Valér Veress 'Identitatea minoritară ca oglindă a identității majoritare. Analiza comparată a identității minorităților maghiare din România, Serbia, Slovacia și Ungaria'. In: V. Boari, S. Gherghina, R. Murea (eds.) *Regăsirea identității naționale*. Iasi: Polirom, 2010, p. 131.

de durată în abordarea științifică a relațiilor interetnice din regiune va putea fi realizată numai în condițiile transformării concepțiilor tradiționale ale legitimității naționale, care exprimau competiția dintre două ideologii naționale rivale, în favoarea unei abordări centrate pe acceptarea pluralismului identitar ca o trăsătură firească a vieții în spațiul multicultural transilvan.

Particularități ale tranziției spre modernitate

Cauzele dezvoltării în Transilvania ale unor ideologii naționale conflictuale și chiar opuse – care veneau în contradicție cu trecutul multicultural și instituționalizarea pluralismului etnic, cultural și religios în cadrul regiunii – trebuiesc căutate în particularitățile formării identității naționale în țările din spațiul est-european, la care se adaugă factorii ce derivă din specificitatea evoluției istorice transilvănene.

1. *Caracteristici ale vieții statale*

Datorită faptului că marea majoritate a unităților politice moderne din vestul Europei s-au constituit din punct de vedere teritorial-istoric ca succesoare ale statelor centralizate medievale, cu o continuitate îndelungată pe un teritoriu statal bine definit, cetățenii acestor țări erau puternic preconșionați să se identifice cu statul, care le oferea statutul deplin de membrii egali ai comunității politice. Prin concomitența afirmării drepturilor cetățenești individuale și a procesului formării statelor naționale moderne, identitatea națională din țările occidentale a putut căpăta o puternică semnificație *civică*. Diferențele etnice și culturale au jucat un rol secundar în constituirea noilor structuri de putere și erau politizate într-o măsură mai mică. În schimb, în zona est-europeană condițiile istorice diferite au impus un alt model. Existența imperiilor multiculturale și întârzierea modernizării socio-economice a determinat fragilitatea societății civile și astfel a întărit importanța apartenenței etnice, a limbii și a religiei în această parte a Europei.

Pe teritoriul Imperiului Austriac de care Transilvania a aparținut de la începutul secolului 18, alternativele pentru constituirea statelor naționale erau limitate de anumite particularități cu efect restrictiv: caracterul multi-etnic atât al fostelor state medievale înglobate în Imperiu cât și a regiunilor istorice ale acestora; nivelul slab de dezvoltare a societății civile și predominanța factorului etnic în procesul de formare a națiunilor; absența continuității

cu entitățile politico-teritoriale medievale; supraviețuirea autonomiilor și autogovernărilor regionale și etno-teritoriale. Procesul s-a desfășurat în mod anevoios mai ales datorită faptului că popoarele incluse în structura Imperiului și-au pierdut continuitatea istorică a propriei statalități independente (e.g. maghiarii și cehii) sau nu au avut nicidecum un stat propriu (rutenii și slovaci, între altele).

Astfel, crearea identității naționale a coincis în timp, în cazul popoarelor din regiune, cu procesul constituirii (sau reconstituirii) „propriului” stat, având acum atribuțiile unui stat național. Transilvania, o „țară de frontieră”⁸ prin excelență, era în mod deosebit marcată de această lipsă de continuitate politico-statală. Dat fiind că regiunea a avut prin excelență un caracter mixt din punct de vedere etnic, era previzibil ca aspirațiile pentru construirea statului național ale diverselor comunități etnice să conducă la revendicări rivale, cu atât mai mult, dacă luăm în considerare că logica gândirii naționaliste împinge prin natura lucrurilor pe purtătorii ei să militeze pentru stabilirea unor frontiere de stat care să cuprindă în interiorul lor pe cât mai mulți conaționali.

O posibilitate ipotetică – care a trebuit abandonată însă aproape de la început – a fost ideea creării unui stat național german (austriac), bazat pe dominația politică, culturală și lingvistică a elementului german pe întregul teritoriu. Deși o asemenea idee s-ar fi bucurat probabil de un anumit sprijin din partea germanilor din Transilvania, Bohemia, Moravia, Silezia etc., nici ponderea demografică, nici poziția politică a acestor comunități nu a fost îndeajuns de puternică pentru a oferi fundamentul necesar implementării unui asemenea plan.

Instituțiile politice tradiționale ale provinciei, pe care puterea imperială era nevoită să se sprijine pentru a-și putea asigura dominația stabilă, au fost în mare măsură construite pe privilegii de natură etnică și teritorială. De aceea guvernul de la Viena trebuia în anumite limite să respecte identitatea culturală a subiecților săi transilvăneni. Cu toate acestea, Habsburgii au făcut tot ce le-a stat în putință să submineze potențialul pericol pe care-l putea reprezenta ascensiunea unor forțe politice naționale alternative. Satisfacerea unor revendicări identitare ale românilor în timpul lui Ferdinand I, Carol III și Maria Tereza era înfăptuită probabil și în scopul de a slăbi ponderea

⁸ Expresia a fost utilizată de George Cushing într-o prelegere intitulată *Hungarian Cultural Traditions in Transylvania* [Tradiții culturale maghiare în Transilvania], publicată de School of Slavonic and East European Studies din Londra în 1984.

elementului etnic maghiar, considerat competitorul național alternativ cel mai puternic în regiunile estice ale Imperiului.

2. Modernizare desincronizată

Oricare ar fi fost rațiunile în spatele sprijinului limitat oferit de Viena pentru satisfacerea nevoilor culturale românești, acest factor a contribuit neîndoielnic la crearea identității naționale moderne în regiune. În schimb, instituționalizarea „celelalte de-a doua iobăgii” a însemnat un pas înapoi, atât pentru dezvoltarea economico-socială cât și pentru cea națională. Consolidarea relațiilor feudale într-o perioadă când anumite țări din Europa de Vest tocmai au reușit să deschidă cale liberă spre modernizare prin eliminarea sistemului servituților, nu poate fi interpretată decât ca un regres, o mișcare cu fața spre trecut, care a împiedicat în mare măsură crearea unor puternice instituții civile și a unei puternice identități civice.

În mentalitățile individuale și colective s-a înrădăcinat puternic ideea că statutul unei persoane este dependent nu doar de performanțele și valoarea individului respectiv ci în mare măsură și de apartenența la o anumită comunitate, definită mai ales prin criterii etno-naționale. În asemenea condiții, la destrămarea imperiului apartenența etnică a devenit singurul liant capabil să creeze solidarități organice și să inspire loialitate membrilor comunității, iar viitoarele unități politico-teritoriale trebuiau cu necesitate să-și dobândească legitimitatea prin asumarea reprezentării identității și intereselor unei anumite comunități etnice. Pentru a fi măcar parțial eficientă, cultura civică, atât cât s-a putut ea forma în condițiile neprielnice ale regiunii, trebuia clădită cu necesitate – și a și fost clădită – pe această structură de solidaritate etno-comunitară preexistentă. Minoritățile etnice se găseau excluse prin definiție din retorica oficială de legitimare, fiind nevoite fie să opteze pentru asimilarea în națiunea dominantă, fie să-și construiască concepții identitar-naționale proprii.

În timp ce în Occident națiunea modernă s-a dezvoltat ca expresia respingerii hotărâte a privilegiilor feudale, semnificând puterea „poporului” și egalitatea în fața legii a tuturor cetățenilor, în Transilvania – ca o consecință a slabei dezvoltări urbane și burgheze – nobilimea a fost cea care a preluat ideea națională, folosind-o în parte pentru prezervarea pozițiilor sale tradiționale de putere. În loc de eliberarea iobagilor de sub servituțiile feudale și proclamarea deplinei egalități a cetățenilor, într-o primă etapă s-a petrecut exact opusul: comunitățile tradițional libere, omogene din punct de vedere

social și etnic, au început să-și piardă drepturile lor speciale ca urmare a unui proces treptat de diferențiere internă, care a condus în final la crearea unei clase nobiliare unitare, la care s-au adăugat acum și membrii privilegiați ai celorlalte două *natio*. Nu numai că membrii elitei nobiliare nu au fost excluși din națiune, ci dimpotrivă: poziția dominantă trecută și prezentă a diferitelor elite politice, ce s-au autodefinit acum ca elite naționale, a devenit cel mai puternic argument în susținerea revendicării unui statut privilegiat pentru națiunile ale căror reprezentare a fost asumată de aceste elite.

Așadar, în cazul Transilvaniei putem vorbi de o fază premodernă-prenațională de mobilizare ideologică și politică a elitelor, care a precedat și a pregătit mobilizarea națională propriu-zisă. Tranziția de la argumentația premodernă la cea având caracteristici moderne s-a făcut treptat, iar procesul n-a fost de fapt completat pe deplin nici până în zilele noastre. Desincronizarea dezvoltării socio-economice cu cea din vestul Europei a marcat profund întreaga evoluție a ideologiilor și politicilor naționale din regiune.

3. *Semnificațiile etnoculturale ale sistemului politic medieval*

Instituționalizarea pluralității etno-culturale în cadrul sistemului politic medieval al Transilvaniei prin instituția celor trei *natio* și a celor patru religii „receptate” a exprimat deopotrivă egalitatea comunităților incluse în structurile de putere cât și poziția subordonată a celor sortite să rămână în afara acestor structuri. Referindu-se la interpretarea istoriografică a acestei situații, Sorin Mitu evidențiază existența unei linii clare de diferențiere – deloc întâmplătoare – între pozițiile adoptate de către istoricii români și punctele de vedere exprimate de către istoricii maghiari: În timp ce “istoriografia română insistă asupra discriminării la care erau supuși românii, de natură să compromită tocmai ideea de toleranță, [...] istoriografia maghiară preferă să aprecieze jumătatea <plină> a paharului, contrapunând toleranța confesională din Transilvania secolului al 16-lea războaielor religioase care sfâșiau tot atunci alte părți ale Europei.”⁹

Referirile la existența celor trei *natio* în documentele medievale nu înseamnă, evident, că atunci am fi avut națiuni în sensul modern al termenului, adică cel conectat cu identitatea națională. Apartenența la națiunile politice medievale a fost condiționată de statutul socio-politic și/

⁹ Sorin Mitu, ‘Iluzii și realități transilvane’ In: Gabriel Andreescu, Gusztáv Molnár (ed.) *Problema transilvană*, Iași: Polirom, 1999, p. 73.

sau teritorial al indivizilor, fiind expresia anumitor privilegii. Iobagii maghiari sau saxoni erau în aceeași situație ca cei de etnie română, evident excluși din națiunea politică, în timp ce nobilii de origine românească făceau parte din clasa nobiliară maghiară, asimilindu-se treptat în aceasta și din punct de vedere etno-cultural. Anumite precondiții ale inegalității naționale din epoca modernă pot fi identificate însă chiar în semnificațiile etnice ale inegalei distribuții a accesului la putere întruchipată de instituția celor trei *natio* recunoscute, datorită faptului că drepturile indivizilor, dar și a comunităților politice au fost alocate în mare măsură în funcție de criterii etno-teritoriale. Deși termenul de „*natio*” trebuie înțeles în primul rând ca o comunitate de drepturi și privilegii, structurarea celor trei „națiuni” transilvănene nu era nicidecum lipsită de semnificații etnice și culturale.

În primul rând, rațiunea constituirii celor trei *natio* a fost necesitatea asigurării participării la exercițiul puterii și implicit a loialității diferitelor comunități etno-regionale prin includerea lor în sistemul de guvernare. În al doilea rând, două din cele trei „națiuni” (secuii și sașii) erau omogene din punct de vedere etnic, în timp ce a treia -nobilimea din comitate- deși a inclus persoane cu origini etnice diverse, a fost maghiară în spiritul, mentalitatea și stilul ei de viață. În al treilea rând, faptul că românilor, marginalizați și din punct de vedere socio-economic, nu li s-a permis să formeze propria lor *natio*, așa cum nici biserica ortodoxă nu s-a bucurat de statut egal cu confesiunile catolică, reformată, luterană și unitariană, era o expresie evidentă de inegalitate etno-confesională, ceea ce a avut consecințe importante asupra dezvoltării identității naționale românești.

Reflectând asupra cauzelor care au generat excluderea românilor din rândul națiunilor politice transilvănene, Gusztáv Molnár consideră că „structurile tip regim de stări ale Transilvaniei, cristalizate în secolul al 14-lea și rămase în funcțiune în secolele ce au urmat, au stat neputincioase în fața problemei românilor de religie ortodoxă și cu instituții locale de origine slav-bizantină. Incompatibilitatea celor două sisteme de instituții, cel central-european, de origine occidentală și cel sud-est-european, de origine bizantină, nu lăsa pur și simplu posibilitatea integrării românilor ca un corp social.”¹⁰

Desigur, această problemă merită o cercetare mai aprofundată. Oricare ar fi fost însă motivele excluderii elitei românești din rândul celor trei națiuni nobiliare, este neîndoielnic că nerecunoașterea românilor ca națiune politică și faptul că nu au putut beneficia (decât într-o măsură foarte mică)

¹⁰ Molnár Gusztáv, ‘Regionalism civic (2)’ *Provincia*, 28 iunie 2000.

de conducerea spirituală a propriei lor elite nobiliare (aceasta fiind inclusă în nobilimea maghiară și în bună parte maghiarizată), a constituit un important factor de influențare a ideologiei lor naționale și în același timp – într-un mod ce poate părea paradoxal – un factor catalizator în procesul afirmării identității naționale românești.

Raportarea la identitățile comunitare premoderne: continuitate și discontinuitate

Ca urmare, deși analiza comparativă a factorilor ce au contribuit la formarea identităților naționale implică cu necesitate și o serie de determinante de natură economică, socială și culturală, totuși se poate afirma că principalul element de diferențiere în constituirea conștiinței naționale moderne a maghiarilor, românilor și germanilor din Transilvania pare să fie legată de pozițiile de putere inegale ale elitelor lor politice.

Dincolo de similitudinile importante, între cele două ideologii naționale principale existau și diferențieri semnificative. În timp ce mișcarea națională maghiară din Transilvania apărea de la început ca fiind integrată în ansamblul activismului național maghiar, apariția concepției naționale române din Ardeal a fost premergătoare răspîndirii ideii naționale românești în Principatele Dunărene. Spre deosebire de maghiarii din Transilvania care s-au definit de la început ca membrii inseparabili ai națiunii maghiare, românii din regiune s-au considerat o comunitate politico-teritorială de sine stătătoare, având propria lor individualitate identitară. Tocmai în această calitate și-au asumat elitele românești transilvănene rolul de pionerat în formarea ideologiei naționale românești în ansamblu, care s-a răspândit apoi prin contribuția lor în teritoriile de la Sud și Est de Carpați.

În privința statutului politic moștenit din epoca premodernă, maghiarii au ocupat în mod evident poziția cea mai favorabilă. Cu toate că statul ei medieval s-a prăbușit, elita nobiliară maghiară era într-o poziție comparativ bună să-și asume de timpuriu rolul conducător în „renașterea” națională opusă tendinței de dominare politică și culturală germană. Două din cele trei *natio* din Transilvania – nobilii comitatelor și secuii – erau maghiari prin cultură, mentalitate și limbă. Statutul privilegiat din trecut al elitelor maghiare, care era extrapolat în ideologia națională modernă asupra întregii populații de etnie maghiară, conferea națiunii maghiare – în viziunea ideologilor ei naționali clasici – rolul conducător în statul care urma a fi creat.

Atât precondițiile politice cât și cele spirituale ale unei astfel de evoluții erau prezente: „Dat fiind faptul că cei mai mulți maghiari care aveau o educație făceau parte din clasa nobiliară, „ – consideră C.A. Macartney – „aproape toți scriitorii și intelectualii lor aveau o origine nobilă, iar ei în mod instinctiv au imaginat națiunea prin prisma clasei de care aparțineau... Spiritul nou (*al modernității nm.*) nu a diminuat câtuși de puțin exclusivismul social și politic al naționalismului maghiar”.¹¹ Dintr-o atare perspectivă mișcarea națională maghiară trebuie probabil considerată în prima ei fază ca reprezentând și o încercare a nobilimii de a-și construi o nouă legitimitate, prin combinarea unei ideologii moderne și esențialmente egalitare cu o viziune pronunțat conservatoare despre rolul „predestinat” și „etern” al clasei dominante tradiționale în slujba națiunii.

În schimb, în cazul românilor, cei mai importanți determinanți au fost lipsa participării politice în trecut, excluderea lor din rândul celor trei „natio”, statutul socio-economic dezavantajos și absorbirea treptată a păturii privilegiate române în nobilimea maghiară. În consecință, rolul conducător în mișcarea națională a trebuit să fie asumat de către intelectualitatea relativ recent formată, și mai ales de către Biserica Unită cu Roma. Toate acestea au contribuit la rolul crucial al factorului etnic în formarea conștiinței naționale românești.” Termenul de națiune este utilizat – în *Lexiconul de la Buda*, la Gheorghe Șincai, Samuil Micu, Dimitrie Țichindeal ori Ion Budai-Deleanu – ca un sinonim pentru <neam>, având rostul de a descrie comunitatea de limbă, sânge, obiceiuri și credințe a românilor. Această accepțiune, curentă la scriitorii Școlii Ardelene, va impune norma semantică pentru secolele al 19-lea și al 20-lea”.¹²

Germanii (sașii) au ocupat dintr-o anume perspectivă o poziție intermediară în acest tablou. Comunitatea săsească nu putea aspira nici la un rol dominant exclusiv în Transilvania, nici la crearea propriului stat național pe acest teritoriu. Ea a beneficiat în schimb de tradiții îndelungate de autoguvernare etno-politică și teritorială și a putut profita de orientarea ei natural-prohabsburgică. Cu toate că atât omogenitatea etnică cât și cea socială a sașilor a devenit din ce în ce mai alterată iar conducerea comunității a fost preluată de pătura burgheză bogată din orașe, includerea iobagilor sași împreună cu patriciatul săsesc în cadrul aceeași confesiuni luterane a constituit un puternic factor cultural omogenizator și o precondiție importantă a formării conștiinței lor naționale.

¹¹ C.A. Macartney, *Hungary: A Short History*. Edinburgh 1962, p. 130.

¹² Daniel Barbu, ‘Cetățenia și statul-națiune’ *Provincia*, 21 mai 2000.

Nivelul comparativ înalt al dezvoltării economico-sociale a localităților săsești din Transilvania și puternicele lor legături politice și culturale cu germanii de pretutindeni au făcut ca regiunea saxonă să devină foarte importantă pentru Imperiul Habsburgic. Cumulate, aceste condiții au determinat o evoluție diferită a identității comunității germane față de cea română și maghiară. Deși, evident, făceau parte din „lumea germană” din punct de vedere lingvistic, cultural și religios (ca adepți ai bisericii luterane), sașii nu au urmărit integrarea în statul german, păstrându-și o identitate etno-teritorială distinctă, în care atașamentul față de pământul Transilvaniei apărea ca un element fundamental. Exprimând această poziție, conducătorul sas Rudolf Schuller sublinia că „ei nu voiau să fie pur și simplu germani, ci germani din Siebenbürgen (Transilvania nn.)”¹³

Evoluția ideologiilor și mișcărilor naționale în Transilvania, pare deci să confirme ipoteza avansată de Ernest Gellner, conform căreia „sub impactul unei anumite forme socio-economice (...) apar atât clase (...) cât și națiuni, care devin semnificative din punct de vedere politic și adeseori determină schimbări ale frontierelor atunci *când ele converg*. (subl. aut.) Tensiunea economică, în cazul în care este semnalizată și întărită de diferențe culturale, devine potentă din punct de vedere politic și determină o retrasare radicală a hărții.”¹⁴

Este adevărat că gânditorul britanic vorbește aici despre formarea națiunilor în contextul industrialismului modern, care a caracterizat dezvoltarea din vestul continentului, însă concluzia sa cu privire la efectul catalizator al coincidenței dintre inegalitatea socio-economică și cea etno-culturală este aplicabilă și pentru zona noastră de investigație, cu un important amendament: rolul proeminent al pozițiilor politice deținute de principalele elite politico-culturale, care au constituit veritabile nuclee de formare ale conștiințelor naționale maghiară, românească și germană. Deși într-o primă fază natura și retorica revendicărilor se concentra asupra obținerii unor privilegii pentru elitele de tip premodern, existau importante elemente care denotau evoluția spre formarea unor ideologii naționale pe deplin constituite.

Prevalența factorului etnic în procesul de formare a ideologiilor naționale infirmă totodată în bună parte validitatea în cazul Transilvaniei a ipotezei formulate de către John Breuilly, conform căreia ideologia națională ar fi apărut ca o reacție față de contradicția crescândă dintre expectanțele

¹³ *Apud* Claudio Magris, *Danubius*, București: Ed. Univers, 1994, p. 319.

¹⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*. Oxford :Blackwell, 1994, p. 199.

societății civile și cerințele statului modern, oferind noilor instituții o legitimare istorico-comunitară tradițională.¹⁵ În lipsa atât a unor structuri de societate civilă bine constituite cât și a statului modern în sensul deplin al cuvântului, ideologiile naționale fundamentate pe etnicitate au îndeplinit – mai ales în etapele inițiale ale mobilizării naționale – mai degrabă un rol compensator și o integrare la nivel precumpănitor simbolic în “lumea modernității”.

Argumentul teritorial și cel demografic în faza genezei ideologiilor naționale

Argumentația elitei naționale maghiare a pus accentul pe ideea continuității politico-statale. Dat fiind faptul că Transilvania făcea parte din statul medieval al Ungariei, o legătură tradițională exista între nobilimea din Transilvania și cea din Ungaria, ceea ce le oferea acum o bază comună de legitimare. Mai mult, maghiarii – atât cei din Transilvania cât și cei din afara ei – puteau argumenta că Principatul Transilvan era într-un anumit sens continuarea Ungariei istorice, care a oferit protecție culturii maghiare în secolele 17 și 18 (care au urmat prăbușirii regatului maghiar medieval). În consecință, principiul de bază al ideologiei naționale maghiare (care a fost îmbrățișat și de către maghiarii transilvăneni) a devenit ideea recreării statului național maghiar în interiorul frontierelor istorice ale Ungariei.

În schimb, în cazul românilor a prevalat afirmarea unui concept diferit de continuitate. Dat fiind că nu au existat tradiții medievale de statalitate care ar fi putut fi invocate, în sprijinul revendicărilor naționale au fost avansate argumente demografice și de istorie etnică. Într-o primă etapă, revendicările avansate de români se mențineau în cadrul constituției medievale transilvănene, urmărind asigurarea acelorași poziții privilegiate pentru pătura conducătoare română de care se bucurau membrii celor trei națiuni politice recunoscute. Acesta era scopul petiției *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, trimis în 1791 împăratului Leopold al II-lea, în numele clerului, nobilimii și burgheziei române.¹⁶

¹⁵ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, pp. 335–344

¹⁶ Regarding the nature of this document, see David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum: Din istoria formării națiunii române*, rev. edn., București: Ed Științifică 1984, pp. 94–101.

Cu toate că se conforma ordinii de drept existente, solicitând drepturi numai pentru membrii elitei, prin argumentele invocate (vechime, număr) petiția se referea la întreaga populație română din regiune. Pe această bază Keith Hitchins este de părere că *Supplex* ar fi reprezentat primul document al mișcării românești din Transilvania „care poate fi pe drept cuvânt considerat ca având un caracter național”.¹⁷ Nu putem fi în întregime de acord cu această apreciere, având în vedere contradicția dintre natura revendicărilor și cea a argumentelor, cât și faptul că lipsea elementul de mobilizare populară esențial pentru o mișcare națională în deplinul sens al cuvântului. Totuși, însemnătatea deosebită a petiției – ca un moment de cotitură în procesul de tranziție de la gândirea politică premodernă la ideologia națională pe deplin formată – este de necontestat.

Argumentul populațional apare pentru prima oară în calitate de principiu legitimizator în cadrul acestui document. A fost reliefat în special faptul că la sfârșitul secolului al 18-lea populația românească avea o majoritate absolută în Transilvania, susținându-se totodată ideea că românii au constituit dintotdeauna populația cea mai însemnată numeric în regiune. Este demn de subliniat însă faptul că în această primă etapă argumentul majorității demografice – prezente și trecute – era utilizat mai ales cu scopul de a contrabalansa ideea continuității politico-statale avansate de ideologii maghiari, fără a avea o tentă exclusivistă. Revendicările naționale românești din a doua jumătate a secolului al 18-lea – și în bună parte și cele din secolul al 19-lea – se fundamentau în primul rând pe argumentul reprezentării echitabile (proporționale cu ponderea demografică). Totodată, reprezentanții Școlii Ardelene au fost puternic preocupați de origini, invocând ascendența romană.¹⁸ Dreptul istoric ocupă un loc important și în argumentația petiției *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*. În sprijinul cererilor avansate documentul argumenta că românii trăiau în Transilvania încă din timpul împăratului Traian, precum și prezența lor continuă în toate cele trei provincii.

¹⁷ Keith Hitchins, *The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 119–133.

¹⁸ Samuil Micu, *Istoria românilor*, the first edition according to the original manuscript, with footnotes and historical commentaries by de Ioan Chindriș, I-II, București, 1995; Gheorghe Șincai, *Hronicul Românilor*; Ed. Florea Fugaru, București: Ed. pentru Literatură, 1967; Petru Maior, *Istoria pentru începutul Românilor în Dacia*, second edition, Buda, 1834; Ioan Budai-Deleanu, *De originibus populorum Transylvanie*, ed. Ladislau Gyémánt, București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1991.

Primii care au scris despre originea romană a românilor au fost umaniști italieni în secolul 15: Poggio Braccolini, Bonfini (cronicarul regelui Mathias al Ungariei). Ideea a fost reluată în secolul al 16-lea de arhiepiscopul de Esztergom, Nicolaus Olahus, fiind răspândită și în școlile iezuiților, ca și în cele protestante. Deci existau destule șanse ca ideea originii romane să prindă rădăcini în mintea și sufletul tinerilor români care învățau în astfel de școli. Teoria continuității va căpăta însă semnificație politică numai în contextul formării identității naționale românești în secolul al 18-lea. Cel care se referea într-un mod clar la argumentul originii romane în sens politico-național era episcopul unit Inocențiu Micu Klein.¹⁹ Contextul era dat de împrejurări din viața personală a episcopului. Devenind proprietarul unui teren în Sibiu în 1734, magistratul îi interzice să construiască în oraș, dat fiind că acest privilegiu era rezervat sașilor, pe baza drepturilor teritoriale exclusive ale acestora pe Pământul Săsesc. Încercînd să combată acest argument, Micu Klein apelează la dreptul primului sosit. Ideea primatului istoric va constitui o dimensiune de neînlocuit a identității și ideologiei naționale a românilor din Transilvania, iar apoi și a celor din Principatele Dunărene.

Importanța întâietății istorice în structura ideologiei naționale românești este fără îndoială derivabilă și din frustrările istorice puternic resimțite, excluderea românilor din rândul celor trei *natio* recunoscute în perioada premodernă. A contat probabil mai ales faptul că românii nu puteau să apeleze la argumentul continuității politico-statale, precum și caracterizarea lor ca „venetici” în documentele oficiale ale vremii, o etichetă utilizată ca principal temei al refuzului de a fi acceptați în rândul națiunilor politice privilegiate.²⁰ Paradoxal, tocmai faptul că românii erau excluși din rândul națiunilor politice din epoca premodernă era utilizat acum ca un argument împotriva ideii cooptării lor la putere în calitate de națiune parteneră. Românii erau descriși în unele lucrări ale exponenților naționalismului maghiar clasic ca un popor absent din adevărata istorie a Transilvaniei, făurită în principal de voievozi, principii și nobili maghiari. În același timp, revendicările naționale românești erau respinse și prin acuzarea românilor de o „lipsă de recunoștință” pentru faptul de a fi fost adăpostiți

¹⁹ Cf. Augustin Bunea, *Din istoria românilor: Episcopul Ioan Inocențiu Klein (1728–1751)* Blaj, 1900, pp. 28–108.

²⁰ Punctul 3. din *Diploma Leopoldianum* refuză românilor statutul de națiune politică subliniind necesitatea ca “ sistemul organizării Principatului să fie ferit de tulburări, iar poporul român, ca și alte popoare venetice să nu poată conta printre națiuni” Apud Száz György: Erdély múltjáról-jelen időben, *Népszabadság*, 30 iunie 1985.

de către maghiari atunci când ar fi migrat din Principatele Dunărene în Transilvania.

Într-un asemenea context, este deosebit de interesant felul în care istoria a fost utilizată de ideologi români transilvăneni pentru contracararea statutului de „venetic” atribuit românilor, prin susținerea și legitimarea simbolică a unor teze de factură esențialmente modernă, contractualistă. Este vorba aici de modul cum reprezentanți ai Școlii Ardelene – cu referire la cronica lui Anonymus – au invocat pretinsul pact dintre cuceritorii maghiari conduși de Tuhutum cu locuitorii români bășinași ²¹ - ca fundamentul istoric și în același timp legal și legitim al necesității instaurării (în viziunea lor: a reînstituirii) comunității politice a Transilvaniei bazat pe egalitatea dintre națiunile ei. Cu toată structura arhaică a formei argumentației, putem identifica în această cerință a *composesoratului politic* istoricește fundamentat germeii unui transilvanism românesc timpuriu și – datorită condițiilor – foarte repede stins. Ideea de bază a unei asemenea dorite reconcilierii a fost necesitatea întâlnirii românilor și maghiarilor pe tărâmul comun al legalității și al transformărilor democratice de factură modernă.

Într-adevăr, revendicările naționale românești din 1848 se fundamentau în primul rând pe argumentul reprezentării echitabile (proporționale cu ponderea demografică) și a necesității asigurării folosirii limbii naționale, deci idei prin excelență legaliste. Momentul 1848-49, care marchează intrarea în faza mobilizării naționale politico-ideologice moderne de masă, a constituit probabil una din ultimele șanse de a împiedica o dezvoltare mutual exclusivă și conflictuală a celor două ideologii naționale. În rândul elitei românești transilvănene exista speranța că noua constituție maghiară va asigura într-adevăr deplina egalitate între cetățeni. Însă pentru aceasta ei considerau necesară, dincolo de legiferarea legalității civice, și oferirea unor garanții constituționale care să includă recunoașterea explicită a națiunii române ca având drepturi egale cu celelalte două națiuni importante ale Transilvaniei.

În argumentarea necesității acestei recunoașteri, discursul de legitimare istorică mai apare – e drept – la unii autori, însă în mod evident subordonat acum retoricii legaliste și revendicărilor politice actuale. Astfel, Simion Bărnuțiu arată că românilor, „descendenților romanilor”, li s-a refuzat de prea multă vreme locul lor legitim printre națiunile Transilvaniei. În structura argumentației sale accentul cade însă pe necesitatea folosirii momentului politic actual, pentru ca românii să fie capabili să-și stabilească și

²¹ Cf. Mitu, op.cit. p. 73.

să-și îndeplinească programul național.²² Pe aceeași linie de gândire, George Barițiu este poate și tranșant atât în afirmarea importanței primordiale a argumentului legalist față de cel istoric, cât și în formularea unor soluții concrete. Cerând renunțarea la disputele despre „vechime”, „întâietate”, „originea denumirii unor locuri geografice” etc., el formulează totodată o viziune ancorată în prezent, propunând organizarea Transilvaniei prin constituirea unor cantoane românești, maghiare și săsești, după modelul Elveției.²³

Unirea Transilvaniei cu Ungaria în 1848, ca de altfel și Compromisul austro-ungar din 1867, s-au produs însă fără existența unui acord consensual între națiunile care populau regiunea și fără recunoașterea românilor ca o națiune distinctă. Ca și în alte regiuni, în Transilvania, formarea identităților naționale moderne a coincis cu contestarea drepturilor și privilegiilor etno-comunitare și teritoriale. În loc de criterii etnice sau religioase, s-a declarat primordialitatea drepturilor cetățenești ca principiu organizator al statului. Persoanele aparținând diferitelor comunități naționale puteau beneficia de drepturi etnice, culturale și religioase în limitele stabilite de lege. Națiunile, în schimb, nu au fost recunoscute ca entități colective, iar acest fapt a însemnat, potrivit propriei lor percepții, privarea lor de posibilitatea de a-și apăra și promova în mod adecvat drepturile și interesele național-comunitare.

Drepturile naționale colective erau respinse și implicit înlocuite cu dreptul națiunii dominante. Toate acestea în numele drepturilor cetățenești, drepturi interpretate însă de liderii maghiari în termeni strict individuali. În urma acestui eșec, dreptul istoric a rămas în continuare temeiul fundamental al concepțiilor naționale – deopotrivă ale celei românești și maghiare-, căpătând treptat accente exclusiviste.

²² Silviu Dragomir, *Studii și documente privitoare la revoluția românilor din Transilvania în anul 1848-1849*, vol 5 Sibiu-Cluj, 1946, pp. 108–110.

²³ G. Barițiu, *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei de două sute de ani în urmă*. Sibiu, 1890.

Principii divergente de legitimare națională

În timp ce în cadrul modelului vestic al națiunii unitățile politico-statale existente au constituit baza de pornire în formarea națiunii ca unitate culturală, în Europa Centrală și de Est procesul s-a desfășurat în direcția opusă: de la unitatea culturală spre cea politică.²⁴ Contradicțiile inerente acestui proces în țările care datorită particularităților dezvoltării istorice au adoptat o definiție etnică a națiunii s-au manifestat în modul cel mai dramatic tocmai pe teritoriile aparținând regatului Ungariei în cadrul Monarhiei Dualiste, între care și Transilvania. Aici se confruntau două principii de legitimare mutual exclusive. În timp ce guvernele maghiare urmăreau realizarea unei națiuni maghiare în sens politic, care să reunească toți locuitorii indiferent de apartenența lor etnică, popoarele nemaghiare se orientau spre constituirea unităților politice corespunzătoare propriilor identități culturale.

Această contradicție comportă o complexitate mai mare decât apare la prima vedere. Reprezentanții de frunte ai elitei politice maghiare reformatoare erau într-adevăr adepți fervenți ai concepției liberale predominante pe atunci în Europa, conform căreia conștiința de cetățean, identitatea civică este singurul posibil liant eficient dintre individ și colectivitate, iar conștiința apartenenței la o comunitate etnică nu poate decât să slăbească acest liant. Însă dincolo de retorica lor de factură liberală modernă declarativ neutră din punct de vedere etnic, care conferea drepturilor individuale și “binelui comun” locul central în sistemul de valori al societății politice ce urma să se nască, viziunea liderilor maghiari conținea și elemente tradițional-conservatoare și legitimiste, care îi apropiau în fapt de poziții etnocentriste. Astfel, ei considerau că limba maghiară „în mod firesc” trebuie să devină limbă oficială și își bazau legitimitatea noului stat pe tradiția regatului medieval maghiar. Cetățenii de origine etnică nemaghiară nu erau excluși din acest discurs de legitimare, dar condiția acceptării lor era aderarea la „patriotismul politic” maghiar, adică la mitologia și idealurile naționale ale maghiarimii, precum și acceptarea supremației limbii maghiare în cadrul statului.

Chestiunea limbii a constituit într-adevăr o problemă extrem de delicată, strâns legată de “argumentul istoric”. Importanța chestiunilor lingvistice pentru identitățile și ideologiile naționale derivă – așa cum evidențiază Will Kymlicka – din însăși faptul că “aceste chestiuni sunt centrale

²⁴ Alfred Cobban *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*. rev. edn., London: Collins 1969, p. 38.

atât pentru libertatea individuală cât și pentru comunitatea politică.²⁵ Cu atât mai mult în țările din spațiul estic, unde națiunile s-au constituit în jurul ideii de etnicitate, problema folosirii și recunoașterii limbilor naționale a căpătat, dincolo de aspectele socio-tehnice o puternică semnificație simbolică.

Mișcarea națională maghiară s-a dezvoltat chiar de la început ca o luptă pentru drepturi lingvistice, pentru recunoașterea limbii maghiare ca limbă oficială în cadrul Imperiului. Acest „certificat de naștere” a avut consecințe de lungă durată. Pe măsură ce ideologia națională s-a dezvoltat și s-a manifestat pe scena politică, pentru nobilimea maghiară care conducea procesul a devenit din ce în ce mai important să lărgască baza de masă a revendicărilor naționale. Apelul la limbă – și la cultura populară – ca simboluri esențiale care leagă toți maghiarii indiferent de statutul lor economico-social, a îndeplinit un rol important în cadrul acestei strategii de legitimare. Prin proclamarea limbii maghiare drept singura limbă oficială s-a oferit de fapt vorbitorilor acestei limbi – mai cu seamă al celor nativi – nu doar un avantaj instrumental în comunicarea zilnică, dar și sentimentul dobândirii unui privilegiu și a unei surse de mândrie și demnitate suplimentare față de restul populației. Acest fapt a avut un efect de excludere asupra locuitorilor care nu cunoșteau limba maghiară și a determinat elitele acestora să obțină acceptare populară prin utilizarea aceluiași model : evidențierea virtuților „creatoare de națiune” ale propriilor lor limbi.

Dacă pentru mișcarea națională română ponderea etno-demografică reprezenta un argument, pentru statul național maghiar de după 1868 ea apărea mai degrabă ca o problemă. Pozițiile demografice insuficient de puternice deținute de maghiari în ansamblul teritoriului, dar mai cu seamă în anumite zone preponderent rurale locuite de populație nemaghiară compactă (cum ar fi partea de nord populată masiv de slovaci, Ardealul de Sud și zona Munților Apuseni locuită preponderent de români), făceau dificilă implementarea aspirațiilor etnonaționale și ofereau o legitimare națională nesatisfăcătoare, considerată în termeni demografici. Acest fapt poate constitui probabil unul din factorii explicativi ai apariției unei noi direcții de dezvoltare a ideologiei naționale maghiare, bazată pe conceptul de *națiune politică*.²⁶

²⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Introduction* in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 2.

²⁶ În legătură cu cele două direcții – de națiune culturală și națiune politică – ale conștiinței naționale maghiare vezi Szűcs Jenő *Nemzet és történelem*. Budapest: Gondolat, 1984.

Ideea națiunii politice maghiare care să includă toți cetățenii maghiari, de toate naționalitățile, poate fi considerată dintr-o atare perspectivă ca o încercare de a concilia nevoia imperativă de a afirma caracterul maghiar al statului în temeiul principiului naționalist clasic al legitimării („un singur stat, o singură națiune”), cu necesitatea practică de a afirma caracterul neutru și nepartizan al statului față de comunitățile etnice, printr-un gest politic oferit numeroșilor locuitori nemaghiari. În acest scop a fost adoptată Legea naționalităților din 1868. În timp ce oferea nemaghiarilor într-un spirit liberal posibilitatea folosirii limbii materne, inclusiv în contactele cu autoritățile de stat și recunoștea dreptul acestora de a se asocia „pentru dezvoltarea limbii, artei, științei, industriei și comerțului”, legea proclama că „toți cetățenii țării, din punct de vedere politic, sunt membrii aceleiași națiuni, ale națiunii maghiare unitare și indivizibile, care include cu drepturi egale toți cetățenii patriei, indiferent de naționalitate”.²⁷

Conceptul națiunii politice atotcuprinzătoare implica supremația legală a drepturilor cetățenești individuale față de drepturile naționale colective, însă cu intenția evidentă a elitei conducătoare de a limita și reduce la minimum politizarea problemelor etnice ale nemaghiarilor, percepută ca o potențială sursă de pericol la existența statului. Ca o parte a efortului îndreptat spre crearea statului unitar din punct de vedere politic, considerat o garanție a stabilității interne și a integrității teritoriale, în 1876-77 s-a procedat la o reorganizare administrativ-teritorială care a eliminat ținuturile autonome al secuilor și sașilor și a extins sistemul uniform al județelor pe întregul teritoriu.

Principalul motiv în spatele măsurilor de reorganizare teritorial-administrativă a fost îngrijorarea că recunoașterea drepturilor colective ale diferitelor comunități etnoculturale le-ar încuraja să promoveze idealurile naționale ale statelor unde ei formează entitatea națională dominantă. Această temere a fost exprimată de contele Tisza István, lider liberal proeminent și vreme îndelungată prim-ministru al Ungariei, astfel: „În interiorul granițelor Ungariei nu poate exista decât o singură națiune: această națiune politică este cea maghiară. Ungaria nu poate deveni o Elveție a Estului. Atunci ar înceta să mai ființeze.”²⁸

²⁷ László Péter (ed), *Historians and the History of Transylvania*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 34.

²⁸ *Apud* John Lukacs, *Budapest um 1900. Ungarn in Europa*. Aus d. Amerikan. von Renate Schein u. Gerwin Zohlen. Wien: Kremayr u. Scheriau. Berlin: Siedler, p. 161.

Trebuie menționat că, deși în privința necesității consacării caracterului unitar al statului a existat un consens în rândul politicianilor maghiari, s-au ivit însă divergențe și au avut loc dezbateri cu privire la modul în care conducerea statului trebuie exercitată la nivel regional sau local. O parte a deputaților care aprobau conceptul de națiune politică maghiară unitară au considerat totuși că un anumit grad de autonomie ar trebui oferit naționalităților în județe și localități. Toate aceste propuneri au fost însă, în ultimă instanță, respinse.

Afirmarea principiului statului unitar și apelul retoric la tradiția istorică a regatului medieval, deși atât de populare printre etnicii maghiari, nu a putut totuși oferi o legitimare îndeajuns de puternică pentru popoarele care trăiau pe teritoriul statalității „renăscute”: cele mai importante fiind românii din Transilvania, slovaci din „Ungaria de Sus”, croații, slovenii, sârbii din Voivodina și rutenii. Chiar din 1868 aceste popoare și-au reafirmat cerințele lor anterioare pentru autonomie și drepturi colective, propunând ca Ungaria să se constituie ca un stat multinațional, cu șase limbi oficiale; reprezentare proporțională în cadrul instituțiilor centrale; autonomie culturală; drepturi de autoguvernare la nivel regional; precum și stabilirea unităților teritoriale – administrative în funcție de distribuția etnică.

Aceste revendicări erau în concordanță cu principiile constituționale tradiționale ale Transilvaniei, bazate pe pluralitatea drepturilor național-comunitare. Instituțiile transilvănene însă difereau în mare măsură de tradiția juridică a Ungariei propriu-zise, unde exista doar o singură națiune politică, *natio hungarica*. Dificultatea concilierii acestei contradicții poate explica – cel puțin în parte – de ce gânditorii și liderii politici de frunte ai Ungariei din secolul al 19-lea, deși în anumite limite erau în favoarea pluralismului etno-cultural, nu puteau accepta un model multinațional în sens politic, în consecință nereușind, până la urmă, să integreze Transilvania în statul național maghiar.

Între comunitățile naționale din Transilvania, românii erau cei mai înclinați să dezvolte o ideologie națională incompatibilă cu concepția națiunii de stat maghiare bazată pe legitimarea teritorial-istorică. Ca urmare a ponderii lor demografice (reprezentau 56,85% din populația Transilvaniei în 1890 și 55,08% în 1910)²⁹, a statutului lor economic și politic comparativ defavorizat, precum și a vecinătății cu noul constituit Regat al României, românii din Transilvania și-au dezvoltat o puternică conștiință a identității lor

²⁹ *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, Új sorozat, vol. 27, p.133, vol 64, p.137.

separate. Pentru români, ideea statului unitar maghiar din punct de vedere politic nu putea fi nicidecum acceptat, oricât de mare ar fi fost libertatea de care s-ar fi bucurat minoritățile naționale din interiorul acestui stat. Scopul lor minimal a fost menținerea autonomiei transilvănene, cu asigurarea unor drepturi colective pentru comunitățile naționale din interiorul ei.³⁰

Înlocuirea principiului etnic al reprezentării politice cu un concept „civic” modern era văzut însă de români drept o încercare a elitei conducătoare maghiare de a ascunde și în același timp legitimiza adevărata predominanță a elementului maghiar și planurile de asimilare a nemaghiarilor. Introducerea limbii maghiare ca obiect de studiu obligatoriu în școlile și grădinițele românești confesionale, precum și faptul că unitățile educaționale de stat erau aproape în totalitate de limbă maghiară, nu au făcut, desigur, decât să întărească asemenea suspiciuni. Faptul că, comuniunea politico-națională unitară propusă era denumită de către promotorii ei „națiunea politică maghiară” în loc de „națiunea politică a Ungariei” era interpretată de către români ca o dovadă în sine a adevăratelor intenții omogenizatoare ale guvernării. Reprezentanții aparatului administrativ de nivel mediu, care erau în majoritatea lor maghiari sau maghiarizați, au contestat într-adevăr chiar de la început dezirabilitatea drepturilor naționalităților și au încercat să limiteze aplicarea acestora la sfera economicului și culturii, considerate mai puțin delicate din punct de vedere politic.

La insistența cu care românii au apărut ideea drepturilor colective a contribuit probabil și faptul că, datorită excluderii lor din rândul corpurilor politice medievale, elitele românești nu se puteau bucura niciodată în trecut de privilegiul reprezentării comunitare, spre deosebire de maghiari, secui și sași. Așa cum foarte sugestiv sintetiza Alexandru Bohățiel în Dieta de la Sibiu din 1863-64 „pentru că un nobil român a avut tot aceleași drepturi ca și un nobil maghiar, un cetățean din pământul regesc a avut aceleași drepturi ca și alt cetățean din pământul acela, un cetățean din orașele și comitatele Transilvaniei a avut aceleași drepturi ca și ceilalți cetățeni. Nu le-au putut folosi însă *ca națiune* (sublinierea ne aparține), fără numai contopiți în celelalte naționalități. Pentru aceea, astăzi nu pot fi mulțămii cu egala îndreptățire individuală, ci numai cu îndreptățirea națională.”³¹ Revendicările naționale

³⁰ Cf. Simion Retegan, ‘Pronunciamentul de la Blaj (1868)’ *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj*, vol. 9.

³¹ Dieta Ardealului, Ședința 18 (28 august 1863), In: Teodor V. Păcățian, *Cartea de aur*, Sibiu, 1905, vol. III, p. 148.

românești transilvănene urmăreau așadar realizarea unui model de guvernare consociațional, în care fiecare națiune participa în calitate de subiect politic separat și cu drepturi egale la exercitarea puterii. „Dreptul națiunii” apărea liderilor români ca o premisă esențială în vederea depășirii unei frustrări istorice resimțite ca dureroasă și ca o precondiție a recăștigării sentimentului egalei îndreptățiri, a egalei demnități cu celelalte popoare.

Concomitent cu eforturile de asimilare politico-identitară a etnicilor nemaghiari, s-au intensificat procesele de asimilare în rândul maghiarimii a populației nemaghiare recent imigrată în orașe. Pentru mulți nou sosiți în localitățile urbane, adoptarea identității maghiare a constituit un corolar și un factor stimulator important al mobilității ascendente. Acest proces a fost încurajat de către autorități, interesate în cea mai mare măsură să obțină o creștere a ponderii locuitorilor care își asumau apartenența la națiunea maghiară, având în vedere că etnicii maghiari formau chiar și în 1910 ceva mai puțin de jumătate din populația Ungariei, iar mai mult de 40% din populație nici măcar nu cunoștea limba maghiară.

Efectele asimilării în maghiarime a populației românești imigrate în centrele urbane transilvănene, împreună cu factorii istorici, socio-economici și culturali care descurajau mișcarea etnicilor români spre orașe, s-au reflectat în ponderea deosebit de redusă a românilor în mediul urban. Chiar și în centrele în care s-a concentrat burghezia românească și unde, ca atare, dispunea de condiții mai prielnice pentru păstrarea identității, populația de etnie română forma doar o minoritate a populației.³²

Populația rurală era prea puțin mobilă ca să fie interesată îndeajuns să-și modifice identitatea în scopul dobândirii de avantaje, și prea puternică, prea masiv prezentă ca să poată fi constrânsă politic să facă acest pas.³³ Intrarea în faza socio-economică de mobilizare națională a elitelor și clasei muncitoare urbane ca urmare a procesului de industrializare începând cu a doua jumătate a secolului al 19-lea a reprezentat așadar pentru ideologia și politica națională maghiară o șansă de importanță strategică pentru impulsionarea asimilării nemaghiarilor și atingerea unui grad mai ridicat de omogenitate națională.

³² Conform datelor recensământului din 1910 (*Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, vol 64, pp. 130–133), proporția populației românești era 26,3% în Sibiu, 28,7% în Brașov, 16,3% în Arad, 12,4% în Cluj.

³³ În 1910 ponderea populației rurale era 85,9% din totalul populației românești din Transilvania (*Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, vol 64, p. 188).

În același timp, accelerarea procesului de industrializare și migrație spre centrele urbane a avut și un efect opus : întărirea elitelor socio-economice și politice românești în cadrul orașelor transilvănene. Asimilarea nu era singura opțiune posibilă pentru membrii acestei elite. O dată depășit un prag critic al numărului membrilor păturii industriale și comerciale românești existente într-o anumită localitate, noii veniți puteau fie să se integreze în viața acestei elite, asumându-și identitatea românească, fie să se asimileze.

Pe măsură ce organizarea internă și puterea economică a burgheziei românești se consolida, mișcarea națională dobânda noi impulsuri și noi membrii activi, capabili să o sprijine în mod eficient. De altfel, datorită neacordării dreptului la sufragiu universal și prin aplicarea unor tactici politice bine chibzuite, elita maghiară a reușit în fapt să-și perpetueze dominația în cadrul păturii conducătoare politice și administrative a statului, chiar în multe din zonele locuite preponderent de români.

Termenul de referință fundamental – patria istorică și prezentă – pentru liderii români proeminenți din regiune rămânea Transilvania. Iată cum se exprima în acest sens Andrei Șaguna în 1863: „Toți suntem, domnilor, fiii uneia și aceleași mame, ai unei patrii (...). Ce se atinge de mine, mă rog odată pentru totdeauna să mă judecați, nici după naționalitatea, nici după religiunea de care mă țin, ci să mă judecați după patria mea și patriotismul meu.(...)” Și adăuga: „Ardealul, patria noastră e într-o legătură indisolubilă și indivisibilă față de celelalte provincii și țări ale M. Sale”. „Ca ardelean”, considera că are o singură patrie: Transilvania.³⁴

Refuzul acordării pentru entitățile naționale a statutului de subiect politic și crescândă insatisfacție a elitelor politice nemaghiare, mai ales a românilor, în privința percepției predominări a elementului etnic maghiar într-un stat care pretindea a se comporta egal față de toți cetățenii ei, indiferent de apartenența lor etnică, a condus însă treptat la dezvoltarea unei retorici naționale alternative care a sfârșit prin a contesta aranjamentele politico-teritoriale existente.

³⁴ Dieta Ardealului, Ședința 7 (27 iulie) In: Pacatian, op.cit. pp. 67–69.

Strategii de legitimare națională transilvăneană în cadrul statului român din perioada interbelică

Schimbarea teritorială intervenită la sfârșitul primului război mondial, în urma căreia Transilvania a devenit parte integrantă a statului român, a fost percepută în mod contradictoriu de către cele două comunități naționale principale din regiune: românii au celebrat-o ca fiind apoteoza făuririi statului lor național, maghiarii l-au resimțit ca pe o profundă tragedie națională. Rezolvându-se aspirațiile naționale ale unei comunități (ale românilor), s-a creat în același timp o nouă problemă națională: aceea a minorităților de pe noul teritoriu al României.

Noua configurație politico-teritorială a pus majoritatea românească în fața unei probleme dificile: compoziția etnică a statului lărgit a fost mult mai complexă decât aceea a Vechiului Regat. Numai în teritoriile care aparținuseră înainte de 1918 Monarhiei Austro-Ungare (Transilvania, Partium și o parte din Banat) populația de 5.570.000 includea 1.651.000 maghiari și 565.000 germani.³⁵ În același timp, România Mare a avut în compunerea sa Basarabia, Bucovina și sudul Dobrogei, cu un număr mare de ruși, ucraineni, respectiv bulgari. Datele recensământului din 1918 arată că, raportat la întregul teritoriu al țării ponderea populației românești era de 71,9%, în timp ce în cadrul Transilvaniei (inclusiv regiunea numită Partium și partea din Banat revenită României) românii formau doar 57,8% din populație.³⁶ Se puneă așadar în mod presant întrebarea dacă și în ce măsură statul trebuia să-și schimbe structurile pentru a oferi un model de integrare pentru cetățenii ei care nu aparțineau populației românești din punct de vedere etno-național.

Noul statut teritorial al Transilvaniei a condus la o schimbare profundă și a situației comunității maghiare din regiune, însă într-un totu alt sens decât în cazul românilor: dintr-o națiune dominantă, maghiarii au devenit o minoritate atât numeric cât și în privința statutului politic. Trecerea bruscă de la statutul de națiune dominantă la cel de minoritate a fost resimțită și datorită efectelor traumatizante ale rușii de „patria mamă”, de statul maghiar perceput ca protectorul intereselor și culturii maghiare. De fapt, tranziția în statutul teritorial a însemnat pentru locuitorii maghiari ai Transilvaniei o separare forțată între comunitatea politică și comunitatea

³⁵ Ferenc Takács, 'A romániai népszámlálás', *Heti Magyarországnak*, 7/1989, p. 3.

³⁶ Recensământul populației și locuințelor din 7 ianuarie 1992. Vol III. Structura etnică și confesională a populației, București 1995, pp. 5–45.

culturală, prin pierderea bruscă a dimensiunii politico-statale a propriei identități.³⁷

În primele luni după extinderea suveranității românești asupra Transilvaniei se părea că există șanse ca România Mare să fie construită pe baza unei anumite împărțiri a puterii între români și celelalte comunități naționale importante. Proclamația de la Alba Iulia, care exprima poziția politică inițială a liderilor români transilvăneni a inclus următoarele principii, care au fost primite favorabil de minorități:

„1. Deplină libertate națională pentru toate popoarele conlocuitoare. Fiecare popor se va instrui, administra și judeca în limba sa proprie prin indivizii din sânul său, și fiecare popor va primi drept de reprezentare în corpurile legiuitoare și la guvernarea țării în proporție cu numărul indivizilor ce-l alcătuiesc.

2. Egală îndreptățire și deplină libertate confesională pentru toate confesiunile de stat.”³⁸

Sașii au votat în favoarea unificării Transilvaniei cu România pe baza acestui program, iar în deceniile următoare organizațiile politice minoritare – atât cele ale maghiarilor cât și ale germanilor – au cerut insistent rezolvarea problemei naționale pe baza principiilor de la Alba Iulia. Încă de la început numeroase semnale indicau însă că cercurile conducătoare din Vechiul Regat vor opta pentru un stat centralist unitar și pentru modele etnonaționaliste de legitimare, respingând soluțiile autonomiste sau federaliste.

Foarte curând și liderii români transilvăneni au adoptat aceeași linie politică. Astfel o ruptură de lungă durată s-a creat în societatea din România de-a lungul liniei care despărțea majoritatea românească de comunitățile minoritare. Această realitate a devenit evidentă când noua constituție a fost aprobată într-o formă care a ținut seama exclusiv de voința majorității naționale. Constituția din 1923 a proclamat România “stat național unitar

³⁷ Câmpul ideologic care configurează identitatea națională a minorităților naționale din Europa Centrală și de Est este definită de Rogers Brubaker (1996) ca având trei surse principale: “țara mama exterioară” care își asumă protecția culturală a minorităților; ideologiile naționale majoritare ale statului național în care trăiește minoritatea respectivă; elementele ideologice formulate de către elita conducătoare a comunității naționale minoritare.

³⁸ ‘Rezoluțiunea Adunării Naționale de la Alba Iulia din 18 Noembrie/1 Decembrie 1918’ In: *România și minoritățile. Colecție de documente* Tg. Mureș: Pro Europa, 1997, p. 9.

și indivizibil”³⁹, ideea unității naționale devenind o axiomă ideologică și politică a identității naționale românești. Comentînd semnificația acestei idei fundamentale pentru istoria statului român de după 1918, Lucian Boia consideră că „mitul unității ... s-a implantat atît de adânc în conștiința românilor, încât chiar și specialiștii, istoricii sau sociologii se străduiesc să treacă sub vedere structurile regionale ale fenomenelor studiate.”⁴⁰

În acest context, tradiționalele argumente ale autohtonității, întăietății și continuității istorice a românilor pe teritoriul Transilvaniei au fost reluate cu o deosebită vigoare, căpătând acum o puternică tentă antiminoritară în sensul delegitimizării oricărei aspirații naționale alternative. O sinteză elocventă a acestor argumente apare în viziunea istoricului C.C. Giurescu: “Noi suntem de aici, însă toți vecinii noștri au ajuns mai tîrziu în țara pe care astăzi o ocupă ... Noi suntem cel mai vechi popor creștin din Europa de Sud-Est. ... Noi suntem ... singurul popor din această parte a Europei care a reușit să-și făurească o viață politică neîntreruptă de la întemeierea statutului până astăzi” – proclama, cu un vădit entuziasm patriotic, istoricul român.⁴¹

O componentă importantă a acestei reconstrucții identitare a reprezentat rescrierea istoriei prin proiectarea idealului statului național asupra trecutului. Ca rezultat al acestui efort, România a devenit un fel de categorie existențială hegeliană care urmărea pe tot parcursul istoriei să se realizeze, să se împlinească ca stat național unitar. Toate acțiunile și evenimentele erau văzute și reinterpretate acum prin prisma acestui ideal.⁴² După cum remarcă Sorin Mitu, „întreaga istorie românească este investită cu acest sens, este profund teleologică, evoluând în mod <legic> către unirea tuturor teritoriilor românești într-un stat unic.”⁴³ Spre deosebire de perioadele anterioare, când ideologii români transilvăneni se străduiau să fundamenteze egalitatea în drepturi a românilor cu celelalte națiuni transilvănene, acum argumentația legalistă trece pe un plan cu totul secundar, cedând locul conceptului teleologic și exclusivist al idealului statului național românesc.

³⁹ ‘Constituția din 28 martie 1923’ In: *România și minoritățile. Colecție de documente*. p. 10.

⁴⁰ Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas 1997, p. 163.

⁴¹ C.C. Giurescu, *Istoria românilor*, II./I. București: Fundația Regală pentru Literatură și Artă, 1943, p. 258.

⁴² Pentru o analiză a mitului unității în istoriografia românească vezi Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, pp. 145–176.

⁴³ Mitu, op.cit. p. 70.

Dezavantajele aplicării unui asemenea model au fost desigur mari, efectele asupra situației politice interne prezentând o natură contradictorie. În timp ce, pe de o parte, a contribuit cu succes la mobilizarea majorității etnice, discursul exclusiv de legitimare a condus pe de altă parte la crearea și recrearea permanentă a imaginii „inamicului intern”, întruchipat în existența unor minorități, determinând astfel permanentizarea instabilității politice și o constantă criză de legitimare.

În noile condiții, ale statutului de minoritar, ideologiile și retorica națională tradiționale ale maghiarimii au devenit în mare parte irelevante. Noua situație etno-politică a impus trasarea unor noi repere spirituale pentru maghiarii din România, care să răspundă unor cerințe vitale stringente:

- să redefinească în noile condiții *identitatea* comunității maghiare din România

- să elaboreze un *program de autoorganizare* în vederea apărării și perpetuării identității naționale

- să stabilească natura *raporturilor* comunității cu statul român, cu statul maghiar, cu maghiarimea în general, cu românii, precum și cu celelalte comunități naționale și etnice din România.

Acest rol a fost asumat la începutul anilor douăzeci de un grup de intelectuali maghiari ardeleni, mai ales scriitori (cei mai proeminenți fiind Kós Károly, Kuncz Aladár, Makkai Sándor, Reményik Sándor etc.), ale căror concepții, idei despre coexistența etnică din Transilvania au devenit cunoscute sub numele de *transilvanism*. Departe de a se constitui într-un sistem ideatic coerent și unitar, prezentând mari variații de la un autor la altul și trecând prin transformări de la o epocă la alta, transilvanismul a enunțat totuși anumite principii care au influențat profund viața comunității maghiare din Transilvania, și ale căror efecte, mai mult sau mai puțin directe pot fi constatate și astăzi. În elaborarea alternativei ideologice propuse, transilvaniștii procedează la o reconsiderare radicală a felului în care identitatea națională era cel mai adesea tratată până atunci. În locul viziunii care privea conștiința apartenenței la o comunitate națională ca un bloc omogen, uniform și unidimensional, fondatorii transilvanismului au propus o abordare nuanțată, care să țină seama atât de structura internă complexă cât și de transformările în timp ale identității.

Una din meritele principale ale transilvanismului este de a fi formulat o alternativă de coexistență națională la concepția „un singur Stat, o singură Națiune”. Transilvanismul oferea națiunilor conlocuitoare o viziune care urmărea înlocuirea paradigmei naționaliste clasice a conviețuirii cu un model

bazat pe afirmarea deplină a pluralismului identitar. Diferența fundamentală față de viziunea națională maghiară clasică constă însă în faptul că, în concepția transilvanistă, rezolvarea situației maghiarilor din România nu presupunea revenirea Transilvaniei în componența cadrelor statale maghiare. Revendicările teritoriale puteau fi abandonate, condiția fiind ca statul să se transforme, să se adapteze noilor cerințe impuse de existența mai multor comunități naționale pe teritoriul său. Această propunere etno-politică alternativă formulată de ideologii maghiari transilvăneni era menită să atenueze polarizarea societății de-a lungul liniei care opunea majoritatea națională minorităților naționale, oferind asigurări care să risipească temerile românilor cu privire la integritatea teritorială.

Este vorba aici de o ruptură evidentă față de conceptul de *națiune politică* maghiară din a doua jumătate a secolului al 19-lea și totodată de o revigorare a conceptului de *națiune culturală*, de fapt o revenire la matricea inițială în care s-a format identitatea și ideologia națională maghiară. Viziunea transilvanistă aducea însă elemente noi și față de concepția tradițională a „națiunii culturale maghiare”. În interpretarea gânditorilor transilvaniști națiunea nu mai era concepută ca o entitate culturală perfect omogenă, și nici măcar una care tinde – sau ar fi dezirabil să tindă – spre o asemenea omogenitate. Dimpotrivă, era considerată o situație normală și firească starea în care o cultură națională – în cazul de față cea maghiară – este formată din culturi regionale, care își aduc fiecare contribuția la îmbogățirea patrimoniului cultural național.

Desigur, renunțarea la conceptul de națiune politică nu însemna că transilvaniștii ar fi minimalizat rolul și importanța cadrului politic corespunzător pentru dezvoltarea culturii naționale. Dimpotrivă, ei considerau că toate eforturile trebuiau îndreptate spre crearea unor structuri politice care să asigure egala îndreptățire pentru fiecare cultură națională din interiorul unui stat. Fără a avea în vedere în vreun fel limitarea exprimării particularităților naționale (etnice, culturale, religioase) ale fiecărei comunități în parte, teoreticienii transilvaniști au propus reunirea acestor identități particulare într-o formă de identitate comună mai largă: identitatea transilvană. Din această perspectivă, concepția transilvanistă poate fi considerată o încercare de reformulare a paradigmei naționale tradiționale etnocentriste prin înlocuirea ei cu o viziune a „unității în diversitate”.

O contribuție de o importanță decisivă aduce în acest sens studiul lui Kós Károly, intitulat *Transilvania*. Denumită de autorul ei „o schiță de istorie culturală”, cartea prezintă istoria Transilvaniei de la antichitate până

în zilele noastre, argumentând că „forța spirituală” a pământului transilvan poate „uni vocile vieții unor etnii diferite, adeseori antagonice, într-o melodie consonantă.”⁴⁴ Fără a diminua rolul vechimii, al perpetuării locuirii într-un anumit teritoriu în stabilirea drepturilor național-comunitare, Kós le atribuie însă o semnificație net diferită. Spre deosebire de istoriografia națională tradițională, istoria Transilvaniei nu mai apare în această lucrare ca arena confruntării perpetue dintre popoarele ei. Dimpotrivă, ceea ce autorul evidențiază de-a lungul lucrării este tocmai *istoria comună* a popoarelor Transilvaniei, faptele care le leagă și care în viziunea autorului au condus la formarea unor elemente identitare transilvănene comune:

„Cele trei națiuni ale Transilvaniei au trăit fiecare viața lor interne: fiecare și-a clădit propriile lor facilități culturale și sociale, unele lângă altele, fără a se amesteca între ele, în general fără a se obstrucționa sau a intra în vreun fel în calea celorlalte, însă contactându-se, învățându-se de la alții și influențându-se reciproc”⁴⁵

Mergând pe linia fundamentării unei viziuni identitare alternative în contextul căutării unor soluții la problema națională deopotrivă acceptabile pentru minoritate și majoritate, transilvanismul a reafirmat permanent ideea comunității de soartă dintre români, maghiari, și celelalte popoare ale Transilvaniei, atribuindu-se acestei idei o nouă semnificație politică. Dependența reciprocă dintre comunitățile naționale era argumentată de gânditorii transilvaniști și prin faptul că aspirațiile minorității nu puteau fi satisfăcute decât prin cooperarea și acceptul majorității naționale. Pornind de la asemenea premise ideatice, întemeietorii transilvanismului nu doar au afirmat existența unui „specific transilvan”, a unei identități regionale distincte, ci au încercat efectiv construirea, întărirea unor punți de încredere între popoarele Ardealului. Afirmând relativa independență a sferei culturii față de dinamica politicului, scriitorii din jurul revistei *Erdélyi Helikon* au considerat că relațiile culturale pot îndeplini un rol catalizator în procesul reconcilierii naționale.

Reglementarea de lungă durată a raporturilor interetnice în Transilvania presupunea în concepția teoreticienilor inițiatori ai transilvanismului stabilirea clară a criteriilor de acceptare reciprocă a legitimității locuirii în regiune. În această privință, ideea fundamentală avansată de ideologii transilvaniști este

⁴⁴ Kós Károly, *Erdély, Kultúrtörténeti vázlat*, Cluj-Kolozsvár, Erdélyi Szépművészeti Társaság, 1929, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 64. Kós are în vedere aici națiunile în sensul modern al noțiunii (românii, maghiarii și germanii), nu națiunile politice din perioada medievală.

aceea a co-legitimității, a legitimității egale pentru toate cele trei comunități naționale având o tradiție istorico-teritorială în teritoriul Transilvaniei (cea maghiară, românească și germană). În concepția transilvanistă aceste trei comunități sunt posesori egali ai dreptului inalienabil de a considera Transilvania patria lor istorică și prezentă. Această viziune se opunea din principiu oricărui exclusivism de sorginte naționalistă, prin însăși afirmarea egalei îndreptățiri a mai multor națiuni de a se raporta la același teritoriu ca patria lor comună. Din acest punct de vedere, ideile enunțate de gânditorii transilvaniști reprezintă o alternativă atât față de poziția care privește Transilvania ca fiind exclusiv românească, cât și față de viziunea în care dimpotrivă, caracterul pur maghiar al regiunii apărea aproape axiomatic.

Tocmai încercarea de a oferi o asemenea alternativă explică legătura organică în gândirea transilvanistă între *regionalism* și *europenism*. Într-o epocă profund nefavorabilă atât diviziunilor regionale cât și structurilor transnaționale, în care modelul considerat sacrosant și apărat cu strășnicie era statul-națiune, transilvaniștii au avut clarviziunea și statura morală să arate rolul și misiunea minorităților ca punte între popoare în construirea unei lumi noi, bazată pe recunoașterea și promovarea alterității, în toate aspectele ei (etnice, naționale, religioase, regionale etc.) Programul transilvanist pentru „o Europă a regiunilor”⁴⁶ formulat în termenii cei mai clari de Kuncz Aladár, avea în vedere refacerea adevăratei unități europene, crearea unei „Europe spirituale unite” prin fundamentarea cooperării pe „regionalismele lăsate să se exprime liber”⁴⁷, prin crearea unui cadru favorabil pentru afirmarea individualității și specificității regionale. În argumentarea acestei cerințe, modelul istoric al conviețuirii etnice și confesionale din Transilvania era prezentat ca un model de toleranță și pluralism cultural care ar trebui preluat și urmat și de populația din afara regiunii.

Din păcate, în deceniile care au urmat, speranțele de început ale transilvaniștilor cu privire la realizarea unei autentice reconcilierii naționale s-au împlinit în prea mică măsură. Din partea elitei românești transilvănene ecoul ideilor transilvaniste a fost în general slab, denotând mai degrabă o lipsă de receptivitate și o anumită indiferență, dacă nu chiar respingere. Deși în cadrul elitei politice conducătoare a românilor transilvăneni a existat un curent regionalist, reprezentat în primul rând prin activitatea lui Romulus

⁴⁶ Conceptul este utilizat de Pomogáts Béla în articolul Régiók Európája, *Korunk* 3/1994, pp. 8–14.

⁴⁷ Kuncz Aladár, 'Erdély az én hazám' In: *Erdélyi Helikon* 1929, pp. 487–492.

Boilă, această orientare, chiar dacă întrucâtva mai generoasă în privința ofertei politice pentru minorități în comparație cu Constituția din 1923, nu agreea însă sub nici o formă ideea co-legitimității celor trei națiuni transilvănene, considerând supremația românească a regiunii drept o axiomă politică.

Ambiguitatea inerentă situației este bine ilustrată între altele de activitatea istoricului Nicolae Iorga, personalitate deosebit de influentă a vieții științifice, culturale și politice din România interbelică. În dezbateră pe tema „spiritului transilvan” inițiată de revista săsească *Siebenbürgisch Deutsches Tageblatt* și continuată de revista maghiară *Pásztortűz*, Iorga a recunoscut existența unei tradiții transilvănene specifice, vorbind chiar, la un moment dat despre „o conștiință a solidarității politice pentru naționalitățile care trăiesc alături de noi (de români n.n.)”⁴⁸ În același timp însă a pledat pentru realizarea „unității spirituale depline” a României.⁴⁹ Deși în unele din scrierile sale s-a declarat favorabil apropierei și coexistenței pașnice dintre români și maghiari, în alte luări de poziție viziunea sa era ancorată într-un etnocentrism care a lăsat puține posibilități pentru conciliere și dialog. Considerând Transilvania și istoria ei ca fiind exclusiv românească⁵⁰, Iorga a refuzat în fapt celorlalte națiuni fie și un minimum de legitimare cultural-istorică pe acest teritoriu.

Chiar pusă într-o formă nesatisfăcătoare pentru afirmarea pluralismului cultural și național, ideea regională nu a obținut totuși niciodată o poziție dominantă în rândurile clasei politice românești din Transilvania, fiind sprijinită doar temporar și mai ales de anumiți membrii ai generației vârstnice, care deplâneau pierderea de poziții în favoarea elitei politice și administrative din Vechiul Regat. În schimb, ideologi mai tineri (Nae Ionescu, Nichifor Crainic, Emil Cioran etc.), din ce în ce mai influenți în anii treizeci, socializați intelectual și politic în primii ani care au urmat schimbării teritoriale, au formulat aspirația unui „românism pur”, lipsit de nostalgii și conotații regionale. Aspirația lor era integrarea deplină în societatea românească, prin ștergerea tuturor diferențelor dintre românii din Regat și românii transilvăneni. Identificând esența românismului cu ortodoxismul,

⁴⁸ Nicolae Iorga, ‘Doctrina naționalistă’, In: *Doctrinile partidelor politice*. Cluj-Napoca: Garamond, 1994.

⁴⁹ Cf. Pomogáts Béla: ‘Az erdélyi lélek’ *Háromszék*, 25 aug 1993.

⁵⁰ Iorga este autorul inovației ideologice-lingvistice prin care Moldova, Valahia și Transilvania erau denumite prin sintagma „țări românești” pentru întreaga perioadă a existenței lor istorice. Despre semnificația termenului pentru istoriografia românească vezi Sorin Mitu, op.cit.

acești ideologi au contestat implicit chiar și faptul că românii aparținând unor confesiuni neortodoxe (cum ar fi cea greco-catolică) ar trebui considerați membrii autentici ai națiunii române.⁵¹ Modelul social imaginat de acești intelectuali era conceput pe baze etnocratice, propunând oferirea de privilegii socio-economice, politice și culturale populației de etnie română.

Trebuie totuși menționat că în ciuda acestui climat general profund nefavorabil, în sferele mai înalte ale culturii (mai ales literare) române au existat idei și intenții care înclinau spre o reconciliere cu maghiarii și celelalte minorități. Scriitorul Ion Chinezu – care ulterior a alunecat, din păcate, puternic spre dreapta – a avut în 1935 cuvinte de apreciere la adresa apelului transilvanist pentru colaborarea între naționalități, deși a păstrat anumite rezerve față de ideea transilvană în sine.⁵² Poetul ardelean Emil Isac a sprijinit eforturile de cooperare culturală româno-maghiară încă de la începutul anilor douăzeci, exprimând într-un articol publicat în revista bucureșteană *Ideea europeană* aprobarea sa față de existența unei pluralități culturale în Transilvania.⁵³ Strategiile de legitimare culturală ale majorității române includeau uneori apelul la valori umaniste care prin natura lor tindeau spre transcenderea într-o oarecare măsură a particularismului național. Este demn să amintim, în acest context, încercările unor gânditori români de seamă (Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, Nicolae Iorga etc.) de a se delimita de ideile extremei drepte. Intențiile acestor autori de a elimina demagogia naționalistă și xenofobia din instrumentarul ideologic al discursului istoric de legitimare națională⁵⁴ și de a distinge între naționalismul „adevărat” și cel „neadevărat”⁵⁵ prezintă anumite similitudini cu eforturile asemănătoare ale scriitorilor transilvaniști.

Cultura română nu a putut însă în condițiile date să se desprindă, să se depărteze prea mult de formulele politice oficiale ale legitimării naționale. Această situație era reflectată și de faptul că inițiativele – de altfel deosebit de laudabile – de conlucrare româno-maghiară în domeniul literaturii, a culturii

⁵¹ Despre acest subiect vezi Z. Ornea, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*. Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1995.

⁵² Cf. Ion Chinezu, 'Literatura maghiara din Ardeal' *Revista Fundațiilor*. 1935, p. 4.

⁵³ Cf. Osvát Kálmán, 'Ideea europeană' *Zord Idő*, 1920, pp. 648–650.

⁵⁴ C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Românismul, catehismul unei noi spiritualități*. Fundația Carol II, București, 1936, p. 77.

⁵⁵ N. Iorga, *Adevăratul și neadevăratul naționalism* în *Neamul Românesc*, XXVIII, 201 (20. IX.1933), p. 1.

în general (publicarea unor reviste comune, înființarea unor societăți literare în comun etc.) au avut de regulă o viață foarte scurtă. Incapacitatea statului de a integra comunitățile minoritare, presiunile asimilaționiste exercitate asupra minorităților și limitarea drepturilor acestora au produs în deceniile care au urmat o înstrăinare tot mai pronunțată a persoanelor cu identitate națională neromânească față de puterea politică și față de calitatea lor de cetățean, mai cu seamă la nivelul raportării emoțional-afective.

Concluzii

Întreaga evoluție a Transilvaniei s-a caracterizat prin interacțiunea și raportul de forțe – demografic, economic, politic și spiritual – mereu în schimbare dintre cele trei comunități etnice importante – români, maghiari, germani – , care deopotrivă au considerat acest pământ ca patria lor, fiind legați de acesta prin profunde legături emoționale. Caracterul multicultural al regiunii a fost de altfel parțial reflectat și recunoscut de către sistemul politic medieval al regiunii. Epoca Principatului – perioada statului transilvan autonom – oferă în acest sens cea mai bună perspectivă pentru evaluarea felului în care drepturile și privilegiile comunitare au fost instituționalizate în strânsă legătură cu diversitatea etnică, lingvistică și religioasă.

Cu toate premisele favorabile pentru dezvoltarea unui model multicultural de coexistență națională, regiunea a ajuns odată cu începuturile modernității – datorită acțiunii unui complex de factori economici, politici și socio-culturali – terenul de confruntare și miza principală pentru mișcări și identități naționale, a unor retorici de legitimare *paralele*, care au intrat în competiție și chiar în conflict. Nu este deci de mirare, că „posesia” regiunii, respectiv includerea ei în cadrul propriului stat național, a devenit o aspirație fundamentală a ambelor națiuni, în timp ce pierderea teritoriului (sau a unor segmente de teritoriu) de către una din părți în favoarea celeilalte a fost resimțită ca un șoc, o lovitură aproape iremediabilă.

Într-un astfel de climat, cu totul nefavorabil coexistenței etnice, minoritățile au fost nu doar marginarizate, ci adeseori au devenit ținta atacurilor naționaliste. Cauza principală a acestor evoluții trebuie probabil căutată în promovarea de către factorii de guvernare a unor concepții și strategii ideologice bazate pe afirmarea drepturilor istorico-teritoriale exclusive ale majorității etnice, care au condus la construirea unui discurs de legitimare etnocentrist și utilizarea tot mai frecventă a retoricii antiminoritare.

O schimbare de durată în această privință ar presupune treptata modificare a imaginilor despre sine ale celor două națiuni precum și a imaginii despre „Celălalt”, implicând transformarea relației tradiționale dintre prezent și trecut, când istoria părea să domine (la nivelul iluzoric-ideologic, desigur) modul de gândire și de acțiune al oamenilor.

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KRISZTINA BERNÁTH

National Identity, Foreign Language Knowledge and Language Use in the Romanian-Hungarian Border Region

According to the objective of the European Committee every citizen of the European Union needs to speak at least two foreign languages besides their mother tongue. Within the ENRI research project with the application of qualitative and quantitative research means we analyzed the tendencies regarding mother tongue, bilingualism, the knowledge of foreign languages and identity within the Romanian-Hungarian border region. In this study we aim at presenting the results of the questionnaire¹. Regarding the fact that the research is not mainly based on sociolinguistics or the sociology of language, and was not planned to study language, it only deals with the questions of language knowledge partly, we only have a limited amount of data regarding this topic. Nevertheless due to the fact that language use is an important part of identity research, we aim at presenting these data by attracting the attention to the methodological limitations we encountered.

Mother tongue as a research dimension

From the point of view of our topic mother tongue is an important dimension, which has been institutionalized as a census category between 1860 and 1910 in the whole of Europe. In 1860 Quételet only suggested to include mother tongue in the censuses, and it entrusted every state to decide the importance of this. Fifty years later a conference on statistics in Saint Petersburg concludes that mother tongue is the only objective criterion based on which one can operationally grasp the national identity of the individual (Brix 1982, quoted by Horváth 2008). Mother tongue was first registered in

¹ The detailed presentation of this research can be found in Hatos Adrian's study in the present volume.

1880, and after that it was included in every census regarding Transylvania. At first the problem of plasticity of the definitions of mother tongue was raised, what it exactly meant, and what operational criterion can be used to determine it (Varga E. 1998: 10–63). At present we represent it as an obviously objective dimension of the cultural self of the individuals, similar to the biological characteristics (Kreager 2004), with the supposition that every person has a natural connection (independent from the individual subjective causality) with one and only one language (Kamusella 2001).

This approach is an idea forced upon the language realities as a normative, empirically verifiable fact by the nation state ideology. We can presume that for the individuals living in a monolingual community the use of one language is considered to be given by fate and nature, the identification without any alternatives.

It is not a novelty in the scholarly literature that it is difficult to decide which criteria are the ones based on which the individuals experiencing multiple language contact situations opt for a given language and consider it their mother tongue. In linguistically pluralistic societies in the case of use of one or more language identification with one language is not straightforward. Thus the language the individual identifies with can be determined by multiple, non exclusive points of view: individuals can identify themselves with a language because it was the first they learnt, in the context of very strong primer emotional bonds, but it is not necessarily the language they know best or use the most, or with which the individual identifies himself or herself due to unknown reasons (see Erb–Knipf 1999).

During the 2002 census 1.44 million people declared themselves having Hungarian as their mother tongue, this being 13,167 more than the ones who declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality/ethnicity. As opposed to the other linguistic minorities in Romanian the Hungarian community is relatively concentrated, meaning that the majority of the Hungarian speakers live in such communities (villages or towns), where Hungarians are in an absolute majority, or in a significant proportion. For example one quarter of the citizens live in administrative units where 90% of the inhabitants are of Hungarian mother tongue (Horváth 2008).

Though to different extents, an important element of the definitions of being Hungarian – and the majority of the ethnicity definitions of the nations of the Carpathian basin – is the knowledge and general use of the language, as well as identification with it (Csepeli et alii 2002). Within this a

particularly important element of the self-identification of the Hungarians in Romania is the somewhat manifested identification with the Hungarian mother tongue and the Hungarian culture (see Culic 2001b; Culic et alii 2000; Veres 2005a; Veres 2005b).

The connection between ethnical belonging and some cultural skills works as a norm that can be validated within the given community, and interiorized by the individuals. In the case of such powerful community norms it can be expected that the ethnic and mother tongue self-identifications overlap significantly, which means that it is not likely for someone of Hungarian nationality not to identify Hungarian as one's mother tongue, and this could be observed in the case of the last two censuses. Though from the point of view of self-identification mother tongue plays a central and constitutive role, and, according to the dominant model of identity, the Hungarian ethnic identification is congruent with the Hungarian mother tongue, the last two censuses have shown an increase in the numbers of hybrids² (Horváth 2008).

Half of the ethnically divergent Hungarian mother tongue citizens live in the Partium (34.5% live in Szatmár county, the rest in Bihar). We need to mention that the ethnically divergent but Hungarian character population of the Partium, namely 22,930 people, is dominantly – in 56% – of a Roma identity (Horváth 2008).

Bilingualism and language competences

The research of the bilingualism of the Hungarians in Romania during the nineties focused not on the analysis of bilingualism, but can be characterized by the sociolinguistic approach and language use (see nr. 1995/2 of the periodical *Kétnyelvűség*, or Péntek 2001b). During the past decade the sociological surveys done in the Hungarian communities of Transylvania continued this tendency (especially regarding identity research and that on the sociology of minorities) and they registered data referring to language use, applying them in explaining, interpreting other phenomena and processes, as subordinate variables and indicators.

² In the classical terminology the hybrid is a syncretic product which is constituted based on intercultural contact. Regarding it from the point of view of the cultural manifestations of heritage considered to be clean (and with authority) and self identification forms, it can be considered some kind of a middle product (Bhabha 1994; Young 1995).

The researches on the ways of articulation into the majority society manifest a special interest in language use. Thus some researchers determine it as an indicator of assimilation in the different situation of language choice (especially what regards the language of education) (Sorbán 2000; Sorbán–Dobos 1997). Others treat the level of the knowledge of language as an indicator of the integration of the Hungarians in Romania into the Romanian society (see Csepeli et alii 1999, 2002). Within identity research the issues of language knowledge, language use, especially the social phenomena regarding them became of a great importance. This means studies that analyzed how knowledge and use of mother tongue correlated with other criteria of group belonging are presented as a characteristic of ethnic classification and identification (Culic 2001a; Veres 2000, 2005b). The linguists and the diaspora researchers dealing with bilingualism, the relations between mother tongue and second language use usually try to evaluate the linguistic situation of the Hungarians in Romania, as well as their specific subgroups (see Péntek 2001b; Vetési 2001). The empirical basis of these analyses were made up by the professional experience of the researchers as well as case studies referring to smaller regions, there have been no data gathering on the whole of the population (Horváth 2005c).

A central role in the analysis of the linguistic situation of the Hungarians in Romania is played by the asymmetric situation of the Hungarian and Romanian languages, the subordinate context determined directly by the legal regulations, and indirectly during the symbolical power exercises, within which the Hungarian language is reproduced in institutional frames and in institutional communicational situations. In these terms they analyze the bilingualism characteristic of the majority of the Hungarian population in Romania as a language practice mainly and almost exclusively commanded and validated by authority. In these analyses they emphasize the deteriorative effects of bilingualism on the minority mother tongue use (dominance shift, language shift, language erosion, etc.), and the analysis of bilingualism as a general phenomenon, which determines communication in linguistically differentiated contexts can be considered marginal from given points of view. The dominant interpretational framework referring to bilingual practice (very much simplified) can be outlined in the following way: the bilingualism of the Hungarians of Transylvania is shaped by the conditions of the legal and (more and more powerful) social status asymmetry between the Romanian and Hungarian languages, and it became institutional in the

very narrow space of “mother tongue monolingualism and second language monolingualism” (Péntek, 2001b:113).

As a conclusion we can say that the institutionalization of the bilingualism of the Hungarians in Romania favours the strengthening of the linguistic processes considered undesirable from the minority point of view, much more than the institutionalization of bilingualism which upholds the dominance of mother tongue usage. A way out could be represented by the renegotiation of the ethno-politic integration model directly determining the linguistic situation, mainly the fact that “the inferior legal status of the mother tongue ends, and the relations between the language of the minority and that of the majority is shaped within these relations of coordination” (Péntek, 2001b:111) (For details see: Horváth 2005c).

Foreign language knowledge and identity

The main stage for language teaching is the compulsory educational system, thus the proportion of foreign language speakers is much more significant within the younger generations, who not only learn more languages and at a higher proportion, but usually more intensely than the generations before them. The main tendency of the area of language choice is that the balanced proportions of learners of English and German are changing greatly to the favor of English. We cannot demonstrate this from the present language learning and knowledge data, but on the level of desires we can identify a tendency in tune with the multilingual concept supported by the European Committee, which signals that the choice of English as a first foreign language is going to be general, while on the level of second foreign languages, at least on the level of desires, German is only one language besides the neo-Latin languages, French, Italian and Spanish. Whether the educational system is able to fulfill these needs is a question we do not know the answer to yet. The languages of the neighboring former socialist countries are not present on this palette. The interest in these is close to none. The few who speak these languages (Romanian, Serb, Slovakian, Ukrainian, Slovenian, Croatian, Czech) have received their language knowledge as a family heritage, or during a period of their life spent in these countries (Medián - Szénay 2005).

In the following we wish to present the manifestation of the above mentioned tendencies mirrored by the data collected within the ENRI re-

search. Besides the prevalence distributions we refer to the conclusions of the cross table analyses as well.

National self-identification and identity

The majority of the respondents questioned within the Romanian sample, 62.5% identified with the Romanian identity, while one third considered themselves to be Hungarian. 6% of the respondents had double identity, 5% considered themselves Romanian and Hungarian, while 1% other double identity. The remaining 1.1% of the respondents have other ethnic self-identification. 98.3% of the Hungarian sub-sample considered themselves to be Hungarian, only 0.1% to be Romanian or other nationality, while 2% had a double identity, 0.7% of those declared themselves Hungarian and Romanian.

Q30. How would you characterize your ethnic belonging?

Ethnic belonging	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	62.5	.1
2 Hungarian	30.4	98.3
3 Romanian and Hungarian	4.9	.7
4 Other mixed ethnicity	1.0	.9
5 Other, but only one ethnicity	1.1	.1
Total	100.0	100.0

98% of the respondents with Romanian mothers declared themselves to be Romanian, 1-1% to be Hungarian or of a double identity. 87.5% of the Hungarian mothers declared themselves to be Hungarian, 4.1% to be Romanian, while 8.6% had a double identity.

On the Hungarian sub-sample the identification of 99.9% of the respondents was similar to the mothers'.

97.1% of the children of Romanian fathers had similar identities to their father's, 1% declared to be Hungarian, while 2.2% declared to be of a mixed identity. In the case of the Hungarian fathers 88.1% of the respondents considered themselves to be Hungarian, almost 4.6% Romanian, while 7.3% declared to be of a mixed identity. The Hungarian sub-sample

included only one respondent who had a different identity from its father's, stating to be Romanian.

Q32 What ethnicity does your parents and your partner belong to?

Ethnic belonging	Romania			Hungary		
	Father	Mother	Partner	Father	Mother	Partner
1 Romanian	62.6	.2	64.3	.2	.2	1.3
2 Hungarian	32.8	98.7	32.2	98.7	98.7	95.8
3 Romanian and Hungarian	1.8	-	1.1	-	-	1.1
4 Other mixed ethnicity	.3	.3	.9	.3	.3	.7
5 Other, but only one ethnicity	2.6	.8	1.5	.8	.8	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the case of choice of partners one can observe on the Romanian sub-sample that 93.7% of the Romanian respondents is homophile, 5.7% choose Hungarian partners, while in the case of the Hungarian respondents these numbers are 91.1 and 7.9%. In the case of double identification the majority of the respondents choose Hungarian (83.3%), 4.2% choose Romanians, while 12.5% choose a mixed identity partner.

In the case of the parental pattern one can observe that 95.7% of the Romanian mothers, while 89.5% of the Hungarian mothers marry same ethnicity men, while in the case of the fathers these numbers are 95% and 91.2%.

Language use in the family

Q31 Which is the most frequently used language in your home?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	62.0	-
2 Hungarian	32.7	99.9
3 Both	4.8	.1
4 Other	.5	-
Total	100.0	100.0

Analyzing from the point of view of nationality of the respondents one can see that 95.4% of the Romanian nationals use the Romanian language within the family communication, 1% use the Hungarian, while 3.4% use both languages.

Almost 97% of the Hungarian respondents speak Hungarian in the family, only 1% speak Romanian, while 2.5% use both languages.

Half of the double identity respondents communicate in Hungarian in the family, one third in both languages, while 15% in Romanian.

Q54 In which language do you mostly speak with your children?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	64.8	-
2 Hungarian	28.5	99.8
3 Both	5.6	.2
4 Other	1.0	-
Total	100.0	100.0

95.6% of the Romanian mothers, while 92.8% of the Romanian fathers use the Romanian language as the main means of communication, both languages are used in 3.6% and 5% of the families. Around 90% of the Hungarian parents use the Hungarian language at home, in the case of mixed marriages they use both languages alternately, and especially by the mothers.

Q34 Which language did you learn first, before you started going to school?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	61.9	.2
2 Hungarian	32.4	99.6
3 Both	4.6	.1
4 Other	1.1	.1
Total	100.0	100.0

It is not new that the majority of the respondents (97%) first learnt the language spoken by the mother in the case of both nationalities. There is a somewhat higher number of respondents who have the opportunity to learn a different language from that of their parents' before going to school – this is usually the Romanian language. In the case of double identity respondents almost half of the respondents determined the Hungarian language as their first language, one third indicated the Romanian, while one fifth indicated both languages.

Q35 What language were you taught in during primary school?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	65.3	.2
2 Hungarian	24.4	98.9
3 Both	9.0	.1
4 Other	1.3	.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Around 97% of the respondents declaring themselves Romanian start their education in Romanian, 1% in Hungarian, while almost 2% in a different foreign language. 73.5% of the Hungarian respondents learn in Hungarian in primary school, 21% in both languages, while 6% in Romanian.

Regarding the fact that in the sample the proportion of Hungarian national respondents is higher than that of those who finished their studies in Hungarian, we can conclude that a significant proportion of the Hungarian respondents in Romania finished their studies in Romanian due to different reasons, though the popular approach according to which children who wish to prevail in a Romanian majority society need to be educated in Romanian is not unambiguous (see e.g. Bögre-Bernáth 2011).

Q36 In what language do you talk to your colleagues (friends)?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	62.1	-
2 Hungarian	16.6	99.6

3 Both	20.9	.2
4 Other	.4	.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Regarding the communication with friends one can observe that a great majority, 93.5% of the Romanian respondents use the Romanian language, 5.3% use both languages, while 1% use the Hungarian language (see Bögre-Bernáth 2011).

Almost half of the Hungarian respondents speak Hungarian to their friends, almost 2% use Romanian, while 47% use both languages in communication. The situation is similar in the case of language use in the workplace or during shopping, the use of both languages is significant.

Q37 In what language do you talk in the shop or the market?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	61.1	-
2 Hungarian	10.1	99.9
3 Both	28.7	-
4 Other	.1	.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Q38 In what language do you speak to a person who is not an acquaintance or colleague?

	Romania	Hungary
1 Romanian	62.6	-
2 Hungarian	9.5	99.9
3 Both	27.5	-
4 Other	.4	.1
Total	100.0	100.0

The questions referring to language knowledge on the Romanian sub-sample made possible a detailed mapping of language skills. Thus in the case of all five languages included in the questionnaire we can see a detailed

description of the different levels of language knowledge. As opposed to this in the case of the languages listed in the Hungarian sub-sample the analysis produces information regarding general knowledge.

While 74.1% of the respondents in Romania speak Romanian very well, 15% speak well, in Hungary only 1% of the respondents use the Romanian language at this level. The majority does not know the language, or knows it little.

If we analyze the data of the Romanian sub-sample a little bit more carefully, we can see that 95% and respectively 97% of the respondents declaring themselves to be of a Romanian nationality use the Romanian language well or very well in speaking and in writing, while in the case of the Hungarian respondents this proportion varies between 69 and 73%. In the case of double identity respondents this rate is 87.5% and 92.5%.

How well do you know Romanian?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Understanding	Speaking	
1 Not at all	.9	.6	.6	.6	97.9
2 A little bit	5.7	5.8	5.8	3.1	.3
3 Fair enough	7.4	6.5	6.5	7.3	.6
4 Good	17.0	15.7	15.7	14.9	.3
5 Very good	69.1	71.4	71.4	74.1	.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

How well do you know Hungarian?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Writing	Reading	
1 Not at all	43.7	42.8	32.9	34.5	.5
2 A little bit	7.3	7.7	13.5	12.6	.1
3 Fair enough	3.4	3.8	5.4	4.8	.1
4 Good	5.4	5.1	6.3	5.6	4.1
5 Very good	40.2	40.6	41.8	42.4	95.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The Hungarian language is spoken well or very well by half of the respondents of the Romanian sample, in Hungary this ration is almost 100%.

13.5% and 17.4% of the Romanian respondents write or speak well or very well in Hungarian. In the case of respondents with Hungarian identity this ratio is 99.6% and 99.2%. The majority of the double identity respondents, 92.5% and 97.5% can use the Hungarian language on this level in writing or speaking.

How well do you know German?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Understanding	Speaking	
1 Not at all	90.0	90.3	87.3	88.7	88.8
2 A little bit	2.6	2.3	4.6	3.2	.9
3 Fair enough	2.6	2.4	2.6	3.0	4.6
4 Good	3.5	3.6	4.1	3.6	2.1
5 Very good	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	3.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The German language is not very widely known on either sides of the region: in Romanian around 5% of the respondents know the language well or very well, in the case of Romanians this ratio is smaller, 3%, while 9% of the Hungarians speak the language well.

In both countries only around 10% of the respondents declared to speak well or very well German.

How well do you know the Slovak language?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Understanding	Speaking	
1 Not at all	98.8	99.1	98.5	99.0	99.2
2 A little bit	.3	.1	.8	.3	-
3 Fair enough	.4	.3	.3	.3	.3
4 Good	-	.1	.1	.1	-
5 Very good	.5	.4	.4	.4	.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The Slovakian and Romani languages are not known by any of the respondents in any of the countries, the proportion of the ones speaking these languages on a basic level varies between 1-2%.

How well do you know the Romani language?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Understanding	Speaking	
1 Not at all	97.8	97.8	96.9	97.1	99.2
2 A little bit	.7	.7	1.3	1.0	-
3 Fair enough	.1	.1	.3	.3	.2
4 Good	.5	.5	.5	.5	-
5 Very good	.9	.9	1.0	1.0	.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

How well do you know <i>other</i> language(s)?	Romania				Hungary
	Writing	Reading	Understanding	Speaking	
1 Not at all	28.9	26.4	25.0	24.9	85.2
2 A little bit	20.4	22.2	14.2	16.4	1.4
3 Fair enough	16.1	14.2	20.3	18.3	3.9
4 Good	22.7	25.5	26.4	26.3	2.7
5 Very good	11.8	11.8	14.2	14.1	6.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Besides the mentioned 5 languages one could identify other languages as well. The majority of the respondents named English, Spanish and Italian.

If we consider the whole of the responses, we can observe that in Bihar and Szatmár counties around 40% of the respondents spoke another foreign language, while in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Bihar counties this proportion is 15%.

If we analyze these data based on ethnicity, we can see that two thirds of the Hungarian respondents from Transylvania represent this proportion, while only one third of the Romanians. A little bit more than half of the

Romanian respondents know only one language, one third of the respondents know two languages, while only 8% know three. In Hungary 85% of the respondents stated to know only one language, 12% stated to know two, while only 2.5% know 3 languages.

It is not a novelty that the ones who know several languages belong to the group of people with a higher education, the number of languages known increases with the levels of education.

Language levels	Romania		Hungary	Romania		Hungary
	RO writing	RO speaking	RO	HU writing	HU speaking	HU
Good	86.0	89.0	1.2	45.6	48.0	99.3
Fair enough	7.4	7.3	.6	3.4	4.8	.1
Not at all	6.6	3.7	98.2	51.0	47.1	.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Language levels	Romania		Hungary	Romania		Hungary
	GER writing	GER speaking	GER	SLO writing	SLO speaking	SLO
Good	4.9	5.1	5.7	.5	.5	.3
Fair enough	2.6	3	4.6	.4	.3	.5
Not at all	92.6	91.9	89.7	99.1	99.2	99.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Language levels	Romania		Hungary	Romania		Hungary
	ROMANI writing	ROMANI speaking	ROMANI	OTHER writing	OTHER speaking	OTHER
Good	1.4	1.6	.6	34.6	40.4	9.5
Fair enough	.1	.3	.2	16.1	18.3	3.9
Not at all	98.4	98.2	99.2	49.3	41.3	86.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Main conclusions

– The majority (62.5%) of the respondents in the Romanian sample identify themselves as Romanians, while one third as Hungarians. Almost 6% of the respondents have double identities, 5% of those consider themselves Romanian and Hungarian, 1% of a different double identity. The remaining 1.1% have a different ethnic self identification. In the case of the Hungarian sub-sample 98.3% of the respondents consider themselves to be Hungarian, 0.1% to be Romanian or of another nationality, almost 2% have double identities, 0.7% of which consider themselves to be Hungarian and Romanian.

– 93.7% of the Romanian respondents are homophile, 5.7% choose Hungarian partners, while in the case of the Hungarian respondents this proportion is 91.1% and 7.9%. In the case of double identification the majority of the respondents (83.3%) have chose a Hungarian partner, 4.2% a Romanian one, while 12.5% chose a double identity partner.

– 95.6% of the Romanian mothers, and 92.8% of the Romanian fathers use the Romanian language as a main means of communication, both languages are used by 3.5%, while Hungarian by 5%. Almost 90% of the Hungarian parents speak Hungarian at home, while in the case of mixed marriages the languages are alternately used mainly by the mothers.

– In the case of the ones questioned in Bihar and Szatmár counties, 40% speaks a foreign language, while in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Bihar counties this proportion is 15%.

– A little bit more than half of the respondents know only one language, one third of the respondents know two languages, 8% know three. 85% of the respondents in Hungary said that they knew only one language, 12% know two languages and only 2.5% know 3%.

– The speakers of more languages belong to the ones with a higher educational degree, the number of languages spoken rises with the educational levels completed.

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