

EUROPEAN, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITY

THEORY AND PRACTICE

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FOREWORD

Brigitta Balogh – Krisztina Bernáth

This volume presents the conclusions of the scholarly work conducted with the title *European, National and Regional Identity – Theory and Practice (ENRI)* between November 2009 and May 2011 within the Romania-Hungary Cross-border Cooperation Program 2007-2013 (registration code: HURO 0801/180). This program, financed by the European Regional Development Fund and co-financed by the competent agencies of the concerned countries (the Romanian Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism and the Hungarian National Development Agency), purposed the strengthening of border relationships and the integrated development of border regions. Under this program, three universities of the region united their efforts: the Partium Christian University of Oradea – also acting as the leading partner of the project – and the University of Oradea from Romania, and the University of Debrecen from Hungary, in order to map the main issues related to the core, the structure and the interactions of European, national and regional identity, within a joint social science research.

1. Overview of the ENRI study

In spite of the primary social scientific nature of the study, it could be seen as interdisciplinary because it encompassed the collaboration of philosophical and sociological research groups. Five research groups cooperated within the three participating universities – two focusing on philosophy and three on sociology – relatively independently, but following a coordinated work plan. At the same time, these smaller, four or five-member research groups set up specialized units: the groups dedicated to philosophical and sociological research represented larger units constantly updating each other on the progress of work, results achieved and further actions to take. In this manner, three structures were profiled simultaneously within the project: the administrative units based on the number of universities (three university research groups), the disciplinary units (two research groups by discipline) and the four-

member research groups functioning as basic units (five groups, two from the Partium Christian University, two from the University of Debrecen and one from the University of Oradea).

Three major study goals were set. The first goal was given by the fact that albeit the debates on the various types of identities became a basic subject in philosophical discourses in the past few years, the relating research and texts focused typically on certain types of identity, and reckoned to a smaller extent with the interactions of the various identities and the mode of their ability to organize in relation with each other. Therefore we set the target to work out a theoretical framework which permitted the interpretation of European, national and regional identity within the same conceptual structure. The second goal consisted of mapping, in a representative manner, the basic elements of the identity of the population living on the two sides of the Romanian-Hungarian border in four Northern counties (two in Hungary and two in Romania). The importance of this aspect lies in that albeit we had an intuitive idea on how the inhabitants of the region saw themselves and each other, up to now we never had such a comprehensive investigation. Finally, the third major goal concentrated on establishing an interdisciplinary cooperation which was adequate for offering a relevant interpretation to the real situation and for drawing up the necessary conceptual framework.

2. Objectives of the philosophical research groups

The task of the philosophical research groups was to bring under the same framework the most important theories which were able to offer a comprehensive interpretation of the issue of identity, on the one hand, and to confront with each other the social and political philosophical theories on the identity types falling within the scope of research, on the other hand. We expected to identify the basic elements of the comprehensive framework theory set as a goal, based on the conclusions of these two tasks.

Our unification of the theories of identity embarked on two paths. The first one started with a historical approach, because we all were aware of how mistaken it would have been to treat the actual identities, but also the relating theories, in an unhistorical manner. Indeed, the fac-

tors emphasized in certain eras in their endeavors to pinpoint the modes of self-interpretation believed to be correct or appropriate depends, not lastly, on the historical set available to choose from and the alternative views faced. The conclusions of this line of research are summarized in three chapters of this volume, dedicated to the history of philosophy.¹ We should note that we never expected historical reconstruction to yield new or independent scientific results; we solely aspired to gain a practical overview, a sort of a map of the philosophical approach to the problem of identity, ending with the late nineteenth century. Accordingly, we tried to phrase the chapters dedicated to this subject using a propedeutical tone which occasionally bordered on didacticism.

The second path in unifying the comprehensive identity theories focused on reviewing the contemporary theories. Our initial idea was to cover each and every important movement and school of method in the twentieth century, but not before long, the time limits of such an attempt became clear, and the researched topic did not justify comprehensiveness in this regard either. Discussing the possible approaches during the joint exchange of experiences and consulting with third-party experts² eventually led us to confine ourselves to examine two approaches more closely – the theory of narrative identity³ and the theory of recognition⁴ –, because we deemed these to be most adequate for offering an ample framework for the interpretations of identity and grounds for a better understanding of the interactions and communication of actual identities.

The master material of the philosophical part of research was provided by the confrontation of theories on European, national and regional identities with each other. In this field, the benefits and drawbacks of interdisciplinary approaches were reflected in the philo-

¹ István Bujalos: *A modern identitás története (History of Modern Identity)*; Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: *Az identitás problémája Hegelnél (The Problem of Identity in Hegel's Philosophy)*; Tamás Valastyán: *Az identitás konstrukciója és dekonstrukciója (Construction and Deconstruction of Identity)*.

² Cf. Alpár Losonczi: Identity as a Phenomenological Issue. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2010/2.

³ See in this volume: Éva Biró-Kaszás: *A narratív identitás elméletei (Theories of Narrative Identity)*.

⁴ Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: Theory of Recognition. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

sophical research group, aggravated by the fact that philosophical literature discussed these types of identities with quite different focuses. For example, while national identity enjoys the attention of a quite a wide-ranging political philosophical literature thanks to the nationalism studies blossoming in the twentieth century, and European identity too has become a subject of constant inquiries of political theoreticians thanks to the consolidation of the EU, regional identity is a topic with such limited possibilities of generalization – or at least, there has been such a modest outcome in mapping the benchmarks of possible generalization until today – that we had to use the social scientific approaches in the most general sense possible instead of the *stricto sensu* philosophical approaches. Nevertheless, we were able to establish a research structure which enabled us to integrate these partial criteria in a relatively organic way.

We approached European identity first from the point of view of the late modern European idea and the related expectations,⁵ and secondly in light of European cultural identity,⁶ and endeavored to define how the building blocks of a possible European political identity could be identified.⁷ In these efforts, it turned out useful to compare the subject with the United States of America and to reckon with the accomplishments of American political philosophy.⁸ The topics of national identity were examined in conjunction with the ideology of nationalism,⁹ and we also touched upon the way the theories on the multicultural nature of modern societies attempted to transform the customary (traditional and modern) framework of identity inter-

⁵ Tamás Valastyán: Europe and Modernity. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

⁶ Beáta Kassai: European Cultural Identity. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

⁷ See in this volume: Beáta Kassai – Gizella Horváth: *Az európai politikai identitásról (About European Political Identity)*; Éva Biró-Kaszás: *Habermas demokratikus és kozmopolita Európa-eszméje (The idea of democratic and cosmopolitan Europe in the vision of Habermas)*; see also Attila M. Demeter: The European Nation? *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2010/2.

⁸ See in this volume: István Bujalos: *Személyes és nemzeti identitás az amerikai filozófiában (Personal and National Identity in American Philosophy)*; Attila M. Demeter: op. cit.

⁹ See in this volume: Attila M. Demeter: *A nemzeti identitásról (On National Identity)*; Cf. Gábor Flóra: *A nemzeti identitás és ideológia kérdése történeti–szociológiai megközelítésben (National Identity and Ideology: a Socio-Historical Perspective)*. In op. cit.

pretations.¹⁰ In interpreting regional identity, we tried to systemize the different focuses and purposes of the concept of the region,¹¹ we reviewed the landmarks of the European Union's regional policy,¹² and not lastly, we inquired into the self-interpretation, economic and broad aspects of political potential residing in the rediscovery of regional identity and its harmonization with the other types of identity.

3. Objectives of the sociological research groups

Accomplishing the second goal of research – namely, to map in a representative manner the basic elements of the identity of the population living on the two sides of the Romanian-Hungarian border in four Northern counties (two in Hungary and two in Romania) – evidently came within the tasks of the sociological research group. In 2010, they conducted two parallel surveys on a sample of roughly 2000 in two Northern counties each in the two bordering countries: in Satu Mare and Bihor counties in Romania, and in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Hajdú-Bihar counties in Hungary, in a total number of 45 towns.¹³

¹⁰ Attila M. Demeter: Multiculturalism. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

¹¹ Zoltán Zakota: Region, Regionalism, Regionalization. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

¹² See in this volume: Zoltán Zakota: *Regionalizmus az Európai Unióban (Regionalism in the European Union)*.

¹³ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *Az ENRI felmérés mintavétele (ENRI survey sampling)*; *Szocializációs modellek a román–magyar határ menti megyékben (Socialization Models in the Romanian-Hungarian Border Counties)*; *Kollektív hatékonyság a határmenti régióban (Collective Efficacy in the Border Region)*; *Önkéntes részvétel a határmenti régióban (Voluntary Participation in the Border Region)*; *A társadalmi bizalom Magyarország és Románia határmenti megyéiben (Social Confidence in Hungarian and Romanian Border Counties)*; *Nemzeti kisebbségek jogaival szembeni attitűdök (Attitudes towards Minority Rights)*; Sorana Săveanu: *Etnikai sokszínűség és az intézményekbe vetett bizalom (Ethnic Diversity and Confidence in Institutions)*; *Diszkrimináció (Discrimination)*; Floare Chișea: *A román és magyar etnikumok közötti szomszédosági kapcsolat (Neighbor Relations between the Romanian and Hungarian Ethnic Groups)*; Sergiu Băltătescu: *Szubjektív jólét Románia és Magyarország határmenti megyéiben (Subjective Well-being in Romanian and Hungarian Border Counties)*; *Elégedettségi szint Románia és Magyarország határa mentén (Satisfaction Level along the Romanian-Hungarian Border)*; István Murányi – Katalin Ábrahám: *Az identitás szintjei és az előítéletesség Kelet-Magyarországon (The Levels of Identity and Prejudiciality in Eastern Hungary)*.

Yet, we had two reasons not to want to rely solely on a quantitative survey. First because the proper interpretation of results necessitated the use of qualitative methods too. Secondly, we were aware of the fact that the particularities of a concrete regional identity could be identified solely through the narratives of self-understanding of the region's inhabitants (which are, of course, also narratives of understanding each other, but the mutually conditioned nature of these two perspectives proved to be an essential and important belief from the very beginning). At the same time, the qualitative part of research – for methodological reasons, as well as because of financial and time limits – could not be carried out to such a comprehensive extent as the quantitative part; therefore, we confined ourselves to a few special target groups,¹⁴ hoping that a possible future continuation of the research could resume and enhance the qualitative aspect too.

4. Results

Albeit most of the members of the sociological and philosophical research teams participating in the research never took part in a joint study with the representatives of the other field, it became clear during the research that the common premises and discussion methods to be involved were present, because indeed the results of symbolic interactionism¹⁵ or the productivity of the narrative approach¹⁶ played an important role both in the philosophical and the sociological part of the project. Thanks to the structure of research, the results of the different research groups could be integrated with each other.

¹⁴ See in this volume: Krisztina Bernáth – Zsuzsanna Bögre: *Nagyvárad a lokális és a nemzeti identitás keresztmetszetében – élettörténeti kutatás alapján (Oradea at the Crossroads of Local and National Identity – Based on a Biographical Review)*; Flórián Sipos – Sándor Márton: *Szent István hátrakötött kézzel: egy nemzeti radikális szervezet tagjainak nemzeti attitűdjeiről és történet szemléletéről (Saint Stephen I with His Hands Tied Back: on the National Attitude and Approach to History of the Members of a Radical Nationalist Organization)*.

¹⁵ Floare Chișea – Melinda Dincă: Identity from the Perspective of Symbolic Interactionism. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2010/2; Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: Theory of Recognition. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

¹⁶ See in this volume: Éva Biró-Kaszás: *A narratív identitás elméletei (The Theories of Narrative Identity)*; Krisztina Bernáth – Zsuzsanna Bögre: op. cit.

From a historical point of view, the problem of identity appears to be a specifically modern question, as its emergence was caused by the dissolution of the traditional social hierarchy which set the role of man in a given social order *ab ovo*. At the same time, personal identity as a philosophical issue ran parallel with the thematization of self-consciousness, which has been augmented gradually by understanding that self-consciousness – and together with it, our personality – was not directly accessible to ourselves either, but was conveyed partially by the reactions of others. All these combined with the modern concept of liberty led to the conclusion that late modernity bestowed upon us two possibilities for elaborating the identity issue: the first one (following Nietzsche) was hallmarked by the narratives selected or developing contingently from a rational point of view, while the second one (following the young Hegel and his late legatees) referred to the layers of identity which interacted with each other in a non-instrumental, but a communicative rational manner.¹⁷

In contrast with the preliminaries of the concept of narrative, the contemporary theories on narrative identity do not focus on the contingency of the narrative at all, but rather on the way how sense is formed, even when paying maximum respect to the ultimately non-dominable nature of the life history and history.¹⁸ Recognizing the constant tensions between the self and the alien is a common feature of interpreting identity, shared by narrative theories and the theory of recognition; the latter one attempts to map not only the manifold indirectness of the formation of identity, but endeavors to define normative principles which could contribute to a better understanding and possible solution of the problems faced by the political communities of our days.¹⁹

Seeking to identify the building blocks of a European identity, it appears that the dichotomy of unity and diversity – now become a motto

¹⁷ See in this volume. István Bujalos: *A modern identitás története (History of Modern Identity)*; Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: *Az identitás problémája Hegelnél (The Problem of Identity in Hegel's Philosophy)*; Tamás Valastyán: *Az identitás konstrukciója és dekonstrukciója (Construction and Deconstruction of Identity)*; and Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: *Theory of Recognition*. Op. cit.

¹⁸ See in this volume: Éva Biró-Kaszás: *A narratív identitás elméletei (The Theories of Narrative Identity)*.

¹⁹ See Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: *Theory of Recognition. Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

– defined the Europe idea from the beginning, just as the other dichotomies such as the Christian tradition (both in terms of origin and cultural substance) and the Kantian (universal) civil constitution (as a goal and as a value), or the parallel of democratization and the leveling preparing the way for tyrants, noted by Nietzsche.²⁰ At the same time, some modern social theoreticians (e.g. Jürgen Habermas) drew attention to the fact that the possibility of the manipulative use of power is not necessarily an inherent consequence of democracy, but could well be based on the idea of popular sovereignty and the ensuing unilateralism of the relationship between the nation and the individual.²¹ As an alternative to this belief, Habermas proposed the reinterpretation of popular sovereignty in terms of intersubjectivity and the division of sovereignty beyond the national and transnational levels. This would also rob the notion of the nation from its original homogeneity and would make it adequate for actually reckoning with the multi-layered organization of modern societies. Interpreting the issue in this framework, European identity – as a construction genuinely determining our self-interpretation – is possible if a civil solidarity could emerge and transcend the boundaries of nation states, conditioned by commitment to a common constitution, following the American model.²²

In his study on national identity, Attila M. Demeter confirmed the theory that once the French Revolution created modern nation as not being a primarily social or cultural, but rather a political entity, the centralized policy of the homogenization of language made it possible for the notion of nation to acquire also an unintended cultural interpretation.²³ At the same time, the homogeneous notion of nation also led to undermining the legitimacy of the intermediate powers between the individual and the state – in modern words: of the civil sphere –, creating the centralized and uniform nation state and contributing to the conversion of traditional patriotism into nationalism. The consequence of all this for national identity was that the modern individualization following the dissolution of earlier social attachments was accompanied

²⁰ See Tamás Valastyán: *Europe and Modernity*. Ed. cit.

²¹ See in this volume: Éva Biró-Kaszás: *Habermas demokratikus és kozmopolita Európa-eszméje (Habermas' Democratic and Cosmopolitan Idea of Europe)*.

²² Op. cit.

²³ See in this volume: Attila M. Demeter: *A nemzeti identitásról (On National Identity)*.

from the very beginning by the powerful collectivism of nationalism,²⁴ creating a gross duplicity in modern national identity which could easily lead to manipulatable tensions between individual liberty and unconditional loyalty to the nation. At the same time, as Ernest Renan pointed out, national identity, which is predominantly conscious, is not conditioned by a common language or a common ethnic origin; moreover, it is rather the revival of different origins. And this means that the propagation of a common language is less a necessity of the nation and more of a centralized, bureaucratic nation state.²⁵

All these ensure favorable chances of survival for the “Europe of nations” and for the emergence of a future strong European identity, because indeed, based on the above, the erosion of the nation does not ensue from the erosion of the nation state, and the European constitutional patriotism envisaged by Habermas faces no theoretical hindrances either.²⁶ Nevertheless, as Demeter pointed out, it is to be feared that this future patriotism would not find sufficient ground in the liberal vision of social communicative action, and it would be much more practicable to base the possibility of love of nation on the decentralized forms of power.²⁷

However, the American model is worth considering not only with regard to the constitutional patriotism that is based on the decentralized forms of power, but also because it provides an alternative model to the nationalist and nation-state-like mode of unifying individualism and collectivism. This possibility is examined in the study penned by István Bujalos in our volume,²⁸ which discusses the patriotism model functioning in the United States from the point of view of relationship between individualism and collectivism. Following Michael Walzer, he points out that there is no radical difference between liberal and communitarian political philosophies in terms of basic beliefs, because communitarianism could be interpreted mostly as a correction of liberalism, and this correction is necessary precisely because

²⁴ Op. cit.

²⁵ Op. cit.

²⁶ See Attila M. Demeter: The European Nation? *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2010/2.

²⁷ Op. cit.

²⁸ See in this volume: István Bujalos: *Személyes és nemzeti identitás az amerikai filozófiában*.

contemporary western societies could easily become countries of radically isolated, hence manipulatable and abusable individuals if they followed the model of pure liberal individualism. According to Republican movements, the various forms of self-government are meant to reduce this isolation and exposure to a centralized government.

When examining the possible and desirable levels of self-government, one cannot ignore the role of regions and the related possibilities either, because the various levels of regional organizations are adequate also for utilizing the economic and social potential of European, subnational and inter-national regional units.²⁹ On the European level, regional policy is supported mostly by the need to offset the economic mechanisms that tend to centralize development resources around the central regions of the Union, polarizing the initial social-economic inequalities.³⁰ At the same time, regional policy is preferred to traditional catching-up policies also in that theoretically it serves as support for independent initiatives, as opposed to the centralized redistribution of resources.³¹ This way, it also plays a role of multiple-leveled (supranational, subnational and inter-national) complementation and coordination between the also multi-leveled central decision-making mechanisms and regional self-government.

Local identity could be seen as a type of regional identity, discussed with a delicate approach in the case study authored by Krisztina Bernáth and Zsuzsanna Bögre.³² According to the testimonies of life story interviews of Oradean inhabitants, there are several motivations seen in practice which confirm the results of our theoretical thoughts. Such is the attachment of identity to symbolic actions and emotions, as well as the fact that the homogenizing tendencies of the nation-state ideology (aggravated by state socialism in our case) affect not only the identities of minorities³³ they attempt to eliminate from the symbolic

²⁹ See: Zoltán Zakota: Region, Regionalism, Regionalization. *Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

³⁰ Op. cit.

³¹ See in this volume: Zoltán Zakota: *Regionalizmus az Európai Unióban (Regionalism in the European Union)*.

³² See in this volume: Krisztina Bernáth – Zsuzsanna Bögre: *Nagyvárad a lokális és a nemzeti identitás keresztmetszetében – élettörténeti kutatás alapján (Oradea at the Crossroads of Local and National Identity – Based on a Biographical Review)*.

³³ On the relationship between identity and recognition, see: Brigitta Balogh – Gusztáv Molnár: *Theory of Recognition. Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle*, 2011/1.

sphere, but also the self-esteem and feeling-at-home of the majority, which is supposed to be the beneficiary of the process according to the nation state ideology. Another conclusion coinciding with our theoretical views is the positive effect of civil self-organization both on local identity and its healthy symbiosis with the other forms of identity.

Finally, the sociological surveys conducted on the two sides of the Hungarian-Romanian border enabled us to make comparisons which showed the tendencies we had to face in envisaging the future of the region. These tendencies profiled elements related to ethnicity and citizenship, but some also showed that we could speak of a region with a genuine, real identity- shaping function also when it came to mentalities.

An ethnically determined tendency was the one showing the relative segregation of the informal networks of Hungarians living in Romania in that region, as well as the relative ethnic segregation of jobs.³⁴ At the same time, social confidence seemed to be connected rather to ethnicity, because it was higher both among Hungarian Hungarians and Romanian Hungarian inhabitants of the region than among Romanian Romanians.³⁵ In contrast with this, the sense of social efficiency seems to be connected rather to citizenship; this feeling appeared stronger among the Hungarian part of the region than in the Romanian part, while Romanian Romanians and Hungarians showed largely similar efficiency indicators.³⁶ However, participation in civil organizations registered a larger proportion in the Romanian inhabitants of the region than in the Hungarians.³⁷

Characteristics of nationality and citizenship play a mixed role with regard to confidence in institutions; our surveys demonstrate that Hungarians tend to have more confidence both in the local and the central institutions. As for the beneficiaries of the strongest confidence among the inhabitants of the region, the picture is roughly similar: most confided in are the local institutions and the police,

³⁴ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *Szocializációs modellek a román–magyar határmenti megyékben (Socialization Models in the Romanian-Hungarian Border Counties)*.

³⁵ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *A társadalmi bizalom Magyarország és Románia határmenti megyéiben (Social Confidence in the Hungarian-Romanian Border Counties)*.

³⁶ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *Kollektív hatékonyság a határmenti régióban (Collective Efficiency in the Border Region)*.

³⁷ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *Önkéntes részvétel a határmenti régióban (Voluntary Participation in Border Regions)*.

followed by European institutions, state institutions and justice; least trusted are clearly the government, the parliament, the politicians and political parties.³⁸ The importance of the regional-local identity is demonstrated by the fact that the confidence indicators of Romanian Hungarians – who generally tend to have significantly less confidence in institutions – registered values similar to the confidence levels of the Romanian population.³⁹

As we know, an essential characteristic of our identity as self-interpretation is that we always look to “others”. Therefore, an important part of the study is formed by the results found about the attitudes of the region’s population towards minority rights.⁴⁰ The first striking fact in this regard is that sensitivity towards minority rights is the still highest among those directly concerned: while Romanian Romanians and Hungarian Hungarians have roughly similar indicators, support for minority rights is higher only among Romanian Hungarians. At the same time, the survey showed two unexpected results. One of them is the fact that apparently, the recognition of ethnic minority rights is the lowest in the region among people with higher education and city dwellers; the second one is that participation in civil organizations seems to have a negative effect on ethnic tolerance, statistically speaking. We assumed the first unexpected result to come from the education system which conveys romantic nationalism and the second one to be caused by the fact that the solution to ethnic competition is obviously ethnic solidarity.⁴¹ However, the non-logical nature of such reactions to coexistence in a mixed ethnic environment is shown by the fact that the survey confirmed the hypothesis of contact as an explanation to ethnic attitudes, according to which the level of ethnic tolerance is directly proportional with the level of the ethno-cultural diversity of the given community.⁴²

³⁸ See in this volume: Sorana Săveanu: *Etnikai sokszínűség és az intézményekbe vetett bizalom (Ethnic Diversity and Confidence in Institutions)*.

³⁹ Op. cit.

⁴⁰ See in this volume: Adrian Hatos: *Nemzeti kisebbségek jogaival szembeni attitűdök (Attitudes towards the Rights of National Minorities)*

⁴¹ Op. cit.

⁴² Op. cit.

HISTORY OF MODERN IDENTITY

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The philosophical problem of identity is a metaphysical question. Here and now, metaphysics simply carries its lexical meaning: philosophy that examines the basic questions of the nature of reality.

Many think that today the nature of reality is not the subject of metaphysics, but of physics or science generally. The progress of natural sciences helps us to get a better and better understanding of reality. Physics discovers smaller and smaller particles: quarks or bosons are particles that were unheard of 30 or 40 years ago during physics class. But what about numbers? Are they material entities, too? Or what about ideals such as integrity or honesty? Evidently, we can't say that justice is an organization of elementary particles.

One of the main concepts in metaphysics is identity. Identity (Latin: *identitas*) means identicalness in the sense of correspondence. However, identity also designates self-identity, that is, the fact that something is what it is and not something else.

Depending on the things that correspond or on the thing whose self-identity we are examining, the problem of identity raises different questions.

For instance, identicalness is a law of logic, expressing self-identity. In the Aristotelian logic, the law of identity states that terms in a logical process must be used with the same meaning.

Identity could also be used in the ontological sense, following Leibniz, whereby we state that two things are exactly identical if every predicate which is true for one of them is also true for the other one. But we could also use it in the ontological sense as Hegel did, stating that identity is nothing else but the identity of identity with non-identity.

Thus, we distinguish qualitative identity and numerical identity. Qualitative identity is the essential sameness of two things, movements or objects. Qualitative identity means that two things – for instance, two dogs – have common properties. Two Rottweiler dogs have more common properties than a Rottweiler and a bulldog. Nu-

merical identity necessitates absolute or full qualitative identity.

We could argue that there is no identity, but only in the relative sense. Then again, we could join Wittgenstein when he says “two objects of the same logical form are... only differentiated from one another in that they are different.”¹ And we could also claim that identity is an unproblematic notion.

However, identity as self-identity poses a metaphysical question: *What makes the thing what it is?* In other words: What are the changes that a thing can undergo and still remain the same? The changes the thing can undergo and still maintain its identity depend on the nature of the thing.

The philosophical problem of identity is closely related to the philosophical problem of cause. Aristotle differentiated material cause from formal cause. He thought that things underwent material or formal changes, but still were the same after certain changes. Live things grow and change their form. Their identity does not require either the constancy of form or the constancy of material. Neither form, nor material is constant in the case of living things. Living things grow and change their form.

An excellent presentation of the metaphysical problem of identity as self-identity is found in Judith Thomson’s study *The Statue and the Clay*². Below is a recapitulation of the thought process of this study:

Change of form:

Let us assume that I bought 5 kg of clay at 9 a.m. Let us designate this piece of clay with the name CLAY.

Let us assume that of this clay I shaped the statue of King Alfred at 12 a.m. Let us designate this statue with the name ALFRED.

Based on the identity thesis, CLAY and ALFRED are identical – Clay = Alfred. However, this is a false statement, because the CLAY existed at 9 a.m., while ALFRED did not.

But now, at 2 p.m., ALFRED and CLAY fill the same space, they have the same form, shape, color, material, smell, etc. What else could their relationship with each other be but identity?

The opponents of the identity thesis will reply that CLAY constitutes ALFRED. But what does “constitute” mean?

¹ Wittgenstein, L.: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. p. 13.

² Thomson, Judith Jarvis: *The Statue and the Clay*.

If ALFRED is a statue on the table at 2 p.m., and CLAY is a statue on the table at 2 p.m., and both statements are true, but ALFRED is not identical with CLAY, then there are two statues on the table.

As a solution, Thomson proposes that the properties of things should be considered *temporary*.

Change of material:

Let us assume that at 3 p.m. we broke ALFRED's left arm, replaced it with a new one, and spread the material of the old arm on the floor.

Thus, CLAY is not entirely on the table, but ALFRED stands on the table at 3 p.m. Stating they are identical at 3 p.m. would be false. We consider ALFRED to be identical with itself, even if his left arm is new.

What is the quantity of material *replaced* after which we can no longer speak of self-identity? After replacing the windscreen wipers, our car is still the same. What if we replaced the body and the engine? Would identity disappear after replacing too many parts?

No one could tell. Certain philosophers claim that self-identity does disappear with change. Judith Thomson's solution is the triple effect: one thing constitutes another thing at a certain moment in time. – "x constitutes y at t".

But this way, Judith Thomson simply rephrased Aristotle's explanation in other words and signs. Moreover, Aristotle built his explanation of the thing using the material and formal cause, as well as driving motive and goals, and thereby represented the thing's existence-in-that-particular-way, not its identity.

In modernity, debates on identity construed as self-identity focused rather on the personal, human identity. Man constitutes his own identity (ego) together and against the other (alter ego) and others.

For instance, Descartes considered that I am a thing that *thinks* (doubts, understands, accepts, denies, wants, refutes, imagines, and senses). In Locke's opinion, man's self-identity is nothing else, but the constant life of his *body* that was constantly changing in its material particles. Speaking of otherness, Hegel pointed to man's identity with the self. And then, Nietzsche's basic question was how man became what it was.

The issue of self-identity was an essential one in modernity. The self-determination of the self takes place in an interaction with society

and results from the individual's socialization. Socialization is mediated by social roles, and the individual internalizes the social values. Out of the often contradictory social elements, the individual shapes its more or less coherent identity. The individual's awareness of its own identity develops gradually³ starting from childhood to adulthood.

In traditional societies, the determining power of community is stronger, while in modern societies, the individual is more at liberty to shape his identity.

However, man does not create his own identity in modernity either. In each society, humans are born into important groups, people are born with identities. Man's identity is constituted by his community and his society, but through the common construal, criticism and self-criticism, man continually shapes himself.

Man has many identities. We can speak of racial, ethnic, national, cultural, gender, sexual, professional, religious, etc. identities. Man's self-definition resides rather in his designating which of his roles, identities and values is essential, on a temporary or a general basis. Man organizes his goals, his values and his identities hierarchically.

Not only the individuals, but also the communities have an actual, historically changing identity. Collective identities constitute individual identities, but these individual identities themselves exert an effect on collective, social identities. Starting from the mid-19th century, the different identities and their interactions have been studied not only by philosophy, but by various sciences too, such as psychology, social psychology, biological and cultural anthropology, sociology, etc.

Below comes a brief presentation of the identity concepts of four philosophers from the 17th-18th century.

The general organizing principle of personal identity is always the dominant concept of man in a given age and society. The first picture of the modern man was drawn by Thomas Hobbes in the middle of the 17th century, during the British civil war.

Hobbes found that humans possessed almost equal physical and intellectual capacities. The differences in physical force and intelligence were insignificant. Thanks to the equality of their capacities, the expectancies of achieving their goals were equal too. If two people want the

³ In his renowned book, Erik H. Erikson described eight development stages between childhood and adulthood.

same thing, a conflict shall arise between them. People find their basic motivations in feelings and desires. Hobbes thought that these were egotistic desires, and people always acted out of self-interest. Albeit Hobbes found desires in themselves to be neither bad, nor good, this finding had no actual significance, because from the point of view of human coexistence, human egotism should be considered to be evil. Nature implanted conflict in man, because everybody wanted to validate their own interest only. The original human nature is characterized by egotism. It ensues from egotism that in the state of nature of human coexistence everybody is everybody's foe, everybody wages war on everybody. Human life, freedom and possession are not safe. In the state of nature, there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."⁴ From this horrible state of nature, men can only get free if they create society. This horrible state of nature can solely be terminated by waiving the freedom to protect their lives, transferring this natural right to a ruler, by contract.

Thus, society or, more precisely, the laws made in society and morality generated by the laws will place boundaries to the individuals' egotism.

Personal identity is always a resultant of the interaction between human nature and social environment. In Hobbes's opinion, human nature was originally evil and egotistic. He found that human nature was made good in and by society, because people integrated social laws and morality into their own identity.

Contrarily, at the end of the 17th century, during the glorious British war, John Locke did not find man to be originally evil. Man partook of divine goodness even in the state of nature; in the state of nature, men generally followed the divine law: the law that one would not impair the other man's life, health, liberty or goods. In Locke's opinion, the state of nature was not a horrible state. There was no continual conflict and continual war in the state of nature, but the natural law ruled.

Locke derived the natural law from the fact that we humans were created by the Creator and thereby were owned by the Creator. Thus, it is not us to dispose of our and others' lives, but the Creator.

The power to implement the natural law was secured equally for everyone. Thus, there was indeed power in the state of nature and everybody

⁴ Hobbes, Th.: *Leviathan*. p. 86.

was an executor of this power; there was punishment too, as in the society created after the contract, as in the political state. Moreover, Lock considered that the state of nature was better than absolute monarchy, because in the state of nature, power was shared and limited by the law.

Locke did assume that the natural law was not respected by everyone in the state of nature either. It did happen that somebody would make “a declaration of a design upon [another’s] life”⁵, or “in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state”⁶. Thus, according to Locke, human nature was not altogether good. Human nature did contain an inclination to evil too: to take away others’ lives, liberty and goods. Life, liberty and goods constitute man’s identity, and in lack of these, man’s dignity is gone. Civil government is created as a result of the social contract, for the protection of life’s dignity, liberty and property.

Locke thought that human identity, besides desires and self-interest, did not just consist of political and moral components. Man was not just *homo politicus*. According to Locke, man did not only partake of divine goodness, but also of divine rationality.

But as opposed to Descartes, Locke considered and argued at length that rationality did not contain innate notions.⁷ Rationality is a capacity; man is capable of using his reason filled with experience. According to Locke, man is God’s image insofar as he is able both to be reasonable and to be good.

But the identities of men are not constituted solely by his rationality, morality and desires. These are indeed the essential components of identity, but an individual man’s identity also contains his body. What constitutes one man’s identity? “Nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeing particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.”⁸ The body is not simply the carrier of identity, because if it is only the identity of the soul (desires, rationality and morality) that determined man’s identity, then different men living in different ages would be the same one man. We

⁵ Locke, J.: *Two Treatises on Government*. p. 201.

⁶ Idem.

⁷ The entire first book of his work is dedicated to the argument against innate notions. Cf.: John Locke: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

⁸ Locke, J.: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Vol. II, Chapter XXVII, p. 137.

identify a given creature as being human based on his body. Besides being spiritual substance, man is also physical substance.

According to Locke, it is indeed not the body or the spirit that constituted the identity of the person, but consciousness. The body and the spirit are substantial components of man, but man becomes a person by his self-consciousness. Man is a thinking being with a body, who “can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places”⁹. Consciousness constitutes personal identity. Man’s physical and spiritual components may change and do change during his lifetime, but as long as he is conscious of himself as being the same, this consciousness keeps him united into that one person.

Thus, Locke found that the thinking and bodily substances constituting man were united in consciousness and self-consciousness. In fact, what he argued with was exactly what needed to be argued: how consciousness – which most philosophies designated the connection of the human body and spirit with – was possible. Moreover, in his essay on human understanding, Locke did not speak of the constituent factors of identity (liberty, dignity, morality following the natural law) which were present in his treatise on civil government. Not only the connection between body and soul is difficult to explain, but also the political philosophical and metaphysical interpretations of identity are hard to reconcile. Albeit Locke’s concept of identity was superficial and inconsistent, it did have a considerable effect in modern Western societies.

Prior to Locke, Descartes had found that the connection between the physical and thinking substance constituting man was located in the epiphysis. Before long, modern science proved Descartes wrong, because connection in the epiphysis was not true. Descartes himself knew that the relationship between body and soul was an essential question in connection with his philosophy. To the related inquiry of Princess Elizabeth, Descartes answered: “There are two things in the human soul [...] The one is that it thinks; the other is that, since it is united to the body, it can act and be acted upon along with it. I have said hardly anything about the second...”¹⁰

Descartes considered the achievement of certain knowledge to be the purpose of philosophy. Science could solely be based on knowledge

⁹ Idem. p. 138.

¹⁰ Descartes, R.: *Correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643.*

that was certain. Descartes reached certain knowledge using methodological doubt. The basic concept in methodological doubt was that all knowledge which can be submitted to some doubt must be put aside. Then the extreme skepticism would turn into certainty. Certain knowledge, which can no longer be doubted, is nothing else but Descartes's famous statement: "I think therefore I am."¹¹ Certain knowledge is connected to the self. But who is this self that I am? And what is this self that I am? Certain knowledge is that I am a thing which thinks. "What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."¹²

In terms of personal identity, the source of the Cartesian criticism of knowledge is the ego as the cognitive subject. This cognitive subject throws off, because it can do so, all earlier scholastic knowledge. He can freely rely on his own thinking.¹³ The two basic particularities of the Cartesian modern personal identity are thinking and liberty. Man is a freely thinking being.

However, Descartes considered that before he pulled down everything using the methodical doubt, he needed a temporary house. "It is necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may live commodiously during the operations [of building the new house]."¹⁴ The temporary house is nothing else but Descartes's temporary morality with the following maxims:

"The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes."¹⁵ The second maxim of the temporary morality is perseverance. "My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute

¹¹ Descartes, R.: *Descartes: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*. Part IV, p. 29.

¹² Descartes, R.: *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Meditation II, p. 28.

¹³ In his excellent introductory study, Gáspár Miklós Tamás stated that the epistemological turn of the Cartesian philosophy was underlain by a more essential particularity of modernity: the liberty of the cognitive subject, of the ego. Cf.: Descartes: *A módszerről (On Method)*.

¹⁴ Descartes, R.: *Descartes: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*. Part III, p. 20.

¹⁵ Idem.

in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain."¹⁶ Albeit perseverance is a stoical virtue, Leibniz was not entirely correct in saying that Cartesian and stoic philosophies were the same on moral issues. As demonstrated by the first maxim, Descartes indeed opted for the middle road and not for apathy. Leibniz is not entirely correct even if Descartes's third maxim was indeed the stoic principle "to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world."¹⁷ This third maxim is built on the separation of fortune and happiness, which indeed is characteristic of stoic ethics.

Thus, man is a freely thinking being who is guided by temporary moral principles in everyday life. In other words, the temporary moral principles confine free thinking to the world of science. And true science, which relies on certain knowledge, ensures the longest possible earthly life for man. The medieval life vision of everlasting life and salvation was replaced by the modern want for long life. As Descartes stated it in his work *Discourse on Method*: "The preservation of health [...] is without doubt, of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental one."

The modern notion of personal identity endeavors to harmonize human nature (natural desires, affinities, interest, egotism and human body), social co-existence following the laws and moral rules, individual liberty and dignity, and the rationality that serves all these. Attempts in modernity to achieve this were hallmarked by Hobbes, Descartes and Locke, among others.

I believe that Kant's philosophy offered the most successful framing of these conceptual structures into each other. The starting point of Kant's concept of subject was the self's knowledge of itself as the object of experience, as the carrier of desires, affinities, goals and dispositions. But beyond pure experience, the self had to assume something else too, which was the basis of experience – namely, the ego. The self could know its ego empirically, but had to assume it as a prerequisite of knowledge. This ego is the subject itself. The subject is something in the background which precedes all experience, uniting

¹⁶ Idem. pp. 21–22.

¹⁷ Idem. p. 22.

the perceptions. Thus, the self for itself is at the same time the subject and the object of experience, and accordingly, its facts are driven by two laws. As the object of experience, it pertains to the sensory world, and its facts are determined by the laws of nature and society. Contrarily, as a subject, it is an inhabitant of the intelligible world, an autonomous being that is able to act according to the laws created for itself. And it can envision itself free only from this second point of view. One is free solely as a transcendental subject.

There have been philosophies that explored new and essential components of the modern personal identity also after Kant (Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl – to name only a few continental examples.) But indeed, Kant's philosophy marked the end of an important chapter.

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THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

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As we have already discussed it in this volume, identity is a typically modern issue, because for questions such as “who am I?”, “who are we?” to arise, first there had to be a collapse in the traditional concept of the world which defined man’s place in the universe based on some assumed cosmic order.¹ For this very reason, the problem of identity cannot be separated from the problem of liberty, albeit it has been very clear from the very beginning when this problem arose in this form that such a liberty cannot be absolute, or it can be so only in a very specific sense; indeed, who we are has always been determined greatly by factors which fall beyond our range. The interpretation of identity has always been connected closely to our interpretation of our liberty on the one hand, and of the dialectics of our liberty and determination, on the other hand.

All these questions related to liberty, the dialectics of liberty and determination become expressed in the problem of self-consciousness posed in the modern age, for several reasons. First of all, by challenging the validity of ontological or religious legitimation, self-consciousness became the sole forum which could serve as a starting point for any ascertainment. Secondly, the only starting point at hand for the source of free action in the interpretation of liberty, is, again, self-consciousness. Thirdly, while self-consciousness is the most direct connection with ourselves, our self-interpretation must also begin with self-consciousness, either in the sense that the

¹ See: Charles Taylor: *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001, 3–111. passim, 144–145; Idem: *The Politics of Recognition*. In Amy Gutmann (ed.): *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, 25–73, 27–29; Axel Honneth: *The Struggle for Recognition. Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Transl. by Joel Anderson. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, pp. 121–125.

approach must reckon with the nature of self-consciousness, or in the sense that eventually self-consciousness (the self) is the one that poses these very questions on itself.

Hegel's work set new approaches in motion in European philosophy also in this regard, because he broke with two assumptions which were considered evident in modern continental philosophy, namely: the assumption of the subject's static nature and of the direct nature of our relationship with ourselves. He achieved this by stating the dynamic nature of the subject,² on the one hand, and by perceiving it as being essentially mediated, on the other hand; moreover, this shift in approach characterized his philosophy as a whole, not only his attitude towards the problem of the subject.

The basis of Hegel's approach

Taken in its entirety, Hegel's philosophy undertook no less than to return to the goal which modern philosophy seemed to abandon, namely to know reality, in particular the entire reality as it is. It is a well-known fact that such endeavors, albeit on different grounds, were qualified as being impossible both by Cartesian philosophy and the Kantian critical philosophy; nevertheless, Hegel changes the approach and claims: we miss the point as soon as we assume a difference between reality and the cognitive consciousness. It is much more practical and more legitimate philosophically speaking to look at reality as to something which we must understand *ab ovo* as always being shaped by our consciousness and our self-consciousness; therefore the interpretation of our world is always self-interpretation too.

One of the consequences of such a worldview is that the knowledge of any object assumes that we can indicate a place for it in the entire system of our interpretation of reality. At the same time, this very system cannot be static either, because on the one hand there is a pertaining movement during which we discover the meaning of

² See: Andreas Luckner: *Genealogie der Zeit. Zu Herkunft und Umfang eines Rätsels. Dargestellt an Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1994, pp. 16–19.

certain moments, and on the other hand, it also has a pertaining movement whereby the individual moments separate from each other. In this manner, there cannot be indicated a point in our interpretation of reality which is not a result of a self-interpretative process; moreover, neither can there be indicated one which could be interpreted independently from the other ones. And this way, any interpretation of Hegel's concept of self-consciousness must reckon with the entire Hegelian philosophy. Naturally, this discussion shall confine itself to the most characteristic issues.

Hegel's logical approach to identity

As noted earlier in this volume,³ the problem of identity in European philosophy became an object of analysis not only regarding human self-identity, but was approached also by classical logic. Accordingly, Hegel poses the issue not only in connection with the nature and modus operandi of self-consciousness and our self-interpretation, but also in the logical part of the system. However, as the principle of dynamization and mediation is generally valid for his entire philosophy, it is practical to discuss the concept of identity also in the context of multiple mediations by other concepts.

In *The Science of Logic*, the concept of identity appears within the framework of "the logic of essence", which denotes the level in the structure of the conceptual network describing our world on which the essential and the unessential aspects are distinguished through the reflective movement. This is the level where the so-called reflective definitions appear, namely identity, difference and contradiction, closely related to each other. Now, the concept of identity operates when we are trying to define essence in itself, although, when we are about to stop on this level, we would actually say nothing, because simple self-identity is rather indeterminateness.⁴ In order to actually determine the object, we would have to turn towards the differences, indeed, both towards the "indifferent" differences, as well as towards the contradictions, because these will

³ See the chapter *History of Modern Identity* authored by István Bujalos in this volume.

⁴ G. W. F. Hegel: *The Science of Logic*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

say *in concreto* what the object examined is.⁵ And thus “[...] the consideration of all things that are that reveals, *in them*, that each is self-unlike and contradictory in its equality with itself, and each self-identical in its difference, in its contradiction: that everything intrinsically is this movement of transition of one of these determinations to the other, and that everything is this transition because each determination is itself, within it, the opposite of itself.”⁶ This is what Hegel calls the “negative movement which... identity itself is represented to be”,⁷ stating that “[...] truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference, and hence consists only in this unity”.⁸

In the first part of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*⁹, Hegel adds to all this that the distinction between identity and difference is made by reflective understanding which assumes the differences to be independent, and at the same time also affirms their relativity, without “bringing these thoughts into one” or unifying them into the notion.¹⁰ Afterwards, he distinguishes the “abstract identity of understanding” from concrete identity, where the latter one is “first” discoverable (in the order of logical discussion) in the Ground, and “with a higher truth”, in the Notion.¹¹

Hegel’s logical analysis on the notion of identity reveals the following: 1. The notion of identity depends on the notion of difference (including contradiction), because in itself it lacks substance. 2. This difference is not external to identity, but it is the only one able to determine its nature. This does not only mean that an object’s self-identity can be determined solely in its difference from other objects, but also that the determination of the object itself assumes that one should distinguish essential and non-essential elements within the object, as well as their relations, and thus the object is not different only from other objects, but also identical with itself and different from itself at the same time, in the motion of determination. 3. Not

⁵ Op. cit. p. 357

⁶ Op. cit. p. 357.

⁷ Op. cit. p. 414.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ G. W. F. Hegel: *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. Part One; Logic*. Blackmask Online

¹⁰ 114. §, Op. cit. p. 87

¹¹ 115. §, Op. cit. p. 87

even in the logical discussion does the “abstract identity of understanding” represent a level which is able to realize the claims raised by the notion of identity. Naturally, this should not be surprising, considering that the structural principle of the entire Hegelian philosophy is the dialectical tension – that can be called a “pragmatic contradiction” – between what a notion promises to signify and what it actually signifies.¹² In terms of identity, the ensuing consequence is that what the notion should actually mean is in fact expressed at a much higher level, in the notion. Likewise, if we consider not the notion of identity itself, but the identity of a concrete object, then the ideal determination of such cannot confine itself to the object in itself, but it must also consider it in its reference to other objects relevant in terms of its understanding, not ignoring that the determination must also include the very movement of determination.

Evidently, the above is valid also if our examination does not focus on the identity of a preferential object, but on human identity, on our self-interpretation. In Hegel’s construal, human, self-conscious identity requires an even more complex framework of analysis than the above, considering that “consciousness is consciousness of the object, and on the other hand, it is consciousness of itself”,¹³ and thus, that which we are seeking, does not take place in an abstractly assumed self-consciousness which performs the examination, but *between* the self-consciousnesses that interpret themselves and each other, in the space of intersubjectivity.¹⁴

¹² For the elaboration of the nature of pragmatic contradiction, see: Vittorio Hösle: *Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität*. Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1998, p. 198.

¹³ G. W. F. Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Transl. by Terry Pinkard, http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/About_Me_files/Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20%28entire%20text%29.pdf, p. 81. downloaded on 13 September 2011

¹⁴ „[...] what is supposed to happen can only be brought about by way of both of them bringing it about.” Op. cit. p. 166.

Identity, self-interpretation and self-consciousness in Hegel's philosophy of spirit

As our preliminary analyses demonstrated, the starting point for mapping identity in the sense of self-interpretation must be the problem of self-consciousness, which is discussed in the third part of the Hegelian system, *The Philosophy of Spirit*. Of course, we still cannot ignore that understanding self-consciousness requires – according to the principle of totality of the Hegelian philosophy – that certain “pre-self-consciousness” and “supra-self-consciousness” strata are also considered, meaning the abilities which underlie self-consciousness, as well as those which fold out of self-consciousness.

According to Hegel, one of the most important steps in preparing the appearance of self-consciousness is the appearance of the “soul”.¹⁵ Man becomes a subject for himself only at this moment, because this is the point where he distinguishes himself from the “natural totality of his determinations” as the object, as the world external to him. The birth of the self thus corresponds to the birth of objective consciousness.¹⁶ This underlies the actual self-consciousness whose abstract notion expresses only that in each object of consciousness we are also aware of ourselves and that our self, which we distinguish from the world, is identical with itself. However, this abstract identity is the non-substantial expression of our identity with ourselves,¹⁷ and as such, it is by no means adequate for stating who this soul is. This requires the superposition of the various levels of self-consciousness which also represent the variations of the reality of self-consciousness.

Hegel identified the first buds of the soul's gaining self-consciousness in the references of desires, insofar as in desire self-consciousness tries to terminate the differences between itself and its object, striving also to annihilate its object and become identical with it. We speak of the moment of annihilation because in its endeavors of acquiring, self-consciousness attempts to terminate the independence of the object of its desire (that is, it endeavors to encompass

¹⁵ G. W. F. Hegel: *The Philosophy of Spirit* Kessinger Publishing, 2004, 29, 30.

¹⁶ 412. §, Op. cit. p.30.

¹⁷ 424. §,

it); the moment of identification is mentioned because satisfaction contains "the determination that self-consciousness is *identical* with its object".¹⁸ "The judgment or the division of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a *free* object in which the soul is aware of itself as a soul, but it also falls outside of it".¹⁹ Yet, as we have shown, this is not even actual self-consciousness, but its buds only. Self-consciousness becomes real only if another self-consciousness appears. Hegel calls this form of self-consciousness the recognizing self-consciousness,²⁰ and the process of its development the process of recognition.

A first approach to the essence of the recognizing self-consciousness reveals that it exists not simply for itself, but for another self-consciousness. "In this other as a soul, I contemplate myself, and also another absolutely independent object which exists directly, opposing me as a soul."²¹ Therefore, self-consciousness, while it is aware of its uniqueness, faces its negation, and this opposition inspires it "[...] to *be revealed* as a free soul, and to *exist* for the other as such. This is the process of *recognition*."²²

As long as it senses the other consciousness as being *directly* different, the process of recognition appears as a struggle for self-consciousness, because it is the only way it can strive to terminate the direct difference. This directness also appears as sensuality, as being-a-thing, therefore self-consciousness is able to exceed its own directness only by putting its own life to risk by negating its sensuality.²³ Therefore the struggle for recognition is a struggle "of life and death",²⁴ but this way it calls forth another contradiction: the disappearance of either will not yield the completion of recognition, but its impossibility.²⁵ Exceeding contradiction first takes place as a unilateral process: one of the struggling parties renounces recognition

¹⁸ 429. §

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Recognition of self-consciousness is discussed in paragraphs 430 to 435 of the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

²¹ 430. §,

²² 430. §,

²³ 431. §,

²⁴ 432. §,

²⁵ Ibid.

for the sake of survival, while the other one becomes recognized unilaterally. This is a relation between a master and a slave.²⁶ According to Hegel's analysis, the common feature in this relationship is the struggle for satisfying needs,²⁷ but no longer through satisfying desire directly, but through the careful and planning shaping of objects. In the meanwhile, while the master contemplates its own superiority through the mediation of the slave, the slave "[...] creates in this subordination and fear of the master the beginning of wisdom – transition to the general consciousness."²⁸

Thus, the highest form of self-consciousness is represented by general consciousness, which is an "affirmative awareness of itself in other subjects" – knowledge which is aware of the autonomy of each subject as free individualities and of not being different from them. This is the stage of mutual recognition: "real generality as mutuality is characteristic of it insofar as it is aware of itself as being recognized in the free other, and is aware of this as long as it recognizes the other one, knowing it to be free".²⁹ In this unity – which is also a unity of consciousness and self-consciousness – the difference between the individuals seems terminated,³⁰ guiding the analysis towards the capacity of reason and the "objective spirit", social forms of coexistence, legal, moral and ethical relations.

Hegel's considerations in the *Philosophy of Spirit* allow for the following conclusions on the organization of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness in its abstract notion means that we are aware of ourselves in every possible object. In this regard, it carries a surplus compared to the notion of the soul (which expresses a separation from everything else) by including also our relationship with the "other" different from ourselves, as well as that with ourselves. However, this relationship is entirely of a "practical" nature because even in its most primitive form – desire – it aspires to acquiring that which is different, creating a movement to which it serves as a source. In the second phase of self-consciousness, the movement of recogni-

²⁶ 433. §

²⁷ 434. §

²⁸ 435. §

²⁹ 436. §

³⁰ 437. §

tion, another aspect is added to this: self-consciousness recognizes that some of the objects different from itself are not merely objects, but also self-consciousness (objects which are also *themselves*). This yields the multiplication of perspectives for self-consciousness: it is not simply about *its* sensing other self-consciousnesses, but also about its awareness of itself as appearing both as an object *and* as self-consciousness for the other self-consciousnesses. This level reveals the original indirectness of self-consciousness, because indeed, in the real sense of the word, I cannot be self-consciousness without the recognition of the other self-consciousnesses – adding that here “the recognition of the other self-consciousnesses” should also be construed bilaterally, as a *genitivus subjectivus* and a *genitivus obiectivus* at the same time: it expresses also the fact that self-consciousness recognizes the other self-consciousnesses, but also that the others must recognize it in order for it to materialize in the common space. The initial phases of this process (or its hypothetical beginning) is marked by the natural determinateness of self-consciousnesses, making it to appear as a struggle of life and death as long as they learn, in the spirit of pragmatic contradiction, that this strategy is inadequate for gaining recognition. Here the life-and-death struggle is replaced by a master-slave relationship which is asymmetrical, but by teaching self-consciousness – at least on the slave side – to distance itself from its direct desires and to transform reality actively, it represents a transition towards to so-called general self-consciousness and accordingly, to the possibility of reason, morality, legality and freedom.

Of course, the above did not offer us a complete answer to the concrete form of the shaping of identity, but only helped us map the mechanisms which in Hegel's view determine the evolution of our identity. The most important findings are: 1. Our identity – as it follows the organization of self-consciousness – is essentially mediated, meaning that what we are is shaped and revealed in a space shared with others, through the mediation of other self-consciousnesses. 2. The shaping of identity is not free from power relations, albeit the ideal version is based on mutual recognition. 3. Taken either in its shaping, or in its final shape, mapping our identity in its complex entirety would mean the charting of our entire world and self-inter-

pretation. Starting from the framework of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, we could also say that while the focus of our identity is self-consciousness and its structure, essentially every stratum of our being plays a role, starting from the natural determinations through people whom we share space with to the social relationships of our existence, to the cultural products in which we understand ourselves, to the moral and ethical relations in which we experience our freedom and our responsibility. However, all this is based on an essential structure, namely on the one determined by the principle of recognition. This thought creates an almost direct connection with certain aspects of contemporary philosophy.

CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (SCHELLING AND NIETZSCHE)

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Identity and modern philosophy

In modern philosophy, the cognoscibility of the world has become conditioned by the cognition of the self, that is, by self-knowledge. Consequently, each moment in self-knowledge (starting from the origins of our notions through ideation to the essential nature of our behavior) is being put to evaluation. Therefore, to a certain extent, ontology and epistemology are becoming connected precisely through the (pre)position of existence. This is a long historical process in which the understanding that thought and existence must be derived from the certainty of self-consciousness appears as a constant element. As Manfred Frank pointed out in one of his studies, this story began with Descartes's pioneering appearance, became universal with Leibniz, then peaked with Kant, Fichte and Schelling, as with these authors, subjectivity became the principle of the deductively developing system of knowledge; or, in other words, the specific form for the possibility of objective substantiation of knowledge could be derived from the selfhood of subjectivity.

According to Frank's scenario, this entire historical process took place within the framework of a more general scientific and technical reorganization. The large-scale development of natural sciences gave one momentum: accordingly, natural sciences make up a system of value-neutral knowledge and rules whereby nature becomes comprehensible. Another momentum came from technology in its most comprehensive sense: accordingly, technology is an efficient instrument in man's hands whereby nature becomes controllable. In this field, as Frank reminds us, Francis Bacon uttered the most popular words: "*Knowledge* itself is power..." In Adorno's and Horkheimer's opinion, the hubris of the illuminated man transpires from this

phrase, laying the foundation for the risk entailed in the high-handed behavior that disdains otherness such as other civilizations and species, as well as in excessive self-confidence that has no doubts about itself. Frank does not take the interpretation of this phrase this far, but offers a more prudent phrasing when he says “Bacon’s famous phrase, which identifies scientifically attainable knowledge with power, further ratifies that deep, inner reference that is maintained by scientific inquiry through the power which lies in the increasing domination over nature” (translated from Romanian).¹

It would be difficult to question that this process left such a deep mark on the subject, the self, self-consciousness, and on cognitive reason that postulates existence, that particularly this deep mark, this seal of power has become the best clue to identifying it. Let us take another quote from Frank who writes, referring to Martin Heidegger:

“Based on its origin, this epistemological shifting phrase could be called ‘metaphysics’ after Heidegger. For now, the meaning of this expression could be explained as objectifying or illustrative thought. Accordingly, the subject presents that which in itself is non-transparent and non-existent, by presenting and representing it in its own translucency: the world of objects. That which in the world of objects is transparent (as the laws themselves) is only a fulguration of being made specifically transparent by the subject” (translated from Romanian).²

Construction, self-consciousness, mediality

The concept, according to which the world of objects is represented by the fulgurating, flashing self-translucency of the subject and its transparency, appears most univocally and clearly in Schelling’s work. During this forming, Schelling learned greatly from the scheme doctrine of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and could see a sort of a materialization of the same experiment in Fichte’s doc-

¹ Manfred Frank: *Identität und Subjektivität*. In: Idem: *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis*. Reclam, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 80.

² Ibid.

trine of science; however, the meticulous elaboration of the potentiality of the cognitive subject which presumes the possibility of existence, in the context of the philosophy of identity, indeed bears his name.

Nevertheless, this philosophical task is not confined to the methodological framework of the philosophy of the self, as was the case, for instance, with Fichte. Moreover, it exerts an impact on the possibilities of amplification or perfection of the entire philosophy. Indeed, the starting point in Schelling's transcendental philosophy is the self, but the end of the path is the identity of the self with the world and with nature. This identity must be construed, and must be done so through various degrees of potency. Therefore, identity is a construction.

The acts referring to consciousness and intelligence, as well as the medial or mediating movements between intelligence and nature, are amplified in this construction. At the same time, activities that target being or existence are reduced. All these aspects can be seen as early as the study called *Of the I As Principle of Philosophy* that precedes the *System of Transcendental Idealism* which is, undoubtedly, the first to turn regarding the topics of philosophy of identity. The new philosophy proposed by Schelling

“seeks to unveil and reveal that which is [Dasein], so that the nature or spirit of philosophy cannot lie in any formula or letter; its highest topic must be what is immediate in man and present only to itself, and cannot be what is mediated by concepts and laboriously recapitulated in concepts”.³

The exposure of existence in this context means that being (existence) is actually nothing else than a mere derivative. And indeed the derivative of “what is immediate in man and present only to itself”: that is, for its self-consciousness or its self-awareness. However, we should picture this activity of the central consciousness in Schelling's work not so much as an immovable, punctual essentiality, but rather

³ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: *Of the I As Principle of Philosophy*. In: Idem: *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. Four Early Essays*, Bucknell University Press, 1980, p. 67.

as a presupposition of “the synthesis of multiplicity in the unity of consciousness”.⁴

Well, this presupposition is structured in a meticulous manner, also inspired by the philosophical constellation of the period, in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*.⁵ On the one part, the unveiling of ‘what is’ by self-consciousness is further refined; on the other part, Schelling also attempts to elaborate on the medial construction of the I – if we are allowed to say so – besides the nature of the I as a principle. As a reward of this thinking process, the concept of productive intellectual intuition is born. Examples for the first one, that is, for the detailed moments of existence reduced, can be found in the parts of the text referring to the original and artificial prejudice of being, where the philosopher demonstrates that things outside us are merely prejudices. However, he does so not by neglecting them, or by pointing out the absence of any connection between the things outside us and the existence of our Self, but precisely by exposing their identity:

“The proposition *There are things outside us* will therefore only be certain for the transcendental philosopher in virtue of its identity with the proposition *I exist*, and its certainty will likewise only be *equal* to the certainty of the proposition from which it borrows its own.”⁶

In this manner, transcendental methodology becomes accessible for Schelling, and within this methodology, he is justified in stating that “there is no question at all of an absolute principle of *being* (...), what we seek is an absolute principle of *knowledge*”.⁷ For Schelling, the first knowledge is the knowledge about ourselves, or, as he calls it, self-consciousness. However, self-consciousness or the identity

⁴ Op. cit., p. 65.

⁵ Of the young Schelling’s philosophical studies, see: János Weiss: *A fiatal Schelling [The Young Schelling]*. Postface to the volume Friedrich W. J. Schelling: *Fiatalkori írásai [Early Writings]*. In this text, Weiss’s mainly suggests that in the reinterpretation of the young Schelling’s thinking it is worth taking a look at the philosophical works of other authors of that period, such as Jacobi or even Hölderlin. Op. cit., pp. 189-207.

⁶ F. W. J. Schelling: *System of Transcendental Idealism*. University of Virginia Press, 1993, p. 8.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 16.

assumed by self-consciousness is found to be mediated too. The specific form of expression of this mediality and mediation is reflection. Thus, the mediality of reflection expresses an identity and, particularly, the indifference of the I and of the world, of intelligence and nature. The initiative activity – from the direction of nature – of this oscillatory and potential movement organized into this identical unity is none other than man who has reason and is able to think:

“Nature’s highest goal, to become wholly an object to herself, is achieved only through the last and highest order of reflection, which is none other than man; or, more generally, it is what we call reason, whereby nature first completely returns into herself, and by which it becomes apparent that nature is identical from the first with what we recognise in ourselves as the intelligent and the conscious.”⁸

The revival of reflection initiated from the direction of consciousness is contemplation; its most perfect form is productive intellectual intuition. This form of consciousness differs from the mechanical thought of ordinary, non-reflective consciousness in that it animates the world particularly through the act of contemplation that is within it. As Schelling put it: the mechanism of ordinary consciousness rather conceals intuiting in the object, while the productive intuition of transcendental reflection “merely glimpses the intuited through the act of intuiting”.⁹ Schelling’s phrasing also reveals the medial nature of transcendental identity: he speaks of transformation, reaching, transition in connection with understanding and interpreting the relation between knowledge and being, that is, between intelligence and nature. For this very reason, we can state that the self’s knowledge about itself and about the world, that is, self-consciousness, is not a stating, posterior explanatory act, but “a pure doing, which simply has to be nonobjective in knowledge”. Pure doing is none other than the performing intellectuality of “an intuition freely productive in itself”.¹⁰

In this concept, artistic and intellectual productivity become very close, and they differ solely in terms of the direction of the productive force:

⁸ Op. cit., p. 6.

⁹ Op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 27.

“For whereas in art the production is directed outwards, so as to reflect the unknown by means of products, philosophical production is directed immediately inwards, so as to reflect it in intellectual intuition. The proper sense by which this type of philosophy must be apprehended is thus the *aesthetic* sense, and that is why the philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy.”¹¹

In fact, the productive aesthetical structure of intuiting and intuition, as well as the medial nature of mediation and mediality is that which creates relation between art and philosophy, and this relation is best represented in the discourse of identity. This aesthetical affinity of identity discourses is noted by Odo Marquard too, who states – precisely regarding Schelling’s philosophy – , that the philosophy of history of the identity being created is perfected in the aesthetical system, and reaches its limits, that is, its end, therein. Marquard attaches great importance to oblivion in reaching and experiencing the end. In his opinion, Schelling’s identity system presents oblivion as a kind of a solution, meaning that the emancipation story of the identity being created must be oblivious of its own impotence. The most refined and unforgettable manner to do this is presented in art, which is, of course, “a quick march into the world of illusions”.¹² Indeed, in the aesthetical illusion, we become oblivious of ourselves rather than finding ourselves. But, at least, we can do this productively.

Deconstruction, body, phenomenality

While in Schelling’s case, we drew attention to the constructive moments of identity, in Nietzsche’s case, we are emphasizing the dominance of deconstructive movements; although, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, there is a confusing variety of paths towards thinking through the way identity and being are shaped as being identical or

¹¹ Op. cit., p. 14.

¹² Odo Marquard: *Identität: Schwundtelos und Mini-Essenz – Bemerkungen zur Genealogie einer aktuellen Diskussion*. In: O. Marquard und Karlheinz Stierle (eds.): *Identität*. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 1996², p. 366.

the way identity develops itself as being. Indeed, the entire opus can be conceived as a movement in which the principle of identification and the adventure of plurality draw near each other, or, as Maurice Blanchot put it, as the transcending of integral discourse – in which the organizing principle is coherence – by fragmentary language.¹³ Of course, this transcending is not quite a progression towards a more developed stage, but rather a “restless wandering in the foreignness”, exploration in the free air of “*undiscovered world*”, curiosity for things afar, for all things strange.¹⁴ If we look at Nietzsche’s philosophy as a basic criticism of the cognoscibility of Being identical with itself, from this perspective, there are three intertwined critical strata available for the eyes of him who, using Nietzsche’s words, embarks on the coldness and anxiety of solitude entailed in the difference of a deeply suspicious observation: namely that of the subject, of ontology and of epistemology. The subject, ontology and epistemology as a critical stratum refers to, first of all, the discovery or rather the regaining of the philosopher’s task, or, more correctly, the liberation of the critical potential abundance residing in a task which was drained by metaphysics, and in particular, transcendental philosophy and language (its logic).

This drainage actually followed the gradual intensification of a sort of a hubris and flatulence of the European soul, spirit or mind, whereby a closed, unitary, self-identical entity was discovered and identified in the subject’s or the individual’s intellect. At the same time, out of its “proud, deceptive consciousness” as “means for the preservation of the individual”, the intellect views its own existence (not incidentally, the projection of this deception) as being cognoscible.¹⁵ Nietzsche never ceased criticizing vehemently this intellectual scheme that was in fact perfected through Kant and Schelling. Besides the criticism of principium individuationis completed in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche endeavored to accomplish this critique, in the most spectacular and possibly the most audacious manner, in

¹³ Maurice Blanchot: *Nietzsche and Fragmentary Writing*, in: Idem: *The Infinite Conversation*, University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche: *Human All Too Human*, Read Books, 2007, pp. 4–6.

¹⁵ Cf. F. Nietzsche: *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* in *The portable Nietzsche*, Viking Press, 1968, p. 44.

his unfinished study *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, unpublished during his lifetime. The way he metaphorized the path of nerve stimulus can be perceived as the persiflage of the Kantian apperceptive scheme:

“A nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image – first metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound – second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.”¹⁶

This is how the nerve stimulus is transformed from a transcendental scheme of notion into a transgressive performing metaphorization that crosses the various spheres and produces connections between these spheres. The concept which re-places necessity with contingency, that is, the idea that leaves behind the passive categorical subordination and emphasizes the functioning of arbitrariness and active force, was so live in Nietzsche’s thinking that it recurred several times in his works and notes. Nearly ten years later, after the above-quoted passage, in a thought penned during the time of *Zarathustra*, one of the recurrences reads:

“Initially, apperception is just activity ('arbitrary' movements!)

My theory: *the entire development* of spiritual life takes place in *every activity* of man

Actions are already perceptions themselves: in order to perceive *something*, an *active force* must be *functioning*, perceiving and *letting* stimulus act, *taming* it – as *such* a stimulus – in an *amended* form.

It is a fact that *something utterly new is being born continuously*. (...)

There is always something *new* being born in spiritual development too.

It is utterly impossible to *deduce* sensation and notion from each other.”¹⁷

The subject-critical application of this continuous creation of the utterly new may elucidate how Nietzsche does not take into consid-

¹⁶ Op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁷ F. Nietzsche: “Az új felvilágosodás” [*The New Enlightenment*] (based on the Hungarian translation: Imre Kurdi). Osiris/Gond, Budapest, 2001, pp. 187–188.

eration any essential entity that could organize in itself, in terms of identity, the forces that would act at the time of perception or at the time of knowing afterwards. Rather, consciousness, spirit and other similar centralities are being created continuously through these forces, so that immediately as they become active, in that very performing moment, they should liberate in themselves "something 'wandering' that takes pleasure in change".¹⁸ Free spirit is such a (de) centrality constantly transcending itself, which is able to leave itself as a wanderer precisely because it applies to itself the appraisal processes of reevaluation, that is, the perspectival elements such as "the shifting, distortion, and apparent teleology of the horizons and everything that belongs to perspective".¹⁹

This intensive validation of perspectivalness, plurality and decentralities in the selfhood discourses in Nietzsche's thinking results in the elementary criticism of the identical self, on the one part, or, as Paul de Man put it, "the deconstruction of the value of values",²⁰ and allows for the creation of a plausible and flexible concept of the self, on the other part. Nietzsche left us numerous texts which point to this direction of the (de)ception of the self, albeit they never comprised a coherent whole. Words from the above-quoted *Human All Too Human* such as:

"it may be of greater importance (...) to hearken to the low voice of the different situations in life; these bring their own opinions with them. We thus take an intelligent interest in the life and nature of many persons by not treating ourselves as rigid, persistent single individuals",²¹

or another saying: "When we have first found ourselves, we must understand how from time to time to *lose* ourselves and then to find ourselves again. This is true on the assumption that we are thinkers. A thinker finds it a drawback always to be tied to one person."²²

¹⁸ F. Nietzsche: *Human All Too Human*. Read Books, 2007, p. 406

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁰ Paul de Man: *Az olvasás allegóriái [Allegories of Reading]* (based on the Hungarian translation by György Fogarasi). Ictus/JATE, Szeged, 1999, pp. 163–164.

²¹ F. Nietzsche: *Human All Too Human*, Op. cit., p. 390.

²² Op. cit., http://www.lexido.com/EBOOK_TEXTS/THE_WANDERER_AND_HIS_SHADOW_.aspx?S=306 Downloaded on 16 June 2011

– well, such phrases point to the fact that Nietzsche found no substantiality in the ego, consciousness, soul, and spirit, but rather a rhythmically produced activity of forces, created and situated by cases, events, accidents and life situations. Indeed, force is needed for life situations to utter voices, and for us to hear these voices. As he put down in one of his notes: he found interest in the “individual as multiplicity”,²³ and the individual conceived as multiplicity is, on the one hand, a part of the multiplicity of things, while on the other hand, it is able to gain insight into and concern itself with this multiplicity – descend, then soar again, fluttering, fearlessly, intangibly. The individual can thus be characterized as being part of the multiplicity of things, but also as being above it, keeping the “immense variety” “beneath him” in a perspectival and free manner.²⁴

This broad and unrestrained staging of the individual can be observed also in the syntagm “inner world”. By no means should it be perceived and construed transcendently, therefore it cannot be identified with the soul, consciousness or such central entities. Nietzsche had a rather phenomenal idea of the notion inner world, at least as suggested by a few notes from *The Will To Power*. The notes and thoughts on the phenomenality of the inner world, in the third book entitled *Principles of a New Valuation*, clearly point to the possibility of a new, alternative identity discourse, in which the body is the guide, opposed to the soul, consciousness and spirit:

“If our “ego” is for us the sole being, after the model of which we fashion and understand all being; very well! Then there would be very much room to doubt whether what we have here is not a perspective illusion – an apparent unity that encloses everything like a horizon. The evidence of the body reveals a tremendous multiplicity; it is allowable, for purposes of method, to employ the more easily studied, richer phenomena as evidence for the understanding of the poorer.”²⁵

²³ F. Nietzsche: “Az új felvilágosodás” [*The New Enlightenment*]. Op. cit. 237. Cf also: “*Mu hypotheses*: the subject as multiplicity. (...) The continual transitoriness and fleetiness of the subject...” F. Nietzsche: *The Will To Power*, Op. cit.

²⁴ F. Nietzsche: *Human All Too Human*, Op. cit., p. 7.

²⁵ F. Nietzsche: *The Will To Power*, http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/nietzsche_wtp03.htm Downloaded on 16 June 2011

As a strong condition to unfolding the phenomenality of the body as a possible discourse of identity, Nietzsche submitted every substantial quality to criticism, primarily, of course, substance itself. In his opinion, there was no bigger error than to consider psychical and physical phenomena as being two manifestations of the same one substance. "Nothing is explained thereby: the concept '*substance*' is perfectly useless as an explanation."²⁶ Then ensued the reevaluation of the categories subject, causality and interpretation as substantial qualities which played a delusive role in the relations between the ego and the world, leading astray the preoccupations about the self(hood). In Nietzsche's opinion, the major and foremost concern with these categories was their becoming the objects and also incentives of a sort of an undiscerning acceptance, of a – nota bene – religious conviction:

"The *subject*: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality: we understand this belief as the effect of one cause—we believe so firmly in our belief that for its sake we imagine "truth", "reality", substantiality in general.— "The subject" is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum: but it is we who first created the "similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity..."²⁷

In order to avoid the homogenization of the subject, causality and interpretation into such a metaphysical unit which leads man astray when he questions his inner world, Nietzsche proposed that the body should be used as a guide in this inquiry. The physiological liberation and validation of the "interplay of physical functions" means the phenomenal grasping of the inner world, whereby it may be found, as Gilles Deleuze put it, that

"What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body – whether it is chemical, biological, social or political. Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. This is why

²⁶ Op. cit.

²⁷ Idem

the body is always the fruit of chance, in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most 'astonishing' thing, much more astonishing, in fact, than consciousness and spirit."²⁸

This way, our identity is shaped as a contingent, arbitrary and variable constitution of the body as the phenomenality of the inner world sustained by various forces.

²⁸ Gilles Deleuze: *Nietzsche and philosophy*. Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006, p. 37.

THE THEORIES OF THE NARRATIVE IDENTITY

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According to the introduction of *Routledge Encyclopedia Of Narrative Theory*, at the beginning of the 70s, we can refer to a narrative turning point and to narratology as a science. Nowadays, the narrative is essential not only in some domains of the humane and social sciences, such as the theory of literature, linguistics and philosophy, but also in the contexts of anthropology, psychology and sociology. As follows, I shall analyze the role of the narrative in the formation of self-identity, both in action and responsibility. In this domain, the cognitive phenomenologic approach and the hermeneutic one are dominating. One may state that in the case of the cognitive approach the narrative assures the coherence and continuity of identity, and the hermeneutic phenomenology emphasizes the connection of the identity with the world.

Analyzing the relationship among action, life and the narrative, Ricoeur constructed a model based on three levels (mimesis I, II and III): the model of narrative prefiguration, configuration and transfiguration. The first level is the one of simple observation, the description of action, and the action itself uses the already settled semantics of the action in a unitary way. The configuration represents the emplotment of the narrative colour and the achievement of coherence – the combination of some events, persons, or independent motivations, and the gradual settlement in a narrative, which renders an account of the past. The transfiguration means the reconsideration of the story in the light of some plans, intentions and results. (Ricoeur 1999a).

Given the study of Ricoeur, entitled *The ego and the narrated identity*, we can establish what the narrative identity is. "By constructing the identity of the narrated story, the narrative constructs the identity of the character, which can be defined as narrated identity. The identity of the story constructs the identity of the character." (Ricoeur 1999a, p. 384) Let us notice that Ricoeur refers to the identity of the character. The necessity to re-write or re-tell the story occurs because the identity of the character derives from the tempo-

ral unity, this is what makes him more different than all the others, yet while he lives his life, unexpected events can perturb this unity. In other words, in conflictual circumstances the task consists in the self-preservation of the character and ego in order to maintain the temporal permanence. In such conflictual situation the reflexive and foreboding character of the story helps a lot, a fact also emphasized by the theory of the narrative. (Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 384, p. 390.)

The consideration of these unexpected situations matters only as far as from the area of fiction we pass to the narrative, which pays attention to the existential constant values of the person, who is responsible for his own facts in his world. The correspondent from life of the action/network of actions can be highlighted with the notion of practice. Life can be represented as a network of practices, which are interwoven and interpenetrated. Taking the reasons of Ricoeur into account, that notion of practice which, just like the narrated story, can be united by means of configuration, is the proper one. Such a notion of practice is the one including the relationship of incorporation, one in which the action as a whole is defined (according to the rule, inevitably and necessarily) by the partial actions. The most elementary rule of this type is the constitutive rule; in this context the rule represents the signification. The practice of chess contains the pawn and the established way according to which it can move, yet it does not contain the "volley," which is related to the practice of lawn tennis. The constitutive rule "emphasizes the character of the *interaction*, which defines the majority of the practice." (Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 394.) Starting from Weber, Ricoeur introduces the larger notion of action, whose essence consists in the fact that it is a behaviour through which those, who act, connect subjective meanings, and the deliberate meaning refers to the others' behaviour, related to it. Consequences: the action also contains the aspect concerning the support of its result; the experience in something is nothing but "internalized interaction;" practice becomes the prefiguration of the narrative before the narrative (*mimesis I*). (Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 396)

Ricoeur considers that the connection between practice and the narrative repeats at higher levels too. Between different types of practice and the universal intention of the individual human existence there are longer or shorter comprehensive practical units, the so-called life plans. In MacIntyre's theory regarding the normative action the mutual relationships, which interpenetrate the life plans and

practices, more exactly their unity, have an essential place. (MacIntyre, 1999) Ricoeur considers that the "idea concerning life in the form of narratives" creates the basis for the ideal of a "good life" to be meaningful. (Ricoeur, 1999a, p. 398.) However, Ricoeur criticizes MacIntyre's solution. There are more reasons, which do not permit us to place the narrated unity of life above all the various practice. Firstly, the "stories are not experienced, they are narrated." Even if we accepted that the stories of life represented acted narratives, thus narratives woven in facts, one cannot avoid the issue regarding only the joint authorship of the narrated life. Thirdly, the concentrated narrative should have well-settled beginnings and endings, the beginning and end of real life do not represent the personal story of the given subject; moreover, I can tell different stories regarding my own life. Fourthly, the unifying life plans are connected to the horizon of expectations deriving from the horizon of personal experience, the self-understanding has a meaning only for the life which had already passed. (Ricoeur, 1999a, pp. 399-402.)

Ricoeur considers the mimetic function of the narrative fundamental. Tengelyi thinks similarly: if, starting from MacIntyre, we accept that we undergo the stories, we become the victims of an appearance, which can be interpreted from a kantian viewpoint. More exactly, "involuntarily, we shall present (...) what is only a *regulating* principle (...) of the story's narrative as the *constitutive* principle of the life story. (...) Thus, the mirage of life, which tells its own story, becomes the mother of the *metaphysics of destiny*." (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 25) The idea concerning the approach of the reality of life expresses the characteristics of non-changeability without suppressing the unique values and the incidental character in the meantime – states Tengelyi. (Tengelyi, 1998, pp. 25-26) Tengelyi believes that the solution consists in the separation of the meaning's formation from the meaning's settlement. "Life stories represent the stages responsible for the *meanings' formation* which, given the fact that they are *impossible to be dominated* and *impossible to be controlled*, are radically different from any approach of meanings." (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 32) "If we consider the life story the stage responsible for the *self-formation* of *senses*, and we see the great stake of the battle fought on this stage to *settle the meaning* in the self identity, it is clear that it is about two different things, although these two things are inseparably united." (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 33)

"The predictions, signs and indications of the developing new meaning, place it into a correlation of references, which can help in the subsequent fixation of the meaning. Yet the meaning, which develops by itself, is capable of producing veritable new beginnings in the story of our lives as, when it reaches the surface level, it always contains some initiatives regarding the meanings, which do not match in the correlation of references found subsequently, and which, as a result, become the victims of the process in which the fixation of the meaning looks beyond: they are eliminated from those modified stories, with which we try to account for the already produced turning point." (Tengelyi, 1998, pp. 38-39)

Tengelyi considers that the event creating the destiny is the event which decomposes the material of the self identity (constructed, interpreted) as a consequence of the process focused on the development of meaning starting from itself (and impossible to dominate); we observe the need to leave ourselves, as the sense which develops and becomes dominant is completely strange to us, more different than the self identity constructed so far: the "*self identity as a frame which encloses the life story splits and opens up.*" (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 43) This strange need pressures us, and only us, irrevocably and plainly – otherwise, this life situation is incidental, yet we find it entirely particular. (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 47)

Tengelyi considers that this interpretation of the self identity, which tries to catch all the complex contents of life cannot be identical with our uniqueness and irrepatability. The latter does not refer to some difference in contents (it does not render the essence of the self identity), it refers only to a circumstantial one. "What it expresses at the first person singular, is nothing but a *positional difference*: that fundamental fact, which tells that what one or another can name as *myself* can't be changed with the ego of someone else, even if, incidentally, it might be assimilated from all viewpoints." (Tengelyi, 1998, p. 45)

"Our reflections drove us to the conclusion that the process focused on the search of self identity is based on a certain 'confusion of perception.' We involuntarily believe that our uniqueness and irrepatability is at stake whenever the material of the story, which we settle our self identity with, vanishes. However, our research demonstrates that the main source of the fact, that we cannot be replaced, must not be searched in those stories in

which we are the main characters, which we keep repeating over and over again, but in those events making up the unique and irrepeatable destiny, which given the irreplaceable forces of the alterity and difference, are pressuring us with the need to leave our selves. (Tengelyi, 1998, pp. 47-48)

Regarding the theories of identity, and the theories generally speaking, the approach of differentiation introduced by Jerome Bruner, who is going to be one of our main actors as follows, appears useful. There is the narrative form of knowledge and the logical and scientific one, as Bruner likes to define it, the paradigmatic knowledge. The narrative knowledge focuses neither on the general causes and their substantiation, nor on the procedures verifying the truth of the declarations regarding the experience, its object is represented by the human intention, actions and sudden changes taking place during the process of development, together with the consequences of the transformation, and its goal is to catch the essence of the sudden appearance of the particular and trivial features, more exactly the formation of meanings. (Bruner, 1986, pp. 11-13)

Jerome Bruner, contemporaneous with MacIntyre, had been previously preoccupied with the cognitive psychology and the theories referring to the learning sciences. The cognitive theory had also discovered the narrative for itself, which it considers the instrument used to construct the ego and its result. In his work, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*, he states that the main function of the intellect is the creation of the world.

Before a more profound analysis of Bruner's conceptions regarding the narrative of life, it's worth resorting to the support provided by the study of Theodore Sarbin entitled *The narrative as a root metaphor of psychology*. (Sarbin, 1986) Sarbin introduces the notion of root metaphor starting from the work of Stephen Pepper. In order to comprehend the experienced time, an unknown domain, we appeal to analogies, more exactly to notions taken from domains, which we had already known. The arsenal of the already known, initial notions, becomes analogy, thus a root metaphor. The undergone time represents an event of history, without being related to one in the past, "a happening developing in the actual state," a dynamic and dramatic action in the chain of the actual events. The root metaphor of the undergone time is the narrative, the story. Sarbin introduces

the narrative principle: “the human beings think, perceive, use their imagination and take moral decisions on the basis of some narrative structures” (Sarbin, 1986, p. 63), therefore the narrative is the organizing principle of the human action – we can say it is a constitutive principle since it provides us with the structure for the stream of experience. (Sarbin, 1986, p. 64) Thus the staged narrative can be identified with human life, however this is not an ontological identification; the narrative functions well as a metaphor, a model in the process approached to reflect on life. Starting from Ricoeur, we can state that the connection between life and the narrative is a mimetic one: the narrative imitates life and life imitates the narrative.

We can mention the three studies of Bruner in which he considers life as narrative analyzing the consequences of this interpretation: *Life as Narrative* (Bruner, 2004), *The Narrative Construction of Reality* and *Narrative Model of Self-Construction*. Taking his work, *Time and narrative*, into account, Ricoeur considers the fact, that we can refer to the lived time only in a narrative form, as a fundamental hypothesis. (Bruner, 2004, p. 692) In the creation of life and narrative the human imagination plays an important role; the reporting of the life story is a cognitive performance itself, not only the reporting of an explicit thing, but, for instance, the result of the activity and selective interpretations of memory. (Bruner, 2004, p. 692)

The story of one's own life is considered “privileged” but also a “doubtful narrative,” as it is reflexive: the narrator and central figure of the narrative are identical, which can predispose the narrator to a series of distortions. Concomitantly, everybody has his own criteria according to which it is the most appropriate narrative way. These are internal and external. Bruner considers that, by means of internal criteria, we appreciate, for instance, if the way we felt and our intentions had been expressed. The listener will also feel, without any verification, if he hears a profound or a superficial story. The external criterion is the one, which shows if the story includes the events of life in a correct way. Can it have an informative role, which is both included and omitted from the story? (Bruner, 2004, p. 693)

Yet these criteria support those, who tell the story of their lives, and are receptive to the cultural, interpersonal and linguistic influence. In a more explicit formulation: because they are constructed, and depend on the cultural customs and the way one uses the language,

it is obvious that the life stories will reflect the theories referring to the "possible lives," which are related to the narrator's culture. The number of narrative models provided describes the course of a life, a really important characteristic of a culture: what kind of narratives of canonical lives and what kind of combinative elements of formal constructions those, who belong to that culture, are provided with in order to create its own life narratives. (Bruner, 2004, p. 694)

The essence of Bruner's argumentation is:

"the cognitive and linguistic processes, modelled culturally, regulating the narration of some personal life stories, also have the necessary power to establish the structure of sensorial perception, organize the memory, decompose, and finally reconstruct the life events according to the desired objective. We finally become the autobiographic narratives, which we tell the story of our own life with." (Bruner, 2004, p. 694)

The individual also becomes a variation of the canonical forms of culture. The opinion according to which, through the mediation of thinking, the language and other symbolical systems mark the representation of reality, had been already noticed in the case of Lev Vygotski. Because of this, the individual intelligence has never been unique.

According to the study of Bruner, the *Narrative construction of reality* (Bruner, 1991), our knowledge and experience are related to certain domains therefore their accumulation is not uniform.

"Each particular modality in the usage of intelligence creates its own integrity – an integrity made of knowledge-plus-experience-plus-instrument – which adapts to the particular domain of applicability. This is a little viable reality, formed by the principles and procedures applied by us. Seen from another perspective, these domains represent the treasury of the sets of cultural instruments." (Bruner, 1991, p. 2)

The domain is a "little world," a piece of the cultural reality, which is formed by a great deal of principles and procedures. During our life time, we become masters in the usage of certain cultural sets of instruments, we are good at the manipulation of certain pieces of reality, while remaining incompetent in other areas of culture, with relevant sets of instruments which are not going to be suitable for us. "But we

can state that the given cultural set of instruments exerts a selective pressure on the development of human aptitudes. (...) Therefore we draw the conclusion that the existence of a point of view will always accompany the knowledge itself.” (Bruner, 1991, p. 3)

The domain of human interactions 1./ is strengthened by principles and procedures, just like the one of scientific logic. 2./ The organization and integration of domains differs from a culture to another. 3./ The domains from the world of human interactions (those regarding the knowledge of man about himself, his social and cultural world) are not organized mainly around some logical principles and logical connections. This domain has its own cultural set of instruments, tools, that is tradition, which on the one hand, are taken as models for the processes, which develop in its context, and on the other hand, they are present everywhere, being familiar and accessible for everybody. In essence, we organize our own experience and memories in the form of some narratives.

Bruner considers the narrative a conventional form mediated by culture, and the usage of narratives occurs at different levels, depending on the individual know-how in the utilization of instruments, which is acquired through the interaction with the surrounding medium, with those around us, and the ones we learn from. The “narratives are particular versions of reality, whose acceptance is settled by tradition and the »narrative imperative«, not by the empirical verification and logical expectations, and despite all this we consider the stories true or false.” (Bruner, 1991, pp. 4-5) Bruner considers that the separation of the narrative form of thinking from the dialogue, the interaction developed in narrative forms, is impossible since they activate and form mutually; it is like the case of the language structure which, at a certain point, cannot be separated from the structure of thinking.

Still depending on the tendencies in the development of literature and philosophy, during the 80s, the psychologists also became aware of the fact that the narrative not only represents reality, it is also its constitutive part. “The question we are preoccupied with does not focus on the way of construction in the case of narratives from a textual perspective, but the way in which the narrative, as an instrument of the intellect, participates in the construction of reality.” (Bruner, 1991, pp. 5-6)

Bruner emphasizes 10 aspects of the narrative constructing the reality. (Bruner, 1991, pp. 6-18). The first is the diachronic one, which refers to the gradual development of human phenomena, yet

this is not the mechanic time, it is the human one. The second aspect is the one which tells that the narrative refers to individual cases, yet this individuality is more the “engine than the direction” of the narrative. This particularity seems included in a story which, in a sense, is general (for example, to pay court to somebody, the school violence), however the narrative exists only in the individual embodiment, and the story is going to be more and more convincing whether the individual event can be better included in its corresponding type of narrative. Thirdly, the narrative represents the materialization of the **intentional** condition. The action and human story always develop in a situation, in a given condition, and the narrative relates all that happens to those involved, everything they do. The action, the human story are always related to intentions and presume the idea of choice. Given the fact that the connection between intention and the subsequent action is weak, one cannot provide causal explanations in narratives, only interpretations of motivations.

The fourth aspect regarding the narrative emphasized by Bruner suggests the possibility of a hermeneutical elaboration. As it is about a hermeneutical interpretation, there are no true statements; even in the best case, the hermeneutical analysis can only be an intuitively convincing account concerning the sense of the “text” or story, obtained in the light of the constituents. Concomitantly, the phenomenon highlighted by the hermeneutical circle suggests that the components, the text, are understood in the light of the whole story. The story is outlined in the context of a narrative or presumptive scene (the narrative structure); the actors and events are included in this context. We may have competitive narratives. The narratives do not wait somewhere in the real external world to be reflected in a text some day: the constructive act of the narrative is the one responsible for the construction of the events themselves in the light of the general and comprehensive narrative: the events become functions, the “servants” of the narrative - states Bruner according to Propp.

The process applied to construct the narrative has already been implemented by little children, being the most comprehensive instrument to organize the human experience.¹ The production of the story

¹ Related to this, it's worth consulting Bruner-Lucariello (2001)

is realized in an interpretative way. The interpretative activity is not demanded by textual or referential problems, without its presence there is no narrative. Most of our stories are trivial and daily, but when the listener finds something strange, the interpretative capacity is immediately activated. The interpretation firstly starts from contextual aspects and intentions, and on the other hand, from the previous knowledge. Both the creator of the story and the listener have previous knowledge. We interpret the elements in such a way that they match with the presumed previous knowledge of the Other. On the one hand, this is going to be the basis of interpretation, and on the other hand, the basis of negotiation, as well as of the way to relate facts (see the ninth aspect of the narrative).

The fifth aspect of the narrative emphasized by Bruner is the canonical aspect and the rupture: the stories are actually stories which ignore the canonical characteristic, what we expect, the common. "It is a rule of the canon that the problem represents the engine of the story: the problem is the violation of what one expects, of identification and the arranged things – more exactly, of the canon. The fate of the narrative depends on the possibility to maintain, reestablishment and redefinition of regularity." (Bruner-Lucariello, 2001, p. 135) Another aspect of this characteristic was presented by Tengelyi in his interpretation of the connection between the life story and the event creating the destiny. The sixth aspect is referentiality, the story in a certain form (not directly) refers to reality (but it also constructs reality – as we had already mentioned at the fourth aspect). From this perspective, it is sufficient to emphasize that the truth of the narrative can be found more in probability than in verifiability.

The seventh aspect of the narrative is the possibility to belong to a genre – a particular story appears in a given, common, specific structure, being carried by it, which provides the event with an atemporal and general dimension. The genres are actually general representations, yet they do not really express too much cohesion of the human conditions, activating in us specific ways of thinking and sensibility. They reflect the social ontology and also invite to a certain attitude of knowledge. More exactly, they reflect not only the human conditions, but also define the way of the intellect's usage as far as the intellect is defined by the language.

The eighth aspect is related to the characteristic, which reveals the "rupture," thus the story includes the interruption of conventionality. The organization of the narrative around what "is not expected" indicates the fact that the narrative is necessarily normative. The rupture, problem and the unexpected are integrated culturally, therefore the norms change. The narrative refers to the rupture without aiming to solve the problem. By including and expressing the fundamental problems of the human existence, the narrative "makes them bearable through the simple fact that it makes them interpretable." (Bruner, 1991, p. 16)

The ninth aspect of the narrative is the contextual sensibility and the capacity to negotiate (negotiability). The reader, the listener must be open (contextually sensible) to the story. However the opening is never perfect as, given our previous information, we make an analysis of the narrator's intentions. According to Wolfgang Iser (1989), Bruner names the given story a special act of speech. Besides this, the opening makes the narrative be the proper instrument of cultural negotiations in the every day life. We are capable of producing and evaluating those versions of the story, which are competitive.

The tenth aspect mentioned by Bruner is the one regarding the accumulation of narratives. Unlike the fundamentalist scientific knowledge, in the case of narratives, we wonder how can different stories match, if the formation of a whole is possible, or if one can operate with precedents in the course of interpretation. More exactly, what kind of strategies can be discovered in the formation of culture, tradition, or "versions about the world." We are aware of the discoveries rooted in history, or the creation of a cause from the previous temporal sequence; the interpretation of the simultaneous as interdependence. These discoveries can spread and emerge as models. In order to elaborate culture we need the capacity to settle the events of the past to their place in a continuous succession to the present, constructing the history. This is a permanent and continuous task. It is exactly this continuous construction of the past, which provides the canonization with forms, and this makes the discovery of ruptures, as well as the modality to interpret them, possible. The human intellects are similar and they work together in the joint process of the narrative accumulation. "Not even our individual life stories (...) can be separated from the continuity of the social

story, constructed and mastered mutually, in which we can settle ourselves and our personal continuity.” (Bruner, 1991, p. 20)

After the presentation of the narrative aspects we return to the initial premises of Bruner, more exactly, the knowledge and human experience have specific domains, which are supported and organized by specific cultural instruments. As a result, the evolution of the intellect does not occur in a cultural vacuum, the symbolical structures of culture are indispensable in the formation of the intellect’s activity. Culture has relatively independent areas, yet besides these, there are those domain of experience, which must be controlled by all the common members of the society, in the case culture is living. For instance: a certain linguistic community, a community of beliefs and social procedures: what we think about man, how must people relate to each other – the community of the people’s psychology, as named in *Acts of Meaning*. These domains are essentially organized in a narrative form. These are actually the fundamental aspects of the narrative realities, we should demonstrate how the structure of human experience in certain singular cases can be organized.

We have seen that both in the interpretation of Bruner, and in the ones of MacIntyre and Tengelyi, the narrative represents an explanatory and normative context. It makes the interpretation of the “world – the man of action endowed with intention – consequence” possible, being also an instrument used in the evaluation of action (of the one, who realizes it). The narrative is the instrument to construct reality. This construction affects all the elements of the trio mentioned above – the world in its largest acception and the concrete situation in which the action develops, as the story outlines within the frames of a story or presumptive scene (the narrative structure), a context including the actors and events. This is the reason why we might have possible narratives which compete: a given narrative is a possible interpretation of the motivations of human action. The act performed to create the narrative is the creation of events themselves in the light of the general and comprehensive narrative: the events become the functions, the “servants” of the narrative. The developing story also becomes a variation of the canonic forms of culture. The narrative interprets the events in such a way that they match with the previous knowledge of those they affect and address to. The narrative, which refers to ruptures, is not supposed to solve the problems: if the narrative contains

and expresses the fundamental problems of man, it also provides human life with a meaning and thus makes it bearable.

There are also psychological narrative approaches of the ego himself, which identify the life story with the self identity. According to these, autobiography represents a set of procedures to “make up” life,” not only the simple record of events. The limited interpretations of the narrative might have also contributed to the appearance and preservation of some ramified debates on the narrative and self identity, and the narrated/narrative identity. Lately the critical voice referring to the narrative characteristic of the self identity had become more and more acute. For example, J. Phelan refers to a real narrative imperialism, J. Lippitt criticizes the exaggerated emphasis of the narrative unity, and G. Strawson lays the basis of a counter-theory. P. Lamarque thinks that one may wonder if the subject has his own real story, if this is influenced by the narrated story. According to him, the unity of life is given by the fact that life is always related to somebody. (Lamarque, 2004, p. 404) However, if the explanatory value of the narratives is important, he thinks that the explanation of causality is the appropriate one. (Lamarque, 2004, p. 406) Bruner considered that one of the important aspects of narratives was exactly the permanent connection among the action, human story and intention, which presumes the idea of choice, and because the relationship between the intention and the subsequent action is weak, in the narrative one cannot find causal explanations, but interpretations referring to intentions. Lamarque excludes the hermeneutical activity from the human world.

The phenomena of human life must be articulated. We do not state – according to what Bruner, MacIntyre and Tengelyi said – that each moment of our life can be articulated by means of the narrative, not even the fact that the narrative accounts of one’s self identity might have a metaphysical basis. The narrative theories regarding the self identity can render an account about the practical criteria and particularities of the man in action – where “the specific feature of knowledge is neither the sight nor the proof but the interpretation.” (Foucault)

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THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC AND COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE IN THE VISION OF HABERMAS

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Habermas is the upholder of constitutional democracy, individualism and individual rights and, given everything he had done, he proved to be a partisan of social solidarity and social reforms. He states that, besides the legal equality, an indispensable condition of constitutional democracy is also suggested by the fact that the citizens consider themselves the creators of laws too. Without being separated from the evaluation of the 20th century history of Germany, Habermas considers that one of his fundamental tasks is the criticism of the nationalistic blunt approaches of the solutions of social and political problems. During the latest decade and a half, the effects of globalization had become another priority of his research. According to him, the post-national state is factual – the name itself shows that the political role of the national state is questionable. As a consequence of the evident effects of globalization, the philosophy and social theory had to pay their attention, in their specific way, to the topic of political institution. In his last works – we mention only some of them: *Between Facts and Norms*, *The Inclusion of the Other*, *A posztnemzeti állapot [The Post-National State of Affairs]*, *The Divided West* and *Europe, The Faltering Project* – Habermas analyzes the possibility of the democratic policy beyond the national state.

The post-national condition and the universal state

Beyond the national state the democratic policy can be realized at two levels: the one of the whole world and the smaller one, at the regional level. After the monstrous crimes of the 20th century it was obvious that the innocent state, presumed by the international right, does not exist, therefore one needs the world-wide state. The kantian model of the universal citizenship is at hand, it would regulate the

relationships among the states, and would really sanction the aggression and genocide, the crimes against humanity and the violation of human rights – such an authority is represented by the Organization of United Nations and its organizations. The efficient functioning of such a universal state is possible through the cooperation of the great powers. (Habermas 2006, 19-20) The amplitude of problems, whose solution is in the interest of each state in question, makes the national states consider themselves parts of the internal community. (Habermas 2009, 192)

Nowadays, even in the developed states, the sovereignty can be preserved only in a particular form. The state is the representative of the citizens, sovereign persons who act collectively, and own the monopoly of the legitimate violence, yet concomitantly, in the context of the European Union and other international organizations, they usually obey the decisions taken together. (Habermas 2006, 137)

The model of the political structure of the post-national state is the Kantian ideal of the universal republic. Kant saw the substantiation of the condition reflected by the universal citizenship and the eternal peace in the constitutionalization of all the international connections, in the extension of the constitutional state at the global level, possible. (Habermas 2006, 143) Finally, Kant considered that only the voluntary organization of the peaceful republics can be carried out. Habermas thinks that the universal society, organized on some republican basis, is not a desirable alternative, and in his volume of studies, *The Divided West*, he sketches the possible alternatives opposing to it. (Habermas 2006, 137) Firstly, the criticism of Kant's universal republic facilitated the creation of a hegemonic liberal vision, the one of the minimal state in a global market, and a society regulated by the private right. The other alternative, deriving from Schmitt, is the one of the model based on the aversion to the occidental modernity, according to which the political sphere represents the domination of some influential areas, rival empires. The third alternative is the opposite of the liberal project, the post-Marxist project, which also gives up the state as a centre of politics, and the globalized world sees it as the dynamics of some parasitical centres and exploited suburbs. (Habermas 2006, 185-193)

Habermas considers that one must not entirely give up Kant's idea and, referring to his work, *The metaphysics of morals*, he states that "there is a conceptual connection between the role of lawfulness promoting peace, and the one of lawfulness serving the idea of liberty which, because of this reason, is considered legitimate by the citizens." (Habermas 2006, 121) The opinion of Habermas is that that "multi-levelled political system, which assures peace and the human rights among nations without the states' authorizations" can be formulated conceptually – it has neither the monopoly of universal government nor the one regarding the application of violence –, being also capable of solving the challenges of the global internal politics at the level traversing the nations (transnational)". (Habermas 2006, 144)

Thus Habermas makes the distinction between the national levels, which traverse the nations, and the supranational ones. (Habermas 2006, 94-102) The task of the supranational level is already sketched above. The task of the level, which traverses the nations, might be the reaction to the challenges of the economic globalization. At this level we must essentially administrate problems of distribution (the climate, the protection of the environment, the sources of energy, drinking water etc.) Habermas considers that since the beginning of the modern world we have been coping with the topic concerning the "preservation of the network of solidarity among the members of the political community" besides the balance of the political context and the market, related to the maintenance of the frail balance of democracy and capitalism. (Habermas 2009, 190)

"In the international community of the sovereign states there aren't the restrictions, which might emerge from the joint legislative obligations. There is only the voluntary limitation of the application of sovereignty (...) which can transform the united parts, by means of a contract, in a politically *created* community." (Habermas 2006, 133) The institution which is created in this way cannot be considered a republican state. In essence, the role is played by the horizontal relationships among the member states, opposing to the centralizing tendencies. The constitutionalization of the international right "drives to the non-hierarchical association of those, who act collectively in the organizations of the cosmopolitan order situated above the nations, which traverse them." (Habermas 2006, 133) According to

Habermas, nowadays this process materializes in three very different organizations: the Organization of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the European Union. Their joint characteristic suggests that they miss the powerful mandates for governance, which traverse the nations and situate above the nations.

However, Habermas considers that the lawfulness cannot be formulated as an analogy of the federal democratic states, in contrast with the conception of the universal federal state of Höffe, as the process has both collective and individual actors. For example, the charter of the Organization of the United Nations emphasizes that the main principle is the equality of the sovereign states, yet the Security Board of the Organization of the United Nations has the right to interfere in the state's affairs, whether demanded by the protection of human rights. "According to these, we can consider the world organization the community of the *states and citizens*. Similarly, the Convention from Brussels advanced the project of the European Constitution on behalf of the *states and citizens of Europe*" (Habermas 2006, 135). Habermas labels his own conception as "global internal politics without any universal government," as this presumes a global society without any centre, constructed politically, in which the "global administration might preserve, in the case of states, institutions and procedures at levels situated above the nations and at levels traversing these." (Habermas 2006, 135)

The efficient constitutionalization of the international right – both at the levels situated above the nations, and at those traversing the nations – cannot be deprived of the national state level, as one can assure equal rights for citizens, regarding the influence of decision takings, only in the context of the state. Therefore, the lowest level is the national level, and these are the member states of the Organization of the United Nations. The levels might be mutually influenced, in the context of the national state this means that the national constitutions should adapt to the principles of the universal constitution. As we have already mentioned, this level might represent the area of democratic legitimacy of the universal state.

The joint political identity is not a precondition of the democratic legitimacy of the universal state, the process of constitutionalization can create this (constitutional patriotism). According to the theory

of communicative action proposed by Habermas, the structure of communication contains the lack of constraint and equality, the conditions to realize the consensus, which are also the preconditions of the democratic legitimacy.

I shall present his conception on the basis of a previous work. Habermas formulates his own discursive model after the analysis of the normative models of democracy. His opinion is that one can preserve the idea regarding the materialization of sovereignty in the nation without having to return to Rousseau's form of republicanism. Furthermore, he states that one must give up that "doubtful procedure," which consists in the need to express sovereignty through the categories of the part and whole, and suggests a conception of society without any centre, which can be deduced from his discourse theory. More exactly, the people's sovereignty should be expressed through the terminology of inter-subjectivity:

"Although it had become anonymous, the people's sovereignty withdraws in the democratic procedures and in the judicial formulation of their conditions, only to appear as a power generated in a communicative way. More precisely, this communicative power originates in the interaction between the institutionalization in laws of the formation of one's desire and the culturally mobilized publicity." (Habermas 1996, 251)

By using some proper communicative procedures, the levels situated beyond the nations can also function in a sovereign way, and the notion of "people/nation" is used in its neutral way, as a component of the universal state, the European community or the state. This way we can eliminate the false idea of homogeneousness suggested by the initial meaning of the word "people/nation." How can we conceive the legislation regarding the formation of one's will over the national level? This is the answer of Habermas:

"In a democratic community they do not allow the consideration of the citizens' political and moral self-understanding as a historical and cultural a priori to facilitate a democratic formation of the will, only as some liquid contents of a cyclic process, which is generated as a result of the legal institutionalization of the citizens' communication." (Habermas 1996, 161)

Habermas also emphasizes that the modern national identities had formed exactly in the way mentioned above. Moreover, the “social subject” itself is the “*konstitutum* of the communicative processes.” (Weiss 2005, 59) Thus the European Constitution – or even the world constitution – might play a catalytic role in the realization of this process at the level situated above the nations. Speaking of Europe, Habermas thinks that

“For a while, Europe has unified economically, socially and administratively, and has had a joint cultural foundation, as well as the joint experience of the defeat of nationalism. There is no a priori obstacle for the given political willpower in order to create the communicative context, necessary from the political point of view, as soon as they lay the constitutional basis of such a context.” (Habermas 1996, 161)

Regarding the real existence of that political willpower, we wonder if the global publicity, which they organize constitutionally, could transform the communicative influence in a political power –, which might drive to a corresponding level of integration in the case of a global society, and assure the proper legitimacy of the decisions of world organizations. (Habermas 2006, 142) We are fortunate that, as Habermas noticed, because the main task of the world organization is the provision of peace and human rights, it is sufficient for the international community to morally condemn their violation. The mechanism of the formation of this willpower can develop as follows:

“The joint cultural premise serves as a limited yet energetic basis of judgement. It is sufficient, on the one hand, to include the normative reactions of the world in the list of problems to be solved in the context of the world community, more exactly, to register them in the order of the day, and on the other hand, to create legitimacy for the voices of global publicity. The attention of the latter is oriented towards certain questions by the mass-media.” (Habermas 2006, 143)

According to the conception of the universal society without a centre, the human rights and peace at the supra-national level might be assured by a world organization, in the spirit of the charter of

the Organization of the United Nations. At the level traversing the nations, at this intermediary level, the great powers might debate on those aspects of internal policy which had surpassed the simple coordination regarding the problems of the balance of world order. (Habermas 2006, 136) Habermas observes that besides the United States, there is no “global player” which might have the corresponding power to re-establish the balance. It would be necessary for the different national states to found “continental regimes,” similar to the European Union.

The third level, the one of the national states, is the one where the national mechanisms of the democratic publicity might indirectly certify the activity taking place at the upper levels. In the post-national state resulting from globalization, the national states are not capable of regulating their national economy and assuring their basis for the sake of social safety, therefore they have to open towards the communities going beyond nations.

Our everyday life is based on shared principles, cultural truth and expectations considered obvious. In the public space, the harmonization of actions occurs within the frames of a mutual language and some statements whose validity is acknowledged mutually. The conflict expresses the interruption of communication, which can derive from disagreement or lack of sincerity. “The spiral of violence starts with the interruption of communication, and then, along the uncontrollable spiral of the mutual distrust, it drives to the discontinuance of communication.” (Habermas 2006, 15) Concomitantly, the improvement of life conditions, the lack of oppression and fear, lead us to the change of mentalities.

A new aspect is suggested by the phenomenon of terrorism, which is often considered a form of manifestation in the case of the civilizations' war. Habermas considers that terrorism and violence have a structural character as their sources can be found in the social inequality, discrimination, poverty and marginalization. The way in which the occidental culture is presented to the external world is also important. It can become a civilizing factor only if they set an obstacle in the way of capitalism, they approach the most serious inequalities – they do not permit the passive assistance of the poverty of some regions and whole continents. In the “war of civilizations”

Habermas sees a name meant to actually hide the rupture in communication and, according to him, very concrete interests (the energy, the petroleum) have their role in the preservation of this rupture. (Habermas 2006, 16-7)

Is the dialogue possible? Habermas considers that the condition of dialogues and understanding represents a certain equality of the speakers. The ideal dialogue situation in the political language can be expressed through the concepts of truth, liberty and equity. The hermeneutical model of understanding is not going to fail beyond the borders of our culture; the interpretations always try to remove the gulf among the previous misunderstandings, no matter how large the cultural and spatiotemporal distances or the semantic differences might be. It is possible that it's about the process of interpretation in which, by means of hermeneutical efforts, the participants gradually extend the horizons of their previous understanding, until the fusion of horizons takes place. The mutual change of perspectives, the analysis of things from the perspective of the other, can be done due to one's good intention, by giving up the nude violence; however, these are necessary yet not sufficient conditions: we need a situation of communication deprived of distortions and latent violence. (Habermas 2006, 17-8) "The institutionalization of discourses indicates an emancipative practice." Regarding these discourses, it is true that

"the problem (...) is how the self-organization capacities can develop in the autonomous publicity for the processes forming the practical willpower of real life, oriented towards values for use, to keep the system-like imperatives of the state authorities and economic system at bay, and to bring the two sub-systems ordered by the mass media in a dependence on the imperatives of real life." (Habermas, 1985, 255, quoted by Némedi 2000, 207)

The main idea of the theory regarding the communicative action of Habermas can be considered viable in the case it meets another culture too, or in the phenomenon named the clash of civilizations, suggesting that real life is inherently rational – this provides the normative basis for the theory of Habermas and assures the basis of the dialogue. (See Némedi 2000, 258)

“There is only the equalizing individualism of the reasonable morals, which claims for the mutual acknowledgement for everybody, according to the equal respect and mutual balanced judgement, consequently, it is universal in the best meaning of the word. The membership status in this comprehensive moral community which, in essence, is open to everybody, means not only solidarity and non-discriminatory inclusion, but also the right of everybody to protect individuality and its alterity.” (Habermas 2006, 23-4)

According to the discursive model of Habermas, the post-national status can really suggest the transformation of the role expressed by the level of the state, it is not only the labeling of a political or social tendency: “The sooner they learn to conduct their interests in the new channels of the »government without government«, the sooner they are going to change the traditional means of the diplomatic pressure and military intervention by *softly* exerting the power.” (Habermas 2006, 176) The daily experience of the mutual dependence and its debate, and the regular international contact support the citizens in the internalization of laws and the conscious emphasis of the affiliation to a large political community. Habermas considers that, from this point of view, it is very important for the European Union to be successful, as solidarity, felt at this intermediary level and traversing the nations, can generate a solidarity at a larger scale. Moreover, the politically constructed universal society cannot function without this intermediary level. (Habermas 2006, 177-9) The European Union's process of formation is considered by Habermas a model for the construction of the citizens' universal society, yet he also sees that the process of the European integration had slowed down.

The European identity and constitution

Despite the frequent problems, which appear unsolvable, the European integration keeps developing. Its functionalist explanation is that the unique economic and financial zone produces constraints, which spontaneously generate the dense network of the transnational dependencies and other spheres of the community too. However

Habermas considers that the “explanatory force of this force of action is not sufficient” and that nowadays one of the most important theoretical problems to be studied regarding the process of unification is the lack of the European identity. (Habermas 2006, 67-8) This strongly political problem can't be solved through the market mechanisms, just like the political problems concerning the extension towards Eastern Europe and the ones of the euro-zone, and the modified global political situation.

The extended European Union can't exist without a constitution, as the decisional processes cannot be only the results of some inter-governmental treaties taking into account that the possible decisional modalities (unanimity, majority, balancing relative majority) do not function. Instead of these, we need modalities of decision similar to those used in the internal affairs of the member states, thus modalities based on reflection and deliberation, and because of this the trust and awareness of affiliation to a community surpassing the borders of the states are indispensable. This fact raises very serious problems of legitimacy. Until now, the medium-term positive advantage brought to the states by the affiliation to the EU, represented a sufficient basis of legitimacy. In order to remove the social and economic differences, resulted from the recent affiliations, we need an active political activity. This also affects the sphere of the national authority. The end of the world bipolar order makes Europe analyze its role much better. (Habermas 2006, 69-70)

The Constitution can be the answer to the problems: it can strengthen the integration and capacity to take collective decisions, it can reduce the so-called democratic deficit being the context responsible for the development of European identity too. The situation is approached differently by the group of euro-skeptics and pro-europeans. The former supports the functioning of the European Union in the governmental form, and the latter sustains the integrated cooperation. For the supporters of the inter-governmental form, the European Union is one of the international organizations without any political mission. The ones, who sympathize with the idea of integration, still related to the terrorist attack on the United States of America, might wish to see the European Union in the political context, as a “global player,” not as a part of a coalition in which the

United States of America assumes a hegemonic role. This position is strengthened by the fact that the level of the national state is not sufficient to solve the political and demographic problems, not even the ones provided with social insurance. Habermas considers that the integrationists are supported by those governments which, unlike the neo-liberal vision, support the intervention of the state and might be happy to see a "European social model." (Habermas 2006, 71-4)

Those voices, which keep telling that the European Union can't develop in a political community provided with self-identity, as there is no European nation, are more and more powerful. Habermas had also analyzed this problem in his work, *Between Facts and Norms*. (Habermas 1996, 500-505) This argument considers the fact that the political community can exist only on the basis of a mutual language, tradition and values evident. Starting from Habermas, I had sympathized with the possibilities of the political power in the case of European citizens. This power is the communicative power, rooted in the interaction between the institutionalization in laws of the formation of willpower and the culturally mobilized publicity. More concretely, regarding the European nation and the inexistent European identity, according to Habermas, the essential question refers to the conditions to be fulfilled for the achievement of solidarity beyond borders. (Habermas 2006, 76)

The form of solidarity intermediated by laws was firstly formed together with the national conscience in the context of national states "through the unification of nationalism and republicanism." The national history is actually an academic construction produced by historians, ethnographers, men of letters, linguists, etc. who, due to the institutional socialization and mass media channels, had transformed the citizens' way of thinking in about one hundred years. This public opinion could represent the basis of the responsibility for the constitutional democracy. (Habermas 2006, 76-7)

Yet this type of political solidarity had transformed in time. "In the case of the democratic practice of public processes suggesting the political self-reflexion, they formed an internal evolution." Instead of the nation's destiny and citizens' interests, they formulate, for instance, the paradigm of justice in political paradigms. (Habermas 2006, 77) An example of historical achievement regarding this pro-

cess is suggested by the way in which the memory of the national German traumas had driven the German nation to the consideration of its own constitution as a result. The precondition of this process was the “inclusion of constitution, as a part of the liberal culture, in the complex net of historical experience and in the values settled before that political situation” to become a logical part of the real world and to manifest as a reasonable imperative. In this way, they can produce the “form of conscience which traverses the nations – a special change through which the object of emotional attaching is not the state but the constitution.” (Habermas 2006, 78)

“While the *national conscience* had crystallized around a State form in which the individuals could appear as actors authorized by the community, the *civic solidarity* forms in the political community formed democratically by the free and equal citizens. The main question is no longer focused on the self-assertion of the community towards the exterior, but on the preservation of the liberal order in the interior.” (Habermas 2006, 78)

The essential organizing role of the practical capacity and different dimensions of the real life will remain essential for the state. We may not even exclude the possibility that the difference between the national history and historical experience will represent an incendiary material for the internal anti-European forces. Concomitantly, the regional, religious and social problems, as well as those regarding the policy of the party, can be rooted in interests, which surpass the national borders, having a unifying role. Yet in this context not only the universal political paradigms, such as the justice, but also the individual particularities can have a certain role. However these can no longer appear as *a priori* data, as natural:

“Those citizens who consider themselves the members of a political community (...) are acting consciously of the fact that the *personal* community is more different than the others – regarding the preferred and accepted life style. This political ethos is no longer natural (...) This is something constructed.” (Habermas 2006, 80)

The realization of the transparency of the non-natural and constructed character is an indispensable condition of the discourse based on equality. Only in this way we can construct the idea of trust and solidarity, which goes beyond the national borders. Yet this “trust is not only a result of the joint process forming the political opinion and wish, but also its precondition. (...) The political civic identity, without which Europe cannot obtain the capacity to act independently, can be constituted only within the sphere, which traverses the nations.” (Habermas 2006, 81, 82)

“Unlike the centralized Universalism of the old empires, modernity is based on the decentralized Universalism promoting the same respect for everybody.” (Habermas 2009, 196) This lack of the centre creates both the precondition and the necessity of the global stratified order, with a three-leveled configuration, like the one described by Habermas. The middle level, going beyond the nations’ border, is one of the great global powers. At this level, Habermas might provide a European Community with a privileged role, a community which can have something in view and act in a unitary way. (Habermas 2009, 197) The importance of this level can be outlined only by referring to the levels situated above and under it.

I have already referred to the fact that Habermas considers the global order a government deprived of government. However, the question is if there is a state to provide the context for the processes of democratic legitimacy, and what kind of institutional organization can replace it? The three elements of the constitutional state are: statality, democratic constitution, civic solidarity. Statality is essentially defined by the state infrastructure. The other two elements can go beyond the national borders. The world supranational organization might enjoy the jurisdiction only in the issues of peace preservation and insurance of human rights at the world-wide level.

The level we are interested in here, the one traversing the nations, would deal with the “global problems of internal policy:” on the one hand, the inequalities regarding the issue of enrichment, the ecological problems etc., and on the other hand, it would initiate dialogues among cultures in order to acknowledge the main civilizations of the world and their equal rights. The first category of problems isn't actually a political one, yet it is rooted in the interests of nation and af-

fects the equitable share. In this case, the solution consists in the creation of possibilities to form the political willpower, emphasizing the necessity of an institutional context and some authorized persons to act. The supranational level is hierarchical, and the one traversing the nations is heterarchic, thus the parts in question are equal regarding the power and authority. This heterarchic structure can be preserved in function "only by extended regional or continental powers, which are representative and capable of taking decisions and establishing the direction of action." (Habermas 2009, 113-4) Habermas refers to the United States, China, India, Russia and the European Union.

We have seen that the ideas of Habermas regarding Europe are conducted by the constitutional democracy, the protection of rights concerning the liberty of the individual, the social solidarity. He sketches the conception of a universal society without any centre, in which, at the supranational level, a universal organization assures the human rights and peace, in the spirit of the charter of the Organization of United Nations. At the level traversing the nations, the responsibility in the debate of the problems regarding the balance of the universal order is assumed by the great regional powers. In this sense, he considers the role of the European Union very important, that heterarchic structure which can solve the regional economic, social, cultural problems efficiently, surpassing the national borders. Given these reasons, we can name the model of Habermas the vision of the democratic and cosmopolitan Europe.

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PERSONAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

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In the early nineties, the University of Debrecen hosted a lecture by a Scot professor of philosophy from Glasgow. He pointed out that the pendulum of history and politics was swinging between nationalism and internationalism, while politics in American society was characterized by a pendular movement between individualism and collectivism. At a first glance, this differentiation may seem correct. However, the strong national consciousness in the United States is well-known.

By the end of the 20th century, American philosophy problematized personal identity, as well as national identity as an important question, but not in the European sense, which wants to differentiate one's own nation, protecting it from other nations. European national identity seeks the answer to the question of who are the Hungarian, the French, the Romanian, etc. European national identity differentiates and defends. American national consciousness inquires into what is that makes one an American. In America, they seek to state which American national identity served the development of the country, and which national identity serves best for future development. In Europe, we can speak of nationalism, while in the United States, one can speak of patriotism. At the end of the 20th century, American philosophers also define patriotism by looking back and reflecting on their history.

The basic question of American national identity is how individualism and collectivism correlate to each other. It was possible for a pendular movement between individualism and collectivism to characterize American society only because both individualism and collectivism were present in American history.

Charles Taylor thought that individualism and collectivism were either ontologically or axiologically based.¹ Extreme individualism both

¹ Cf.: Charles Taylor: Ütköző szándékok: a szabadelvű-közösségelvű vita [*Charles Taylor: Conflicting Intentions: the Liberal-Communitarian Debate*], in: Ferenc Horkay Hörcher (ed.): *Közösségelvű politikai filozófiák [Communitarian Political Philosophies]*, Századvég, Budapest, 2002. pp. 153-156.

in the ontological and in the axiological sense occurred in American spiritual and social life. But extreme collectivism never did, because such collectivism could be accomplished solely in the absence of individual liberty.

Ontological individualism derives social actions, structures and institutions from the characteristics of the individuals, and understands even the social goods as a chain of individual goods. Ontological collectivism is derived the opposite way.

Axiological individualism sees the social values as being a resultant of the individual choices of values, and the individual is so independent even in extreme individualism that his values and aims do not determine his personal identity. Axiological collectivism states the determinism of community values.

The concepts of individualism and collectivism contribute to understanding the relationship between personal and national identity in the United States.

Personal identity was an important philosophical issue also in itself, separately from national and community identity, in twentieth-century American philosophy. Personal identity is not an individual issue, but raises a series of related questions. Personal identity expresses that which makes man unique, differentiating him from others. Every person has his own values whereby he organizes his individual life. Personal identity is a characteristic of the individual, or rather personal identity expresses the individual's characteristics. Personal identity changes from time to time, but there is no identity without continuity. We could say that there is definitely no numerical identity in individuals, that is, man is definitely not completely identical in another moment in time. We could only say that personal identity means a qualitative identity, which is man's similarity and continuity with himself in time.

Where does continuity come from? Man possesses a physical continuity based on his physical existence. Man's identity is expressed in physical properties such as his fingerprints or genes. But we conceive the identities of individuals as physical beings and biological bodies even when we speak of the seven billion people on earth. This number comes from the number of human bodies.

Yet, there are only few who accept man's definition as a purely biological body. In the second part of the twentieth century, many American philosophers – Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Shoemaker – attached

a determinant role to sensing, remembering and being conscious in the personal identity and the continuity of identity. And these are psychological and not biological particularities. Ancient dualisms – the world of ideas and the world of shades, matter and form, physical and thinking things, body and spirit, matter and consciousness, subject and object – are rephrased in a new form in the twentieth-century American philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of mind. Today, the most wide-spread of all is perhaps the reductionism which compares humans as physical beings to animals, stating that humans are nevertheless constituted by another body than animals. However, many support the irreducibility of psychological particularities. Whatever the views sustained, they confine themselves to examining almost only the biological and psychological components of personal identity, analyzing solely the relations between the biological and psychological factors. The above-mentioned philosophers almost completely missed the social and cultural elements of personal identity in their analyses.

However, in the last third of the past century, several American philosophers reiterated the social issues so intensely analyzed in the early twentieth-century American pragmatism, and started to examine the way the national, cultural and community particularities permeated the personality. They saw that personal identity had also a social-cultural layer besides the biological and psychological one.

On this path, John Rawls's philosophy launched the American thinking in the 1970s. In his *A Theory of Justice*², Rawls portrayed the picture of man which challenged many thinkers. Rawls's concept of personality was undoubtedly individualist, because considered man to be an agent free, independent and able to choose, whose identity was not connected to momentary aims and interests.

In Rawls's thinking, the individual determines what is best for him under certain circumstances freely, based on his rational plan of life. If an object has such particularities that choosing it is rational based on the individual's rational plan of life, then that object is good for the individual. If many people choose the same object the same way, then that object is a human good. Rawls stated that men were broadly consentient on what they considered to be human goods. Liberty, possibility and self-esteem were certainly among them.

² Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, 1972.

If people considered one thing to be good, then that means that “it is rational to desire that thing”. The predicate “good” expressed a recommendation and praise for that thing, from a certain point of view. However, points of view changed on a case by case basis, and things are desired for various purposes. The individuals’ points of view – or in other words, their rational plans – determine what is good for them.

Rawls thus considered that human life was nothing else but a life led according to a rational plan. The rational plan is not a detailed plan of individual actions for the entire lifetime. Rather, we can speak of the hierarchy of short-term plans, albeit we elaborate long-term plans in modern societies when we choose a profession or a job. The plan ensures that we reach our permanent and general aims, first of all the primary goods.³

It is the individual who elaborates his own rational plan of life, and decides what is good for him – thus, Rawls’s theory is indeed individualist. But the individual elaborates his plan of life within the framework of right, and the limits of right and justice set the boundaries to the good that can be chosen. The framework for the principles of justice and the rules of right is given by society, or as Rawls puts it, the self-contained national community⁴.

The individual learns the rules of what is right during his own moral development, making it part of his personal identity. Rawls distinguishes three stages of the individual moral development process. Early in the individual development, the individual is not free at all, but his morals are shaped by external social authority, such as the commands of family and parents. He is raised with love, his self-esteem is formed with love, but the child’s morality is primitive, he is not yet aware of the comprehensive schemes of right and justice. The child’s virtues are obedience, humility and affection towards the authoritative persons.

Man is not free in the second stage of moral development either. In this stage, the various human associations and the national community as a whole shapes the individual’s morality. These determine the standards of the individual roles. In this stage, the individual acquires the ideals of the good wife, the good husband, the good friend, the good citizen, the good classmate, etc. In this stage, he recognizes and

³ Cf.: Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, 1973. p. 410.

⁴ *Idem.* p. 457.

learns to accept that other people have other aims, plans and points of view. In this stage, he learns his obligations and duties.

In the first two stages of moral development, human associations and the national community form the social, cultural and moral components of the individual's personality. According to Rawls, in these two stages, national identity constitutes personal identity.

The individual becomes a free being who elaborates his own rational plan of life in the third stage of his moral development. During the period of the morality of principles – as Rawls calls this stage – we want to act according to the rules of justice, because we recognize that the just social configuration promotes our own well-being. Our behavior is no longer determined by our particular relations, but by moral principles independent from particular contingencies. Based on the moral sense built on moral principles, we are able to grow independent of the contingent circumstances. Acting by moral principles reveals man's true nature: man is a free, equal and rational being. This does not mean that our ties and affections towards particular persons, groups and communities are past; on the contrary, "the violation of these ties to particular individuals and groups arouses more intense moral feelings"⁵. If we betray friendship or the nation, our remorse is stronger when we reached the level of the morality of principles.

Man's personal identity "is manifest in the coherence of his plan, this unity being founded on the higher-order desire to follow, in ways consistent with his sense of right and justice, the principles of rational choice."⁶

As we have seen, Rawls found that the purport of the individual's personal identity – both his concept of justice and good – is constituted by his communities, thus, by his national community, but the individual as a decision-maker, as an elaborator of his plan of life, is free and may take a critical position towards the community and national identity.

Based on the above, the Communitarian Michael Sandel is not right in saying that Rawls envisaged an individual who pre-existed to his family and community, whose political and moral choices are free from the burden of any loyalty.⁷ Rawls claims quite the contrary:

⁵ Idem p. 475

⁶ Idem p. 561

⁷ Sandel, Michael: *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 62.

it is at the end of his moral development when the individual grows independent and distinguishes himself from his communities. According to Rawls, the individual's personal identity and particularities are constituted by his communities (his family, his associations and his nation). However, in the third stage of his moral development, he is able to distinguish himself from his particularities. The self creates a *mine* relationship with the properties constituting himself, the *me*, and thus becomes a free autonomous being.⁸

The communitarian philosophies, that emerged in the 1980s and have gained a determinant role ever since, emphasize the role of the community constituting personal identity, contrarily to the individualism of the prior liberal philosophies (Hayek, Nozick, Dworkin, Rawls, etc.). Communitarian philosophers (Sandel, Walzer, MacIntyre, Charles Taylor) consider that society is guided by the public good and common goals, stating the primacy of the common good. Morality is rooted in practice, in the particular practice of the current communities.

But Michael Walzer correctly notes that there is no radical difference between the liberal and communitarian philosophies. Communitarianism is only liberalism corrected. Communitarian philosophies step up only to protect the (historic) communities. Communitarianism emphasizes that man is not "that liberal hero, the autonomous individual, choosing his or her memberships, moving freely from group to group in civil society. Instead, most of us are born into or find ourselves in what may well be the most important groups to which we belong – the cultural and religious, the national and linguistic communities within which we cultivate not only identity, but character..."⁹

Communitarians complained that contemporary Western societies, especially American society – following the liberal model – may become a land of radically isolated individuals, of rationally selfish people who are protected and divided by their inalienable rights. Contemporary procedural liberalism seems to fight traditions and traditional communities – this is what communitarianism warns about.

Of the communitarian philosophers, Michael Sandel is the one who

⁸ Quite the contrary as in Sandel. Cf.: Sandel, Michael: *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 55.

⁹ Walzer, Michael, *Politics and Passion Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2004, p. x.

presents the historical development of American community and national identity, in his work *Democracy's Discontent*¹⁰.

Sandel thinks that the institutions and practice of contemporary American society are embodiments of the Rawlsian liberal theory.¹¹ Sandel relates it as a sad story that this liberalism became dominant in American society. He thinks that American history is characterized by the conflicts between the two rival political concepts, liberalism and republicanism, and just as Rorty, he too considers that the core of American history is political.¹² Albeit the historians of ideas find it excessively simplifying that Sandel relates the history of the United States of America based on the liberal/republican dichotomy, Sandel does tell an interesting story. The end of the story is that today America is a procedural republic built on procedural liberalism. Sandel laments over the victory of procedural liberalism, because people are discontent because of procedural republic. "Despite the achievements of American life in the last half-century – victory in World War II, unprecedented affluence, greater social justice for women and minorities, the end of the Cold War – our politics is beset with anxiety and frustration."¹³ People fear losing their own government; they fear losing self-government and fear the erosion of community. They fear that they will lose control over the powers that govern their lives, and that the moral basis of their community would collapse.

Albeit American history is a debate between liberalism and republicanism, there are similarities between the Democrats' and Republicans' ideas of liberty: people are able to choose their aims and values. But Republicans think that liberty depends on self-government. This means that man contemplates public good and shapes the destiny of

¹⁰ Sandel, Michael, *Democracy's Discontents*, America in Search of a Public Philosophy, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1996.

¹¹ Cf. Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontents*, p.ix.

¹² In an interview, Rorty says: "American culture is essentially political. America was founded upon an ethical concept of freedom. It was founded as the land of the freest society, the place where democracy is at its best, where the horizons are open. There is a kind of national romance about a country that says, "We are different from Europe because we made a fresh start. We do not have traditions, we can create human beings as they are supposed to be." in, Giovanna Borradori, *The American Philosopher*, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.109.

¹³ Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontents*, p.3.

political community together with his fellow citizens. Man must possess the civil virtues necessary for self-government. Thus, republican politics cannot stand neutral towards the values and aims followed by the citizens. Sandel admits that the Republican tradition featured slavery, exclusion of women from public life and property requirement for voting right. He does however state that "the republican tradition, with its emphasis on community and self-government, may offer a corrective to our impoverished civic life."¹⁴

Liberal and republican liberty has always been present in American political life, "broadly speaking, republicanism predominated earlier in American history, liberalism later."¹⁵

Differences between liberalism and republicanism do not come from the idea of liberty primarily. Sandel defines as the differentiating particularity of liberalism the fact that the government must remain neutral in the matter of good life. This is the core idea of liberalism; this is what differentiates modern political thinking from early American political vision, and this idea is embedded today in American political institutions and practice. In Ronald Dworkin's words, this differentiating idea of liberalism is: "Political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another."¹⁶

However, within today's liberalism there is no consent on which the basic rights are and which political scheme is indeed neutral. Sandel distinguishes two directions within today's liberalism. "Egalitarian liberals support the welfare state and favor a scheme of civil liberties together with certain social and economic rights – rights to welfare, education, health care, and so on. Libertarian liberals defend the market economy and claim that redistributive policies violate people's rights."¹⁷ Sandel mentions Rawls and Dworkin as being egalitarians, while the major representatives of libertarians are Hayek and Nozick. Nevertheless, both liberal directions are Kantian, because the starting

¹⁴ Idem, p.6.

¹⁵ Idem.

¹⁶ Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 191.

¹⁷ Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent*, p.11.

point of both is the fact that we are separate individuals, with our own goals, interests and concepts of good life.

Sandel criticizes Kantian liberalism. This criticism poses the following essential question: if the independent self chooses its goals, then what about the obligations which arise from its family, its people, its culture and its tradition, which are not chosen? Sandel censures Kantian liberalism because the unburdened self could only have moral and political obligations which it willingly undertakes. If someone willingly undertakes a political position, he undertakes also the obligations attached to the position. But an average citizen does not have obligations towards his fellow citizens, except for the universal natural obligation not to do any injustice.

Sandel uses an example from American history to illustrate this unreality of liberalism: Robert Lee opposed the secession of Southern states and slavery before the civil war, but after the outburst of the civil war, he eventually concluded that his obligations towards the state of Virginia surpassed those towards the union, because he could not “raise his hands against his relatives, his children, his home”. Liberals could reply that this is not a real moral dilemma, because in fact the moral obligation towards the Union was contrasted by love, feeling and prejudice. But who would seriously think that family and home do not give rise to moral obligations? According to Sandel, this example shows that man’s liberal concept is too thin to be able to cover all of the moral and political obligations. And indeed, everybody – including the liberals – recognizes the obligation of solidarity.

They too recognize that in their argument for the welfare state, their concept of man does not really support the modern welfare state. Sandel summarizes the liberal argument for the welfare state as follows: As the man in need is not free, egalitarian liberals would impose taxes on the rich to ensure the conditions of fair life also for the poor. Thus, the liberal argument is not based on the public good, but on the poor’s right to a fair life. This way, liberalism does not appeal to the community which I identify myself with, but to some arbitrarily defined community spirit whose goals I either share or not. And if a liberal states that this community is created by the general respect for human life, Sandel asks why such a liberal would ensure this right only to those accidentally living in their country, and does not care for those living outside. Sandel draws the critical conclusion that “given

its conception of the person, it is unclear how liberalism can defend the particular boundaries¹⁸ – referring to boundaries in the literal and metaphorical sense alike.

Sandel's republicanism differs from liberalism in that while he states the primacy of the right over the good, republicanism is the politics of public good. Public good is self-government, and republicanism supports the development of the personal characteristics necessary for it. Another basic difference comes into discussion at this point, referring to the differences between ideas of freedom. Republicanism attaches freedom to self-government. Man is free if he is a member of a political community which controls its own destiny, and man participates in the community's governmental decisions. Republican freedom thus requires a certain form of public life, which, in turn, depends on practicing civil virtues. However, liberal freedom has a contingent relation with self-government. And Sandel thinks that the procedural republic (as he calls the contemporary United States which is the embodiment of liberalism) represents a freedom which opposes democracy.¹⁹

In his characterization of the history of the United States, Sandel speaks of local economy and political self-government in the 19th century. Practicing the freedom attached to self-government and local community helped the United States to progress. By the early 20th century, a national economy was created thanks to the changes in capitalism, and, in line with this, grassroots were replaced by a national politics which defined the national identity and public goals. At the end of the 20th century, this turned into a neutral procedural politics that is met by discontent which is almost unexplainable, given the successes.

Differently from the republican communitarian Sandel, the neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty tells a different story of the historical evolution of American national identity.

Rorty's first major work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, is a critique of the theory drawing correspondence between representation and truth. According to Rorty, knowledge does not represent reality, but shapes the world. Thus, neither can philosophy be a basic science through epistemology. Endeavors of a fundamental philosophy must be abandoned. More precisely, one should bid farewell to such endeavors.

¹⁸ Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent*, p.17.

¹⁹ Idem, p.28.

Rorty considers that the truth of knowledge comes from its coherence and from whether it pays off during the improvement of the world, from whether it is confirmed. The aspirations of modern philosophy towards an apodictic knowledge cannot be achieved because one cannot eliminate the contingency of the world and of man.

In Rorty's work, the personal identity of private individuals and individual liberty conceived as self-creation are closely related to contingency. There is no eternal, unchanged essence, neither does man have an invariable core, but everything is contingently relational, thus we ourselves create our world and our personalities. "In fact, everything to do with our life is chance, from our origin out of the meeting of spermatozoon and ovum onwards..." – Rorty wrote. For Rorty, personality and the self are nothing more than what Dennett stated: "center of narrative gravity", or what Lyotard called "nodal point in the communication circuits". On the one hand, contingency means a radical temporality and historicity, on the other hand, it means the insurmountability of chance from the happenings of the world (language, self, community).

Thus, Rorty's concept of personality is coherent with the other parts of his philosophy, and freedom conceived as self-creation is compatible with his concept of personality. Indeed, the strong poet's personality creates a new dictionary.

But Rorty does distinguish the private individual from the public individual or the citizen. He calls the public actor an ironic liberal. However, the liberal does not accept contingency, but the fact that cruelty is the worst thing we can do. Contingency is an ontic-ontological category, while cruelty is a moral-political concept.

Rorty's ethics is based on cruelty meaning that cruelty is a basic negative category. In Rorty's ethics, cruelty is an absolute (i.e. not contingent) point of reference which he constantly departs from, one which can be used for reference to measure moral development towards a bigger human solidarity. But cruelty cannot be eliminated completely; moreover, it rises and decreases over and over again, in a wave-life and contingent form, during history.

This ethics is a norm in American politics and culture. In an interview, Rorty considered politics to be the differentiating particularity of American culture. "American culture is essentially political. America was founded upon an ethical concept of freedom. It was founded as the land of the freest society, the place where democracy is at its best, where the

horizons are open.”²⁰ Rorty assigns philosophy to the service of politics, more specifically, to the service of American liberal democracy.

Rorty tells the story of American liberal democracy in several of his works, but these narratives are not examples of some political theory, nor did Rorty abstract some political theory or political philosophy from these stories and history. One couldn't even say that Rorty idealizes American history and presents it as a type of ideal to others. American history was full of errors, sins and aberrance. American liberal democracy is not politically unitary, but its history is characterized by the debates and conflicts of many programs, ideologies and movements.

By telling the stories and interpreting American history, Rorty shapes a vision. Rorty generally argues for liberal democracy, then, in his work *Achieving Our Country* (1998), he recommends the leftist view, by telling the leftist stories from American liberal democracy. The left is the party of hope; the left is the best supporter of a hope for a better life. Twentieth-century leftist liberalism creates the national identity which serves the homeland best, because the leftist movements came closest to achieving Lincoln's vision; the United States would be a state-community of cooperation, the first society without classes, where income and economy is distributed equally, where equal opportunities and individual liberty are both granted. In the first six decades of the 20th century, this was the core of the leftist rhetoric in the Progressive Movement, as well as in the New Deal. And this rhetoric was drawn up by Walt Whitman and John Dewey.

Rorty agrees with Walt Whitman in that “The United States is essentially the greatest poem” (Whitman). The nation-state is a self-creating poet and self-created poem. In Rorty's opinion, the American people who create their country take God's place. “We are the greatest poem because we put ourselves in the place of God: our essence is our existence, and our existence is in the future.”²¹ – Rorty wrote. Dewey and Whitman endeavored to secularize America, seeing their country as a paradigmatic democracy, a country which can be proud of itself. It can be proud of itself because it is a leader in history.

²⁰ Giovanna Borradori: *The American Philosopher*, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 109.

²¹ Rorty, Richard.: *Achieving Our Country*, Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, Harvard University Press, 1999. 22.

ABOUT EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY

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Contemporary discussion about political identity is always held into a certain impressive array and reference system, namely it does not only envisage *politics* in itself but would like to show what is different from cultural, national, regional, etc. identity. It is just this dichotomy character that makes it difficult to define the notion itself. Should the initial meaning of *politics* have included everything related to public life, the realm of interpretation for which this notion can be deemed relevant has considerably constricted nowadays.

Like in Ancient Greece, in modern times it is also used primarily related of course to governance and in spite of public opinion thinking of „politics being present everywhere” *politics* in itself may be only construed within the restricted framework of politics. Political identity in its turn is limited to loyalty towards power, or towards one party, ideology, political organisation. Within this context the European political identity does not mean anything else than political loyalty towards Europe respectively towards the European Union.

Formation of European Political Identity

In Ancient Greece politics included the whole sphere of public life together with people and its assignments. In the centre of politics there is not the individual but the community, the *polis*. Politics as such was based therefore on an identity situated above individuals. It did not refer to existence but to existence together namely it reunited and integrated the members of the group thus eliminating at the same time the ones not belonging to it, the aliens. This duality, the labelling with „we” and „they” accompanies the entire history of politics. (Bakk, 2003)

Political identity does not have however its beginning in ancient Greece, it rather pertains to the modern speech. Identity reaches actually the focus of philosophy and in the first time of political philosophy in modern age although its immanent categories of the kind of national, political, cultural, religious identity have left as notions not cleared up to the date.

Calhoun deems it that modern age „*has consolidated individual and category identities as well as efforts put in reinforcing the self-identity*” while „*they have caused problems to formation and recognition of identities*” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 99) Interpretation of limits between individuality-collectivism, liberty-determinism has commenced in modern age with specification that meanwhile the theory of modernity itself has converted its own concepts. Beginning since in the fifties for instance the Webern concept of „modernity” has been used simplified for the general process of social development as opposed to its modern-European origins. In Arnold Gehlen’s insight, modernity has led to disappearance of the premises of Enlightenment further acting (Gehlen, 1963), and Habermas thinks that society modernization that brought in society on an universal path separates from cultural modernity that became obsolete, moreover the insatiable acceleration of social processes brings culture into a „crystalized” condition in which all possibilities immanent to premises have already been achieved (Habermas, 1998, p. 8).

Heller Ágnes thinks that at the basis of modern world there is liberty that has replaced the foundations of pre-modern world and given that the essence of liberty consists in the possibility of putting things under question mark modernity does not have actually any foundation for being into a permanent process of self-deconstruction. That means of course that modernity may only be described by a multiple factor model in which the dynamics of modernity is the key-factor. In Heller’s interpretation this dynamics may be described by the institutionalized negation of values of a given worldwide social order, respectively of their validity, being supported by the request and permanent utilisation of concepts of truth, good and just. As a consequence of the modernity dynamics the traditional values such as the ones of modernity lose their validity as they are permanently under the question mark sign (Heller, 2000)

In Heller's vision in the permanent process of recreation, modernity is helped by two types of imaginary: technical and historical. The technical imaginary has its roots in rational Enlightenment, is directed towards the future, offers the prevailing explanation of world by modernity, deems people and nature as being things, and believes in progress, rewards what is useful and overachieving. Unlike that historical imaginary is directed towards the past and tradition, is based on romantics, aims at memory, its influence on thinking not having for target a reinforcement of orienting towards scopes and means but enrichment in significance of personal or collective world (Heller 2008, 8). Although contradictory, the two types of imaginary operate together in modern thinking because for instance although the issues related to social distribution occur rationally and directed to the future the „final” arguments determining achievement of allocations are rather products of historical imaginary.

In modern world the individual may organize very well his life based on technical imaginary the historical one offering but a perspective for that. On the other hand within political communities both types of imaginary are present. The historical imaginary is the one leading the three forms of institutionalization of collective identity: memory, collective narratives and self-definitions.

These three elements respectively institutionalization of these three forms contribute to the survival of political community but historical imaginary does not play in that either no prevailing role because depending on the level of institutionalization the technical imaginary has its role too. The historical imaginary may be associated to modern community based on liberal principles and to a structure of collective identity while technical imaginary with institutional functionality of institutionalized political community. In the survival of a political community the two types of imaginary operates therefore dichotomically (Bakk, 2003, p. 39)

As we have reminded in introduction political identity is in many cases defined by reporting to other identities (e.g. the national, cultural, religious, etc. One). Most of researchers make for instance use of political identity as a synonym for national identity although the two of them are not perfectly identical in contents. Csepeli György, for an example, states that the condition of natural feeling of nation-

al identity is that the person (individual) should apply the same national category on itself that is applied by those belonging to that category. He thinks that cognitive elements of national identity may be educated in the process of socializing the individual identifies to the culture in which they live, learns the state values, written and not written, the holidays, by learning the national ideology and speech the conscience of belonging to a nation forms itself. (Csepeli, 1992) Unlike that formation of political identity is the result of another „process of socializing”. Loyalty towards power, an ideology, a party, a political organization is no doubt the result of cognitive, conscious choice and as such it may change now and then in contrast to the national one.

Within social sciences two „opposing sides” stand out in establishing the relation between political identity and the cultural identity: one of their opinion is that the two paradigms operate based on the “or-or logics” (e.g. Jean-Marc Ferry, Heinrich Schneider), as cultural identity within the European context is related to a system of values that have been dogmatized as accepted standard for many thousand years now and known as the „traditional-fundamentalist” attitude, while political identity limits explicitly to loyalty versus the „institutionalized Europe” that means versus the political system of European Union with its system of values and its political elite. Other researchers have other opinion that European identity has simultaneously both cultural and political valences, the differences being given only by the dominance of one or another: either cultural identity is dominant (e.g. Rostoványi Zsolt) or political one (e.g. Walter Reese-Schäffer, Dér Aladár), but both play a role in establishing the individual’s European identity. (Dér, 2005)

Depending on the selected approach researchers who have treated the topic of European political identity can also be divided into two categories: the ones having symbolist vision and the ones with a constructive one. Symbolists (for instance Simona Cerutti) question European identity in itself by stating that in the event there is something like that then its meaning is not significant compared to national identity. Their opinion is that from among consciences of identity organized on territory bases the national one is defining because it is based on joint history, tradition, culture, language, etc while European

identity can present none of such factors. Constructivists however (for instance Michael Bruter) assert there is already a European identity and that will reinforce in the future among citizens of the union. They deem that national identities highlighted by symbolists are as a rule arrangements artificially made of symbols by a nation's power actors with a purpose of legitimating their power and that of the state.

The proponents of constructivist approach assert that the leaders of European Union just like in case of states have commenced building symbols in the last years and results are ever more evident to such respect. Some symbols as for instance the flag, hymn or money are no more specific to only a nation but belong already to European Union too, and citizens of union identify themselves ever more better with them (Szanyi, 2008). The most powerful attachment of citizens versus the state is given by the status of a citizen's. Identification to symbols can only occur after that, as individual feels himself as part of the „system” firstly as a citizen, namely they are no more strangers or visitors in Europe.

Following below we will engage discussion in the role played by the citizen status in formation and reinforcement of identity, by reviewing citizens' rights, obligations, respectively criteria of citizenship in case of two countries (Romania and Hungary)

Role of the Status of European citizen's in Formation of Identity

As above specified European identity as political identity may be seized more difficult for being a phenomenon much more recent than national identity that usually relates to a well defined framework: a state. This connection is established by the citizenship institution. E/ European identity as any other political identity is essentially a built one but there is legal status in this structure just like resemblance between state and union citizenship namely an objective, general framework that could reinforce symbolic features or even subjective ones of forming identity.

The institution of union citizenship is a completely new consequence of institutionalization of European Union and lies within a

rather complicated relationship with the institution of state citizenship and regulations pretty different regarding such existing in the states of the union.

Union Citizenship and Rights associated to it

Within the fifties to nineties, European Community was united especially by economic relationship and not political relation. As a consequence during the first four decennials of integration citizens of European states members are not citizens in social or political meaning but may be deemed rather citizens of a common market” (Szalainé 2009, 69)

The institution of union citizenship was created by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The union citizenship is a particular legal status to which citizens of union are entitled in parallel with their national citizenship. The union citizenship was reconfirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon that came to force on December 1st 2009.

Regulations concerning union citizenship specify that union citizens are all those people who are citizens of a member country. The union citizenship exists by intermediating from the side of citizenship of member states by appearing under the form of legal relationship between union and citizens *besides* national citizenship.

There are several rights associated to the status of a national citizen's, namely: besides the old rights related to economic activities (right to free circulation and free residence) the new ones occur having political character (right to vote, right of a petitioner's, right to diplomatic protection and consular protection). There is no question that the aim of implementing political rights is to reinforce political cohesion of the union. Citizens have never use such political rights so far, and neither had member states used them with too high enthusiasm (Craig & Búrca, 2009)

The union citizenship may have a slighter effect on the reinforcement of identity as a consequence of the fact that regulations of member states on citizenship may be different and states do not seem to have any bias in favour of giving up their autonomous right of establishing conditions of getting citizenship. There are still states

thinking of citizenship as exclusive framework and they are not prone to accept the double or multiple citizenship institution, which fact becomes ever more necessary in order to facilitate mobility (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands).

Citizenship Laws in Member States

As union citizenship can be only gotten by citizenship of different states it is worth studying regulations of member states concerning citizenship.

Regulations and practice throughout member states of European Union concerning citizenship are detailed studied in two tomes published in 2006 respectively 2007 under the coordination by Rainer Baubock (Baubock ed. 2006, Baubock ed. 2007).

These studies result in the process of formation of joint European identity facing also the fact that western countries older member of the union and east-European countries that have become members more recently have already related themselves differently to citizenship and to the level of language.

There are in English two terms to refer to citizenship: *nationality* and *citizenship*. The first is close to concepts of nation, nationality, while the second evokes connotations related to the status of a citizen's. Related to the union citizenship the phrase „*national citizenship*” is used while whenever it is all about a concrete citizenship, the phrase „*nationality*” is preferred even if both phrases are equally used.

In most of the union states the two phrases appear with the same meaning. (Baubock ed. 2006, p. 98). Formally speaking, citizenship (“*nationality*”) is defined as the legal relation between individual and state that however related at the same time individual also to international laws. (Baubock ed. 2006, p. 15). It is a principle generally accepted for a state its given right to establish who its citizens are.

In the 19th century spirit, citizenship (*nationality*) primarily referred to rights of the kind of defending nation from attacks from outside the country, respectively exclusion of “the others”. In a more contemporary construing, citizenship (*nationality*), is based on the history, culture, ethnicity that are common thus designing membership to a parish having joint convictions and political values. We

cannot however speak about an explicit notion having been unani-
mously accepted. (Baubock ed. 2006, p. 35)

Member states of the union admit the *general principles* related to citizenship: everybody are entitled to citizenship namely stateless-
ness shall be avoided, nobody can be arbitrarily dispossessed of citi-
zenship, and a person's citizenship is not automatically determined
by either marriage or divorce and neither by a change of the spouse's
citizenship (husband's or wife's).

Avoidance of double citizenship or multiple citizenship is a prin-
ciple that has been generally accepted in the legal regulation of citi-
zenship. Beyond the loyalty issue in case of double or multiple citi-
zenship also other complications may occur related to taxation, military
duty, right to vote. In spite of that fact more and more states of the
union see their obligation to take action in respect of accepting the
multiple citizenship.

Most of the "new" states members of European Union are former
socialist countries and in their case the citizenship notion is different
from western perception outlined so far. In these countries citizenship
is closely related to ethnic interpretation, transfer of citizenship
towards further generations takes place rigorously based on ancestry,
there is strong repulsion against multiple citizenship and great focus
is put on taking care of minorities living in other countries, respec-
tively on people of emigration (Baubock 2007, p. 12). In these coun-
tries emigration played a far more important role than immigration
and that has strongly marked reference to citizenship. The essential
difference between these countries and countries of Western Europe
consists in the fact that none of them has existed as independent
state within the limits of present day borders for over 70 years now.

These states are featured by the care for nation, fear of its disap-
pearing, that, besides historical experience are also supported by
demographic situation. The fragility of statehood in these countries
leads to super balancing. In the preamble of their constitutions it is
spoken about ancient roots and historical continuity. It seems that
legitimacy is based on autochthonism and continuity.

The union citizenship brings about certain complications from
point of view of the existing institution of citizenship's.

A right closely related to citizenship is that of *the decline of*

extradition – the sovereign state is not obliged to extradite its citizens. Within the frame of European Union however this right is limited by implementation of the European Arrest Warrant, an aspect of union citizenship that exceeds the states' citizenship.

Another problem may arise from the fact that grant of citizenship is in the states' charge. This fact may generate problems in the case that one state of the European Union would award citizenship also to some people who are not members of the Union (e.g. Hungary of the Hungarian of Serbia, Croatia, Ukraine or Romania of the Romanian of Moldavia Republic).

The right to free circulation within the Union on the other hand may lead to situations in which somebody does not live in their own country for many years. Traditionally such issue could lead to losing citizenship, for which reason the member states should deal with circumspection such situations and shall harmonize their own domestic laws to the ones of the other member states.

In some states of the Union, besides the institution of citizenship's, there is also the one of semi-citizenship's (*denizen* – term used by the Sweden political scientist Thomas Hammar), that designates groups of immigrants having lived for a long while in the country that has received them but without having been awarded citizenship. They have free access on the labour market, have certain rights concerning welfare, and in some places may even take part in local elections. From legal point of view they however are not deemed citizens.

This situation is regulated by the Europe Council Directive adopted in November 2003 and that came into force in 2006. This directive has created a new status: the status of the one who resides here on long term (the *long-term resident status*), referring to those foreigners having lived legally for at least 5 year time in the concerned country. Creation of the "long-term resident" status is not exempt from problems, especially because the European Union has also institutionalized the union citizenship. The question is how much reasoned the difference is between rights granted by *union citizenship* and the ones granted by *long-term resident status*.

Politics of Hungary in the range of Citizenship

From among states having but recently adhered to the Union in case of Hungary ethnically based citizenship is the most obvious. The principle of ethnicity is present in citizenship laws, in provisions concerning visa award, in dispositions on the right of residence and that of labour. According to foreign experts citizenship is approached by Hungarian state under historical, cultural, ethnic and emotional aspect without getting aware of their legal and normative status, of the neutral meaning within a democratic system (Baubock 2007, p. 135)

This approach stayed at the basis of the Status Law of 2001 that has offered quasi-citizenship for people of Hungarian ethnicity of neighbouring states. People who based on the status law have received certificate of Hungarian benefit by the following advantages: cultural rights and in the field of education, discounts for travel tickets, subsidies in the range of welfare and health. Based on the Hungarian certificate the Hungarian from outside borders may work with no restriction of time during three months a year in Hungary. The state law also helped Hungarian teachers (with book tickets for an example) and those families that enrol their child to attend Hungarian language teaching classes. Other helps have been guaranteed for Hungarian establishments and organizations. The Hungarian state's law caused strong reactions in neighbouring states that misinterpreted the gesture as a limitation of their own sovereignty and as a consequence of pressure exerted even *Commission of Venice*¹ has engaged in that and drafted several criticisms referring firstly to the law unilateralism and the lack of preliminary consulting the affected countries.

The Hungarian initiative is not an isolated case. Slovakia has adopted in 1997 the *Law of the Slovakian from outside the borders*, having similar provisions. In spite of that Slovakian law has nowhere near aroused reactions as resulted further to the Hungarian status law. As concerning the Hungarian quasi-citizenship the most vehement reactions has come just from Slovakia's side.

¹ Organization established within the Europe Council as a forum of cooperation between experts in constitutional law

On May 26th 2010, Hungarian Parliament adopted the text of changing the Hungarian citizenship law assuring the Hungarian from outside the borders the right to get Hungarian citizenship into simplified procedure and privileged conditions. Alteration of the law does not mean granting mass citizenship and automatically, that means need is further on of individual application to get it. Unlike previous regulations, the law does not demand anymore the Hungarian from outside the borders to be resident in Hungary and neither have they to pass an examination on elementary knowledge about constitution.

Slovakia's response to the alteration of Hungarian law of citizenship was quick and powerful. The same day, a group of Slovakian parliamentarians proposed summoning of an extraordinary meeting and in Bratislava the Slovakian government was immediately summoned to discuss the alteration of Slovakian citizenship law. On May 31st Ivan Gasparovici, president of Slovakia, signed the alteration of Slovakian citizenship law that by the provision according to which that Slovakian citizen who benevolently becomes citizen of another country will lose automatically Slovakian citizenship, forbids essentially the double citizenship.

In spite of the new leadership of Slovakia being far more open than government Fico, on the occasion of the meeting between Orbán Viktor and Iveta Radicova dated on December 15th 2010, the two prime-ministers stated that Slovakia and Hungary are still at great distance from each other in the issue of naturalization of Hungarian ethnics from outside the borders into simplified procedure, it is not clear further on whether or not the new citizens would have for instance rights to vote, no matter on which country's territory they have their permanent residence.²

² Law no. LV din 1993 concerning Hungarian citizenship was supplemented with alterations that came into force on August 20th 2010 and that provide for that Hungarian citizenship may be applied for also by people from outside the borders who have Hungarian ancestors or by people who themselves have been once Hungarian citizens. The law may be enforced since on January 1st 2011. The first sworn deposition took place on March 14th a day symbolically charged

Romania's Regulations concerning Citizenship

In Romania getting respectively losing citizenship are regulated by a law promulgated in 1991 and republished on August, 13th 2010.

The law establishes Romanian citizenship as the reference of a natural person to and their membership to Romanian state. The law specifies that only Romanian citizens may engage positions of public officers and military officers. Law is based on the *ius sanguis* principle: child of Romanian citizens (even if only one of the parents is Romanian) is a Romanian citizen irrespectively of whether born or not in Romania or abroad. Should the parents of a child born in Romania be unknown then the child will be granted Romanian citizenship.

Romanian citizenship may be gotten also on demand; among requirements for such there is residence on the country territory for a longer period of time (eight years, five for spouses), loyalty versus the state, and means for decent living, good conduct and lack of legal antecedents, speaking Romanian language and elementary notions of Romanian culture and civilisation. Requirements referring the period of residence in the country decrease by half in case of a citizen of European Union, a personality recognized at international level, in case of existence of the status of refugee or in case of the ones who have invested at least one million EUR in Romania.

Citizenship may be awarded again also to people that have lost it as well as descendants until third degree who either move on Romania's territory or give up the previous citizenship or not.

These regulations are applied in case of those citizens of Moldavia Republic who wish they regained Romanian citizenship or that of their parents, grand-parents. Between 2002 and 2005 around 24,000 applications were lodged from Moldavia and Ukraine. In 2009 approximately 100,000 citizens of Moldavia Republic had double citizenship. In 2009 at the Romania's Consulate of Chisinau 650,000 applications were recorded.

Conditions were facilitated a year ago by accepting also the third degree ancestry instead of that of second degree, by eliminating Romanian language test for people who have already had once Romanian citizenship and the period for answering application was reduced to 5 months.

Romanian citizenship comes to force the moment the applicant takes an oath versus the country. (*I swear to be devoted to Romanian homeland and people, to defend the national rights and interests, to observe Constitution and Romania's laws*).

According to article 5 para (2) of Romania's Constitution Romanian citizenship cannot be drawn back to a person who was born Romanian citizen.

In the case of both Hungary and Romania the ethnic bases of citizenship are well seen which is characteristic to member states of Eastern Europe.

Importance of Union Citizenship Institution from European Identity Standpoint

Until in 1990 the European Community has rather functioned as an economic mega-organization and legislators of community states regarded citizens especially like work force, while since early nineties with an aim at reinforcing political unity the process of law regulation has come back to a phenomenon that had been previously neglected namely the citizen's category. Treaty of Lisbon saved from the idea of common European constitution the Charter of Fundamental Rights and within that the institution of union citizenship together with the rights associated to it. Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet highlights that the Union and the member states – it seems, has diverged lately from European discussions referring to the process of adopting a constitution by replacing such discussions more and more with issues of the sort of identity, people, European cultural, religious and humanist heritage, respectively relationships of normative legitimacy (Szalayné 2008, 80)

Related to the institution of union citizenship also criticisms have been expressed: union citizenship is not a too strong notion, it does not compete under any form with state citizenship, union citizenship is not accompanied by obligations, the rights associated with the *long-term resident* status hardly are different from the ones granted by union citizenship.

Based on shortcomings above listed critics come to a conclusion that the institution of union citizenship is too less fit to reinforce the conscience of union identity of citizens of member states.

In spite of such things the significance of Treaty of Lisbon shall not be disregarded and neither that of union citizenship. Treaty of Lisbon created European Union as legal entity thus assuring an institutional framework much more solid for the construction of European identity. As a consequence of that the alliance more or less feeble of the state is replaced with a union that can be better defined. And this way an answer can be given to the question that has become famous pertaining to the former American minister of International Affairs Henry Kissinger: " Well, yet whom shall I call if I would like to speak to Europe?"

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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The specialized literature regarding the national identity and ideologies keeps highlighting a lack of agreements and semantic ambiguity in the definition and approach of some key concepts. Many important terms (such as “ethnic identity”, “ethnolinguistics”, “ethno-cultural” and “national” etc.) are used in parallel, often alternately, without aiming at precise connotations. The causes are certainly related to the scientific character of the discipline yet the situation partially derives from the well-marked ideological and political aspect of the respective concepts too.

In the works published in the West terms such as *national* and *national affiliation* express the citizenship of a country. This situation is mainly due to the fact that in most of the western countries the national identity was mainly constructed around the identity of citizens and, as a result, the state’s territory became the basic term of reference for the “national territory”. However, the Eastern Europe has experienced a more different way of development; in this context the ethnic attributes and affiliation have fulfilled a major role. In the case of this region the mechanic approach of some concepts (and conceptual signification) elaborated under the influence of the historical evolution in the west of the continent inevitably drives to erroneous interpretations. A typical mistake occurs when the *ethnic* term is used by the western authors (or their competitors from the East) in order to designate the minority communities expressing the completely developed national characteristics from the countries belonging to the Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the lack of the conceptual agreement can also reflect the absence of an internal political consensus regarding the answer to the national problem. That is why, for instance, the picked representatives of the national majority prefer the *ethnic group* term in order to designate a minority of their country, while they consider

the *national minority* term too delicate, provided with connotations which might suggest the idea of “autonomy” or “separation”. On the other hand, there are certain national minorities which agree to use a notion such as *national community* in order to define themselves, and they even consider the *minority* term restrictive and inadequate to designate a national community from the most complex viewpoint. Obviously, the issue is not strictly academic, it is known that by promoting the concept of *national community* the members pertaining to a minority actually head towards the acknowledgement of the national collective rights.

Starting from the traditional fundamental theoretic premises in the specialized literature, the present study aims to analyze the socio-historical and identity sources of the evolutions, which had driven to the creation of the East-West division in the perception and “ideologization” of the national identity by also suggesting possible ways and strategies to draw the two visions together in the context of the united Europe.

Theoretical reference points

The nature of controversies regarding the functions of the national identity and ideologies highlights the strong connection between the identity and the political spheres characterizing the contemporary societies. From this perspective, the national identity can be defined as a modern community form reflecting the symbolical cultural identity shared by a group of persons, who live on a certain territory and organize themselves politically in order to protect the spiritual identity values they keep. From this viewpoint, the “national identity” syntagm expresses the relationship among identity, community and modernity, which most of the important contemporary authors refer to.

Thus, in his analysis concerning the historical sources of nationalism, Ernest Gellner describes the nations’ formation as a typical phenomenon of modernity in the highest sense of the word. In the life conditions during the process of industrialization the transformation demanded the creation of new political units based on the nation and its personal standardized culture. “An advanced culture is reflect-

ed in the whole society, it defines it and needs to be supported by the State organization. *This is the secret of nationalism*” (the author’s quotation.)¹

Another important author, Karl Deutsch, adopts a similar point of view and considers the confluence of the state with the people as an element at the beginning of the modern nation.² In fact, this conception reconsiders the main elements of John Stuart Mill’s classical liberal definition according to which “a sequence of humanity can be considered as forming a nation when its members are united by mutual feelings, which do not exist between them and others, which make them want their mutual collaboration more than their collaboration with others, which make them desire their own government or a portion of government exclusively destined to them.”³

From this perspective, the national identity and ideology are strictly connected to each other. The appearance of the national identity coincides with the entrance of the mankind’s development in the modern phase – in its national definition. Consequently, the national idea occurs inevitably when the social circumstances, which generate it, start manifesting. The pre-existent nations do not determine the formation of the national conceptions, and the national ideologies drive to the emergence of the national identity as a modern form of collective cultural identity. “Nationalism – considers Ernest Gellner – is firstly a political principle, which states that the political and national unit should be congruent.”⁴ From this point of view, the *national* term represents the expression of the modern collective politico-cultural identity, which expresses the need and aspiration of a cultural community to define and organize itself as a political community.

We can notice that this interpretation does not value national-ism, it provides it neither with positive nor with negative aptitudes from the perspective of a moral or political desirability. The *national-*

¹ Ernest Gellner, *Națiuni și naționalism*. București: Antet, 1997, p. 34.

² Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*. 2nd edn. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966, p. 105.

³ John Stuart Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ Apud C.A Macartney, *Nation States and National Minorities*. London, 1934, p. 4.

⁴ Gellner, op. cit., p.9.

istic expression is used as a synonym for *national*, without any ironical or – on the contrary – overwhelming intention. What we consider important is the instrumental role of the nationalistic principle, the essential functions of this principle's application in any modern society. According to the author, the essence of the "nationalistic project" is represented by the creation and perpetuation of this type of political unit demanded from the nation, it defines and acts as a protector of nation. This modern political unit is the national state.

All these definitions emphasize the essential role of the national idea as a political ideology in the State political constructions. In the interpretation of this role, the assertion of Rogers Brubaker, according to which the national consciousness ("nationhood") represents "an institutionalized political and cultural form"⁵, appears productive from a methodological point of view as it facilitates the detachment of the researcher from the paradigm of the ethnocentrist-substantialist way of thinking by orienting one's attention towards the role and functions of the national ideology in the context of social *practice*.

The definition formulated by the American thinker conducts the knowledge towards the comprehension of the national consciousness "as an event [...] as a contingent reality, oscillating in terms of circumstances, as a frame of vision and the basis of some precarious individual and collective action, instead of its interpretation as a relatively stable product of some tendencies of the profound economic, political and cultural development."⁶ According to Brubaker, this was the only way to avoid the limitation in a context aiming to consider the nations as unalterable realities existing in a natural way. In order to avoid this trap the investigator of the national phenomenon must direct his efforts to emphasize the concrete historical significations and the multiple modalities in a continuous process of transformation – in which the national ideology achieves its main ideological functions.

The organic relationship between the national identity and modernity underlined by the already mentioned authors can be interpreted as also deriving from the "need of ideology," which characterizes the

⁵ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 19-20.

⁶ Idem, p. 21.

modern society. In this context, when referring to the genesis of ideologies, Paul Ricoeur considers that the pre-modern societies, which were clearly prescribing the individual's way of integration in the social life, were in the pre-ideological phase of development, in which they exerted only the integrating function. There was only the emergence of a society provided with a plurality of the possible ways of integration, which represented the turning point; then we can talk about the working of ideologies.⁷

This vision is also shared by Clifford Geertz, who states that ideologies appear when the "old and unspecialized models" no longer correspond to the changes perceived more and more as political ones. "The loss of orientation is the element that determines the emergence of the ideological activity in the most concrete way, the incapacity, because of the absence of usable models, to understand the universe of the rights and civil responsibilities the individuals have to cope with."⁸ In this context the national identity and ideologies answer "one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, more exactly the preservation of solidarity among the populations of some states which are vast and anonymous, thus their citizens can't enjoy the type of community based on kinship and the face-to-face interactions."⁹

Ricoeur has essentially contributed by also emphasizing the three fundamental functions of ideology: the *integrative* function, the *distorting* function and the *identifying* function. Although methodologically the separation of the three functions is possible and can be useful, practically these functions depend and are related to each other. "The problems of integration lead us to those of identification, and the latter drives to the problems of distortion [...]. The concept of integration represents the presumption of the other main concepts – identification and distortion – yet it actually functions ideologically by means of these two functions."¹⁰ Analyzing the assertion modali-

⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. Edited by George H. Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

⁸ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 219.

⁹ David Miller, 'O apărare a naționalității' In Bernard Baertschi & Kevin Mulligan (eds.) *Naționalismele*. București:Nemira, pp 41-72, 2010, p. 55.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, op. cit. p. 265.

ties of the functions mentioned in the case of national ideologies, Kenneth Minogue draws the conclusion that "nationalistic theories can be understood as distortions of reality permitting the people to cope with such situations which they would otherwise find unbearable."¹¹

Referring to the legitimizing function of the national ideologies, some authors state that the concept of nation itself might actually be an instrument invented by the elite to carry out their own goals. Thus Tom Nairn emphasizes the special impact of the national ideologies on the educated middle class, as well as the special capacity of the nationalistic doctrine to produce the mobilization of population beyond the social and class barriers.¹² A historian, Eric Hobsbawm, considers that nation is one of the multiple "traditions invented" by the political elite to legitimize their leading position during a century of revolutions and modernization.¹³ The American thinker, Benedict Anderson, also focuses on the same instrumental role of the national ideologies when he defines nation as a community constructed socially by its members, an "imagined political community", that is a product of the collective social imaginary context corresponding to the needs of mobilization, integration and identification in the modern society.¹⁴ The main principles of this approach can be also found in the theory concerning the social identity, a concept defined by Henri Tajfel as "an emotional and reasonable complex derived from the awareness of group affiliation and the values defining this status."¹⁵

Once formed on the basis of some cultural experience related to a certain social organization, the national identity can enjoy a more or less stability varying with the socio-cultural and political conditions

¹¹ Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism*. London: Batsford, 1967, p. 148.

¹² Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. 2nd edn., London: New Left Books, 1977, pp. 332-334.

¹³ Eric Hobsbawm: 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', and 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', In: *The Invention of Tradition*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 13-14.

¹⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* London: Verso, 1991, pp. 36-46.

¹⁵ Henri Tajfel, 'Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison' In: Henri Tajfel (ed.) *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. New York: Academic, 1978, p. 63.

it is influenced by. The adoption of the constructivist vision regarding the nature of the national identity does not exclude but assumes the acknowledgement of stability, the persistent character of the already reached identity,¹⁶ especially at the level of expression and utterance such as language, culture, religion, the awareness of the common origin, the collective memory of the past, which are only some of the most frequent and typical manifestations. To support this idea, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the fact that, generally speaking, the institutions, actors, political rules and methods change much easier than the identity or its reflection in the political context.¹⁷

Concomitantly, the nationality, as a form of collective identity, also implies a subjective dimension, which refers to the identification of individuals with a specific set of national values. Unlike the concept of national origin, which refers to something already given, inherited by means of birth, the national identity is firstly the expression of the affiliation to a cultural community, defined as political community. This is the reality Ernest Renan refers to when he characterizes the nation, in a suggestive way, as a "daily plebiscite."¹⁸ This perspective is also shared by some contemporary authors such as Walker Connor, according to which "the personal vision of a group about itself, rather than the 'tangible' characteristics, represents the essence in the establishment of a nation's existence or non-existence."¹⁹ or Anthony D. Smith, when he defines the nation as "a population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass culture, a mutual economy and mutual legal rights and duties for each member."²⁰

Such definitions imply two fundamental interconnected dimensions which must be taken into account by the sociologic analysis:

¹⁶ Gertjan Dijing, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions. Maps of Pride and Pain*. London: Routledge, 1996

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

¹⁸ Ernest Renan: *Qu'est ce qu'une nation?* In: *Qu'est ce qu'une nation? et autres essais politiques*. Textes choisis et présentés par Joel Roman. Paris: Presses Pocket, 1992, pp. 37-56.

¹⁹ Walker Connor, 'A nation is a nation, is an ethnic group, is a...'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, I, 4, 1978, pp. 378-400.

²⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*. London: Penguin, 1991.

– a segment of population living in a certain area or territory, in a sufficient number to allow the perpetuation and development of the awareness of identity (the affiliation to a community) of the persons composing it (the demographic dimension).

– a certain type of connection expressing the awareness of identity and affiliation, a “community spirit.”

However, the importance of the two concepts, territory and population, in the case of the national identities derives especially from the fundamental transformations – occurred simultaneously at the beginning of modernity – in the population’s way of thinking and its connection to the territory. As Elie Kedourie observes, while the European state system in the Middle Ages was aware of a great diversity of governments and constitutions, during the modern epoch the assertion of the “principle of nationality” as a general political standard demanded the formation of the society only from nation-states.²¹

The codification and implementation of the modern system concerning man’s rights, as the legal expression of the national civic and political emancipation, was meant, on the one hand, to define a new type of mutual relationships between the individuals and the state, aiming to replace the traditional model of feudal hierarchies and dependences, and on the other hand, to develop identifying alternative ideological strategies and discourses, corresponding to the characteristics and demands of modernization. Therefore the release of individuals (gaining the citizenship quality) and the formation of the liberal state (the application of the principle concerning the national self-determination) must be considered as two interconnected facets of the same historical process. The free citizens had to be integrated into a sovereign state capable of protecting and guaranteeing their liberty, and the functioning of the liberal state assumed the inclusion of the free citizens, who were equal in their rights, into its structures.

Emphasizing this connection, Clifford Geertz makes the distinction between the two major dimensions – both of them necessary and strictly connected to each other – of the national ideologies: on the one hand, the *ethnic* dimension, which expresses the primordial uprightness meant to provide the individuals with a distinct identity,

²¹ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*. London: Hutchinson, 1960, p. 79.

and on the other hand, the *civic* dimension, which expresses the inhabitants' aspiration to gain the citizenship quality in a state.²² In this context, there are many important western authors who consider the *national homogeneity* a corollary needed in the formation of national identity, subordinated to the process of modernization. An eloquent synthesis of these arguments can be found in the argumentation of John Stuart Mill:

“Our experience shows that a nationality might join another one and can be absorbed by this: in the case a nation used to represent an inferior and outdated portion of the human race, the absorption might certainly support it. Nobody could assume that it wouldn't be more efficient for a Breton, Basque or Navarese to share the stream of ideas and feelings of a nation endowed with a complex culture and civilization – the French nation – than to keep revolving around the limited mental orbit, reminding of old times, without taking part in the advancing way of the world.”²³

Conceived in the same spirit, deriving from a functional definition of the nation, Karl Deutsch considers that the “nationalistic project”, oriented towards the creation of a homogeneous society, from the viewpoint of its national identity, can be explained through the necessity to strengthen and extend the channels of communication in the society, in order to assure the popular attachment to the national symbols and norms.²⁴ In his turn, Alfred Cobban adds a new dimension, the politico-statal one: according to him, the national homogeneity is the direct consequence of the transformations which occurred in the international order as a result of the transfer of sovereignty to nations, cultural units defined as the expression of the “popular wish.”²⁵

²² Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', In: Clifford Geertz (ed.) *Old Societies and New States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York: Free Press, 1963, pp. 107-113.

²³ John Stuart Mill, 'Considerations on Representative Government' (1861) In: *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government*, ed. H. B. Acton, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, , 1972, p. 395

²⁴ Karl Deutsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-98.

²⁵ Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*, rev. edn., London: Collins, 1969, pp. 30-38.

Strategies of national identification

Given the adoption of such a general theoretical perspective, one needs the nuanced interpretation of the *concrete social context* in which the major ideological functions of nationalism developed. Approaching such an analysis, Ernest Gellner draws the following conclusions:

1. the national state becomes a political standard as a result of some major changes in the social circumstances of mankind, when a complex culture becomes the operational culture of the whole society

2. the emergence of nationalism is essentially related to the new identifying principles of the advanced industrial society in which:

– there is an important number of jobs that must be taken on the basis of individual merits, according to one's performance and competence

– the inequalities are gradual and present a certain continuity, without impossible barriers among classes or castes

– these inequalities are not interiorized by the beneficiaries and victims of inequality

– they are not justified in themselves, they need a pragmatic justification.²⁶

Just like other authors mentioned before, Gellner considers that there is a necessary connection among modernization, the formation of the national states and the creation of a standardized high culture. In this context, the national homogeneity can be an efficient instrument to identify not only the modern structures of power distribution but also the corresponding political and territorial units (more exactly, those related to the national states), being a corollary and an expression – both ideologic and practical – of the modern society. Furthermore, the same author warns us that we must also consider the *contradictory* nature of the influences, which the policies of national homogeneity can exert on the individuals' status in society, given the competitive circumstances, the nations' struggle to reach

²⁶ Ernest Gellner, 'The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretation. The Myth of Nation and Class' In: Gopal Balakrishan (ed.) *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, pp. 108-109.

power to transform the territory which they consider their national territory into the territory of their own state.²⁷

The relationship between the institution of citizenship and the institution of the national state was certainly marked, during the modern history, by structural pressures and even by conflicts, in spite of their obvious inter-dependence. In our view, their source resides in two fundamental contradictions:

- the contradiction between the affirmation of the national state as a political representative of a single culture and national communities and the affirmation of the national-minority rights
- the contradiction between the national homogeneity characterizing modernity and the protection of the right to identity

In its acception rooted in the contemporary specialized literature, the citizenship cannot be limited to the affiliation of the individual to the political community of the state, it expresses the *totality* of the civil, political, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the potential right, jeopardized the most by the process of homogeneity, is exactly the right to identity in the case of the persons who do not belong to the dominant national community. Even in the cases in which the assimilation in the dominant culture of the persons belonging to a subordinated culture, occurs spontaneously, without any restraint, through the individual's free option, one also needs to focus on the socio-economic, political and spiritual context in which the individual takes such a decision. The citizen's freedom of choice among different cultural communities can manifest completely only when both the macro and micro social conditions are on the side of multiculturalism. However, in the societies, where there are more national communities debating on their priorities, one might hardly refer to the existence of such a favourable context.

Referring to this aspect, Federico Neiburg notices that the national affiliation has two facets, like Janus: on the one hand, it assures the solidarity of those who share the same national identity, and on the other hand, it aims to exclude those whose do not belong to that nation.²⁸ Thus the nature of the functions assumed by the

²⁷ Ernest Gellner, 'The Social Roots of Egalitarianism' In: Ernest Gellner, *Culture, Identity and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 91-111.

²⁸ Federico Neiburg, 'National character' In: N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds) *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* (p10296-10299),

national ideologies in the context of modern societies emphasizes the role of the political authority (of the state) in the settlement of inter-ethnic relationships. As Will Kymlicka states, the national state is actually far from being culturally neutral, although it aims to equally defend the individual rights of each citizen, regardless of their cultural affiliation. "The governmental decisions referring to the language, internal frontiers, public holidays and state symbols obviously involve the acknowledgement, satisfaction and protection of needs and identity in the case of some particular ethnic and national groups. The state inevitably promotes certain cultural identities while neglecting some others."²⁹ "The challenge is endemic in the case of liberal democracies, since they theoretically provide everybody with some equal representation."³⁰

The fundamental question one needs to formulate is the following one: to what extent and in which terms can the state express, protect and support the *plurality* of the collective identities, cultures and community interests on its territory? "Can the citizens with different identities be represented as equal, even if the public institutions do not acknowledge our particular identities, only the universally shared interests focused on the civil and political freedom, income, health, insurances and education?"³¹

Approaching the analysis from a certain perspective, Charles Taylor operates a distinction between two political principles/practices generated by modernity: on the one hand, the *policy of equal dignity*, suggesting the allowance of "the same basket of rights and liberties" to everyone, and on the other hand, the *policy of differences*, which starts from the idea that in order to truly assure the equality in rights, the identity of minorities must be protected by the dominating and assimilating majority. "These two policies, both based on the notion of equal rights, are opposed to each other. For one of them, the principle of the equal respect demands the same treatment of people, without any difference. For the other one, one must acknowl-

Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2001, p. 10298.

²⁹ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, p. 108.

³⁰ Amy Guttmann, 'Introduction' In: Amy Guttmann (ed.) *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, 3.

³¹ Ibidem

edge and even encourage particularities and differences. The former heaps reproaches on the latter suggesting that it violates the principle of non-discrimination. The latter heaps reproaches on the former suggesting that it denies identities, making people adopt a pattern they are not comfortable with."³²

The emphasis of such systemic contradictions comes to strengthen the idea according to which the modern society can be defined not only through the background egalitarianism generated by the generalized economic increase invoked by Gellner. The modern political organism must not be seen in an exclusive way as the unilateral expression of the economic rationality, accomplishing – in various ways – an important role in the reproduction of structures and socio-cultural inequality too. Taking this complexity into account, the national idea might be concomitantly placed in two interpretative contexts: on the one hand, as a reply to the demands of modern industrialism, and on the other hand, as a discursive strategy to constitute and represent the power, which can be and had been used by the political elite in the fight for the assertion of personal interests.

Thus we can better understand the complex character of nationalism, the contradictory effects generated by the national ideologies, and especially their practical application. It is proved that in certain historical contexts nationalism had served not only in the identification of modernity, but also in the temporary survival in the leading positions of some aristocratic elite, related to the feudal structures. In other situations, instead of contributing to the promotion of competence as a fundamental criterion of promotion, nationalism had served in the justification of some selective principles – based on the ethnic affiliation – to occupy the elite positions in the context of the state.

Although it had crushed many social barriers, nationalism drove – in certain zones and stages of the historical development – to policies based on the idea regarding the supremacy of a single ethnic nation and to the discrimination of the ethno-national minorities,

³² Charles Taylor, 'Politics of Recognition' In: Amy Guttmann (ed.) *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 43.

raising new walls in the way of unlimited mobility and equality in chances. The populations of some countries got divided, yet this time not by the medieval system of classes and conditions, but due to the creation of a separating line – which was often as impenetrable as before – between the dominating national elite and populations, on the one hand, and minorities, on the other hand. Moreover, the perpetuation of this situation needed – thus opposing to the very optimistic vision suggested by Gellner – a justification, which was more ideological than pragmatic.

One of the main characteristics of this process of ideological creation is the new reporting of history according to the precepts of the national doctrine, by applying some nationalistic concepts, which lead us to a completely changed vision upon the past. “The main premises of the nationalistic ideas” – as defined by Susan Reynolds – “refer to the fact that the nations represent objective realities, existing along the whole history.”³³ The assertion of the nation’s eternal character and the proclamation of the “nationalities’ principle” as an organizing force of the whole history of mankind are related to the essence of any national ideology.

Although it is a modern phenomenon, in order to function efficiently as a political ideology, nationalism must construct its traditional identification, by means of a process to spiritually approach the past, thus also fulfilling the other two ideological functions mentioned by Geertz: the one of distortion, through the tendentious selection and interpretation – subordinated to its own metaphysics – of the facts and events regarding the past, and the one of integration through the formation and cultivation of a historical memory which should provide the individual and collective existence in the modern societies with a meaning and perspective, marked by the disintegration of the old community structures and the loss of the traditional sense of identity.

Thus the nation becomes an eternal historical category projected into remote epochs, consequently all the facts and phenomena are interpreted in a way which should support the “self image” of the nation. “When the anthropology and metaphysics defining national-

³³ Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe (900-1300)*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, p. 251.

ism are used in order to interpret the past, history will take an entirely new aspect. People who have believed they act in order to fulfill the desire of Divinity, to make the truth triumph or promote the interests of a dynasty, or simply to protect themselves against an aggression, are suddenly seen as acting to make the genius of a certain nationality manifest or strengthen."³⁴ According to this, history becomes the self-improvement process of a nation, reaching certain finality. As Hegel stated "The nations could have a long history before finally reaching their purpose – to constitute into states."³⁵

Taking the nature and finality of the national ideologies into account, we shall try to outline the main characteristics of a possible typology of the national identifying discourses, used in different historical stages and geographic zones:

1. The aristocratic nationalism

This form of nationalism is typical for the period of transition from the feudal state to the modern bourgeois states in the countries in which the transition to modernity had developed later and gradually, without any radical instant separation from the past. It is the period of temporary compromise and transient power balance between the old aristocratic elite and the new bourgeois elite, representing an attempt of aristocracy to preserve its leading positions and privileges by using the new technologies in their own interests. By defining the historical role of nobility in what they name the "salvation of nation", the aristocrats demand a leading political role in the modernizing society, invoking – instead of dynastic and feudal arguments – their traditional social position and their historical merits as "leaders of the nation".

This type of argumentation – based on the "eternization" of nation as a populational category by erasing any conceptual difference between the premodern population and the modern nation – is organically related to the promotion of the conception regarding the "noble" origins of the nation and its historical rights upon a geo-

³⁴ Elie Kedourie, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

³⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H.N. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 134.

graphic and populational area. As a result of the decline of imperial structures and dynastic principles, the former members of the feudal hierarchy become the promoters of the national sovereignty and institutional modernization by adopting new strategies to certify the power. Paradoxically, their rhetorics are focused on the idea of continuity with the medieval statal entities claiming for the reconsideration of this continuity in the case it would have been interrupted by the loss of independence and the inclusion in the territory of some empires during the previous centuries. Of course, the affirmation of such a national doctrine presumed the existence of the nobiliary elite prepared to assume such a role. In the Central Europe, in their initial phase, the Polish and Hungarian nationalism represent the most relevant examples for this type of discourse.

2. The civic nationalism

That part of bourgeoisie, which used to be situated – both geographically and politically – in the centre of the former absolutistic states and empires or their traditional acknowledged sub-units, becomes the historical successor of the nobiliary elite replaced from the power. The new leaders ask for the people's political support, presenting themselves as the opinion leaders of a new nation. The concept of nation, promoted, often ignored or even excluded by aristocracy (like in the case of the French revolution), based on the common citizen. All individuals are considered equal members of the nation, which – from this perspective – becomes identical with the whole political community of the state.

In the context of this model, the discourse regarding the nation-state, defined as the “nation of the free and equal citizens”, functions as an ideologic monopolist instrument of the national, modern and centralist elite aiming to identify the new political structures and the adherent statal territorial units (national villages). This kind of nationalism is typical to the states in the west of Europe, which had led the process of modernization, the transition to the capitalist industrial society. In the countries situated in the east of the continent, which were late in the socio-economic development, the creation of the national civic identity, as well as the civil society in

general, has always coped and still does with a lot of obstacles.

3. The *politico-cultural nationalism* expresses the need, emphasized by the centralist political elite, to consolidate its domination by opposing to the centrifugal-independent tendencies of the national rival elites in the context of the state. The most appropriate method to reach this goal was the attempt to de-legitimize the process of national identification in the case of the non-dominant communities through an official culture and language and the promotion of a homogenizing process related to the minority communities and cultures.

Such policies are typical especially to the eastern part of Europe, where ethnicity represented the decisive factor in the formation of nations. The existence of some different and even opposing national conceptions had generated a powerful identification of the state with a certain ethnic community and its culture. This identification had represented a fundamental source of national inequality between the dominant ethno-national community and the subordinated national communities, which manifested especially through:

- the limited usage both of the ethnic languages and cultivation of the culture pertaining to a minority
- the reduction of educational possibilities in the languages of minorities
- the dependence of the individuals' participation in the leading political elite on the assumption of the dominant linguistic and cultural identity (the assimilation of the elite)
- the critical participation of the national communities pertaining to a minority, as some collectivities, in the management of the state's issues.

4. The *ethnocratic nationalism* is the expression of an advanced stage of the national expansion in the case of the dominant elite, of its tendency to maximize its economic, political and cultural strength to the detriment of the minority groups by using the *ethnic* argument. This stage regarding the development of the nationalistic ideology, typical to the countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, can be considered a continuous process, by using qualitatively new means of the homogenizing policy, promoted under the sign of the

political and cultural nationalism, based on the idea according to which only the members of the majority ethno-national community can be fully considered loyal citizens. The others, the ones who assume another identity, must be assimilated as much as possible, determined to immigrate, stopped to occupy important positions in the state management, and discriminated in the case they do not want to give up their identity.

The most important strategies and methods used to reach these goals have mainly focused on:

- the preferential allocation of jobs in the public administration by taking the criterion regarding the affiliation to the majority ethnic group into account
- the proposal of economic, educational and cultural facilities to the members of the majority community
- the adoption of some discriminatory legislative and administrative measures to the detriment of the minority communities
- the artificial rise of the majority group's share in the localities and zones preponderantly inhabited by the minority population by selectively encouraging the immigration in those localities and zones.

5. The *racial nationalism* represents the extreme case of the destructive manifestation of nationalist doctrines, based on ethno-racial principles stated openly and assumed programmatically. According to these principles, the ones, who are not the inborn members (ethnic origin) of the dominant nation, simply have no choice, they are meant to be excluded from the society, reaching even the physical extermination because of their inborn affiliation to a certain ethnic community.

The “western” and “eastern” model of nation

The fundamental documents of the modern bourgeois revolutions were based on the individuals' rights. The only legitimate political entity one could acknowledge was the national state. However, as we had already mentioned, there were also some important differences regarding the effects when applying these principles to

the political realities in different geopolitical zones. One needs an expressive interpretation especially in the case of the countries (regions), which were late in the process of modernization, and presented significant characteristics in their socio-economic, State and spiritual development. In the case of these countries, the national ideologies also fulfilled a compensatory role for the frustrations and lack of identification generated by the insatisfactions in the economic and political sphere.

The first important thinker, who used a typology based on the differentiation between the *western* and *eastern* model of the politico-national culture in an explicit way, Hans Kohn, considers that in England, France and the United States they developed a voluntarist form of nationalism, which interpreted nation as the result of the reasonable association of people on a certain territory, based on mutual laws, which expressed the aspirations of the middle class. Furthermore, in the Central and Eastern Europe, then in Asia, they noticed the emergence of an organic, mystic and often authoritarian form of nationalism, which, in the absence of the middle class, was created and conducted by intellectuals.³⁶

Sharing this point of view, Anthony D. Smith states that the "western model of nation tended to emphasize the central position of the national territory or the native land of the nation, a mutual system of laws and institutions, the equality of the citizens in front of law in the context of a political community, and the importance of the mass civic culture as a liaison of the community of citizens. Moreover, the eastern model was more preoccupied with the ethnic origin and cultural connections, emphasizing, besides the genealogical elements, the folk or rustic element, the role of the vernacular mobilization in the activation of population through the revaluation of their folk culture, language, habits and customs, religion and private rituals, rediscovered by the urban intellectuals such as philologists, historians, folklorists, ethnographers and lexicographers."³⁷

C. A. Macartney resorts to the same criterion regarding typologies stating that "Europe is divided by a line which separates two

³⁶ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1945, p. 18-20.

³⁷ A. D. Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', *International Affairs* 68, 1992, p. 63.

completely different acceptions of the idea of nation. Above this line there are the nations, which consider the state represents everything, which understand the national feeling as a great enthusiasm related to the state they belong to by means of their own wish. Below the line, the feeling of the mutual civilization, mutual language and origin is preponderant.”³⁸ While the classical theoretical expression of the western model is represented by the conception concerning the “social contract” and the “folk sovereignty” elaborated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the eastern model is reflected by the conception of Johann Gottfried Herder.

Without an appropriate state context and in the circumstances of a weak development of the civil society, the national identities in the east of Europe formed according to the ethnic identity, the assertion of the legitimizing function of the national ideologies obviously meant the powerful identification of the state and state-national ideology emphasizing the interests of the dominant ethnic community. Given such a background, the idea promoted by Walzer, concerning the state, which is ethnically objective, and the complete separation between the state and the ethnic groups, remained an aspiration.

When analyzing the differences between the two models and their causes, Peter F. Sugar emphasizes that the eastern and western nationalism had certain fundamental mutual characteristics: “they represented a revolutionary force meant to transfer the power from the rulers to the nation (without depending on the way in which the <nation> defined itself). The East-European nationalism shared the fundamentally anti-clerical, constitutional and egalitarian orientation with other nationalisms, which used to define its revolutionary character.”³⁹ Taking the social basis of the national movements into account, Sugar highlights the existence of some bourgeois (the Czech nationalism), aristocratic (the Hungarian and Polish nationalism), populist (Serbia and Bulgaria) and bureaucratic (Turkey, Greece and Romania) nationalisms in the east of Europe. From all

³⁸ C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1934, pp. 5-6.

³⁹ Peter F. Sugar, ‘External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism’ In: Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 46-54.

these, the bourgeois nationalism is the most similar to the western model.

Although we can mention many important similitudes between the two types of nationalism, there are also some fundamental differences. The topic regarding the identity between the state's territory and the nation's territory is approached in a significantly different way in the case of the western and eastern model of nations. The roots of these differences must be probably searched in the double nature of the national identity emphasized by Geertz, and in the different role of the "ethnic" and "civic" dimensions in the formation of the two parts of the European continent.

Given the fact that in the west of Europe the civic concept of national identity had typically prevailed, the capacity as a member of nation was conferred by the capacity as a citizen in question, as the two affiliations (as a member of the State collectivity and as a member of the corresponding national collectivity) were mostly overlapping. Thus there were limited possibilities in the formation of some national rival identities in the context of the same state. Consequently, the western authors, who were interested in the subject, often emphasized the factors, which provided the individual with a civic identity. Oomen, for example, considers the inhabiting community an important factor giving birth to the nation,⁴⁰ and Anthony Giddens emphasizes the role of the state and unitary administration.⁴¹

On the other hand, in the Eastern Europe, due to the characteristics of the historical development, the ethnic aspect is considered the primordial objective factor. The states, which were declared national, were confronted with the ethno-cultural diversity, as they had to elaborate identifying and integrated strategies based on ideological and political principles, which were often contradictory, aiming to realize a balance between the need to assert the national doctrine and the need to assure the internal stability, given the existence of a multi-ethnic population and the development of some parallel national movements on their territory.

However, the solution of the problems generated by the existence of these contradictions was aggravated by the existence of a histori-

⁴⁰ T. K. Oomen, *Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity*. Cambridge :Polity Press, 1997

⁴¹ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequencies of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

cal lack of synchronization in the socio-economic development between the two parts of the continent.⁴² Because of the late industrialization and the incomplete modernization, the process of national mobilization – the engagement and attraction of different social segments in the implementation of the nationalistic project – shares important characteristics. The phases of national mobilization extended along a relatively long period of time, starting with the end of the 18th century; the process is still unfinished.

Given the weak socio-economic development, in the first stages they emphasized the ideological and political mobilization of the elites (firstly of the feudal residual elite and then the one of the new bourgeois elite), gradually extending to the ideological and political mobilization of the masses, and later to the economic sphere, engaging more and more people in the process of industrialization and urbanization. In the countries which remained preponderantly agrarian till the first half of the 20th century (like Romania), the greatest socio-economic mobilization of the masses was meant to occur during the accelerated process of urban and industrial mobility determined and directed politically during the communist period of time, given the combination between the nationalistic and communist ideology as the authorities put their heads together to find a satisfying identifying basis for the regime.

This assertion drives us to another fundamental characteristic of the state's national constructions in Eastern Europe: the permanent lack of official recognition or rather their incomplete identification. By identifying the state with a single national identity, the other national communities inevitably found themselves beyond any process of identification, which represented a fundamental source of interethnic pressure. The strategies used to attenuate the possible consequences of this chronic crises of identification were focused, on the one hand, on the minimization of chances and the impact of any alternative national aspirations, and on the other hand, on the amplification of its own nation's role and historical contribution.

⁴² Regarding this subject see Al. Dușu (ed.) *La modernisation des sociétés sud-est européennes*, București: Editura Institutului Cultural Român, 1992; Dan Berindei, *România și Europa în perioadele premodernă și modernă*, București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997; Sorin Alexandrescu, *Le paradoxe roumain* in *International Journal of Romanian Studies*, I, 1976, pp. 3-20.

A characteristic feature of the practical approach of such strategies is represented by the sacralization of the State territory considered as national territory (the property of a single nation) considering all its historical, social, political and cultural aspects. The selective historical memory and the tendentious historiography – meant to emphasize the essential contribution of the dominant nation and reduce the contribution of the other national communities as much as possible – certainly act as essential ideological instruments in the re-interpretation of facts.

The essential role of the collective imaginary level and the myth in the formation of national identities and ideologies derive from the identifying function assumed by nationalism. As a matter of fact, all over Europe, the national rhetorics included a historical component meant to justify the new aspirations by relating them to traditional and previously checked values.⁴³ As Lucian Boia noticed, by definition, the national identity also calls for the attributes of a mythic identity, assuming a process of the reality's mental recreation, through which the mixture of dispersed facts and phenomena is provided with an interpretation or meaning, introducing the principle of order in history.⁴⁴ However, in the East-European countries they felt the need to approach a certain type of mythic creation, which pre-eminently fulfilled a compensatory role in the failures of the present, through which the political regimes undergoing an acute crises of identification were providing some illusive spiritual sustenance to a population frustrated because of the highly decreasing development separating the countries situated in the region from the epicentre of modernity.

Besides the special attention paid to the issues related to territories, the topics regarding the population's ethno-demographic structure were also important and were approached by the national ideologists and political leaders in the eastern space. Given the ethnically mixed character of the population and the existence of the rival national conceptions, the application of the self-determination principle faced numerous hardships in the region, as it was not very clear who the subjects of this right were. All the inhabitants, regardless of

⁴³ Alexandru Zub, *Istorie și finalitate*, București: Editura All, 1991, pp. 54-58.

⁴⁴ Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas, 1997, pp. 8-9.

their ethnic group? Such a solution would have passed all the resolutions in the hands of the majority while excluding the others. The consensual decision of all the nations, which are numerically important? Moreover, what would have happened if such an agreement could not be reached, as it often occurred?

Referring to the theoretical suppositions, which were implicitly present beyond such questions, Will Kymlicka emphasizes a fundamental shortcoming of the classical, Anglo-Saxon conception, regarding the democratic governing system. Of course, the “fact that today most of the countries share the ideal of democracy does not say anything about the way in which the territorial limits of a political community must be outlined or about the way the power must be distributed among different ruling levels (local, regional, federal, international). Moreover, the value of democracy in the case of a certain ethnic group can highly depend on the way one replies to such questions. Instead of directly approaching these topics, very many theoreticians simply consider that the borders of political communities and the prerogatives, which they were supposed to accept, had been already determined.”⁴⁵

Such a presumption could be valid – at least partially – in the case of the countries where the “western” model was the dominant one, making the borders of the political and national community coincide. In exchange, in the circumstances of the competition among the rival national ideologies typical to the east of Europe, the absence of theoretical solutions in this crucial domain had increased the uncertainty and escalated rivalry. In the multicultural historical regions, the ideological arguments and those regarding the identity of the competing national ideologies were aiming to symbolically strengthen and provide the “exclusively national” character of those regions with legitimacy.

However, through the proclamation of supremacy in the case of a single nation the other nation did not disappear, it was still present. No matter how irreconcilable the national ideologies in question might have been, the political elite of the dominant nation had to take the existence of the other important national communities into account, with all the implications deriving from this plurality. Conse-

⁴⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Introduction* in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 1.

quently, the offer of the majority national elites was generally presented in the form of a compromise which devoted the national supremacy in the state of its own community, still preserving a certain space (bigger or smaller) of existence for the minorities too. In such circumstances the incomplete rightfulness of the ethno-nationalist homogenizing policies of the dominant political elites has been one of the main sources of interethnic pressure in the eastern space.

From this viewpoint, we can often refer to a veritable “war of figures”, which developed both in the real plan, through the efforts of the leading factors to modify the ethno-territorial distribution of population in favour of the majority nation, and in the symbolical plan, by trying to manipulate the demographic data in a statistical way, in order to reduce the negative impact which the official acknowledgement of a very large part of the minority population might have had on the dominant national elite.

In general, the distinction between the “real” policies and the “symbolical” ones seems useful to us when characterizing the national elites’ state of mind and way of thinking in the countries where the eastern model was the dominant one. The distance and abyss between the aspiration to create a homogeneous national state (which according to its supporters, might have solved all the national problems in the state) and the ethno-demographic and national political reality, which used to contradict this aspiration – often categorically –, were ideologically attenuated through the “beautifying” of reality – both of the actual and past one – and the interpretation of facts in a way promoting the interests of the dominant national political groups.

Conclusions

The division between the “East” and the “West” had driven, beyond the significant differences in the political culture, to the different perception of the citizenship quality in the case of the inhabitants in the two parts of the continent. The strong identification with a culture and community had fulfilled an essential role – which was more important than the civic identity – in the inhabitants’ mobilization and political integration. As a result, they developed a very complex con-

nection between the political and ethnic problems. Ethnicity, the ethnic affiliation was constantly and intensely politicized while the political problems were often translated into "national" terms.

While in the "western" model the nation mostly provides an appropriate context for the integration of citizens, belonging to all the ethnic groups, into the political community of the state, the historical experience of the national and state development in the Central and Eastern Europe emphasizes the manifestation of a contradiction between the institution of citizenship, on one hand, and the institution of the national state, on the other. Given the fact that the ethnic "frontiers" and the state borders didn't always coincide, the result often consisted in the generation of some sources of pressure and conflict.

The principle of the national unitary state, like in the past, is still considered in some states belonging to the East-Central-European zone as an essential guarantee of the territorial stability and integrity. They believed that the allowance of some collective rights to the minority communities might represent a starting point to obtain a formula of territorial autonomy or other forms of self-determination which can finally drive to secession. There are even some politicians and analysts considered as liberal and democratic in the issues of inter-ethnic relationships, who state that it is important to make the difference between the minority rights, which can be considered "natural rights", and the ones, which can induce "other political actions" (secession). Most of the political actors representing the majority national communities generally consider the collective rights and territorial autonomy as related to the second category. Accordingly, any idea, which supports the allowance of a special territorial status to some regions inhabited by minorities, is rejected, even when proposed by some organizations belonging to the majority nation, and even if based on the requirements of the administrative and financial autonomy, having only an indirect connection to the ethno-national topic.

The causes of this phenomenon are multiple. First of all, we must consider the specific historical conditions facilitating the development of the process focused on the formation of the nations and states in the region, which generated a permanent deficit of the national political legitimacy. Consequently, they developed an ethno-centrist and inherent vision on nation.

Secondly, we mention the privileged role of the mutually exclusive historical images in the formation of national identities. In the context of the national traditional conceptions the nations' right to "possess" their national territory was also identified through arguments describing the other nation as the "eternal enemy". Therefore the members of the rival national communities saw the transformations in the territorial status either as an apotheosis or as tragedy. The memory of these territorial changes had produced a perception of insecurity, which amplified the mutual lack of trust.

There are also more pragmatic arguments shared by a certain part of the political and administrative elite, especially by those related to the structures of the central bureaucracy. In the case of those interested in the maintenance of the centralist system, the invocation of the secessionist danger can effectively act as an obstacle in the process of real administrative and financial decentralization.

All these factors can answer why, in spite of all the progress recorded after the revolution in 1989, the rights of national minorities still represent a controversial subject in the region, with direct implications in the process of democratization and integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Despite the significant progress obtained during the last two decades, the profound causes generating the ethnic pressure haven't been completely annihilated yet. Exclusivist and intolerant attitudes keep manifesting, being often generated or stimulated by the political forces concerned. The weak development level of the civil society's structures and institutions keeps contributing in the exacerbation of those particular elements defining identity, which tend to separate and oppose the national communities.

For the process of reconciliation to become really irreversible, we need continuous efforts and steps towards a gradual de-politization of the ethnic connections, by also assuring some institutional conditions and legal guarantee for the perfect assertion of the identity and culture of the minority groups. In order to surpass the obstacles generated by the assertion of some divergent national ideological positions, which are even opposed from certain points of view, we consider that we need a political agreement among the important national communities historically rooted in the state's territory, based on a reasonable long-term compromise, advantageous for everybody. Given such an agree-

ment, we can identify and implement those socio-technical solutions meant to protect the right to identity and stimulate the ethno-cultural diversity, especially the perpetuation of the minority culture, which needs such instruments of protection in an intense way.

The necessity of a standardized superior culture in the society can be considered theoretically and practically – not only singularly, by adopting the classical nationalistic principle, “a Culture, a Territory, a State”, but also in the terms regarding the plurality of national and ethno-regional cultures enjoying equal rights on the territory of the same state.

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ON NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Theories of national identity

The current theories of national identity in studies on nationalism are so numerous that a common review of all of them herein nears the borders of impossibility; therefore, we are going to point out only the most important *movements*: these are modernism, perennialism, primordialism and ethno-symbolism. A good review of these movements is found in Anthony D. Smith's *Nationalism*.¹ Grouping them by scope, we could say that these theories can be configured around two main subjects: some of them deal with the *concept of the nation* and typologies describing various concepts of nation, while others offer some historic explanation to the process of the creation of a nation.

As for the typologies of nation, the most common differentiation is the one made between the cultural nation and the state-nation (civic nation), originating in the work of the German historian Friedrich Meinecke. According to this differentiation, there are two different concepts of the nation, one of which is characteristic of the part lying west from the Rhine, while the other one is typical of the part situated east from the Rhine. According to the concept of the state-nation, the criterion of belonging to a nation is citizenship. Commonly, this type is exemplified by the French concept of the nation. The concept of the cultural nation sees the essence of belonging to a nation in belonging to a cultural community. The German concept of the nation is referenced as the typical example of this concept. Then, this distinction takes various forms, such as differentiation between ethnical or civic nationalism, essentialism and instrumentalism. Today, the validity of these typologies is more and more often questioned, the most relevant challenge being perhaps Alain Dieck-

¹ Anthony D. Smith: *Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001.

hoff's text,² where he tries to demonstrate that the French nation – seen as the model of the state-nation – was created through a forcible linguistic homogenization in history, and holding French citizenship is not a sufficient condition of belonging to the French nation today either. French are those who are citizens of the French state, preferably white, Catholic persons who speak good French.

As for the other direction in nationalism studies – the historic explanations of a nation's genesis – this schematic review shall confine itself to modernist theories only. Partially because of the limited physical space and partially because – for the reasons explained later – I myself sustain that the typical European form of the nation as a political community is indeed a specific modern phenomenon and European history shows no pre-modern preliminaries of it.

A common feature of these theories, albeit not of all of them, is that they seek an explanation to the process of the nation's genesis in impersonal historic effect mechanisms. Thus, their difference lies in that (1) whether or not they accept this method of explanation at all, and (2) if yes, which are the effect mechanisms to which they attach an explanatory role concerning the creation of the nation.

Let's begin with the latter ones. These effect mechanisms could be (a) social-cultural, (b) economic or (c) political ones. (a) The best example of the first one, that is, of the social-cultural explanation, is Ernest Gellner's³ well-known theory: according to him, the genesis of the nation can be explained by the transition from agricultural society to the industrial order, and the fact that the industrial order and the labor market demand characterizing the industrial order required the creation of a standardized "high culture". The nation is created by calling this culture to life and by forcibly promoting public education. (b) Economic theories are generally Marxist or post-Marxist theories. Their starting point is that the national conscience is a form of a "false conscience", and it evolved thanks to "economic peripherization", "uneven development", "internal colonialization", etc. A typical example of such is found in Michael Hechter's theory, first

² Alain Dieckhoff: Egy megrögzöttség túlhaladása: a kulturális és politikai nacionalizmus fogalmainak újraértelmezése [*Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and Political Nationalism Revisited*], In Regio, 2002/4, 7–22.

³ Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

developed in his work *Internal Colonialism*.⁴ Finally, (c) the political theories, such as those of Michael Mann,⁵ or John Breuilly,⁶ examine the role of the state in the development of nationalism, and seek to identify a historic connection between the emergence of nationalism and the introduction of a given form of government, such as democracy or the republic.

Albeit situated outside the “mainstream” doctrines, theories bearing the names of Charles Taylor⁷ or Isaiah Berlin⁸ offer explanations to nationalism as the process of the emergence of a nation. The latter one is also known as the theory of “the bent twig”. Both see national high culture as being “created” and promoted by the intellectual elite, identifying the direct cause of national awakening generally in political and cultural repression. Thus, the emergence of the nation is a response reaction: the twig is bent, and if let go, it hits back.

Now I would like to examine the other difference. As mentioned above, these theories also differ in whether or not they accept the explanation sought in impersonal effect mechanisms at all. A good example of this is the already discussed debate of Gellner with his senior colleague, Elie Kedourie.⁹ Gellner’s theory can be understood truly only from this debate. Both are modernists, considering the nation to be a modern phenomenon, yet there are essential differences between their theories. Gellner, especially in the works written in his last years¹⁰ was stronger and stronger in the view that the nation was a necessary element of modernity: processes taking place

⁴ Michael Hechter: *Internal Colonialism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.

⁵ See: Michael Mann: *The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism*. In J. Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.): *Transition to Modernity*, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 137–165.

⁶ John Breuilly: *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester University Press, 1982.

⁷ Charles Taylor: *Nationalism and Modernity*. In Ronald Beiner (ed): *Theorizing Nationalism*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, 219–245.

⁸ Isaiah Berlin: *The Bent Twig. On the Rise of Nationalism*. In Isaiah Berlin: *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Princeton University Press, 1998, 238–262; Isaiah Berlin: *Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power*. In Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy, Roger Hausheer: *Against the Current*. Princeton University Press, 2001, 333–356.

⁹ Elie Kedourie: *Nationalism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.

¹⁰ See, for example: Ernest Gellner: *Nationalism*, New York University Press, New York, 1997.

in modernity (such as industrialization) called the nation into existence by necessity, and for this very reason, modernity cannot even be conceived without the nation. However, Kedourie argued that albeit the nation was a modern phenomenon, it was nothing more than a historical accident. In its essence, it was nothing more than an "ideological" construction, and responsible for the creation and propagation of the idea of the nation, more precisely, of national sovereignty, were philosophers such as Kant, but even more so Fichte. Thus, there is an essential difference between considering the nation to be an inevitable necessity, or a mere historic accident.

However, here I prefer to discuss the issue of nationalism by relying not on the afore-mentioned theories, but on the work of a less known author, Chimène Keitner¹¹ and on the results of my own research. Together with Keitner, I too have a modernist approach, that is, I think that prior to modernism, until before the French Revolution, one could not speak of nation in its current sense. I also think, joining Kedourie's opinion, that the idea of the nation is an ideological construction and not a historical necessity, but a mere accident. Nonetheless, I also accept that there were and there still are effect mechanisms, primarily of political nature, which stimulated but also assumed the emergence and existence of the nation. Such is the republican governance. To put it plainly, I am saying what István Bibó also emphasized frequently: "democratism and nationalism are blood-brothers". The introduction of the republican form of governance fuelled the emergence of the nation as a political community and nationalism has a close ideological relation with Rousseau's demand for popular sovereignty.

One hypothesis

Today it is not an original or isolated attempt to consider that modern nationalism in the historical sense was born out of the political experiences and measures of the French Revolution. No matter

¹¹ Chimène Keitner: *The Paradoxes of Nationalism. The French Revolution and its Meaning for Contemporary Nation Building*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2007.

how school-bookish the thesis may seem, the conclusions it allows are very productive, but also quite diverse. For instance, when István Bibó voiced this assumption in his major study on European equilibrium and peace, he was focusing on the emotional and psychological aspects of this process, being faithful to his own approach and methodology. "The major consequence of the French Revolution was – he wrote – the intensification and democratization of community affections, the birth of *modern nationalism*. This is where meaning is attached to the otherwise superficial statement that European nationalism emerged from the French Revolution. Neither the nation as a fact, nor the pertaining affections were born in 1789, but centuries, even a millennium before. However, aristocracy had been the conscious carrier of this community form until 1789, bearing the pertaining affections and responsibility with the tranquility and confidence of age-long possession and exercise. Starting from the late Middle Ages, the intellectual class and the civil class, the third estate, have continuously penetrated into the national framework. However, in the French Revolution, this penetration took the form of a triumphant entry overnight, and out of this the modern national affection was born".¹² Thus, Bibó considers that the existence of the French nation (not in the strict political meaning of the word, but in the imperial sense) precedes the French Revolution, and in equal measure, the imperial national conscience also traced back before the Revolution. Modern nationalism emerged in parallel with the democratization of imperial national conscience, and also changed the intensity or quality of the national affection. However, we might add that all this signals revolutionary origins and democratic emotion in the modern national affection – and indeed Bibó draws these conclusions one by one.

As for myself, without underestimating the political significance of political psychology or of the national affection, I endeavor to focus on the ideological or political components of this process. My attempt is to identify the ideological or political causes which were in action in this historical process. My basic thesis: the French Revolution created the modern nation, not as a social, but primarily as a

¹² István Bibó: Az európai egyensúlyról és békéről (*On the European Equilibrium and Peace*). In Válogatott tanulmányok (*Selected studies*), Vol I, Magvető, Budapest, 1986, pp. 309-310.

political entity, where the nation was seen by the revolutionaries as the exclusive and direct depository of sovereignty. Nevertheless, as an unintended effect of the conscious, centrally controlled homogenization policy, this entity acquired cultural substance, or at least a possibility was created for the national idea to gain a cultural interpretation, particularly by attempting to eliminate France's existing linguistic diversity for political reasons,¹³ and to arouse in the inhabitants of France the feeling of belonging to the French nation as a political and linguistic community.

Before taking any steps further, I would like to dwell a little on the challenges that can be raised against the above hypothesis. The first reasonable question that can be posed against it is how nationalism and the intense affection of belonging to a nation could have emerged in a movement which was consciously internationalist in its declarations and proclaimed the rights and liberty of man as man. The other objection to this hypothesis could come from the followers of the typology which claims to identify both civic and cultural nationalism.

However, regardless of how hard I would exert myself, I could not give an equally concise and brief response to these concise and brief objections. To a certain extent, the particular purpose of this chapter is to tackle these objections without compromising the optimal length of discussion; indeed, I see these objections to be essentially related, therefore the answers to them should also be connected. Thus, if an attempt of a more or less brief answer still appears at this stage of the discussion, it is driven by considerations of a rather heuristic nature.

As a matter of fact, Bibó himself tackles the first objection, and his answer to the hypothetical question draws attention to the moral and emotional significance of the experience of liberation. "While revolutionary democracy, and any democracy for that matter, proclaims the liberty of man, it asserts this liberty always in a given community, and this experience does not bring about the weakening of affections for that community, but rather their intensification and

¹³ During the French Revolution, more than half of the total population was unable to communicate using the standard French language.

amplification”.¹⁴ The other objection is more difficult to answer. In its sketchy form, indeed little explanatory power can be attributed to the typology of the cultural nation vs. the state-nation; nevertheless, this typology may prove valuable in understanding the evolution of the national conscience in the 19th century. Therefore, instead of refuting it, I should like to attempt to offer an interpretation or reinterpretation thereof.

Alain Dieckhoff, who – as I have already mentioned – made great efforts to surpass this dichotomy, warns in his study dedicated to this subject, *Beyond Conventional Wisdom*, that this dichotomy emerged in the 1870s, under very specific historical circumstances related to the Alsace-Lorraine issue. “The German historians (Mommsen, Strauss) justified the integration of the Alsatians in the Reich with the argument that their language and customs belonged to German culture. Their French counterparts (Renan, Fustel de Coulanges) rejected such a claim, and defended the right of the Alsatians to remain French if this was their political choice.”¹⁵ On the other hand, in a step-by-step argumentation, Dieckhoff shows that the French national idea does not cover solely the community of French citizens, and that historically speaking, the French nation emerged as a result of a conscious, centrally controlled cultural and linguistic homogenization process which originated in the French Revolution. Herein, I would like to confine my analysis to the beginnings of this process and to the ideological and political effect mechanisms that shaped this process.

A typical example of a linguistic homogenization attempt is the study performed by Abbot Gregory (Henri Baptiste Grégoire) in 1792, with a title worthy of a declaration of war: Report on the necessity of eradicating dialects [les patois] and of the general spreading of the French language.¹⁶ However, one should add that

¹⁴ Az európai egyensúlyról és békéről (*On the European Equilibrium and Peace*), 310.

¹⁵ Alain Dieckhoff: *Nation and Nationalism in France: Between Idealism and Reality*, paper for the workshop National Identity and Euroscepticism: A Comparison between France and the United Kingdom, 13 May 2005.

¹⁶ Abbé Grégoire: Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française. In *Une politique de la langue. La Révolution française et les patois: L’enquête de Grégoire*, Paris, 1975. *Patois* could equally mean the local dialects of the French language and individual languages (German, Italian, etc.).

the claims of Abbot Gregory in his report were not at all individual caprices or folly: it perfectly fit the ideological basis of the revolution.

Older historiography took Rousseau's effect on the revolutionary ideology for granted. As opposed to this, the historical fact was that Rousseau did not exercise a direct effect on revolutionary ideas; moreover, he was not even a widely read and known political author of that time. Nevertheless, his political views were effective at the time of the Revolution, and were quite popular thanks to Abbot Sieyès who incorporated some elements of Rousseau's political theory in the pamphlet published on the eve of the Revolution with the title *What Is the Third Estate?*, that enjoyed a spectacular success.

Indeed, Rousseau's doctrines were of use for the revolutionary purposes because while he set liberty as the goal of the political changes he urged, he still conceived liberty as the natural state of man. "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains"¹⁷ – he writes in the very first pages of the first book of *The Social Contract*. However, if man's liberty precedes the political states, that means he is free to turn over the political states anytime. Revolutions can be started in the name of freedom whenever we see tyranny to dispossess man of this freedom.

However, Rousseau's doctrines carry a message which results from the above in a not so evident way, but which had gained even greater significance among the revolutionaries after 1792. The contemporary critics of the revolution, such as Edmund Burke, still considered that the state was unable to secure liberty and man's inalienable rights if indeed these preceded political states. "Men – Burke writes – cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together."¹⁸ However, in reality Rousseau's entire efforts focused on conceiving a government system which would map the natural state to politics. "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. [...] How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer."

Thus, his teachings were of use for revolutionary purposes because he did not demand the institutionalization of the state of

¹⁷ Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *The Social Contract Or Principles of Political Right*, Kessinger Publishing, 2004, p. 2.

¹⁸ Edmund Burke: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Google eBook, p. 88.

liberty, but also urged a new form of government, and these two demands were strongly interrelated. Therefore, the issue was not only that Louis XVI was a tyrant (which, besides, was not actually so), but also that the institution of the kingship was bad *ab ovo* as it did not reflect the natural state. The true social system must map the natural state of humans to politics, and if men are free in their natural state and equal as such, then this governmental state can only be democracy. Thus, Rousseau inferred that in order to establish the system of liberty, power must be put in the hands of the people. Obviously, Rousseau submitted the institutionalization of liberty to the requirement of political equality, thereby creating the intellectual prototype of any subsequent democratic dictatorship.

During these endeavors, he did not wish to consider the possibility that the people might abuse of their power, and his efforts solely focused on finding guarantees against preventing anyone from taking over power from the people in the name of the very people, that is, from terminating the political equality of citizens. This is why Robespierre too thought, after Rousseau, that the Republic only had to express the character of the people, and constitutional guarantees against governmental excesses were not necessary because the people were virtuous by their nature. Rousseau himself dreaded the expropriation of popular power so much that he rejected the idea of representation, and proposed a direct participative form of democracy. Sovereignty, he said, “for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented”; “the idea of representation is modern; it comes to us from feudal government, from that iniquitous and absurd system which degrades humanity and dishonors the name of man”.¹⁹ However, from rejecting the idea of representation, one would also infer the rejection of parties, considering that parties are a natural accessory to the representational system. And Rousseau indeed did not approve of “the influence of private interests in public affairs”.²⁰ Presumably, in these efforts he envisaged the ideal of the ancient democratic practice – just like his disciples, Robespierre and Saint-Just – that is, the democratic city-state with its ecclesia gathering all the citizens, where they assemble, debate and adopt a con-

¹⁹ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 44.

scious unanimous decision. This ancient ideal is expressed in Rousseau's concept of the public will (*volonté de tous*): one should try to obtain the broadest agreement possible in assemblies, because this is the best way to assert public will.

Yet, the eradication of the principle of representation proposed by Montesquieu entailed further consequences. Sieyès himself noted that rejecting the principle of representation results in the needlessness of the division of power. When the question of division of legislative action and the king's veto right arose in the fall of 1789 in the National Constituent Assembly, Sieyès objected that "the law, according to the only reasonable definition thereof, is the expression of the will of those governed",²¹ and as such, the governors cannot seize it – either fully, or partially. The law is an expression of the nation's will, and therefore it is standard, as it can only exist this way. Thus, the delegates rejected the idea of bicameral legislation on 10 September, at Sieyès's proposal.

But Sieyès did not only map Rousseau's teaching to the contemporary policy, but also proposed an essential reinterpretation of it. For example, in his pamphlet *What Is the Third Estate?* we see that his interpretation replaced the notion of public will with the general will, also hallmarked by Rousseau (*volonté générale*, that is, the general legislative public will). The difference between the two is that while the first one presumes the existence of a government, the second one stands as the origin of any form of government and constitution. The first one factored in a moment of rational decision, while the latter one, by its nature, rules out any exchange of opinions. Sieyès considered that functionality was sufficient for legitimacy, because – as he called it – "the national will" only "needs its own reality in order to remain legitimate", considering that "it is the origin of all legitimacy". This fuelled the revolutionaries' conviction, which had grown more and more popular during the revolution, that the national will could not be "tamed" with constitution, as it would be an evident logical contradiction for "a nation to commit itself, with the first action of its independent will, to shape its future solely in a

²¹ Sieyès's response to the monarchists, in: Péter Hahner (ed.): *A nagy francia forradalom dokumentumai*, (*Documents of the Great French Revolution*), Osiris, Budapest, 1999, p. 155. (*Translated from Hungarian*)

certain form". National will must function at all times in order to be real, and for this very reason, there "is not", nor "can there be", but nor "is it necessary" for it to be submitted to a constitution: "this would mean that it does not exist at all".²² Accordingly, the internal and structural self-limitation of the national will or sovereignty arising from the constitutional configuration and separation of powers is not only unnecessary, but so is the external limitation thereof. Yet, putting the national will above the laws and the constitution makes it unlimited: it could not have any boundaries in theory either. For that matter, this was the meaning of the absolute sovereign's power in the classical theory of sovereignty originating in Jean Bodin, with the reserve that the sovereign was indeed obliged to submit himself to divine and natural laws.

Contemporaries and critics of the Revolution, such as Madame de Staël, surmised that the revolutionaries simply transferred the king's power to the people. Sieyès himself, in his speech on the Constitution of 1795, considered that popular sovereignty used to be configured according to the king's sovereignty. Whatever the case may be, even the theoretical republican Madame de Staël inferred that pure democracy could be asserted only on the agoras of Athens, and was un conceivable in states with millions of inhabitants.²³ Indeed, Madame de Staël was not the first one in the long line of modern political thinkers to consider that the issue of democracy, in its participative form, was basically a matter of numbers and sizes, but Montesquieu was – indeed he was exceedingly skeptical about the entire issue of republican governance, both about its participative or representative form.

A direct consequence of rejecting the principle of representation was that the difference between society and state vanished, just as in the ancient polis. If the nation or the people are the exclusive depositaries of sovereignty and exercise their power directly, not even a theoretical line could be drawn between society and state. In this regard, the notion of the nation, at least in its form taken during the

²² Abbé Sieyès: What Is The Third State? In *A nagy francia forradalom dokumentumai (Documents of the Great French Revolution)*, pp. 41-43.

²³ Germaine de Staël: *Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la Révolution et des principes qui doivent fonder la République en France (1798)*, Droz, Paris, Genève, 1979.

French Revolution, is a political category par excellence, and not a social one. This explains why Benjamin Constant's memorable criticism of the Jacobin Republic emphasized so strongly the importance of private liberty, that is, of independence from politics.

This notion of the nation automatically led to challenging the legitimacy of intermediary powers, or, in modern words, the *raison d'être* of the civil sphere. "The state or Jacobin nationalism associated with French theory, civic but collectivist in doctrine. Membership of the national community is in principle open to all living on the national territory and all are equal before the law. Individual liberties are respected but, precisely in consequence of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, forms of collective action other than through the national state are not regarded as legitimate. There is no room for intermediary authority between the individual and the state and democracy thus implies national unity, centralization and uniformity."²⁴ The Jacobin doctrine of national sovereignty sees as illegitimate every intermediary social or political institution that expresses the particular identity or interests of people living in the society. And this does not only refer to institutions representing the particular identity of national minorities; indeed, Le Chapelier's Act (14 June 1791) prohibited even the association of workers: the Jacobin doctrine of national sovereignty ruled out the organized representation of particular class interests.

The Jacobin doctrine of national sovereignty called modern nationalism to life, for evident historical, political and ideological reasons, and demanded the linguistic assimilation of minorities, as well as the elimination of political groupings representing class interests. Robespierre said that there were only two parties in France: the people and their enemies, adding that it is only death that the people owe to their enemies.

Summarizing the above: the Jacobin concept of national sovereignty and the institutionalization of this doctrine eliminated the difference between the state and society and its totalizing and assimilating politics stirred the national emotions. For this very reason Bibó emphasized so often that *Democracism* and *Nationalism* embodied in the French Revolution were related emotions. However,

²⁴ Michael Keating: *Nations against the State*, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 25.

he paid less attention to an equally true fact: the historical link between democracism and nationalism was the doctrine of popular sovereignty and its particular interpretation, which presents the issue of the nation not merely as a political question, but also as a matter of power. Sovereignty which cannot be tamed by constitution is a power without limits – both within and outside the state.

Studying from inside, the question is always posed as follows: who should rightfully have sovereignty, that is: who has the power in the state? And if our answer to this question puts power in the hands of the people, then the second question arises immediately: which people? “Nationalism thus acquired a popular base and was linked with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. This is part of the legacy of the French Revolution. [...] Yet once the people had been declared sovereign, it was necessary to specify who the people were and on what basis membership of the state was to be granted”²⁵ – Michel Keating writes, adding: “Among the earliest acts of the French Revolution was the abolition of the three estates of nobles, clergy and the commoners and their replacement by the National Assembly based on the third estate and representing the people of France as a whole. French Jacobin doctrine subsequently identified democracy and popular sovereignty with national unity, denying legitimacy to intermediate forms of authority”²⁶

The generality of the requirement to democratize France was well demonstrated by the overwhelming Parisian success of Sieyès’s pamphlet, whereby he urged this very democratization. The third estate, he wrote in January 1789, is everything. Consequently, the other estates are: nothing. Aristocracy is merely “false people”, “people apart” which could not exist in itself unless it attaches itself to a “real nation”, like those tumors which cannot live except from the sap of the plants which they exhaust and desiccate: “The Third therefore includes everyone who belongs to the nation; and everyone who is not in the Third cannot regard himself as being of the nation”.²⁷ In

²⁵ Michael Keating, *Nations against the State*, pp. 29-30.

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 31.

²⁷ Emmanuel Sièyes, *Qu’ est-ce que le tiers état?*, ed. Roberto Zapperi (Genève: Libraire Droz, 1970), pp. 119-35. Trans. Philip Dawson, <http://userhome.brooklyn.cuny.edu/pnapoli/core4/f2002/sieyes.html>, Downloaded: 28 February 2011.

this spirit, the National Constituent Assembly abolished all the class privileges on 4 August 1789. In this night-long, passionate meeting, the weary representatives issued exulted statements, and Aristocrats willingly renounced their traditional privileges.

However, the transposition of Sieyès's doctrines in daily politics had occurred earlier, in the transformation of the estate assembly into the National Assembly. Although the king ordered the unification of estates only as late as 27 June 1789, the clerics joining the third estate adopted a resolution as early as 17 July, at Sieyès's proposal (491 votes against 90 nays), which rejected the classification of society into orders, and changed the name of the estate assembly to National Assembly. "In the current state of affairs, the National Assembly is the only name which fits the assembly, because solely its members can be considered representatives legitimately and publicly known and sanctified, as being delegated by almost the entire nation, and because representation is one and undividable, not one representative – regardless of the estate and class he was elected by – has the right to exercise the functions apart from this assembly."²⁸

Again, the abolishment of the French society's grouping into estates was pursued, among others, through the expropriation of ecclesiastic properties (2 November 1789), the adoption of the secular constitution of clergy (12 July 1790), and the swearing of clergy by the secular constitution (27 November 1790). By creating the constitutional church, the priests became paid governmental workers, and the clergy ceased to be a political power with its own basis.

In parallel, the National Assembly, with the same resolution adopted on 4 August, abolished the administrative arrangement of France inherited from the times of the "old regime", on the grounds that it was "ambiguous". The new administrative division of France was proposed by the constitutional committee, based on Sieyès's draft, in the fall of 1789, according to which France was to be divided into 80 rectangular counties with Paris as the center, reflecting the committee's attempt to assert the idea that the people's representatives received their assignment from the entire nation, and

²⁸ The estate assembly adopts the name National Assembly. In *A nagy francia forradalom dokumentumai*, [*Documents of the Great French Revolution*] 51-52 (translated from Hungarian).

not from their electors. The final resolution, somewhat more reasonably, divided France's territory into similar sized counties. Furet wrote that the compromise was actually a mixture of "rationalism and empiricism", of "philosophical abstractions and political realities".²⁹

Nevertheless, even if the National Assembly thus succeeded in eradicating the division of France by orders and of the old provincial privileges, breaking the local traditions, eliminating the customs barriers, and introducing a standard public administration everywhere, the Revolution failed to achieve the major goal of linguistic unification of the French population. Albeit the intentions existed, the means were not available.

The clearest reasoning of linguistic homogenization was penned by Barère, who was convinced that French was "the most beautiful language of Europe", whose role was to "transmit to the world the most subtle thoughts on liberty". In his proposal made on the 8th of pluviôse year II (27 January 1794), he enounced before the National Convention that "it is impossible to destroy federalism which is based on not communicating thoughts".³⁰ "We revolutionized governance – he said –, the laws, the customs, the morals, the costume, trade and even thinking; let us revolutionize language which is the common means of the latter one. You ordered that the laws be sent to all the villages of the Republic; but this good deed is in vain for the counties which I referred to. Clarity, which is delivered to the margins of the country at great cost, vanishes by the time it reaches the destination, as those places don't even understand the laws.³¹ Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us smash these harmful and faulty instruments."³² That is, linguistic assimilation is warranted by the propagation of the idea of liberty, i.e. constitutionality and the idea of the Republic.

²⁹ François Furet: *The French Revolution, 1770-1814*, Blackwell Publishing, 1992, p. 88.

³⁰ In Revolutionary rhetoric, federalism designated separatism.

³¹ Barère exaggerates: the justice minister created an office for translating laws and decrees to German, Italian, Catalan, Basque and low Breton as early as December 1792.

³² József Eötvös: *A XIX. század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az államra (Influence of the Dominant Ideas of the 19th Century on the State)*, Magyar Helikon, Budapest, 1981, Vol I, Chapter III, p. 126. (notes)

Uniformity is justified by universalism; assimilation is vindicated by the urge for freedom. If democracy or – in Revolutionary parlance – the Republic is the national estate and equality is a condition of liberty, then man, in its own interest, *can be compelled to liberty* – even by smashing his particular, national identity. Thus, the purpose of linguistic homogenization is not cultural, but political, and is related to the necessity of political consultation (and the optimization of central administration). Linguistic homogeneity is not necessary because diverse linguistic and cultural identities are irritating or disruptive per se and therefore should be smashed, but because political significance is attached to language and communication in the Republic. The most effective means serving this goal – as Edmund Burke noticed already – during the Revolution were the Parisian newspapers distributed in the provinces, as promoters of the revolutionary ideas and the revolutionary language, Parisian French.

Yet, these means eventually turned out inadequate, the time available to the Revolutionaries way too brief for achieving the goal, and France's linguistic unity was created solely later, through the extremely drastic methods of the educational policy of the Third Republic. Nevertheless, even if the French Revolution did not eradicate France's linguistic diversity, it indeed terminated the French people's indifference towards the linguistic diversity of their country.

Finally, all this proves that in the light of history, the issue of nationality and endeavors to assimilate national minorities were also an issue of popular power and democracy; thus, it is understandable why this question arose with particular weight and significance in the European states, followed by Eastern European states that gradually became democratic. The linguistic diversity of France had not been an issue until the provincial masses and urban plebeians did not feel the urge to participate in power, and it had grown into a problem only with the introduction of republican governance and the public recognition of the principle of popular sovereignty. In the end, the nationalism issue is intensified by the creation of the nation's state, nation-statehood, the principle of popular sovereignty and power embodied in it, that is, by this nation-state whose essence and vehement endeavor of uniformity was phrased so pertinently by Constant, the first and probably best critic of all times of the Jaco-

bin Republic: "The same code of law, the same measures, the same regulations, and if they could contrive it gradually, the same language, this is what is proclaimed to be the perfect form of social organization".³³

However, he makes another, equally considerable remark on the same page. Perhaps Constant was the only one of the contemporaries of the Revolution who noted that the final goal of the national homogenization program conducted in the name of popular sovereignty was actually an abstract one: the nation was a form of human community which could never acquire reality and concreteness, not even in theory. "It is somewhat remarkable that uniformity should never have encountered greater favor than in a revolution made in the name of the rights and the liberty of men. The spirit of the system was first entranced by symmetry. The love of power soon discovered what immense advantages symmetry could procure for it. While patriotism exists only by a vivid attachment to the interests, the ways of life, the customs of some locality, our so-called patriots have declared war on all of these. They have dried up this natural source of patriotism and have sought to replace it by a factitious passion for an abstract being, a general idea stripped of all that can engage the imagination and speak to the memory. To build their edifice, they began by grinding and reducing to dust the materials that they were to employ. Such was their apparent fear that a moral idea might be attached to their institutions, they came close to using numbers to designate their towns and provinces, as they used to designate the legions and corps in their army. Despotism, which has replaced demagoguery and has made itself heir to the fruits of all its labors, has continued adroitly in the path thus traced. The two extremes found themselves in agreement on this point, because at the bottom of both there was the will to tyranny. The interests and memories that arise from local customs contain a germ of resistance that authority is reluctant to tolerate and that it is anxious to eradicate. It can deal more successfully with individuals; it rolls its heavy body effortlessly over them as if they were sand."³⁴

³³ Benjamin Constant: *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2003, p. 73.

³⁴ *Idem*, pp. 73-74.

Constant articulated a diagnosis for the very process of how patriotism turned into unconditional loyalty towards the idea of the nation, that is, into nationalism. Patriotism is related to local interests and customs, while nationalism – as strange as it may sound – seeks homogeneity, that is, it is universalistic. Burke too noted that the revolutionaries pursued a sort of a “geometrical policy”: against the revolutionary élan, all “local ideas” had to be “sunk”. “People should no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons or Normans, but Frenchmen, with one country, one heart, and one assembly”.³⁵ But, as he thought, alike Constant, that “we begin our public affections in our families”, he prophesized that the geometrical policy would lead directly to the French losing their country. Instead of the inhabitants of rearranged territories being “all Frenchmen”, he says, “the greater likelihood is that the inhabitants of that region will shortly have no country”. Indeed, no man ever was attached by a sense of pride or affection to a “square measurement”. “He never will glory in belonging to the Checquer No. 71 or to any other badge-ticket.”³⁶

Indeed, our current experience shows that the fact that the nation in itself is an “abstract notion”³⁷, an imagined community, does not mean that emotions towards the nation could not be quite real. However, the Revolutionaries struggled with the dilemma of how to secure civil loyalty towards a newly created idea. The issue also pre-occupied Rousseau, and following Hobbes’s proposal, he reached the conclusion that the national essence had to be spiritualized, in the form of state religion proposed by Hobbes. Yet, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau had in mind a purely civic religion – one which is expressly hostile towards any form of Christianity, as he quite obviously expressed it in the final chapter of his work *The Social Contract*. However, Rousseau must have been considering the idea of a popular or a republican religion for a while, as demonstrated by the proposals for a sort of a festival or religious “liturgy” he made in his famous letter to D’Alembert, whereby he broke with the Encyclopedists. More exactly, he said the liturgy was futile. “With liberty, wherever abundance reigns, well-being also reigns. Plant a stake crowned with

³⁵ Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 289.

³⁶ Idem, p. 290.

³⁷ Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, p. 77.

flowers in the middle of a square; gather the people together there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united.”³⁸ These proposals were put in practice in an almost unchanged form by his most faithful Jacobin disciple, Robespierre, during the Revolution, in the form of the grand Parisian festival of the Supreme Being of 8 June 1794.³⁹ Robespierre reiterated even Rousseau’s reasoning, almost word by word: “gather the people, and you will make them better”.⁴⁰ While the enforcement of the mandatory veneration of the Supreme Being (7 May 1794) and the organization of its first grand festival (8 June 1794) took place in the context of specific historic events, it is equally true that the notion of the Supreme Being accompanied the entire history of the Revolution, considering that the National Assembly adopted the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen “in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being”, on 26 August 1789. The connection between the Supreme Being and the goals of the Revolution was phrased most clearly by Robespierre himself, in his speech of 21 November 1793 in the Jacobin Club, with the not-so-covert goal of stigmatizing the followers of the atheist and Hébertistic movements.⁴¹ In his speech, Robespierre confessed publicly that he was not a good Catholic in college either, but he was never indifferent to the fate of humanity. The idea of the Supreme Being is a humane notion, therefore the Convention could not tolerate the endeavors of the Prussian baron Anacharsis Cloots, the proclaimer of the idea of the universal republic, and the Hébertists following his doctrines to

³⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *Letter to D’Alembert and Writings for the Theater*, University Press of New England, 2004, p. 344.

³⁹ Rousseau’s state religion itself was revived later, in a somewhat more coherent form, by a cult called theophilanthropy, established by a Freemason bookseller in 1796.

⁴⁰ Maximilien Robespierre: A vallási és erkölcsi eszményekről, kapcsolatukról a köztársasági elvekkel, és a nemzeti ünnepekről (*On Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles, and on National Festivals*). In *Elveim kifejtése (My Principles)*, p. 463.

⁴¹ The unreligious frenzy that overwhelmed Paris in the fall of 1793 was reported in detail by a contemporary eye-witness, Louis Sébastien Mercier, in his book *Le nouveau Paris* (1798). In English, see: Mercier: Paris: including a description of the principal edifices and curiosities of that metropolis: with a sketch of the customs and manners of the Parisians under the old regime (Google eBook).

forge a sort of a religion out of atheism, under the pretext of eradicating false beliefs. “The National Convention rejects such with despise. The Convention does not produce books, does not create metaphysical systems; it is a popular political body with the role of safeguarding respect not only for the laws, but also for the French people’s character. It was not in vain that it proclaimed the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the presence of the Supreme Being.”⁴²

Indeed, it is likely that in his outburst against atheist fervency, Robespierre also feared the horrible image of Vendée: he dreaded, with good reason, that the devout provincial population would again rise against the revolutionary government. He also wanted to remove his rival Anacharsis Cloots and the Hébertists. At the same time, we should also note sincere conviction in his speech. Robespierre believed and voiced several times that the Supreme Being was somehow an expression of the French people’s character. This conviction mingled many ideas. Indeed, he thought the same to be true for the Republic. For Robespierre, the Republic embodied the character of the people, that is, the essentially virtuous character of the people, and for that reason he barely cared for the institutional structure of the Republic: the Republic had the sole role of asserting the people’s character. In this regard, the idea of the Supreme Being was a natural accessory to the concept of the Republic, a warranty of civil virtue and of the virtuous civil community, and, as a matter of fact, the cultic manifestation of the people’s original goodness. Robespierre emphasized on several occasions: atheism was aristocratic, while the idea of the Supreme Being was entirely popular.

Robespierre’s speech did not come off without consequences. The founder of the rational religion, Hébert and his atheist followers were executed on 24 March 1794 (Anacharsis Cloots himself was handed over to the executor). A month and a half later, on 7 May, the Convention recognized the existence of the Supreme Being, and a month afterward, Paris held the first festival in its honor. According to the Convention’s resolution, “the French people recognize the

⁴² Maximilien Robespierre: A filozofizmus ellen és a vallásgyakorlás szabadságáért (*Against Philosophism and for the Freedom of Religious Practice*). In *Elveim kifejtése (My Principles)*, p. 250.

existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul",⁴³ and "recognize that it is man's duty to properly venerate the Supreme Being". It also rendered that "festivals must be created in order for man to remember the idea of the divinity and the dignity of his being".⁴⁴ The first festival of the Supreme Being, held on the date established by the decree, on 8 June 1794, was quite grandiose and disorderly. However, it was indeed bewildering that large masses attended, without any particular constraints, and people apparently enjoyed it, which puzzled many historians. As Furet reports, "The event produced something more enigmatic than its instigator had intended: the crowds who attended, dressed in their Sunday best, taking an active part and in very large numbers. Accounts agree on this point, which is hard to comprehend, since the Terror was going full swing and the dread machine had been still for only a day. Was the public at the fête simply because of the lovely June day, or was it too, in imagination, laying the first stone in the building of the future? After all, the spectacle presented was that of the religion of the century, and those who had read a little knew its repertoire in advance. If they could add a thought to exorcize the present, the idea of an end and a fresh beginning, the *journée* had truly found its public. Charles Nodier, who gave an admirable account of the festival, wrote that: »To appreciate it, one must take the trouble to go back to that time. Nothing was left. Here, therefore, was the cornerstone of a nascent society.«"⁴⁵

Conclusions

If the above hypothesis on the emergence of nationalism is correct, we can draw some very important conclusions on national identity. First of all, it is a fact that the nation is an ideal. That

⁴³ The large boards proclaiming the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul were hanging around the Parisian squares for some time even after Robespierre's execution.

⁴⁴ Resolution on the reverence for the Supreme Being. In *A nagy francia forradalom dokumentumai [Documents of the Great French Revolution]*, 382 [translated from *Hungarian*].

⁴⁵ François Furet: *The French Revolution, 1770–1814*, p. 148.

means, it is an “abstract concept” (as Benjamin Constant said once), and not a real thing. Unlike family, relatives or tribes, the nation is not a tangible form of community, and national identity – compared to other forms of identity – is a very abstract form of collective community identity to begin with. Therefore, its further extrapolation faces no theoretical hindrances. National identity was “created” – first in France, then elsewhere too, using the French example – by “separating” the individuals from their earlier particular forms of identity – manors, parishes, guilds, provinces –, then the individuals thus “freed” were reunited under the nation as the most comprehensive form of political community.

But this process in 1789 – as we have seen – did not only entice with the hope of liberation, but also contained gradual *individualization*, the liquidation of former social binds: therefore, until this day, nation has been a community of *individuals*, and nationalism and individualism are interdependent. This claim, albeit astounding, is not paradoxical, nor is it unsustainable.

Such a claim appears to be paradoxical today, because after the age of revolutionary nationalism, we have also known the strongly collectivist forms of nationalism that contrasts the aspirations of liberty and is hostile towards the individual, and it seems to us today that this collectivism is hostile towards individualism. Nevertheless, as Hannah Arendt demonstrated, as soon as – starting the French Revolution – the individual appeared on stage as a completely independent being with inherent rights and dignity, who does not require any larger order encompassing it, it instantly disappeared and was transformed into one of the people. And, because after the French Revolution, humanity has been pictured as a family of people, indeed it is valid statement until today that the true form of man is not the individual, but the nation.⁴⁶

Thus, the individualism of nationalism and its powerful collectivism were born in the same time; not only that the two are not mutually exclusive, but they actually mutually assume each other. Of all these aspects, here and now the only one that bears importance for

⁴⁶ Hannah Arendt: A törzsi nacionalizmus (*Tribal Nationalism*) (Hungarian translation by Magdolna Módos). In Hannah Arendt: A totalitarizmus gyökerei (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*), Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1992, pp. 275-291, p. 278.

us is that the nation is a community of individuals, and this calling into existence of the nation required gradual individualization, the “liberation” of the individual from the social bonds inherited.

However, as this form of identity is based not on direct blood relations and the ties of kindred, but has a predominant *conscious* nature, a nation-building process could only expect success if a clear conscience of this new, comprehensive identity is implanted in the minds of people: a nation only “exists” if members of a given group of humans *know* themselves to be part of the same nation. This also entails – and Ernest Renan saw this quite clearly in his notable-notorious essay on the nation – that a preliminary condition to the existence of a national identity is not a common language, as the nation is predominantly or primarily not a linguistic, but a “spiritual” community: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle”.⁴⁷ (Renan’s finding remains valid even if he simply *had to say this* in the debate on the French nation he held with German historians because of the separation of Alsace. He couldn’t say that the French nation was a linguistic community, considering that most Alsatians were speakers of German.)

Equally, belonging to the same ethnicity is not a precondition of a common national identity, nor is the historic remembrance of a common ethnical origin; but much rather – as Renan suggested – the forgetting of a distinct origin is. If the French had faithfully preserved the remembrance of their distinct – Gallic or Frankish – origin, the French nation could have never emerged. Thus, the conscience of national identity arises not from a carefully preserved memory of a common origin, but on the contrary: from collective historical oblivion and amnesia – and that’s the only way it could arise.

Yet, the success of “nation-building” does not only depend on whether a clear conscience of the new identity can be created in individuals, but also on the ability to awaken in them a *feeling* of belonging to a nation. That is, the creation of a nation-like community is conditioned not only by national identity and its conscience, but also a strong emotional loyalty towards the nation. The fact that the nation is an ideal or an abstract, does not mean that emotions

⁴⁷ Ernest Renan: What Is A Nation? http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html on 13 February 2011.

towards the nation and the individual's emotional identification with the nation is not (or could not be) very real. For this very reason, the French Revolutionaries, faithfully following Rousseau's proposals on the national religion, attempted to spiritualize the national idea, through the mandatory religion of the Supreme Being introduced through Robespierre's decree. That is, they tried – and today we know they succeeded – to transform the nation concept into the object of religious or quasi-sacred reverence. Albeit the object of spiritual adoration in Robespierre's state religion was the concept of the Supreme Being, this concept of the Supreme Being – as he himself emphasized in several speeches – was actually expressing the character of the "French people".⁴⁸ – Obviously, that doesn't mean that this is the only way to arouse emotional loyalty towards the concept of nation; but indeed it draws attention to the necessity of emotional loyalty towards the nation and towards the significance of symbols (anthems, flags), rites, etc. in shaping the nation-type identity. National identity is unconceivable without the common symbols which awaken this emotional loyalty, and fill the hearts with pride and sentiment.

Accordingly, we can draw the conclusion from the above that the nation is merely an "imagined community", a powerfully conscious form of community identity, which does not assume either the historic remembrance of a common origin, or a common language. What it does require is the clear conscience and definite feeling of togetherness. Yet, this certainly does not mean that today we could simply step out from the frameworks of national existence. No matter how theoretical nation is and regardless of the fact that it is a historical product of an ideological construction, the idea – once embodied and taken an institutional form and dominating human thoughts – is very hard to cast off. And this is even more true as, albeit it is true that the nation is an abstract, an "imagined community", still there are a series of *political effect mechanisms* which

⁴⁸ Maximilien Robespierre: A vallási és erkölcsi eszményekről, kapcsolatukról a köztársasági elvekkel, és a nemzeti ünnepekről (*On Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles, and on National Festivals*) (Hungarian translation by Géza Nagy). In Maximilien Robespierre: Elveim kifejtése (*My Principles*), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1988, pp. 443-470.

do not only assume, but also consolidate the conscience of national belonging and national cohesion. Thus, it is worth evoking that nationalism and “democratism” are so-called “blood-brothers”, that is, the national ideal’s gaining ground in France was accompanied by the introduction of the republican governance; and that the linguistic assimilation was urged also for basically republican considerations in France. That is, if the French Revolutionaries considered – and some indeed did – that the dialects spoken on France’s territory at that time (Breton and Basque, but also Italian or German) simply had to be annihilated, then it was not because they were just irritated by linguistic diversity, as are our days’ nationalists, but because they considered that the ideal of liberty (the republican idea) claimed this sacrifice from linguistic minorities.

Of course, not even today do all these mean that republican governance is unconceivable without national community, but rather that the French Revolution introduced a form of democratic systems in Europe which equally assumes and reproduces the nation-type political community. It assumes it because, according to Rousseau’s logic, it conventionally legitimates itself as a nation-state, based on the principle of “national sovereignty”, and is compelled to constantly reproduce because, being a strongly centralized and bureaucratized state structure, it is functional only as long as its citizens as a community speak the same official language which ensures the standard and undisturbed functioning of administration, justice and public education. This is why John Stuart Mill, probably the most known representative of national liberalism, wrote in 1861, in the famous lines of his work on *Representative Government*: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. [...] For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.”⁴⁹

⁴⁹ John Stuart Mill: *Considerations on Representative Government*. In A. D. Lindsay (ed.): *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*, J. M. Dent, London, 1954, p. 361, p. 362

While Renan could have been right in claiming that the nation was primarily a linguistic community and not a spiritual one, the daily functioning of a centralized nation-state and representative governance requires that citizens of the nation-state are shaped into a linguistic community. The nation could exist without a common language, but the nation-state could not. The linguistic homogenization policy of the nation-state obeys this very logic when forcing the official language on those who do not speak it.

REGIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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A presentation of regionalism in the European Union must contain its two major aspects: the specific European regional constructions and the European regional policy. Because of the term's ambiguity, the Union itself can be considered a (supra-national) region, yet we shall use the term only according to some meanings referring to the inferior levels of regional organization, the inter- and sub-State ones.

History

The Rome Treaty, according to which they have founded the European Economic Community (EU, 1957), has not included explicit references to regions or any regional policy, yet. The topic regarding the disfavoured regions becomes evident only during the expansion. Before long, the members of the Community draw the conclusion that the problems generated by these, as well as by the peripheral regions, can be solved only at the community level. They adopted a first official statement referring to the European Regional Policy in 1965 (EU, 1965), followed in 1968 by the foundation of the *General Directorate for Regional Policies*. The reunion of the State and government superiors in Paris, in 1972, adopts a conclusion through which they emphasize the regional policy as an "essential factor in the consolidation of the Community." However, the so-called *Thomson Report*, published by the European Commission in 1973, concludes that "although the objectives of a continuous expansion, settled by means of the Treaty, were fulfilled, its balanced and harmonious nature could not be assured."

In 1975 they founded the *European Fund for Regional Development* (EFRD), aiming to counteract the regional imbalances, which had occurred because of the predominance of agriculture, the transformations in the industrial structure and the structural unemployment. During the first years, it had financed only projects at the

national level, without being significant at the sub-national or community level. At the beginning, it functioned like the other two funds with territorial impact: the *European Social Fund* (ESF) and the *European Fund for Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee* (AGGF). At the beginning of the 80s, they emphasize the topic regarding the efficacy of the funds' usage more and more, and in 1988 they produce the reform of *Structural Funds*, highlighting several main objectives:

- An increased efficiency in the coordination of the funds available (EFRD, ESF, AGGF);
- A new orientation of the financial resources from independent projects towards global programs.

The affiliation of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the preparation of monetary cooperation, as well as the adoption of the unique market program, update the social issue and the cohesion policy (EU, 1988a). In 1986, the *Unique European Act* extends the Rome Treaty with a title referring to the *economic and social cohesion*, repressing the normative act legally fundamenting the regional policy, introducing it among the community policies (EU, 1986). They also aim to counteract the negative effects of the unique internal market's opening and strengthen the economic and social cohesion. In 1988, the Council takes a decision regarding the integration of the Structural Funds under the *umbrella of the cohesion policy*, by introducing some principles such as: the concentration on the poor population and disadvantaged regions, the multiannual programs, the strategic investments, the implication of the regional and local partners. In its turn, the Parliament adopts a resolution referring to the regional policy and the role of regions (EU, 1988b).

November 1, 1993, is the date when the *Maastricht Treaty* and the Revised Treaty of the European Community come into force [EU 1992]. Among the consequences of this analysis we enumerate: the creation of a new instrument, more exactly, the *Cohesion Fund*, the creation of the *Regions' Committee*, as well as the adoption of the *principle of subsidiarity*. The problem is approached very seriously, an aspect also proved by the fact that the sum allocated for the structural and cohesion funds between 1994 and 1999 represented a third of the Union's budget. After the affiliation of Austria, Finland and Sweden, in January 1, 1995, there is a new objective regarding

the favours granted to the regions with an extremely reduced population, in the north of the two Scandinavian countries (EU, 1996).

In 1999 they publish *Agenda 2000*, referring to the strengthening and consolidation of the Union, while also containing some news regarding the regional policy; the new key words are: the concentration of the support, the focus on the issue of financial resources, the decentralization of management (EU, 1999). In May 2004 we witness the most complex extension of the Union. The affiliation of the 10 new states from the Central and Eastern Europe brings a 20% increase of the population, yet only 5% of the gross domestic product and almost the whole territory was eligible for the highest financing level from the Structural and cohesion funds. The *Lisbon strategy*, in March 2000, concentrated on an increased labour, economic reform and social cohesion – all these based on innovation and knowledge (EU, 2000). It aimed to reach very high objectives, yet these could not be achieved, thus there were more subsequent documents to relate the objectives to the everyday life, to accelerate and make the activities more efficient. The policy regarding the cohesion of the actual period (2007–2013) is defined by the largest concentration of resources granted to the poorest regions and a shifting of priorities towards the acceleration of the economic and labour increase, the promotion of innovation.

Regions, as administrative structures

In the union statistics (Eurostat), the *region* has a very important role. It is defined as a surface of land with more or less emphasized borders, often functioning as an administrative unit situated immediately under the State level. The elements defining a region are:

- *the landscape;*
- *the climate;*
- *the language;*
- *the ethnic origin;*
- *the common history.*

Although they can represent the essential particularities of a region, these characteristics do not permit their clear delimitation. For the regions to be used in statistics or administratively, they need exact “borders.” They are usually defined on the basis of the following criteria:

- *natural borders*: physical barriers (relief) separating two groups of the population, preventing them from the formation of a more extended unit;

- *historical borders*: reflect the existence of the small State structures forerunning the formation of the nation-states and persist according to the way in which the latter had preserved them during the administrative reforms;

- *administrative borders*: represent intermediary hierarchical links in the exercise of governmental functions, between the central and local administration which, although often reflecting political, demographic even religious connections, might represent only the result of some arbitrary delimitations.

The spatial differences claim for adequate administrative structures. Thus, an administrative authority must have the opportunity to bring and implement administrative, budgetary and political elements in the legal and institutional context of the country. A region delimits populations / localities with sufficient common characteristics in order to form an administratively independent logical unit. Given that end in view, the region must have:

- well-defined borders which should:
 - be accepted by the administered population,
 - assure the homogeneousness of the region,
 - have a proper size,
- stable borders which should:
 - permit the data collection during an extended period of time (temporal series),
 - permit the identification of population with them.

Given this goal, at the beginning of the 70s, Eurostat made up the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units – NUTS, a coherent system used in the division of the Union's territory, created to obtain the regional statistics. The system had represented the subject of negotiation along three decades, and was considered legal only through the adoption of regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 (EU, 2003). There were two other amendments to reflect both the transformations produced by the expansion of the Union in 2004 (EU, 2007), and the co-optation of Bulgaria and Romania (EU, 2008).

Concentrating on the institutional divisions existing in the member states, the nomenclature operates with two types of regional divisions:

- *normative regions*: as they often have historical roots, they reflect a political will power, with borders settled according to the agreement of local authorities and, as they are considered to have the population corresponding to the optimal usage of resources, they have a universally acknowledged statutory existence; they are regarded as the most suitable units for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data by the statistical systems, yet they are more difficult to be compared because of the great variety they represent;

- *analytical (functional) regions*: are defined according to particular analytical demands, on the basis of some geographic and/or economic criteria; the application of some harmonized rules to define them assures an adequate basis for international comparisons.

NUTS represents a hierarchical system of classification. Each member state is divided in regions level 1, which are sub-divided in regions level 2, which in their turn are further divided in regions level 3, and so on and so forth. The 5 levels are presented in the following way:

- NUTS1: macro-regions, counting about 3-7 million inhabitants, usually including the whole state or federal states;

- NUTS2: meso-regions, developing regions, counting about 800 thousands – 3 million inhabitants, they represent the main units of the regional policy;

- NUTS3: the sub-regional level (counties, for example), counting about 150 – 800 thousands inhabitants;

- NUTS4: the micro-regional level, for example, the affluent areas of the labour power;

- NUTS5: the local level.

Not all the levels are implemented in each member state; thus, in Romania, NUTS2 includes only regions of development provided with a statistical role, and NUTS4 isn't even implemented at the level aimed to collect the statistical data. There are also micro-regions in our country, yet they formed as contexts to facilitate the cooperation among local authorities, in order to carry out common projects.

The regional policy

The *regional policy* notion designates a set of intervention measures, which are usually state-controlled, meant to straighten out the economic and social lack of balance among regions, by influencing the economic activity. This can be done by activating the region's resources, which had not been used, and attracting the external investments or other methods to increase the production and income. The most powerful argument to support the regional policy is that the equitable distribution of benefits, deriving from the integration, must be assured with active means. It appears that the free market mechanisms aim to concentrate the forces of development in the central regions of the Union. The integration aims to emphasize the polarization in the case of some member states or regions defined by well-marked differences between the economic structure and level of development. It seems that the integration brings comparable benefits to all members in the case of some states or economic regions with similar levels of development (Kengyel, 2008).

The goal of the community regional policy isn't mainly the redistribution of the income, but the stimulation of economic development. One of the most important means to reach this goal is represented by the financing mechanism in the context of regional policy. These financings are oriented towards concrete regions, yet the positive effects are propagated through different *best practice* mechanisms. The regional policy is also based on a strong political principle, *solidarity*, as a way to develop the integration.

Strongly connected to the regional policy is also the *structural policy*, meant to eradicate or, if that is possible, to diminish the economic and social structural deficiency of a region or country. One of the main principles of the EU, related to the problematic of the regional policy, influencing it directly, is the one concerning the *economic and social cohesion*. The cohesion assumes the coordination of economic policies in the case of the member states in order to develop the underdeveloped regions. Another notion, closely connected to the regional policy, is the *territorial development*, designating the state-controlled interventions achieved to influence the spontaneous processes of territorial development. Thus, it is about the sum of

goals, means and institutions aimed to transform the territorial structures (Vincze, 2008).

The regional policy of the EU is a *pro-active policy*, more exactly, a policy which, in order to reach its goals, interferes in the development of territorial units in a conscious way, by using some means selected in an appropriate way. The purposes of regional policy, as well as the balanced development, the reduction of regional differences or the increase of solidarity, are hardly quantified and represent long-term goals. On a short-term, among the operative goals, we notice the decrease of unemployment, the development of infrastructure, a better quality of human resources, etc. The current means used to reach the objective of the regional policy are the development of infrastructure, the instructive programs, the stimulation of capital import, the investments in innovation and development, etc. (Vincze, 2008).

The financial sources of the EU can be approached only if some main principles are obeyed. Partnerships and additionality are regarded as main principles, joined by other 4-5 principles (the sources are not entirely harmonized with these). As a rule, they are the following ones (Infoforegia, Vincze, 2008):

- *partnership*: the preparation of the community actions, the resolution and the implementation of programs must be achieved through the collaboration among the Commission, member states and the regional/local authorities, as well as horizontally, regarding the economic and social agents; the responsibility for the way the resources are spent is also shared among them;

- *additionality (co-financing)*: besides the union funds, the programs' financing must also include both national and local, public or private funds;

- *subsidiarity*: in order to make the process more efficient, the decisions must be taken at the lowest level, where the largest amount of information is available;

- *concentration*: the resources derived from different funds must be concentrated on the areas which need the most support for their development, without permitting their waste; the concentration has three aspects referring to the three key elements:

- *the concentration of resources* in the poorest regions;

- *the concentration of the investment effort* in specific domains such as the economy of knowledge for the present period: innovation, transfer of technology, informational and communicational technologies, the development of human resources and business;

- *the concentration of expenses*: the funds are allocated at the beginning of each programming period and they must be spent until the end of the second year after the allocation;

- *orientation according to the program*: the programs regarding the regional development are elaborated on a middle term and only the corresponding projects are financed;

- *transparency and monitoring*: the programming process must be transparent, and the usage of funds must be controllable.

In the actual period (2007–2013), the social funds, the Regional and Cohesive Development provided the financing in the context of three objectives, from which at least one is applies for each of the Union's regions [Inforegio b]:

- *convergence*: for the regions belonging to the NUTS2 level, in which the PIB/capital balance is under 75% from the regional average;

- *regional competitiveness and employment*: for the regions, which do not respect the incidence of the convergence criterion;

- *European territorial cooperation*: for the trans-border and trans-national cooperation among regions.

In order to obtain the financial resources, the member states develop their own National Strategic Reference Framework, which must fulfill several conditions:

- To be settled according to the guidelines formulated by the EU;

- To be sustained through a SWOT analysis, while the priorities and quantified indicators should be nominated;

- The operational programs should contain the financing projects.

The financings related to the regional policy, according to the principles of the Lisbon Strategy, are oriented towards the substantiation of a sustainable development and the consolidation of a society based on knowledge. The basis of these strategic objectives is represented by the human infrastructure and resources, and the triad among research-development-innovation. Three priorities are settled in the context of guidelines:

- An increased power of attraction in the case of the country, region or urban centre by improving the access and service qualities, the environment protection;
- The stimulation of the innovation and entrepreneurial spirit, the development of the society based on knowledge by stimulating the innovative capacities, the promotion of informational and communicational techniques;
- The creation of more qualitative jobs by developing the adaptive capacity of the labour market, an increased investment in human resources.

Funds and institutions

In order to assure the financial means needed to implement different policies, more financial funds had been created. That was also the case of the regional and cohesive policies. However, there are also funds created for other reasons, yet they are also connected to these policies. The funds, which are related to the regional and cohesive policy, in a way or another, are as follows:

- *The European Regional Development Fund – ERDF*: it was created in 1975 to financially support the enterprise, especially the little and middle ones, to create some sustainable jobs [ERDF];
- *The European Social Fund – ESF*: it was created in 1960, providing people, institutions and systems with the necessary financing, to reduce unemployment and facilitate the access of the young people on the labour market, an increased chance on the labour market, thus improving the regional competitiveness [ESF];
- *The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund – EAGGF*, created in 1972; it interferes in the regional policy only through the orientation section, through the support provided to modernize agriculture, an objective especially realized by restructuring and making the production structures and agricultural process and sale efficient [EAGGF];
- *Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance – FIFG*, created in 1993, to support the reorganization of fish trade [FIFG];
- *The Cohesion Fund – CF*, created in 1994, to accelerate the

recovery of discrepancies in the case of the countries with a more limited income, by developing the trans-European networks, through the environment protection [CF];

– *The European Union Solidarity Fund – EUSF*, created in 2002, to provide a fast support in natural catastrophes [EUSF].

The first four represent the so-called *Structural Funds*. During the present financing period (2007-2013), the agricultural and piscicultural instruments are no longer part of this group as they return to their original policies. The last fund is not a simple method of the regional policy or the one regarding the topic of cohesion, it is rather an expression of the European solidarity with the zones experiencing calamity.

The connections among the objectives, funds and instruments are presented in the following table [Inforegio b]:

Objectives	Structural funds and instruments		
<i>convergence</i>	ERDF	ESF	CF
<i>regional competitiveness and employment</i>	ERDF	ESF	
<i>European territorial cooperation</i>	ERDF		

There are two more financial institutions which contribute to the accomplishment of the goals regarding the regional policy in an active way:

The European Investment Bank – EIB, founded in 1958 by the member states, whose property they are. EIB provides long-term credits, with a limited interest. Its main objective is the financing of capital investments in order to reach a balanced development of the Union and the financial support of the common unional projects, yet they also finance projects in the domain of cohesion and convergence, the protection of environment and society based on knowledge (EIB).

The European Investment Fund – EIF, created in 1994 by the European Investment Bank (60%), the European Commission (30%) and 20 European banks and financial institutions. Together with the EIB it forms the so-called *EIB Group*, whose purpose consists in the increased competitiveness of the European economy, by supporting the small and medium enterprise (EIF).

For the actual period, they created four additional instruments of the regional policy in order to increase the efficiency of the funds' usage, more exactly [Inforegio c]:

- *JASPERS* (Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in European Regions), to support the regional investment projects;
- *JEREMIE* (Joint European Resources from Micro to Medium Enterprises), to support the small and medium enterprise;
- *JESSICA* (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas), to support the sustainable investments in urban zones;
- *JASMINE* (Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe), to assure the microcredits, the venture capital and guarantees to facilitate the access to the resources of the small and medium enterprise.

The states in the Pre-accession period (Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey), and the one belonging to the stabilizing group of the West Balkans, potential candidates to the process of adhesion (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), can benefit from the funds provided by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance – IPA [IPA]. This instrument replaces the previous programs and funds (PHARE, PHARE CBC, ISPA, etc.). These funds can be granted to finance five domains:

- the institutional reorganization and stabilization;
- the trans-border cooperation with the member states of the EU and other states from the IPA zone;
- the regional development (economic increase, environment protection, transport);
- the development of human resources;
- rural development.

Trans-border cooperation

The so-called “national states” of Europe refer particularly to the Peace from Westphalia and its principles: the intangible territoriality and the unlimited sovereignty. However they ignore an essential aspect of the problem, the fact that the only European state, which is still within the real borders, is Portugal. The history of Europe is an uninterrupted series of disputes occurred, if we ignore the economic reasons, especially because of two factors. The former is related to

the topic of territoriality, the impossibility reflected by the super-position of the territory conquered by the political nation (contiguous, with clearly defined borders), and the one inhabited by the cultural nation (diffuse, fragmented, borderless). The only counter-example is Portugal again, yet let us not forget that it had lost a world empire in the meantime. Even if they dealt with a new distribution of Europe among its nations, because of spontaneous movements, the new structure would vanish instantaneously. In order to stop this, they should resort to isolated national structures based on autarchy, more exactly to dictatorships, inaugurating a new dark middle ages. Because of the ambiguity of the concept of "nation" all the analysis would stop in the phase of term definition. The second factor is related to the topic of national sovereignty. Given this principle, the "state," more exactly a group of individuals representing and conducting it, afforded hardly imaginable things related to certain groups of people (robbery, violence, crime).

Among others, the European Union represents a grand experiment to approach these aspects of the exacerbated nationalism. The reply to the topic of sovereignty is given by the reconsideration of some state competencies by the supra-state level (integration) and the sub-state levels (regionalization and localization). For the time being, the most efficient solution provided in the first matter, the national one, is the trans-border cooperation, which also represents one of the most important instruments regarding the European regionalization. The process of regionalization makes the minorities cope with new possibilities and challenges. The region represents autonomy whether related to the centralized State authority and an essential step towards the power division. It means decisional competence in some domains such as finances or strategy, and it also expresses possibilities to discountenance the practice referring to minority groups, as well as to groups of tolerated citizens belonging to inferior levels.

Since the foundation of the Union, they've founded more institutions and developed more programs of cross-border cooperation; their oldest form was represented by the *Euroregions*. The first unit of this type, the Euregio, was founded in 1958, at the German-Dutch border. These are trans-border regions, created due to the collective desire of the local, regional and national administration in two or more

neighbour countries, they function thanks to some status adopted by means of agreement and are coordinated by organisms authorized in this sense. Besides the fact that they activate human and material resources, which otherwise wouldn't have been reevaluated so efficiently, the Euroregions are also important from the perspective of the European becoming, as the following affirmations suggest [Neguț 2003]:

- the Euroregions contribute to the reduction of straining and the preservation of stability in the zone;
- they contribute to overcome the negative historical heritage;
- they aim to overcome the economic difficulty and uncertainty, contributing to the attenuation of the regional economic imbalance;
- evidently the European integration undergoes the regional cooperation and, as a result, the cross-border regions contribute to the training of those countries, which are eager to connect their destiny to the future of Europe and European Union.

For a long time, the formation of Euroregions had been aggravated by several structural factors, yet they were the ones participating in their own deconstruction given:

- the different legislative and administrative structures of the neighbour states;
- the hardships on account of the competence differences in the case of border areas;
- the absence of partnership principles;
- the institutional diversity.

The first instrument introduced to support the border regions of the states applying for the accession, to overcome the specific development problems, and their closer integration with the European Union and the other Central and East European countries, was the Program of Community Aid to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe –Cross-Border Co-operation – Phare CBC). The strategic objective was to accelerate the economic convergence of the candidate states in a balanced manner and to prepare them for the participation in the next program, INTERREG [Phare]. In 1990, INTERREG I, originated in the context responsible for the formation of the unique market, being particularly oriented towards the economic development and the reorganization of the border zones. Developed between 1994 and 1999, INTERREG II, had the following objectives [Interreg a]:

- the support of the Community's internal and external border zones to overcome the specific development problems, given their relative isolation in the context of national economies and Community, for the benefit of the local population, taking the environment protection into account;

- the stimulation of cooperation networks on the two sides of the internal borders, and the development of connections between these and the larger community networks, related to the internal market opening in 1992;

- the facilitation of the process of adaptation, in the case of the zones settled at the external border, for their new role, as internal borders in a unique integrated market;

- to answer the new opportunities in the cooperation with the tertiary states in the external zone of the Community's border.

The program had three directions of action [Interreg b]:

- INTERREG II A (1994–1999): trans-border cooperation;

- INTERREG II B (1994–1999): the finalization of energetic networks;

- INTERREG II C (1997–1999): the cooperation in the domain of regional planning, particularly in the management of water resources.

The next program, INTERREG III, also had three directions of action [Interreg c]:

- INTERREG III A: trans-border cooperation between adjacent regions to develop social and economic centres by elaborating common strategies;

- INTERREG III B: trans-national cooperation involving the national, regional and local authorities, for a better integration in the Union by forming a great number of European regions;

- INTERREG III C: inter-regional cooperation to increase the efficiency of regional instruments and policies in the process of development through an exchange of information and experience at a large scale.

In order to overcome the obstacles aggravating the trans-border cooperation and facilitate the cooperation at the union level, they founded the *European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation* – EGTC, as part of the regional policy reform for 2007-2013. These were meant

to promote the trans-border, trans-national and interregional cooperation among members which, in their turn, can be member states, regional and/or local authorities, as well as other actors belonging to the public area (EGCC). It seems that, being more autonomous and flexible, these will take the place of Euroregions over.

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ORADEA AT THE CROSSROADS OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY – BASED ON A BIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

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1. Biography and identity

The history of our life is actually the expression of our identity. It tells us what we think of ourselves, as well as the way in which we would like to see ourselves and be seen by others. This last goal can be reached if we recount the incidents of our lives in a common language. Consequently, the biographical narrative is a presentation and interpretation of our own person.

We might wonder – how can we acknowledge an epoch or social group, as well as the norms and values regarding the co-existence of a localism by means of biographies? Why is biography useful in the cognition of a society? How do the narratives regarding individual persons become the representations of the society's epochs and places? We shall have to find answers to these questions and many other like these when, through the agency of the microanalysis of a local society, we shall try to find out more details regarding the local and national identities of the natives.

Biography represents an evocation of the past from the perspective of the present. Our past can be understood and recounted only through the means provided by the society. Our memory is also guided by society and culture. It is about the fact that we can all access the past (as well as our future) only by means of our culture's categories and patterns – or, as Durkheim would say, according to the „collective representations.”¹ In other words, the values of our community help us in considering the trustworthy events and finding an appropriate form to narrate them. Thus, without the support of

¹ Peter Burke, 2001: 6.

the surrounding groups, we wouldn't be able to select from the multitude of events, we would not be able to decide, which are those events the others around us are interested in, as well as the "objectively" important elements in their contexts. In spite of the details mentioned above, when we refer to the biography of a life, or listen to the biography of the others' lives, we might think that these incidents and details are unique and cannot be repeated. In fact, we would not be able to listen to more dozens of "identical" events since we might anticipate their denouement.

We also have to pay attention to the fact that when we search for the meaning of events, when we try to understand the individual's life, entourage or way of thinking, we also approach the means of culture in order to generalize by means of interpretations. As a result, the means facilitating the comprehension are the products of society acquired by the individual during the process of socialization.² We would not be able to narrate facts, not even to interpret without the linguistic forms or semantic systems provided by culture. The personal biography, rightly considered "only ours," is known by us the most, we have experienced it, and its interpretation would not be possible without the patterns and scenarios provided by culture.³

The collective memory helps the individual to remember his living and construct his biography. Accordingly, biography represents the context of personal and social identities through the evocation of memories. Without the semantic categories used by the society, in which we live, the name of the positions, occupations or sorrows of those around us, even of our personal desires, would be impossible.⁴

That is why we have the possibility to become familiar with an epoch, local society, the narrator's position and connections in this context, when starting from a number of biographies.

² Berger

³ Pataki

⁴ Turner

2. The place, memory, forgetfulness/ letting bygones be bygones

According to Halbwachs, one of the social means related to memory is represented by space.⁵ The space becomes a place when it is owned by inhabitants.⁶ This taking over of the space can be interpreted in more ways. It can mean only the fact that the childhood of an individual is connected to a certain place or event, which he considers important – for instance, a war, death or sacrifice – that occurred in a certain place. After the space is taken over, the place becomes an integral part of the individual's identity, which he will remember forever or at least for a longer period of time. The places become safe points in memories, and appear as common "figurants" in biographical stories. Starting with this moment, the multitude of "figurants," the former names of the streets, the description of the inter-human relations colour the place. And the name of a place includes a great deal of memories and semantic structures for the ones populating it.

These memories and semantic structures are fractionized and decomposed when the local society undergoes a violent change. The transformation can provide "results" only when, both the new political, economic and social actors, and the memories of the older times are transcribed. From this viewpoint, a good method might refer to the change of the names of squares and streets, the reconstruction of the places, which are important for the community, eventually the demolition of buildings or commemorative monuments. However, the question is whether the re-writing of the memory is possible by changing the names of streets, or their dislocation. We know that memories can represent a danger for the power, as they can become the means of a revolt.⁷ Therefore, the creation of new semantic structures starts simultaneously with the destruction of the old ones.

In his analysis regarding the functional part of forgetfulness, a historian, Keszei András, refers to Paul Connerton, who emphasizes seven reasons of the social forgetfulness.⁸ From the seven enumerated

⁵ Peter Burke, 2001, p. 8

⁶ Keszei András, 2010, p. 2.

⁷ Peter Burke, 2001, p. 12.

⁸ Keszei András, 2010, p. 22. Besides those mentioned above, the author also analyzes the faded memory at the disposal of the oppressive power, the structural amnesia, the

reasons we need only two, more precisely the “imposed forgetfulness” and the “faded memory to create a new identity.” According to the two styles, the objective is the creation of a new individual and mutual identity, in which forgetfulness cannot be total, since the original memories cannot vanish completely, it is only that their access becomes more difficult.

3. The reasons of forgetfulness and localization

According to anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, the local society represents the localism, the social connections and contexts, not only a spatial phenomenon.⁹ Moreover, when the author refers to the topic of localism, he understands the familiarity of the social connections and the various technologies, which facilitate the interactivity and relativity of the contexts. All these are created by the tendency to produce associations in the case of the acting power; they are reproduced in different ways. Thus the localism is created by the natives, and the character of localism depends on them. From this viewpoint, the localism represents a context created by the natives.

The transformation can be a natural part of the local phenomena, when the customs and the already existing patterns transform, and after a while they are forgotten. But what happens to this localism when – through the intervention of power – the process of forgetfulness is imposed?¹⁰ If the transformation is obtained by means of the state, on the one hand, the subjects of localism are obstructed in the usage of the acting power, through which they can prove their social responsibility. On the other hand, they can preserve the old memories secretly and their forgetfulness can be partial or temporary. By rewriting the initial conditions, this localism becomes a localized world, where the activity of local actors is no longer needed, the political power does not need their capacity to create the local conditions. In this case, the memories can be preserved and, if needed, they are going to be activated. Localization can be obtained by

overpressure caused by the multitude of information, the purposeful antiquation of the past.

⁹ Arjun Appadurai, 2001, p. 3

¹⁰ Arjun Appadurai, 2001.

means of forgetfulness/letting the bygones be bygones, all supported by the state.¹¹

The question is how these theoretically approached processes are presented/have been presented at Oradea? It is about the town which, in 1910, was the fourth most developed town in Hungary but, starting with April 1919, it became a part of the Large Romania, at its borders. Starting with this period of time, the town didn't develop any longer, the economical context demoted, and its institutions were moved. Later, starting with 1968, as a centre of the Bihor county, it becomes one of the most prestigious towns.¹² During this period of time, the number of inhabitants had increased continuously – in 1948 the town was composed of 82.000 inhabitants, and in 1990 their number increased to 230.000. Through the agency of the forced construction of block districts and forced industrialization, the structure and society of the town had totally changed.¹³ It is not a mistake that János Fleisz, a historian, named Oradea the “town of permanent changes”. From the perspective of the study's theme, we are especially interested in the transformations, which took place at the level of nationalities in the town, more exactly at the level regarding the percentage and number, changes which influenced the identity of the individual and community in a radical way, as well as the localization of Oradea town (according to Appadurai's interpretation).

**Table I. Oradea and the native population
by ethnicity – count and percentages**

Year	Total		Romanian		Hungarian		German		Jiddis		Other totals	
	P		P	%	P	%	P	%	P	%	N	%
1880 ^m	31324		2009	6.4	26675	85.2	1145	3.7	-	-	1492	4.8
1880 ^b	31324		2050	6.5	27220	86.9	1171	3.7		-	883	2.8
1890 ^m	38557		2527	6.6	34239	88.8	1014	2.6		-	777	2.0
1900 ^m	50177		3335	6.6	44750	89.2	1404	2.8		-	688 ^a	1.4
1910 ^m	64169		3604	5.6	58421	91.0	1416	2.2		-	728 ^b	1.1
1920 ^a	68081		8441	12.4	40744	59.8	598	0.9	17880	26.3	18298	26.9

¹¹ Idem.

¹² Fleisz János, 2008, p. 201., p. 203.

¹³ Idem.

1930 ^{im}	82687	20914	25.3	55039	66.6	1118	1.4	4112	5.0	5616	6.8
1930 ⁿ	82687	22412	27.1	42630	51.6	927	1.1	14764	17.9	16718	20.2
1941 ^{im}	92942	4873	5.2	85466	92.0	863	0.9	1259	1.4	2053	2.2
1941 ⁿ	92942	4835	5.2	85383	91.9	671	0.7	1546	1.7	2578	2.8
1948 ^{im}	82282	26998	32.8	52541	63.9	165	0.2	1837	2.2	2578	3.1
1956 ^{im}	98950^c	34501	34.9	62804	63.5	373	0.4	440	0.4	1272	1.3
1956 ⁿ	98950^c	35581	36.0	58424	59.0	343	0.3	3610	3.6	4602	4.7
1966 ^{im}	122534^d	55785	45.5	65141	53.2	499	0.4	101	0.1	1109	0.9
1966 ⁿ	122534^d	56436	46.1	62995	51.4	518	0.4	1463	1.2	2625	2.1
1977 ⁿ	170531	91925	53.9	75125	44.1	618	0.4	785	0.5	2863	1.7
1992 ^{im}	222741	145104	65.1	75187	33.8	652	0.3	25	0.0	1798	0.8
1992 ⁿ	222741	144244	64.8	74225	33.3	959	0.4	284	0.1	3313	1.5
2002 ^{im}	206614	146078	70.7	58205	28.2	339	0.2	20	0.0	1992	1.0
2002 ⁿ	206614	145284	70.3	56985	27.6	563	0.3	166	0.1	3782	1.8

Symbols after the dates: a = mother tongue, n = nationality.

(a) The 427 other unspecified speaking are mostly Polish and Czech and Moravian.

(b) The other speakers are: 159 Polish and Czech and 74 Moravian.

(c) Merged Biharpüspöki (Episcopia Bihorului) and Váradszőlős (Seleuş).

(d) Merged Hegyközség (Podgoria).

Source: based on data provided by Varga E. Árpád calculations of the authors.

In the table above we can notice a continuous increase of the number of inhabitants. This tendency was totally in agreement with the accelerated process of urbanization implemented at the level of the whole country. After the Second World War, the annual increase of the urban population, related to the total number of the country's inhabitants, is continuous. It is a tendency, which is expressed in percents in the following way: 2,9% in 1975, 3,3% in 1980, 3,7% in 1985 and 4,2 % in 1990.¹⁴ The number of the inhabitants in Oradea has also raised constantly according to this national tendency.

¹⁴ Gagyi József, 2009: 149.

The chart displays the drastic transformation occurred in the ethnic structure of the urban population very accurately.

Before the Second World War the population of the town was mostly and permanently Hungarian. This situation changed in 1956, the proportion of the Romanian inhabitants increased by thirty percents, and the Hungarian one decreased by the same percentage. Given the fact that between 1941 and 1956 the number of inhabitants increased with only 1000 persons, such a proportional discrepancy among the nationalities can be explained only by means of the population's mutations conducted by the state. It is an acknowledged fact that between 1941 and 1956 in Romania the Sovietization, the takeover by the communists as well as the process of industrialization took place. Besides all these, the population of Oradea hadn't absolutely changed (it increased from 98.621 persons to 99.663). Even though the greatest transformation that occurred in the town had been the shift regarding the composition of the population's nationalities. Behind this process there is an economic reason and an ideological one as well. The industrialization process taking place in the town demanded workers and so they populated it with Romanian inhabitants. Oradea was a border town, and the politics during that period of time did not aim to develop a town settled by the Hungarian border, where the population was mostly Hungarian. Therefore the increased number of Romanian inhabitants seemed a "logical" step. However we still wonder where the 30.000 Hungarian inhabitants of the town had disappeared.

Whether we advance in time, according to our data, after 1956 they continued the transformation of the local society by increasing the number of inhabitants. Between 1956 and 1966 the population increased with 30.000 persons, between 1966 and 1977, as well as between 1977 and 1992 with about 50-50 thousands persons, each time by proportionally increasing the number of Romanian inhabitants. We also have to mention the fact that during all these years the absolute number of the Hungarian inhabitants had increased too, although within modest limits, and they remained behind the newly come Romanian population.

The chart highlights that the proportion of the former traditional nationalities in Oradea, the Germans and Jews, had undergone less

transformations. Between 1910 and 1941 the number of German inhabitants decreased from 2.2% to 0.7 %. The number of Jews between 1941 and 1956 had slightly increased from 1.6 % to 3.6 %, however until 1977 it decreased significantly, up to 0.5 %.¹⁵

The drastic transformations, which occurred in the number of inhabitants and the nationalities' proportion, suggest us the great transformation developed in the town's localism.

The situation didn't improve following the takeover after 1945 either. Besides the takeover by the communists, the situation was also aggravated by the policy of Romania regarding the minorities, which during this period of time firstly aggravated the Hungarian minority.

4. The period of time after 1945 and the situation of minorities

In the present study I shall approach this theme briefly, without engaging in a profound analysis,¹⁶ as regarding the context needed in the biographical analysis, its concise presentation is important.

After 1918, the Romanian political elite had taken the national minorities into account "due to their high percentage (in the Large Romania 28% of the population belonged to a national minority), as well as to their role in the management of the cultural and economic context of the towns, an obstacle in the process of national consolidation."¹⁷ In the period of time between the two World Wars, and during their subsequent period of time on the podium of political fights, the Romanian nationalism, aiming to consolidate the nation, was the most important.

There are more solutions to delimit the historical and political periods in Romania after 1945; we shall follow a common and largely spread division into periods. The first stage can be placed between 1946 and 1958, the second between 1958 and 1980, and the third in the 80s.¹⁸

¹⁵ The 300.000 Jews from Romania have survived the Second World War. See: Constantin Iordachi, 2000, p. 46

¹⁶ Numerous outstanding studies have been written on this topic, yet we do not aim to enumerate them. We shall only mention the Regio [Region] publication edited by the The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, which keeps publishing the results of the studies carried out in this respect.

¹⁷ Constantin Iordachi, 2007, p. 43.

¹⁸ Constantin Iordachi, 2007, p. 46; Gagyí József, 2009, p. 215.

The first period can be named the “attack of society,” or the “preparation” period, from the perspective of modernization.¹⁹ In essence, the communist power formed exactly during this period of time, with the support of the Red Army in shade. The second period is the one of “revival and accumulation,”²⁰ from the perspective of the external policy it is the period when Romania detaches from Moscow. It is important that the economic expansion and surface liberalization in the 60s and 70s improved the life conditions of the whole population. However, from the minorities’ viewpoint, the communist policy had taken a nationalistic turn without restraint, they emphasized the Dacian-Roman origin more and more, and the applied identifying factor was represented by the ethnocentrist myth. The nation, not the proletariat, becomes the basis of the communist system. The political power had strictly controlled the internal migration towards towns, there were only the Romanian inhabitants, who could move to the towns settled in “bad places,” as we could also notice in the case of Oradea town.

In the 80s they adopted the administration typical of the war-time (implemented in the 50s), the inhabitants’ life standards decreased drastically, they introduced the system of luncheon vouchers, and prescribed the proper number of calories admitted for consumption.²¹ In order to balance the economic and social crises, the Romanian political propaganda drew the attention of the inhabitants towards the “Hungarian danger.” During that period of time, the diplomatic pressures between the two countries were permanent, reaching the climax at the end of the decade. The animosity calmed down only in the middle of the 90s. According to the analysts, the “official” reconciliation between the two countries represented a model for the whole Europe.²²

However, the “Hungarian danger” did not disappear at once in the context of the Romanian culture, a fact also proved by the extremely difficult transformation of the Romanian historiography. According

¹⁹ Gagy József, 2009, 197., 215.

²⁰ Idem.

²¹ Idem.

²² Constantin Iordachi and Marius Turda, 130.

to two authors, Constantin Iordachi and Marius Turda, at the end of the millennium, the Romanian historiography was still dominated by the conflict between the Romanians and Hungarians.²³ And in the majority of History textbooks, edited at the end of the millennium, one can still notice the negative portrait of Hungary. The young generation had learnt from the books criticized by the authors mentioned above that Hungary represented the external enemy of Romania, while the Hungarians from Romania were considered the inner enemies. The authors had analyzed more History textbooks in the shops and noticed the fact that in the Romanian historiography the “Hungarian case” was still a threatening example. Consequently, we wonder to what extent does the public opinion express the reconciliation proposed by the political elite of the two countries (at the middle of the 90s). According to the authors, the “polished clichés, and the mutual preconceptions and stigmatizations kept living in the collective memory, even in the public discourses and professional discourses of the historians.”²⁴ According to the cited study, the younger Romanian historians expressed their opinions in a more different way than the national pattern, although in a much weaker yet more and more determined and certain voice.

Furthermore, we cope with another question: in what way do the biographies of those living in Oradea reflect the policy of the Romanian state regarding the minorities, the image of the enemy presented above, penetrating their everyday life?

We assume that in the case in Oradea might exist a hostile image in the collective memory of the natives, it should be clearly reflected in their biographies. This affirmation is supported by the fact that the identity presented in biographies is formulated by means of the collective memory.

²³ *Idem.* p. 132.

²⁴ Constantin Iordachi and Marius Turda, p. 130.

5. The results of the studies

5.1. Similar behaviours in biographies

In the study²⁵ of biographies accomplished at Oradea, we involved 45 persons. The objective of the study was to become familiar with the characteristics suggesting the identity of the inhabitants living in a town undergoing a continuous change, regarding the number of inhabitants and the structure of the minority population. With that end in view, we have chosen some subjects belonging to the Hungarian minority, who were either born in the town, or moved to Oradea with their parents during their childhood, as well as Romanians, who came to live in the town as adults, because of their work place.

Given our theme, in its more limited meanings, the goal was to understand the local and national identity of our subjects better. Therefore we invoked Romanians and Hungarians, intellectuals and workers, those who were both engaged and absent in the organization of the civil context.

In the case of respondents, whose nationality was Hungarian, we were especially interested in those persons, who were born and grew in Oradea, and who participated in the self-organization of the Hungarian life after 89. We asked the respondents to narrate their biographies as the inhabitants of Oradea town.

The other sub-pattern of the study included the respondents, whose nationality was Romanian, who moved to Oradea when they were adults, in order to study or work. They told the story of their lives from the perspective of their moving and integration.

The two groups were composed of women and men, whose ages were between 65 and 80, intellectuals and workers.

In the present study we shall process the materials obtained from the respondents belonging to the first group.

The main element of the qualitative study – and consequently of

²⁵ The research was done in the context of a project focused on the national and regional identity financed by the Program of Romanian-Hungarian Transborder Collaboration (HURO/0801/180). In the present study we shall present only some of these results. The other results are in developing process.

biographies – is the fact that the data express all that's mutual in the respondents' characteristics and way of thinking. Although, as we had already mentioned, when selecting the subjects, we strived to interrogate groups, which presented certain differences, in spite of all the obvious social differences, we noticed very many similitudes. Furthermore, we are going to present these kinds of similitude.

1. The first mutual characteristic of the respondents is the discontinuous presence of the topic regarding the national suppression concerning the fate of minorities in their biographies. The respondents had hardly dealt with the consequences of the political program based on the "Hungarian danger" (mentioned above). This fact is remarkable since, according to the data provided by the Romanian textbooks of History, one might have expected the infiltration of the Hungarian topic in the everyday life. On the contrary, as we shall demonstrate in the chapter regarding the memory and localism, the respondents referred to the Romanian-Hungarian connections only at the interpersonal level, and avoided the patterns known from the propaganda. When it was about the Romanian people, they often mentioned a proper neighbourhood, an important friendship, and even more, there was a person who referred to a friend, as she considers her a bosom friend. In the case of children respondents, we often met mixed marriages, and in these cases the respondents referred to the Romanian part in a positive and hospitable way.

One of the respondents exemplified the case by means of his relationship with his Romanian neighbour, which was so good, that he had got the key of his house, thus the nephew could enter the house anytime to practise the piano.²⁶

All these do not refer to the fact that in the town there are no conflictual relationships between the Hungarians and Romanians, yet our respondents have been proud of sharing a daily harmonious experience with those related to the Romanian nationality. This part of our biographic study supports the affirmations of Fleisz János, an urban historian, according to whom – because of already known reasons – the Hungarians' position had become more unstable, yet did not undergo that accentuated national separation, like the one at

²⁶ Fragment from the biography of A. K. (66 years old, worker, retired at present).

Cluj, although the religious and cultural barriers are still the same.²⁷

One can say that the Hungarian respondents spoke about the Romanians from the viewpoint of inter-human relations and in their evaluation they considered *“what type of people they are.”*

2. The details enumerated above are also connected to that significant result according to which the respondents complained neither about their fate as a minority in an open way, nor about the consequences generated by the Romanian population's numerical increase. It is essential to mention that the respondents (both the intellectuals and workers) presented successful professional careers, and also benefitted of the appreciation of their colleagues and managers. Taking their accounts into consideration, we draw the conclusion that they reached the top by means of perseverance, diligence, continuous self-training and development, thus they had the possibility to reconsider their abilities. They earned respect through the knowledge they had accumulated and thus they got not only good salaries but also management positions. There were more, who became department and section managers, chief engineers, controllers, there was even one, who became an assistant manager at a factory. In the ethos of biographies they emphasized the importance of work, the construction of adequate careers, which could be obtained by means of continuous learning, trainings and participations in conferences. As a result, our respondents considered that their ability to cope with their work place represented their life program. They were satisfied with the results they had obtained, as if they wanted to demonstrate that the invested energy facilitated their success.

Concurrently, beyond those happened, they outlined a behaviour determined by their minority status. In more cases, the respondents evaluated their former life – a typical gesture defining their biographies – without being asked. Starting from these self-evaluations, we draw the conclusion that the success in career was partially due to their tasks' overfulfilment, and on the other hand because of a self-limiting behaviour. Given this self-limitation, we understand that they created the impression that they did not expect to get management

²⁷ Fleisz János, 2008, pp. 114-115.

positions due to their talent and work. Our respondents told us they had worked hard, but they also added they did not expect anything special, or a management position. It is a fact that they could not become the first in the management board, yet they avoided this theme, and preferred to speak about the way in which they were loved by the subordinates emphasizing how much their managers counted on their advice and knowledge.

It is true that our respondents did not express any frustration regarding the obtained results, however, considering what their wives had declared, we found out that they were completely aware of what they might have had if they had not belonged to the minority group. From some remarks such as “they put you in a tunnel” or “they did not let you teach the young people at the faculty,” we can notice that in the context of their family they expressed their dissatisfaction concerning the results they obtained.

The criticism referring to their own person can be connected to more respondents with the status of minority and the results at their work place, no matter if obtained or not. After the change of regime, the system of Ceaușescu, socialism and the people’s lives could be criticized in public, and the biographies gained another interpretative horizon. The interpretation of the past from the perspective of the present can become schematic, but because of this we can narrate our personal experience. After 1989 they created the narratives regarding the roles of “the opportunist,” “the hero”, “the person who can cope with,” “the oppressed,” for the individual to belong to these categories, to interpret, eventually to re-examine his previous behaviour.

Among our respondents, a director, who enrolled for the party – and in spite of this, in the 80s she was dismissed from her function –, although she had been working for 10–12 hours daily, evaluated her behaviour in the past in the following way:

“What bothered me the most was the fact that when I entered a class I saw the photo (of Ceaușescu), I was simply sick and tired, and the morning songs, and everything in an exaggerated Romanian, everything... for an upright and honest person it was very difficult to swallow this kind of situation, but what can I say... we were some opportunists. If I look backwards, I see we were all like this, because we trembled for our lives. For our lives, our safety, the future of our

children. And then we didn't say anything, didn't do anything, we became cowards and opportunists."²⁸

A former engineer spoke similarly about the same problems:

*"I could not become a chief-engineer. They started to ask me, Sir, would you enroll for the party? The position exists, but if you do not belong to the party, you do not get the position. How could I say I still wanted to be the third employee of the factory when they provided me with the possibility to become the second? Therefore I had been a member of the political party for thirty years. I had to be balanced and not be conspicuous, just like I did. All those, who did not do like that, all left. (abroad)."*²⁹

Another respondent evaluated his behaviour in the following way:

*"Man realized that there is a life towards society, and that there is an inner life, and the two lives cannot be combined. We went to the church seized with fear, as we had heard the slogan according to which the education was atheistic. I went to the church at Easter and I attended the faculty there. Now we can define it as a surviving behaviour, however I would not name it like that."*³⁰

One of the respondents spoke in the following way about the balance between the status of minority groups and the management position: *"I have never had discussions concerning the topic of minorities. Never, with nobody. Everybody avoided them. Moreover, I didn't need to argue with those people I was together with every day."*³¹ According to the context, this behaviour adopted by the respondent at his work place was mutual. There were not only the Hungarian, but also the Romanian colleagues, who avoided the more sensible problems.

Compliance was one of the forms used to avoid the obedience of the written and unwritten rules. A Hungarian intellectual wanted to accomplish some research work:

"It is obvious that in the beginning I did not know how to evade, and then I realized that if man finds a title for his work, which sells well, he can carry out any type of research. This is the way I began

²⁸ Fragment from the biography of K.J. (76 years old, teacher, retired at present).

²⁹ Fragment from the biography of T.W. (80 years old, engineer, retired at present).

³⁰ Fragment from the biography of Z.T. (75 years old, engineer, retired at present)

³¹ Fragment from the biography of T.W. (80 years old, engineer, retired at present)

*to research the movement of the working class but only until 1918...*³²

3. Although it is connected to those mentioned above, it is worth referring to what has driven to the success at the work place, besides the fact that the respondents, given their excellent performances, adapted to the political context in a conscious way. For a person, who had belonged to a minority nation, his personal talent wouldn't have been enough, it didn't matter if he could carry on the things well. It was not even important if he was a member of the political party. They needed more than that.

From the biographies we find out that the respondents belonged to a "sub-culture," marked by the attachment to Oradea. There was only one respondent who expressed his wish to leave Romania after 1989. One of the relevant reasons of this fact might be that these people were not interested in the political context before 1989, they "did not blow the trumpet" to tell they were Hungarians, as one of the respondents said. They did not care about the political context, yet they found in socialism what they had been looking for.

Besides the already mentioned reasons, these persons could manage during the socialism, as they belonged to a generation which agreed to cooperate when the system accepted the intellectuals. This collaboration made them not to force the frames created by the political power, not to belong to the opposition, and accept their fate conditioned by the fact that they belonged to the population of minorities. Given their age, they obtained their diplomas at the beginning of the 60s, when in the Romanian industry they needed a lot of people trained in the technical field and lots of teachers. "The extending factories, the industrial branches and different structures provided those appointed as leaders with tasks and attributions in order to take decisions and administrate the power. In their case they succeeded in the creation of a personal and continuously developing living standard, and a perspective of the way in life."³³ In other words, the aspirations of the respondents coincided with the progression of economy. In the industrial enterprises, which had just been founded, in the new factories, mines, hydro-electric power stations, the

³² Fragment from the biography of J.P. (60 years old, intellectual in philology)

³³ The analysis of Gagyí József 2009: 201 replies to some problems.

demand for labour force was high. Many respondents succeeded in achieving their goals relatively well due to the coincidence between the economic circumstance and the individual output.

*"I was able to manage the things so that at the faculty I could deal with things properly, as an early engineer I approached the topography and then the mechanical drawing, which at the time was related to the context of topography, then I began to study the faculty courses again. And I had learned, learned and learned for a whole life. 15 years ago, 10 years ago. I had my exams in Bucharest, this was the only way one could advance."*³⁴

And this might not have been the solution, we might add, if the respondent had not obtained his diploma during that period of time when the political power decided to bring about a rapid advance in the Romanian economy. Their compliance, talent and diligence, matched very well with the new launch of the Romanian economy.

4. Another important mutual characteristic of the respondents was the very good knowledge of the Romanian language. Yet they acquired this competence in very different ways. We cannot state that the respondents, who had studied in Romanian schools, knew the Romanian language very well, as most of our respondents finished the comprehensive school, even the high-school, in Hungarian. By means of this study we cannot support that public opinion according to which the children must attend a Romanian school in order to be successful in a society where the majority of the people is Romanian, as we noticed exactly the opposite of this.

The father of a respondent, the director of a school, thought of it similarly:

"During the enrollment period, my father used to welcome the parents at the entrance. He was very attentive when saying 'jó napot kívánok,' then 'bună ziua.' And then he could see who replied in Hungarian and who greeted in Romanian. The enrollment for the Romanian section was done in one room, and for the Hungarian one in the other room. Thus the school was divided in two, the stairs were following two different directions. When he saw that a parent, who had answered in Hungarian, went to the Romanian section, he

³⁴ A fragment from the biography of A.K. (71 years old, engineer, retired at present).

told him: "Dear parent, You are a Hungarian parent, your place is not there. Please, return. You have taken the wrong turn. You must not go to the right but to the left... In such cases, the parent was either embarrassed or he told he had already taken his decision. And then my father explained him..."

At their work place our respondents had already spoken the Romanian language well, they felt at their ease, although most of them began their studies in the Hungarian language. However it is true that they had to learn the Romanian language very well in order to manage themselves.

According to our respondent, there was a very simple modality to learn Romanian very well:

"I was very diligent and hard-working as, if I wanted to pass my exams, I had to sit down and learn. I worked in the domain of health, I had to open my mouth. I had no other possibility. Then they asked me if I spoke the Hungarian language."

The learning of the Romanian language demanded the effort of each respondent, which they found as natural as possible. The agreement and commitment to learn the Romanian language was related to the familial socialization. The father of a respondent, an engineer, had to validate his diploma in the Romanian language in order to be employed.

"He did not know the Romanian language, he went to Moreni for two years, worked at the golden mine as a worker, and learned there. He learned Romanian there and came home, validated his studies and got married. All these happened in 1937..." This family did not question if the acquisition of languages was important or not.

5. As an ultimate point, we must mention the fact that in the case of respondents the local and minority identity were inseparable. The "natives from Oradea" did not separate their love for Oradea, the preservation and transmission of local memories, or the activities in the local civil organizations from the national identity. The "Magyars from Oradea work for the sake of self-organization," as Fleisz stated in one of his studies.³⁵ The people did not activate in the public life, because they were either born in Oradea or Hungarian, but

³⁵ Fragment from the biography of Z.E. (70 years old, professor at a faculty).

because they were both. And those, who wrote books referring to the past of Oradea, or the industrial development of the town, they didn't do it because they were Hungarians or because they were born in Oradea, but because they were Hungarians from Oradea.

5.2. The details of local and national identities

The Hungarian respondents can be divided in two groups according to their place of birth. Those who were born in Oradea belong to the first group. They are the "natives" from Oradea. The other group is made up of those, who were not born at Oradea, but moved there with their parents during their childhood, and assume their identity as natives from Oradea. In this chapter we shall refer to both groups without separating them, since from the perspective of the themes approached, there was no significant difference between the two groups.

5.2.1. The local identity in feelings, according to memories

The attachment to this place, Oradea, had been already noticed in the first sentences of the biographies, as these represented a framework of the way of life. The respondents connected their first memories to a house, street or a district. They presented the "assimilated" space by means of inhabitation, which they narrated a lot about. Since the respondents were older, they could tell a lot about the space providing them with a lot of memories. If we perceive the *localism* according to the approach of Appanduraj, we shall not be surprised that the stories are full of accounts regarding inter-human relations and friends, or presentations of the connections among people generally speaking. The respondents began the story of their lives by presenting their connection with their house, neighbours, street, churches, and schools. Most of them, certainly according to their age, did not avoid their experience undergone during the Second World War, and recounted the destruction of the town and house. And their memories related to the anti-aerial shelters preserved the characters which, instead of taking a refuge somewhere else, remained there. The presentation of the war was descriptive in

the majority of cases, which is even more interesting, if we think that that was the time when the town had changed its “master.” The sieges and escape from the anti-aerial shelters were experienced by the respondents during their childhood.

“Everywhere you could see nothing but dead people, here for example, there was a large pile, then 10 meters lower, almost in front of the Travel Agency, there were two legs, the body was no longer there... at the corner there were six dead people in a pile. One could see that the victims had to kneel down, this is how they shot the whole line with their machine guns. I can show you, half of the bullets are still in the wall...”³⁶ Then he continued the story of his memories in the following way:

“The second floor and the attic of the town-hall burnt down. Yet nothing burnt down at the first floor. Can you realize the way it was constructed?! Rimanóczy must have made it very well over then...”³⁷

One may wonder about the role of those incidents in biographies, which had no direct morals regarding personal life. The destructions committed in the wartime, seen during their childhood, were recounted invariably by each of the older ones, who had lived in Oradea then. We can find out the answer from the following narrative referring to the burnt town-hall:

“This is the reason why what had been posted on the town-hall’s building was a big lie, as in October 12, 1944, they displayed the Romanian flag. Firstly, we went there with the whole family: father, mother, my elder brother and myself. None of us saw a Romanian there, it was full of Russians and civil inhabitants. I saw none of them. Secondly, there had never been a flag in the tower. I have a picture highlighting this as well, they also displayed the Hungarian flag before, between the two wars the Romanian flag was on the top of the support, which was keeping the pole of the flag, on the roof of the festive hall opposite the church. The flag was there, they could settle any flag there. There was no space in the tower. Moreover, who should have gone there? The town-hall was burning, you could not settle any flag there...”³⁸

³⁶ Fragment from the biography of A.K. (71 years old, engineer, retired at present).

³⁷ Fleisz János 2008: 214

³⁸ Fragment from the biography of P. B. (80 years old, civil servant, man, retired at present).

The message of the story suggested that the respondent knew it exactly, where the Romanian commandant had put the Romanian flag in 1944, when the town had been conquered. And that meant that the exact place was not on the town-hall's building, as it also appeared on a memorial plaque in 2011.

One may wonder: what can we find out from these memories related to childhood? Why is it important to know where they had initially put the Romanian flag in Oradea? The reason is exactly what had not been told, but the story tells it afterwards. More exactly, the fact that the respondent was there, saw a lot, and knew all about it. He dwelled much longer than usually on explaining where the flag had been, which means that he wanted to emphasize the fact that he knew the details exactly. He could not be cheated or misled, he knew it exactly how they symbolically overtook the power in the town.³⁹ I found out that the town hall had burnt down, the Romanian flag could not be settled on that building and the respondent knew it exactly, where the flag reached. By means of these war incidents the "natives from Oradea" also suggested that they knew what had happened in the town then, as they had already lived here.

The respondents moved during their childhood, a long time ago, and their reasons could be more: the enlargement of the family, the exchange of the parents' work place or the demolition of the settlement, where the respondent had been born. When they moved, the respondents set up relationships with their new neighbours, they met new friends. The memory of the good friends they had spent their childhood with, no matter if they were Romanian or Hungarian, stays alive. We can also notice that our respondents referred only to those relationships of vicinity with the Romanian people, which were positive and marked their friendship. In their everyday acts, the Hungarian and Romanian people were found in close ties of friendship. A respondent mentioned his Romanian neighbour, as his mother had taught the Hungarian language to her son, and his friend's mother had taught the Romanian language to our respondent. "*A mixed couple had been living opposite our house. And they had a son and a daughter, and auntie Birta took care of me in a very wise and*

³⁹ Fragment from the biography of P. B. (80 years old, civil servant, man, retired at present).

*clever way, when I was together with her son, as we lived opposite Cornel, and we were of the same age. She taught me the Romanian language, she dictated and talked to me, etc. And when she visited us, my mother and Cornel...'*⁴⁰

Or in another case they presented the image of a street, where both Romanian and Hungarian had shared their lives. These families had lived their daily lives in mutual understanding, in a close connection. The respondents were not aware of the Romanian-Hungarian conflict during their childhood, there is no story which refers to something like that.

"The truth is that in our childhood we did not know they were Romanian, we always spoke the Hungarian language. Thus at the end of the 50s and 60s the situation occurred in these terms."

The cohabitation with the Romanian people appears as something natural, sometimes there were only the surnames, which suggested that the characters in question were related to the Romanian nationality. For instance, when during the school time, a respondent rent a room from a Romanian family, where he had been placed by his parents for more years.

The respondents, who remember their childhood, often wander among their memories on the way between the school and home, telling what the listener could have seen then, and they think they traverse that way by means of a video camera. The spaces appear as some familiar settings, the names of streets in the Hungarian language, and the squares and buildings with their functions, also in Hungarian, have been preserved in the memory of the respondents.

*"An important matter regarding Venice,⁴¹ that street, Hodosi Miklós or T. Cipariu, as it is known today, and the Szőlős street, related to the railways, or the old tram, when man was walking towards the Venice station, well, this used to be the street where, interestingly, I met people belonging to each level of society."*⁴²

While recounting the memories of his childhood, one could sense an external "domesticated" and intimate life, in which the respond-

⁴⁰ Fragment from the biography of P. B. (80 years old, civil servant, man, retired at present).

⁴¹ Fragment from the biography of P. B. (80 years old, civil servant, retired at present).

⁴² Fragment from the biography of J. P. (60 years old, intellectual, social sciences).

ents were having a good time, which they preserved a lot of memories about.

One of the respondents was unusually attached to his family house. The house was bought by the respondent's mother on the money saved from her daily domestic work. In the accounts, the house appeared as a three-storied palace, where the large family was provided with sufficient space. However, the respondent had to sell this house. The first floor was sold, as the niece needed the money for a treatment in Cluj, thus the respondent saved the child from blindness. The second floor was sold because the respondent needed the money to take care of his mother – who had depended on daily support for more years –, and not to send her to an asylum. Although the respondent was attached to his home, he had to sell it because of objective reasons. The respondent was proud to narrate the story of the house, he told he was happy to walk in front of his former home, as he “purchased” the sight of his niece on the money he got on it and could assure an old age worthy of his mother. The respondent presented the sale of his home as a fact, which had strengthened him, not as a loss, but an action, which made him more spiritual. This native home represented an important place in the life of the interviewee, who symbolically considered it his property.

Another respondent of ours also spoke about his powerful attachment to his native home, however, opposed to previous recounts, the loss of his house represented a trauma for him, as the neighbourhood, where he had been born, was demolished. Then they constructed the Rogerius district,⁴³ block D5. The street, where the respondent was born, which appeared in the story as a real district, was demolished, and the inhabitants were moved to other parts. The father of the respondent was a baker, and the bakery was settled in the house, which was subsequently demolished. The family got a house with two rooms in the neighbouring street, and the family house was reconstructed and rented. Willing that or not, the town managers and architects destroyed those old relationships, which had formed in the demolished space of life. When the respondent's father found out that the new inhabitants demolished the brick kiln he had

⁴³ Venice is a district in Oradea.

made, he could no longer visit the old street. He learnt how to turn about the whole region. The respondent told that, when he met his former neighbours, they, the “inhabitants of the field,” used a language, which nobody else can understand. Among them there was a special world, with many incidents and a mutual fate. And this world disappeared from Oradea, when the Rogerius district was built.

5. 2. 2. *The power of action of the local identity:*

In this chapter we might cite the story of each respondent, as in the everyday life each of us contributes to the formation of environment, to the transformation of the space designated or obtained in the native home. However we shall take into consideration “only” those happenings in which the individual has used/uses his power of action in the construction of the community he belongs to.

A very good example to illustrate the power of action in the case of *localism* is the high-school memory of one of our respondents. The building of the Premonstratensian Gymnasium, which had been besieged, was almost ruined after the war. Before they began their courses, the first task of the pupils, teachers and parents was to clean the ruined zone. Several older pupils carried the debris from school, and crossed the town with the trucks to gather everything they could use during their classes at school.

These pupils contributed to the physical reconstruction of their school, and this recovered due to their functional effort. The former interviewed pupils confessed their powerful attachment to the school building, and appreciated their former pupils very much; they also said the success of their career was due to the background of their school. The emotional attachment regarding that place remained unflinching, and when they had the chance, they transposed this attachment into facts. After the change of the regime, this generation founded the Association of the Former Pupils of the Premonstratens Gymnasium for their own support but also to support the town and the present youth.

The example of this Association shows that at the individual level we cannot state exactly, why somebody uses his creative power in the interest of community. All the respondents of this group were Hun-

garian, and more of them develop public activities, or cultivate the identity of the community, which they are related to, in a certain way. It is hard to say if they do it because they are Hungarians and, as a result, they are eager to cultivate the national identity, or because they wish to transmit the new generation something from their medium, a localism in which they might live. In their case, the creation of localism can't be separated from the fact that they are Hungarians, not even from the fact that until 1989, in the Ceaușescu regime, they had no possibility to participate in the activities of the public life.

We would like to illustrate this intrinsic connection by means of an example. The story regarding the demolition of St. Ladislau Church became legendary. It is the nature of the legend which suggests that the participants in the event and the narrators of incidents remember different details. Yet the essence is the same. The Hungarians from Oradea formed a living chain around the St. Ladislau church and thus they could save it.

*"We went there of our own accord. There was no memorandum. Our presence was not compulsory there. We had stayed outside for days and held each other's hands. And we did not give up, we didn't give up. Hence whenever I am in the town, and go there, I always find somebody there. He lits a candle, or something. There it wasn't anything like that, it was not a rule for us to go. There, the people who were born in Oradea... The natives from Oradea, they had been the protectors."*⁴⁴

Another respondent of ours had just completed his military service at Arad, as a radio technician. At a certain moment they alerted the company.

"As a radio technician I knew it was about a real mission, since I got some real ammunition and a code – if we had heard it, we would have had to come to Oradea to establish the order. Can you imagine my psychical condition after I heard that we had to go to Oradea? But we didn't know what was going on. We did not know what was going on. After everything was over, we were taken home to Arad."

⁴⁴ Fragment from the biography of O. T. (man, engineer, today an active member of a civic organization, pensioner).

Two weeks later they let me home... And I came home and then I found out about everything. That they wanted to demolish it, and the people surrounded it. And then we were waiting with our arms, to see what we could do... It was something shocking. But it's all right now, the demolition did not take place...⁴⁵

Three of the respondents referred to the intention to demolish the St. Ladislau Church and "protect" the church. Nowadays the protection of the church by forming a human chain around it has become a legend, the parents are those, who tell the young people today about these happenings, and thus they strengthen their local and national identity.⁴⁶

One of the respondents spoke about a similar symbolical happening, yet this did not affect so many people, and in this context the local and national identity cannot be separated either.

"The building of the Partium University in Oradea, the centre of the Hungarian University, was all in ruins in 1991, yet they did not want to give it to us. They wanted to take that building back, by all means, they wanted to give it to the University in Oradea. And then we had not got out of the building for more weeks, we slept there at night, for more weeks, with a group of students. And some professors, who had been there, as during that period of time there was no section, only the one of religion and social work. And then we slept there for nobody to come in, because if we had left at night, they would have broken the door and taken the building...⁴⁷

The two memories speak about the actions to prevent the confiscation of the local space in which the participants, in the name of community, did not deliver the places they had already owned to the political power. While the first happening had become a legend, the second one is known especially by those who participated in the event.

According to Appanduraj, the formation of a place in a local community depends on the local subjects' power of action. In Oradea,

⁴⁵ Fragment from the biography of A. S. (70 years old, man, entrepreneur, retired at present).

⁴⁶ The defence of the St. Ladislau Church with a chain formed of people demands the collection of happenings narrated orally and additional archive research. The further study of this theme might contribute to the knowledge of Oradea town from the perspective of the social and sociologic history.

⁴⁷ Fragment from the biography of Z.E. (70 years old, professor).

like in the whole country, after the communists had overtaken the power, there was a new "conquest" of the space, conducted by the state. The former relationships of vicinity were destroyed by the new political system through the demolition and transformation of houses and squares, and the construction of new districts of blocks of flats. The inhabitants of these houses had to move to new places, and new people moved to the old places. The appearance of the town of flow-ers before the Second World War was remodeled by the forced industrialization, without the creative participation of the inhabitants in these processes. The local society of Oradea town had become a localized world. During the communism there was a continuous transformation of the town's image and local conditions, the number of inhabitants was gradually increasing and the power to create homes could not keep pace with these changes.

The following situation symbolizes this process:

*"Before the war time there were 70.000 inhabitants in Oradea. Now there are 230.000. This is a really significant change. My wife is a teacher who teaches to the Romanian children too. They are good. I am pleased with them. One of the little girls said: "My God, auntie Margit, the weekend is not going to be pleasant. Why? Well, we shall have some guests and must show the town to some children of our age. What can I show them? I do not know the town." – told one of the respondents."*⁴⁸

This situation changed officially after 1989 when, in the name of democracy, they had the possibility to recover the localized local society.

The question is who are those – by using the terminology of Appanduraj – local subjects, who are able to become the active actors of the local society after the dictatorship? Who are those members of the oppressed generation, who are capable of taking advantage of the possibilities provided by the power? After fifty years of compelled passivity, who is able and eager to get involved in public activities?

⁴⁸ Fragment from the biography of Z.T. (75 years old, intellectual in the technical domain, retired at present).

5. 2. 3. *The institutionalization of the local identity after 1989*

After 1989 the official organization of the local and national identity took a new swing. This took place in more ways, for instance, they founded civic organizations; this category contains everything, from the Association of the Former Pupils of the Premonstratensian Gymnasium to SOCOB⁴⁹. Besides these, the functioning and activities of the Barabás Guild, which unites the fine artists from Transylvania, also represent a creative force of identity. Here we mention the programs of the television from Oradea in the Hungarian language in the 90s, named TVO and TVS, and also, for instance, the documentaries by means of local intellectuals. This category also includes the works related to the local and industrial history⁵⁰, as well as the studies written in the domain of urban history. The increase of the number of urban inhabitants suggests that the inhabitants are not aware of the past and history of the town, and Oradea had not become their real home. Because of immigration, the new inhabitants could “possess” the spaces only to a certain extent. They have no personal memories related to the past, yet they can take them into possession by means of some efforts in the domain of knowledge. Therefore one needs the written elaboration of studies, which offers a real image of the town’s past.

Most of the respondents participate in the recreation of the local identity. They are “natives from Oradea,” who still have personal memories about the past of the town, and also own a capital of connections and acquaintances, which support them in the new launch of the local society.

6. Conclusions

From the studies of biographies we could draw the conclusion that at Oradea the affective structure of the “natives from Oradea” is very complex and represents their connection with the town. This relationship got weaker because of the forty years of socialism, when

⁴⁹ The Federation of the Civil Organizations from Oradea and Bihor (SOCOB).

⁵⁰ See for example: Makai Zoltán – Pásztai Ottó: Nagyvárad ipartörténete [The history of Oradea’s industry], Europrint Kiadó, Oradea, 2008

localism had become a localized town. During the socialist period, Oradea experienced a continuous standardization, even in the case of the natives from Oradea, and remained mostly empty for the recently arrived Romanian inhabitants. The “conquest” of the town could begin after 1990, when the civic organizations founded by the “natives from Oradea” played an important role.

For the new generation and those moved recently to the town the knowledge of the local localism will represent the modality, through which from a given space they create their personal space perceived as a home. The civic organizations will have an essential role in the creation of local contexts.

The subjects of localism are the minority Hungarians and the majority Romanians. Today, this is the incontestable context of localism from Oradea. The Romanians and Hungarians do not live together in the context of an ethno-region, as neighbours, but together, and use the same space. The interpretation, value and goods do not co-exist autonomously, but in a combined way. In the context of work places, in the domain of education, and in many cases, in the family relationships, this mixture is obvious.

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SAMPLING IN THE ENRI SURVEY

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The sample of the ENRI survey was planned as a random stratified one. In both countries we have aimed at a random sample of 1000 subjects each.

For the data collection, we have adopted a multistage approach.

In the first stage we have selected the collectivities in both countries from which the subjects had to be selected subsequently. By doing that, one of the aims was to finally have a number of settlements included in the sample larger than 30, such as that multilevel analysis to correspond to the data. The settlements have been selected using a stratified approach after classifying the localities by their population into three classes: 1) large county capitals (Oradea, Satu-Mare, Debrecen, Nyiregyhaza); 2) townships in the area; 3) villages. Large cities and towns have been automatically included in the sampling while villages have been selected randomly. The tables with subsamples corresponding to each settlement included in the survey show that the requirement for at least 30 subjects per place was more thoroughly fulfilled in the Hungarian survey.

In the second stage, we have selected the subjects. First, the number of subjects in each settlement was decided based on two criteria: proportionality and a number of at least 30 subjects, again to maintain the sample fit for multilevel analysis. This means that, in the case of some rural areas, proportionality is not observed. Subjects have been selected then by interviewers applying a procedure of random route subject choice.

The final sample of the research, used in the following analyses, is one in which the Romanian subsample is trimmed in order to correspond in relative size with the Hungarian one (the Hungarian base population is larger than the Romanian one) and in which errors in the original data have been deleted. The sample has a very good representativeness with the single exception of rural/urban breakdown in Romania where we have an overrepresentation of urban population.

The final database, which will be used in the analyses included in this report, is made up of 1000 subjects from Hungary and 824 from Romania. Subjects of Hungarian ethnicity make up 29.9% of the Romanian sample and 97.9% of the Hungarian sample.

Country	Ethnic group	%
Romania	Other (Romanian)	70.1
	Hungarian	29.9
Hungary	Other	2.1
	Hungarian	97.9

The comparative distribution of population and sample by county and type of settlements is shown in the table below:

	Population total	% in Population	% in Sample	Urban population (%)	Urban sample (%)
Bihar (Ro)	600246	29.0	28.9	50.3	69.3
Satu-Mare (Ro)	366270	17.7	16.2	44.7	52.4
Hajdú-Bihar (Hu)	541298	26.2	26.5	80.3	80.8
Szabolcs-Szatmár (Hu)	560429	27.1	28.2	54.2	47.5
	2068243				

	N in the database
Apagy	38
Balkány	35
Balmazújváros	38
Berettyóújfalú	35
Debrecen	183
Ebes	31
Földes	30
Hajdúnánás	35
Hajdúsámson	30
Kaba	40
Kálmánháza	38
Kisvárdá	35
Kocsord	39
Mátészalka	35

Mikepércs	31
Nagycserkesz	39
Nyíregyháza	105
Nyíretelek	34
Nyírpazony	39
Ópályi	38
Sáránd	31
Sényő	39
	1000

	N in the data base
Oradea	192
Salonta	41
Marghita	36
Beiuş	20
Aleşd	29
Valea lui Mihai	32
Ştei	16
Oşorhei	10
Pietroasa	30
Avram Iancu	26
Auseu	17
Mădăraş	27
Curatele	27
Spinuş	25
Satu-Mare	111
Carei	30
Negreşti Oaş	14
Tiream	22
Foieni	18
Tăşnad	30
Dorolt	30
Pişcolt	21
Sauca	20
	824

SOCIABILITY PATTERNS IN THE COUNTIES AT THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN BORDER

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Preamble

In this chapter, we shall investigate the patterns of sociability and implication into informal social networks of the ENRI investigation's subjects. The chapter shall cover the frequency of informal contacts with friends and work colleagues as well as the ethnical composition of the networks of friends and the workplace. These variables will be comparatively investigated, following the differences between Hungary and Romania, between Romanian ethnics and Hungarian ethnics as well as the exploration of the determinants of these differences.

Variables

The central variables analyzed in this chapter are generated by the answers to 4 questions concerning the membership to informal networks of our investigation's subjects:

- How often do you spend time with your friends?
- How many of your friends belong to another ethnical group?
- How often do you spend time with your work colleagues?
- How many of your work colleagues belong to an ethnical group different from yours' ?

Results

The frequency of spending time with friends

Asked about the frequency of spending time with their friends, the Romanian subjects seem to meet their friends more often than the Hungarian subjects. Sociability seems to be a characteristic associated to the ethnicity, rather than to the country: the differences keep

going between Romanians and Hungarians (in favor of Romanians), if we restrain the analyses to Romania, and between the Hungarians in Hungary and those in Romania there are no significant differences when it comes to the frequency of socializing with friends.

Table 1. The frequency of spending time with friends per countries (%)

		How often do you spend your free time with friends?				
		never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
Country	Hungary	25.4	35.8	22.0	12.9	3.8
	Romania	18.6	31.4	26.8	18.3	4.9

P(chi-square)<0,01

Table 2. The frequency of spending time with friends per ethnicities in Romania (%)

		How often do you spend your free time with friends?				
		never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
ethnicity (only in Romania)	Romanian	15.2	31.6	29.7	18.8	4.6
	Hungarian	26.9	31.0	19.4	17.1	5.6

P(chi-square)<0,01

Table 3. The frequency of the Hungarians' spending time with friends per countries (%)

		How often do you spend your free time with friends?				
		never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
Only Hungarians	Hungary	25.8	35.8	21.9	13.0	3.6
	Romania	26.9	31.0	19.4	17.1	5.6

P(chi-square):0,1

We have assumed that the differences between Romania and Hungary regarding the intensity of the relationships with friends occur due to the different structure per ages between the two countries: we know that the weighting of individuals below 35 years old is much higher in Romania than in Hungary, whereas the weighting of individuals above 45 years old is much higher in Hungary. The size and structure of informal networks may vary along the life cycle and this co-variation could explain the differences between Romania and Hungary. The test of this relationship, shown in the table below, does not confirm our supposition, yet it brings certain indications regarding the sources of the differences between Romanians and Hungarians: the associations are only significant with the adult population, but especially with the young one. The tables of association controlled depending on the age groups show that the differences regarding the frequency of spending time with friends, recorded between Romania and Hungary decrease at the same time with aging. In other words, the young people in Romania and Hungary have different ways of maintaining informal networks, a difference which has not been recorded in the case of the individuals included in the aged quartiles (more than 45 years old): young people in Romania spend more time with their friends than young people in Hungary. The verification of the relationship between ethnicity and sociability per age groups only for the Romanian subjects (to check if the previously found association reflects a national or an ethnical specificity) has not generated conclusive results, due to the small number of cases (in all 4 association tables, the percentage of cases with frequencies below 5 is higher than 20%).

Table 4. The frequency of spending time with friends per countries and age groups

				How often do you spend your free time with friends?				
				never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
Respondent's Age (Binned)	<= 35**	Romania01	Hungary	15.5	37.6	31.0	11.9	4.0
			Romania	7.0	27.5	31.0	27.1	7.4
	36 – 45*	Romania01	Hungary	20.8	39.6	22.0	14.7	2.9
			Romania	12.5	33.0	30.0	19.0	5.5
	46 – 57 [^]	Romania01	Hungary	27.1	33.9	18.5	15.8	4.8
			Romania	19.9	35.6	27.4	13.0	4.1
	58+ [^]	Romania01	Hungary	37.7	32.6	17.8	8.5	3.4
			Romania	39.1	31.3	17.3	10.6	1.7

** P(chi-square)<0,01

* P(chi-square)<0,05

[^] P(chi-square)>0,05

Sociability outside the own ethnical group reflects the different ethnical compositions in the two countries. Just as we have expected, the percentage of the subjects in Hungary who declare that there are individuals from other ethnicities in their group of friends is much smaller than the similar percentage in Romania. The very small weighting of groups with other ethnicity than the Hungarian one explains this fact.

Table 5. Declared ethnical composition of the group of friends per countries

		How many friends do you have, who belong to a different ethnic group (Romanian, Slovak, Roma, other)?			
		none	few	most	all
Romania01	Hungary	79.1	19.3	1.3	.3
	Romania	25.2	64.2	10.0	.7

P(chi-square)<0,01

The association of ethnicity with the ethnical composition of the group of friends for Romania indicates that it does not depend on ethnicity. Considering the fact that the Hungarians' weighting is almost twice smaller than that of the Romanians in the investigated Romanian area, the result is somehow unexpected: due to the small probability of having Hungarians in the network, it would have been normal to have a smaller ethnical isolation of the Hungarians. The association table suggests the fact that informal networks are to a great extent segregated per ethnical criteria, many of the Hungarians having for example ethnically homogeneous informal networks (88% of the Hungarians declare that few or none of their friends belong to another ethnical group).

Table 6. Declared ethnical composition of the group of friends per ethnicities in Romania (%)

		How many friends do you have, who belong to a different ethnic group (Romanian, Slovak, Roma, other)?			
		none	few	most	all
Ethnicity (Romania only)	Romanians	26.4	63.5	9.6	.6
	Hungarians	22.5	65.7	11.0	.8

P(chi-square)>0,5

Socialization with work colleagues

Sociability differences, such as those found in the case of relationships with friends, have also been recorded in the case of relationships with work colleagues: the percentage of the Hungarian subjects who

declare that they never go out with their work colleagues is much higher than that of the Romanian subjects.

Table 7. The frequency of spending time with work colleagues per countries (%)

		How often do you spend your free time with colleagues from work?				
		never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
country	Hungary	59.3	29.9	6.0	3.6	1.2
	Romania	40.8	32.2	17.3	7.3	2.4

P(chi-square)<0,01

Considering the different structures per age groups between the two national subsamples, we have assumed that the difference between Romania and Hungary is due to the higher weighting of retired individuals in the Hungarian subsample than the Romanian one. Our supposition has been refuted by the controlled association table of the country with the frequency of going out with friends for the dichotomous occupational category, where we have classified subjects into two categories: retired and non-retired. The controlled association table below shows that the individuals to be retired in Romania have a much higher frequency of spending time with work colleagues than those in Hungary, whereas 28.2% of the Romanian citizens in this situations get together with their work colleagues at least once a week, in their spare time, in Hungary, the same occurs only in 10.8% of the cases.

Table 8. The frequency of spending time with work colleagues per countries and occupations (%)

				How often do you spend your free time with colleagues from work?				
				never	once a month or even more rarely	once a week or even more rarely	several times a week	every day
Occupation status	Not retired**	country	Hungary	56.6	31.5	6.6	4.2	1.1
			Romania	31.1	37.6	20.2	8.0	3.1
	Retired***	country	Hungary	68.8	24.3	4.0	1.5	1.5
			Romania	70.9	15.4	8.6	5.1	.0

** P(chi-square)<0,01

^ The weighting of cells with theoretical percentages lower than 5 is higher than 20%.

Ethnic fractionalization of the workplace

As we have expected, the ethnic fractionalization of the workplaces is much higher in the Romanian counties included in the study (which have a significant Hungarian community) than in Hungaria, where minorities hardly represent 3% from the subjects.

Table 9. Declared ethnic composition of the workplace per countries (%)

		How many colleagues do you have, who belong to a different ethnic group (Romanian, Slovak, Roma, other)?			
		none	few	most	all
Romania01	Hungary	85.7	13.3	.9	.1
	Romania	26.7	62.0	10.3	1.0

P(chi-square)<0,01

The weighting of cells with theoretical percentages lower than 5 is higher than 20%.

The representation of the ethnic composition of workplaces is not significantly different between the Romanians and Hungarians in Romania. Here, the findings are similar to those concerning the rep-

resentation of the ethnical composition of the friend group. This is an unexpected aspect, considering the fact that the Hungarians' weighting in the investigated population is hardly half of the Romanians' weighting, so that the probability of having Romanian colleagues is double as compared to that of having Hungarian colleagues. This could mean either that the ethnical composition of workplaces is not probabilistic but, possibly segregated (there are companies which hire mostly Hungarians and companies which prefer to hire Romanians), a situation which is also justified by the fact that the Hungarian population is not uniformly distributed in the investigated collectivities, or that the representations of our subjects on the studied aspect are distorted.

Main results

- Romanian subjects spend more time with their friends than Hungarian subjects
- The difference between Romania and Hungary regarding the frequency of going out with friends decreases at the same time with the age of subjects: young people in Hungary are less “friendly” than those in Romania
- The representation of the ethnical composition of informal networks suggests that the Hungarians' networks are significantly more segregated, ethnically speaking, than the Romanians'. This can also explain the differences regarding the frequency of the above informal meetings in Romania between Hungarians and Romanians (which, however, are not conclusive).
- Romanian citizens spend time with their work colleagues more frequently than Hungarians.
- The representation of the ethnical composition of the work places suggests again that the employers from the investigated area of Romania are relatively segregated from an ethnical point of view.

COLLECTIVE EFFICIENCY IN THE CROSS-BORDER AREA

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Preamble and objectives

The concept of collective efficiency reflects the variable nature of cohesion and social control in collectivities or neighborhoods. It is inspired, on the one hand, from a long tradition of community studies and by the resurgence of the concerns for sociability and social cohesion brought by the concept of social capital. On the other hand, the concept obviously derives from the fundamental psychological notion of the *self-efficacy*, proposed by Bandura (1977). In psychology, the self-efficacy stands for the belief of a person in her/his own ability, more precisely, his/her belief that he/she can fulfill properly certain objectives. According to those who have proposed the concept (Sampson & Graif, 2009), collective efficiency stands for the convergent belief of the members of a collectivity in the uniformity of objectives, in the capacity of members to achieve these common objectives. Such beliefs mobilize membership and are able to contribute to the achievement of collective assets, which the “conventional” dimensions of the social capital (belief and networks) cannot provide directly. Acting efficiency of the beliefs in the capacity of own collectivities or in the communality of certain objectives and values can also explain the proven efficiency of several deficient collectivities in tight social networks (bonding type), where the majority participates intensely in the bridging delocalized and without similarities networks, which, however succeed in providing, by community involvement, the public assets required, such as public safety. (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997) have found, for example, that collective efficiency has a negative relationship with the incidence of violent offences at the neighborhood level, even when other factors are being controlled at the neighborhood level, such as the economic disadvantage.

The investigations concerning the sources of collective efficiency are relatively recent. Occasionally, empirical studies have indicated several factors at the level of collectivities, which may inhibit collective efficiency: deprivation (community poverty) or residential mobility (Duncan, Duncan, Okut, Strycker, & Hix-Small, 2003), both situations being able to erode social relationships and social trust. A constant factor in these studies is ethnical or racial heterogeneity (Duncan, et al., 2003; Sampson, et al., 1997), by implementing an argumentative approach related to that of Putnam (Putnam, 2007). Cultural diversity incurs the fragmentation of relationships for ethnical criteria through a segregated sociability that prevents communication and interaction patterns. But some multilevel empirical researches show the fact that sense of collective efficiency is determined rather by individual characteristics (economic status, marital status), whereas the hypotheses of contextual determination are less supported by data (Duncan, et al., 2003).

The chapter herein covers several objectives regarding the study of collective efficiency in the communities of the four border counties in Hungary and Romania included in the investigation of the ENRI study: the quantification of collective efficiency, the comparison of collective efficiency levels between the two countries and the exploration of the determinants of collective efficiency, comparatively in the Romanian and Hungarian collectivities included in the study's sample.

Collective efficiency quantification

Initially, for the quantification of collective efficiency, 8 Likert type items have been included, having values measured on a 5 stage scale (from total disagreement to total agreement):

The initial scale items have been:

Do you agree with the following statements regarding the locality where you live?

1. This is a tight, united neighborhood.
2. Generally, the people of this neighborhood do not get along.
3. The people of this neighborhood are willing to help their neighbours.
4. The people of this neighborhood do not share the same values.
5. The people of this neighborhood are trustworthy.
6. The people of this neighborhood intervene if youngsters are too noisy.
7. The people of this neighborhood would intervene if youngsters soiled the walls or the streets.
8. The people of this neighborhood would scold a child if he/she was disrespectful.

The percentage distributions of the valid cases of the eight items are shown below:

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the items of collective efficacy

		strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree	% missing
1	This is a very tight community	6.7	10.5	31.1	34.1	17.7	1.0
2	People here generally do not get along with each other	15	28.6	31.7	17.3	7.4	1.0
3	People here are willing to help their neighbours	2.9	7.4	30	39.4	20.3	1.1
4	People here are characterized by diverse values	2.5	10.5	32.3	28.5	26.3	3.0
5	People here are trustworthy	2.9	7.7	40.6	36.1	12.6	1.4
6	People here would act and do something if children were noisy	9.2	10.3	30.8	37.2	12.4	3.6
7	People here would act and do something if children drew on the walls or if they littered	2.4	7.3	25.8	41.8	22.7	2.9
8	People here would scold children if they were rude	4	9.1	29.6	40.7	16.6	3.1

The scale construction has required several item transformation operations: 1) the reversal of item 2 values; 2) the calculation of accuracy indicators and the determination of the scale construction's method; 3) the input of values calculated by multiple regression of the cases with missing values – values have been calculated for 101 cases showing missing records, non-answers or the “I don't know” value; 4) the calculation of the collective efficiency score with all valid cases.

Finally, the score with a satisfying accuracy index ($\alpha=0,707$) was built using the above items, except for those numbered as 2, 4 and 6. The individual score for the perception of collective efficiency was built by adding the items' values. The variable obtained has a 17.9 average, a minimum of 4.85 and a maximum of 25.79. Following the inputs, 9 cases have remained without perceived collective efficiency score due to the high number of missing values at the initial items. Both the K-S and Shapiro-Wilks tests reject the normality hypothesis for the distribution of these variables.

How does collective efficiency vary in populations?

As the collective efficiency concerns a characteristic of human collectivities, we have indicated below the ECP averages for the sample localities, grouped per countries, following the decreasing order of the locality averages:

Table 2. Average collective efficacy by settlements

		ECP
Kálmánháza	HU	21.3
Hajdúsámson	HU	21.1
Ebes	HU	20.7
Sényő	HU	20.5
Apagy	HU	20.5
Mátészalka	HU	20.4
Mikepércs	HU	20.1
Kocsord	HU	19.4
Sáránd	HU	19.1
Nyírpazony	HU	18.9

COLLECTIVE EFFICIENCY IN THE CROSS-BORDER AREA


Balmazújváros	HU	18.6
Debrcen	HU	18.5
Nyíretelek	HU	18.4
Kisvárd	HU	17.7
Nyíregyháza	HU	17.7
Ópályi	HU	17.5
Berettyóújfalu	HU	17.3
Balkány	HU	17.0
Földes	HU	16.7
Kaba	HU	16.5
Hajdúnánás	HU	15.5
Nagycsérkesz	HU	14.8
Sauca	RO	21.3
Negresti Oas	RO	20.3
Auseu	RO	19.3
Curatele	RO	18.9
Osorhei	RO	18.5
Alesd	RO	18.5
Foieni	RO	18.2
Piscolt	RO	17.8
Dorolt	RO	17.8
Valea lui Mihai	RO	17.8
Satu-Mare	RO	17.5
Stei	RO	17.3
Beius	RO	17.2
Tasnad	RO	17.2
Oradea	RO	17.0
Marghita	RO	16.9
Tiream	RO	16.5
Salonta	RO	16.4
Carei	RO	16.3
Madaras	RO	16.2
Avram Iancu	RO	15.4
Spinus	RO	15.4
Pietroasa	RO	15.3

These figures are informative only as the localities' subsamples are not representative. On the other hand, we notice high variations of the ECP average values, both in the Romanian subsample and in the Hungarian one.

Collective efficiency in Romania and Hungary

The comparisons of the collective efficiency's distribution per countries and ethnicities indicate quite clearly the apparent advantage of the Hungarian citizens. The comparison shows that the values of the efficiency perceived in Hungary are much higher than in Romania, which raises the issue if the difference can be assigned to different perceptions between countries or ethnicities. The K-S test indicates a significant difference between the distributions of collective efficiency in the two countries.

Figure 1. Collective efficacy by country



The comparisons per ethnicities and nations suggest that the difference is made rather between countries than between nations. The difference between the Romanians and the Hungarians in Romania, concerning the ECP, is insignificant.

Table 2. Collective efficacy by ethnicity and country

		ECP medie
Hungary	Hungarian ¹	18.47
Romania	Romanian	17.20
	Hungarian	17.46

¹ Our comparison has excluded the Romanians from the Hungarian sample, due to their small number – a single subject from Hungaria has declared himself as being of Romanian ethnicity.

Collective efficiency patterning

For the patterning of collective efficiency, we have introduced several variables at the individual level (age, gender, training level, marital status and ethnicity) as well as a variable at the context level – the type of locality.

Table 3. OLS regression model of collective efficacy

	Hungary					Romania				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	15.580	0.907		17.179	0.000	16.714	0.557		29.981	0.000
Respondent's Age	0.008	0.010	0.032	0.755	0.450	0.010	0.011	0.052	0.980	0.327
Gender (male=1)	0.284	0.226	0.040	1.257	0.209	-0.300	0.223	-0.047	-1.345	0.179
Subject's education (university education=1)	0.671	0.397	0.053	1.691	0.091	0.152	0.264	0.021	0.577	0.564
Marital status (married or coabitation=1)	-0.374	0.228	-0.054	-1.642	0.101	-0.195	0.230	-0.030	-0.849	0.396
Occupation (subject retired=1)	0.380	0.353	0.045	1.076	0.282	0.603	0.373	0.086	1.616	0.106
Settlement type (urban=1)	1.245	0.226	0.173	5.510	0.000**	0.082	0.236	0.013	0.349	0.727
Ethnicity (Hungarian=1)	0.783	0.753	0.032	1.039	0.299	0.077	0.247	0.011	0.313	0.754
	R2=0,033					R2=0,012				

The regression pattern of collective efficiency is much better determined in Hungary than in Romania due to the influence of the locality type: the Hungarian citizens of urban areas perceive the collectivities they are part of as being more cohesive than those of rural areas. This difference does not occur in the case of Romanian citizens. In Romania, none of the predictors included in the analysis, influences in a significant manner the value of the perceived collective efficiency.

In order to obtain better results, several improvements of the collective efficiency patterning are required: testing its inter-specific variability (in the quite probable case that $ICC > 0.05$), the construction of multilevel regression patterns to explain the multilevel efficiency. The respective patterns should also contain, among the interdependent variables, the ethnical fractionalization index of the collectivities included in the study, in order to test the impact of this characteristic upon the control and competency collective feelings of their residents.

Results' summary

- Collective efficiency may be quantified at a satisfying level of accuracy by 4 items of the initial 7 item scale.
- The average of the collective efficiency feeling is significantly higher in Hungary than in Romania.
- The Hungarians in Romania have collective efficiency indexes similar to their Romanian ethnicity neighbors', which suggests the fact that there is no ethnical determination of the collective efficiency feeling.
- The type of locality (rural or urban) is the only significant predictor of personal efficiency: it indicates a positive effect of urban localities in Hungary upon the control and cohesion feelings of their inhabitants.

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VOLUNTARY MEMBERSHIP IN THE CROSS-BORDER AREA

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Preamble

The chapter herein shall compare the levels of associative membership in Hungary and Romania, using the data of the ENRI survey. The analyses will cover the comparisons per countries, ethnicities and the various forming of the associative membership scores.

Voluntary membership and social capital

Following the seminal works of Putnam (1993), associative membership has been considered as one of the main indicators of bridging social capital. Indeed, Putnam argues for a consistent relationship between reciprocal relationships and networks objectivated in civic associations, on the one hand, and development in the regions of Italy. Putnam has also argued that civil society associations foster trust – the main ingredient required for cooperation and solidarity. Reciprocity, trust and even collective efficacy would be nurtured in organizations in which people go to follow their passions and work along with people they often do not know.

Since its forwarding, Putnam's argument has been questioned many times on serious grounds: not all associations are of democratic sorts – many dictatorships have relied on voluntary associations to take over power in democratic regimes (Paxton, 2002; Roßteutscher, 2002); many associations are based on networks of similar people, the so called bonding networks that discourage solidarity and altruistic trust, the basic elements of the so-called bridging social capital. Of this last sort are, for example, the religious associations promoting isolation and intolerance too often.

Depending on the sorts of associations considered, the empirical evidences in favor of voluntary associations, generally, and their positive democratic and development effects are, however, quite solid. Various researches, stimulated by discussions about the connections among social capital and democracy, have shown that members of associations score higher on political interest and are better informed on political issues, are more ready to vote (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Niemi & Junn, 1998) or are more often politically active (Dekker, Koopmans, & Van den Broek, 1997). A similar co-variation was recorded by Comşa (2007) on a Romanian urban sample.

A base activism, working mostly as a latent variable - of a rather psychological than social or cultural sort - in connection with indicators of social participation, has been invoked in several studies in this heterogeneous area of research. Brady, Verba and Schlotzman (1995) propose that part of the variation in political engagement could be explained by such a factor. The author of this paper has found, in a study of community involvement in Romanian cities (Hatos, 2006) that, controlling for age, education, gender and occupational status, there is still a minority of people who are more interested in taking up leadership roles in collective actions, consistently throughout their lives, or to participate in such actions, without too much assessment of costs and benefits.

All the above mentioned empirical and theoretical results underline the fact that voluntary associations can be divided, considering the language of social capital, into two categories: bridging associations (charity associations and voluntary ones), on the one hand, which promote altruistic giving (see Uslaner, 2004), on the presumed effects of associations on trust and social cohesion) and bonding associations, in which people with similar values and backgrounds congregate to promote their worldviews and interest, without significant trans-group solidarity effects or, even worse, with negative effects with regards to altruism, generalized trust and/or tolerance. Various contextual variables can affect the distribution of incentives towards participation in association of one sort or other. One such feature is a minority vs. majority competition which can produce an increase in volunteering in culturally homogenous groupings through the phenomenon called by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) „reac-

tive solidarity". In such situations, competing cultural groups (like ethnic groups) are mobilized into and through ethnic (or religious or racial) associations, which by no means promote social confidence or tolerance.

Given the differences in social and economic development between Romania and Hungary as well as due to the certified richness of generalized trust in Hungary, as compared to Romania, we expect bridging associative membership to be higher in Hungary than in Romania or, the other way round, bonding associative membership to be greater in Romania than in Hungary. Moreover, due to the competitive nature of the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians in North-Western Transylvania, we expect a significant increase in voluntary membership in the regions of Romania near the border as compared to the similar Hungarian areas.

Quantification of the associative membership

4 types of membership have been quantified in 12 types of voluntary organizations. For each of these types of organizations, the percentage distributions of the membership types, for the two countries, have been detailed below. The membership types are:

- Appurtenance and active membership
- Appurtenance, without active membership
- Appurtenance in the past
- Without any kind of appurtenance

The categories of voluntary associations included in the questionnaire were:

The table below shows the comparisons regarding the answers to these items for the subsamples of Romania-Hungary.

Table 2. Association membership and participation in Romania and Hungary

Type of association	Country	Member and active participant	Member, but not active participant	Used to be a member, but not anymore	Never been a member
... Sport club or any organization for outdoor activities	Hungary	3.3	1.7	7.8	87.2
	Romania	4.8	3.0	13.8	78.4
... Artistic, musical-cultural or hobby organization	Hungary	2.4	1.6	3.0	93.0
	Romania	3.5	4.3	13.9	78.3
... Trade union	Hungary	2.0	2.7	19.5	75.8
	Romania	2.4	4.8	15.6	77.2
... Business, professional or farmer organization	Hungary	0.7	0.9	1.4	97.0
	Romania	4.8	1.6	5.0	88.6
... Humanitarian, charity, human rights, minority or immigrant organization	Hungary	0.8	0.2	0.6	98.4
	Romania	1.5	1.9	4.8	91.8
... Environmental, peace or animal protection organization	Hungary	0.4	0.1	0.9	98.6
	Romania	0.9	1.4	5.2	92.5
... Religious or church organization	Hungary	4.0	3.5	1.9	90.6
	Romania	16.5	19.0	8.6	56.0
... Political party	Hungary	0.5	0.6	1.6	97.3
	Romania	2.6	6.4	11.5	79.6
... Scientific, educational or parents and teachers' organization	Hungary	0.9	0.5	1.9	96.7
	Romania	2.4	2.9	6.4	88.4
... Social organization of senior citizens or of people with disabilities	Hungary	1.8	0.0	0.4	97.8
	Romania	2.0	1.4	3.2	93.4
... Youth work (e.g. boyscout, tourist guide, youth club)	Hungary	0.5	0.8	4.2	94.5
	Romania	1.1	3.5	7.4	88.0
... Other voluntary organization	Hungary	1.4	0.3	1.7	96.6
	Romania	2.5	3.4	5.4	88.6

The answers to the questions for the identification of the membership type have been agreed by counting the affirmative answers for each type of membership, thus generating 3 scores of individual membership: active membership, inactive membership, past membership.

Analyses

In all the categories of organizations and membership, percentages are higher in the Romanian sample, as compared to the Hungarian one. The result is surprising, considering the generally low scores usually registered for this variable in Romania, as compared to those in other European countries, including Hungary, in other international comparative studies. For this situation, we can forward several explanations:

- The over-representation of urban population in the Romanian subsample, as it is well-known the fact that the inhabitants of the urban environment have a higher probability than those of the rural environment to be part of voluntary associations.

- The Romanian area included in the sample is one with high membership scores, correlated with relatively high modernity and development levels (see Sandu), while the Hungarian area included in the sample is one of the least developed areas of this country.

- For certain categories of associations, the explanation for the percentages obtained is quite simple: the religious membership is obviously more intense in Romania (a situation which explains the much higher participation rates in religious organizations), as the high numbers obtained for the category of business or agricultural organizations could be explained especially through the appurtenance to agricultural associations.

The first of the operating hypotheses is immediately rejected through the analysis of the membership per residence environments in the two countries. On the one hand, one may notice that our expectation for higher membership rates in urban areas is not confirmed, as these are larger in Romania, irrespective of the type of locality considered.

Table 3. Association membership in Romania and Hungary by type of settlement

		active participation
Hungary	urban	.15
	rural	.26
Romania	urban	.44
	rural	.44

Besides these hypotheses, the possibility of a sampling error or of different membership patterns in Romania and Hungary should not be ignored.

Membership patterns

We have built three measurements for associative membership:

1. Active membership: by counting the types of organizations which the subject declares that he is affiliated to and which he/she attends in an active manner.

2. Passive membership: by counting the types of organizations which the subject declares that he is affiliated to, but which he/she does not attend in an active manner.

3. Past membership: by counting the types of organizations which the subject declares that he has been affiliated to, but to which he/she does not belong any longer.

Table 4. Association membership by country and ethnicity

Country	Subsample	active participation	non active participation	no longer member
Hungary	Hungarian	0.19	0.13	0.45
Romania	Other (mostly Romanian)	0.40	0.56	1.15
	Hungarian	0.53	0.43	0.60

The table comparing the environments of the three indices between ethnicities per countries confirms, on the one hand, the low membership rates of Hungarian citizens and, on the other hand, it shows that Hungarian ethnics in Romania have an associative behavior specific to Romania rather than one specific to their ethnicity. For that matter, Hungarian ethnics have higher membership rates even than their Romanian ethnicity fellow citizens.

The three membership scores are not necessarily inter-correlated (as the result is consistent between countries). While the active membership score is weakly correlated ($p < 0,05$) with the non-active membership, but is not correlated with the past membership, the strongest relationship is the one between non-active membership and past membership.

Table 5. Correlations between types of participation

	active participation	non active participation	no longer member
active participation	1.000		
non active participation	0.054*	1.000	
no longer member	0.022	0.272**	1.000

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Membership – age relationship

This is probably due to the mixture of two mechanisms for the generation of membership indicators correlated with the moment of the life cycle: due to the first mechanism, young population has higher active membership rates, without having significant past membership rates whereas aged people have low active membership rates, yet potentially high values of inactive membership and past membership.

The drawings below show much more accentuated differences between age categories (grouped according to the limits of age quartile ranges) regarding the active and non-active membership rates in Romania as compared to Hungary. In Romania, active and non-active membership rates are much higher for the category below 36 years old (the first quartile) than the other three age ranges. The differences are less accentuated in Hungary. As for the past membership, while there are no variations between age groups in Romania, the pattern of age group averages in Hungary confirms our anticipations: the average number of organizations which the person was affiliated to in the past rises at the same time with age.

Figure 1. Mean active participation by age groups




Figure 2. Mean of non active participation by age groups





Figure 3. Mean of no longer participation by age group



Considering the conclusions of the analyses above as well as the hypotheses implicitly deduced from the literature analysis, we have elaborated OLS multiple regression patterns for the variation of the active membership in voluntary associations.

Table 6. OLS models of active participation by countries

	Hungary					Romania				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	sig	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	sig
(Constant)	.017	.143		.119	.905	.642	.163		3.927	.000
Respondent's Age	-.001	.002	-.028	-.655	.513	-.007	.003	-.119	-2.280	.023*
Gender (male=1)	.028	.036	.025	.782	.434	-.060	.066	-.031	-.914	.361
Education (university diploma=1)	.225	.062	.115	3.620	.000**	.302	.078	.140	3.884	.000**
Marital status (married or coabitation=1)	-.021	.036	-.019	-.586	.558	-.197	.068	-.100	-2.915	.004**

Occupation (subject retired=1)	.007	.056	.006	.132	.895	-.028	.110	-.013	-.251	.802
Type of settlement (towns and cities=1)	.116	.036	.103	3.270	.001**	.098	.070	.050	1.413	.158
Ethnicity (Hungarian=1)	.040	.119	.011	.340	.734	.222	.073	.108	3.053	.002**
	R2=0,017					R2=0,048				

Active participation has a worse determination in Hungary than in Romania – determination measures are much lower in Hungary than in Romania. In any case, the R-squares of the two models indicate unsatisfactory specifications of the model. In Hungary participation is higher in urban settlements and in the case of subjects with university diploma. In Romania, participation increases with education, it is higher in the case of Hungarian ethnics, but decreases in the case of those who are married or live in cohabitation and with age.

Main findings

- Irrespective of the membership type considered, the membership rates are higher in Romania than Hungary
- In Romania there is a much higher variation of the membership rates depending on the age than in Hungary.
- In both countries, the membership is more intense in the case of subjects with higher education.
- The regression patterning of associative membership generates better results in Romania than in Hungary. Certain errors may affect the results significantly.

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SOCIAL TRUST IN THE COUNTIES AT THE CROSS-BORDER BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA

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Preamble

The following pages explore the variations of generalized trust, one of the most important parts of the social capital in the populations investigated by the ENRI survey. I shall start by a theoretical discussion on the signification and the determinants of generalized trust and continue by introducing the results of some bi-varied comparisons and, finally, I shall pattern the trust, through multiple regression, apart from the two nations participating in the research.

Trust: theoretical plan

Trust is the most general factor which facilitates voluntary cooperation and a fundamental dimension of the social capital. Among many definitions of trust, Ostrom mentions the one of Gambetta, which he considers “a particular level of the subjective probability by which an actor assumes that another actor or group of actor shall perform a certain action” (Gambetta, 2000, p. 216). Therefore, trust allows the trusting individual to perform an action which involves the risk of a loss if the trusted individual does not do what he is expected to. Recent developments of the theories of social capital have indicated the necessity to distinguish the various types of interpersonal trust. An important issue of the specialists is to make the difference between the trust which is reducible in other forms of social capital and the irreducible trust in other forms of social capital.

In certain forms of trust, the trusting individual knows the structure of incentives where the transaction partner makes decisions either due to the repetitive nature of the interactions between them or due to the existence of other network members who monitor the actions of the trusted individual and/or due to the regulations or laws

which punish or compensate the behavior of the trusted individual. The type of trust based on the interactions between actors is called **strategic trust** (Bădescu, 2001, p. 130).

When we say that a society has high levels of trust, we actually say that its members are trustworthy, a characteristic which derives, as Collier (2002) notes, from social interactions. Consequently, trust, as a subjective belief, cannot be supported in the long run if not frequently verified by the behavior of the trusted individual. Trust also assumes the credibility of the trusting individual. It is possible that an untrustworthy individual trusts another individual. However, it seems quite reasonable to assume that those who are credible in their turn manifest higher levels of confidence, as a projection effect, so that a collectivity with a high level of trust is not a larger group of naïf individuals, but a collectivity of individuals who, by repeated interactions, have built reciprocal trust beliefs.

Most of the positive expectations regarding the behavior of the other individuals are consequences of other forms of social capital, in other words being “rational” consequences of the repeated interactions, of the institutions or regulations in a certain context. Specialists have identified a much more important form of trust, irreducible to the dimensions of social capital and which can be assimilated, at the psycho-sociological level, to a certain type of social orientation. We can imagine the individuals as being disposed on a continuum of the extent to which they are willing to trust others, where, to an end are the individuals who always cooperate, even in the absence of those attributes of the situation which makes the partners more credible, and to the other end are those who never cooperate, irrespective of the context. Unconditionally cooperative social orientation seems to be the psycho-sociological term closest to the **generalized trust**, which is also the most used type of trust in the debates concerning the nature of social capital. Generalized trust is conceptualized as a “central value manifested through optimism and trust in the others and through the conviction the environment exterior to the individual can be controlled” (Bădescu, 2001, p.129). Empirical data suggest the fact that few individuals are unconditionally cooperative. On the contrary, besides networks and institutions, the equity and correctness reasons affect the probability that individuals adopt conditional

cooperation in situations of collective actions. Generalized trust is the ingredient considered to be necessary for the competitive functioning of societies, able to solve their problems by producing collective goods. Its source is uncertain – recent studies indicate its rather exogenous source (Rothstein, 2000; Stolle, 1998) to the associative membership and repeated interactions – finding contrary to Putnam’s famous hypotheses. In the same quoted material, Rothstein (op. cit.) formulates a daring hypothesis, eccentric as compared to the tradition of the reasonable selection theory: generalized trust has its origins in the group’s identity marks, which orientate, through the content of “collective memory”, the expectations of individuals regarding the behavior of others or of institutions. Uslaner has a similar conception which argues that the exogenous and stable nature of generalized trust suggests the fact that it may be assimilated to values, and that is why he proposes the term of moralist trust (Uslaner, 2002). Moralist trust is a moral commandment to treat individuals as if they were trustworthy. If Rothstein’s hypothesis is real, the possibilities of intervention, through solutions such as community or education development, for stimulating generalized trust, are quite limited. Otherwise the average levels of generalized trust constitute an indicator of a society’s moral standard (Rothstein & Stolle, 2007) which affects the transaction costs specific to the respective society.

According to Uslaner (2002, 2004), generalized trust does not depend as much on the adult experiences as on the socialization situations in the early years of life. It reflects a general perspective of optimism and control of life, while being correlated to low levels of economic inequality. As generalized trust is the best predictor for the implication into activities of support for unknown individuals, including for those who suffer or have suffered from certain forms of discrimination or marginalization – donations, charity activities, organized voluntary work, Uslaner expects to find a strong connection between generalized trust and support politics in favor of minorities. By comparing the American states, in terms of generalized trust, social politics and other dimensions of the social capital, Uslaner finds that higher levels of the social trust are correlated to larger redistributive politics, on the one hand, and with higher levels of civic commitment, on the other hand, without involving any negative effects of generalized trust.

Cultural diversity is, according to the literature, in a complex relationship with generalized trust. On the one hand, as we have already seen, minorities may benefit from high levels of trust, through reducing politics of the inequalities which are more probable in societies with high values of social trust. On the other hand, the existence of a contrary effect has been suggested: the erosion of generalized trust in situations of ethnical and/or cultural diversity. Putnam (2007) supports the hypothesis according to which the ethno-cultural diversity increases social isolation and causes the decrease of community solidarity relationships, including that of generalized trust. Whereas Putnam's American data support his hypothesis, other assessments, which use statistic data from other contexts, do not necessarily confirm Putnam's hypothesis. The series of international comparative empirical works of Hooghe, Reskens, Stolle and Trappers (2006, 2009) do not identify, for example, a negative relationship between diversity and social capital.

Generalized trust in Romania and Hungary

The various quantifications of generalized trust have constantly generated better values in Hungary than in Romania. In the World Value Survey of 1999, the percentage of Hungarian citizens who have declared that most individuals are trustworthy was almost double than in Romania (21.8% as compared to 10.1%).¹ In the Eurobarometer of 2003-2004, the average of interpersonal trust measured by a 10 point scale was of 0.159 in Romania, whereas in Hungary it was of 0.251 (Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009). These results make us anticipate higher levels of interpersonal trust in Hungary than in Romania.

Yet, the comparison regarding the levels of interpersonal trust between Hungarian ethnic individuals in Romania, Hungarian citizens (who have declared themselves as being 98% Hungarian) and Romanians, representing the majority in the Romanian subsample, is interesting. A significant difference in the levels of trust between the Hungarians and Romanians in Romania shall indicate the possibility of

¹ Comparison performed using the online analysis utility supplied by WVS and available at <http://www.wvsevssdb.com/wvs/WVSAanalyze.jsp?Idioma=I>

a cultural or religious determination of generalized trust or, the other way round, if the international differences can be reduced to differences of economic and social or institutional history composition, such as the minority statute of the Hungarians in Romania, a situation which should determine, according to the similar findings of other countries, a decrease of the level of interpersonal trust. The comparison is even more appropriate as similar studies have generated results difficult to be construed: the STRATSOC survey (2010)², performed on a sample of 4500 individuals older than 25 years old in Romania, has generated smaller values of interpersonal trust for Hungarians than for Romanians. It is interesting that the average of Hungarians is generated by very low levels of trust in the case of Hungarians from Szekely counties (among the smallest in the country), but with similar levels of trust between Romanians and Hungarians in the case of the inhabitants of border counties. Such results suggest the fact that theorizations regarding the effect of the minority statute upon generalized trust do not apply uniformly.

Trust quantification

Applying the recommendations of (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008), for the quantification of generalized trust, three Likert type, 5 level answers items have been used:

1. One should be prudent in human relationships.
2. Most people would try to take advantage of others.
3. Most often, people follow their own interests.

Table 1. What would you say about people in general: can they be trusted or one cannot be careful enough with them? (%)

One cannot be careful enough with people	16.1
2	18.3
3	35.3
4	21.6
Most people can be trusted.	8.8

²Unreleased data.

Table 2. According to you “most people try to take advantage of you if they have the opportunity” or “people try to be fair”? (%)

Most people try to take advantage of you	19.2
2	15.3
3	34.5
4	23.9
Most people try to be fair with you.	7.1


Table 3. Can we say that in most of the situations people try to help or they are mainly preoccupied with themselves? (%)

People are mainly preoccupied with themselves	19.5
2	15.2
3	33.7
4	22.4
People mostly try to help.	9.1

The summative scale built by adding the values obtained on the three questions has good consistency ($\alpha=0.809$). Individual scores have been calculated following the replacement of the 10 missing values by multiple regression.

Bi-varied and multi-varied comparisons of social trust

Figure 1. Trust by countries



Average values of the social trust score are significantly higher in Hungary than in Romania. Moreover, the Hungarians in Romania have generalized trust scores significantly higher than their majority fellow citizens. In this case, one may assume that interpersonal trust is influenced by the individual's ethnical appartenance.

Table 4. Trust by country and ethnicity

		Medie încredere interpersonală
Hungary	Hungarian	9.53
Romania	Romanian	7.14
	Hungarian	8.30

In order to better understand the inter-individual variation of the levels of generalized trust, we have patterned this variable through multiple regression, using several predictors at the individual level and at the contextual level: ethnicity, age, gender, training level, civil status, occupation and type of residence. We have performed the patterning individually, on national samples.

Table 5. OLS model of trust by countries

	Hungary				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	6.983	0.630		11.080	0.000
Respondent's Age	0.007	0.007	0.040	0.950	0.342
Gender (male=1)	-0.067	0.157	-0.014	-0.426	0.670
Education (university education=1)	0.353	0.275	0.041	1.287	0.198
Marital status (married or coabitation=1)	-0.151	0.158	-0.032	-0.953	0.341
Occupation (subject retired=1)	-0.205	0.245	-0.036	-0.834	0.404
Settlement type (urban=1)	0.314	0.157	0.063	2.001	0.046*
Ethnicity (Hungarian=1)	1.935	0.524	0.117	3.695	0.000**
	R ² =0,014				

	Romania				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	3.347	0.577		5.801	0.000
Respondent's Age	0.026	0.011	0.124	2.408	0.016*
Gender (male=1)	0.126	0.230	0.019	0.547	0.584
Education (university education=1)	0.763	0.272	0.100	2.799	0.005**
Marital status (married or coabitation=1)	-0.013	0.238	-0.002	-0.057	0.955
Occupation (subject retired=1)	-0.540	0.386	-0.072	-1.401	0.162
Settlement type (urban=1)	1.799	0.245	0.258	7.344	0.000**
Ethnicity (Hungarian=1)	1.305	0.255	0.178	5.118	0.000**
	R ² =0,09				

The regression model explains very little the dependent variable in Hungary while it explains almost 10% of the variance in Romania. This is due to much stronger effects in the case of settlement type and ethnicity in Romania, on the one hand, and to two additional positive influences: age (the higher the age, the stronger and the more trusting the individual) and education (people with higher education credentials in Romania are more trusting than the others – which is not the case in Hungary).

The regression patterns above are not satisfying for explaining the variations of the generalized trust, first of all because the necessity of using multi-level regression has not been explored: provided that the literature highlights the importance of collectivities' ethnical composition upon our dependent variable, this approach is necessary.

Further analyses should begin from a better specification of the regression patterns, on the one hand, but should also apply more appropriate regression techniques for the type of available data. Considering the data grouped character, the inter-group variation of generalized trust should be verified and, depending on the ICC coefficient generated by the assessment, the decision of patterning trust through multi-level regression should be made.

Main findings

- Social trust is significantly higher in Hungary than in Romania.
- The level of trust is rather ethnically specific than nationally specific: in Romania, Hungarians have much higher levels of trust than Romanians.
- Simple regression patterns explain very little the variation of trust. The explained version is much larger in Romania than in Hungary.

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ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

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The generalized and institutional trust is one of the resources relied on the conditions necessary for ensuring the functioning of democracy. In the case of a real and functioning democracy, the collective action cost is low and thus it increases the citizens' participation in the production of collective goods (Uslaner, 2002). Active citizenship is seen as the cornerstone of ensuring the development of democratic attitudes (Putnam, 2000).

Social trust is one of the defining elements and a fundamental source of capital and also a condition of social action generation. From this perspective, Coleman (1990) and Uslaner (2001) argue that social action would not be possible without the rule of reciprocity and predictability of behavior of those with which one interacts. Thus, trust in others ensures collective action: with no trust that the other community members will participate in the production of public goods is unlikely to produce action (Voicu, 2006). Low social capital, mainly the low level of social trust leads to the increase of the collective action cost (Norris, 2002) and lower levels of trust in institutions that referee the observance contracts, something that causes the erosion of interpersonal trust (Rothstein, Stole, 2002);

One of the first theorists who have studied the problem of social trust was Luhmann (1979). He offers a functionalist perspective on the concept, wondering which the relevance in explaining the social life is. The author considers trust a crucial element of social life that it has the function to reduce the complexity of making it so manageable (predictable) for individuals. The distinction between inter-personal trust and confidence in what he calls trust in the system (institutional), the author stresses the cultural dimension in both cases: whether the trust is secured by the legal system, it is controlled by each culture symbolic, being taught by members of communities. Luhmann defines trust as an attitude towards other individuals or to the broader social system, but also as a social norm of different cultures.


Regarding the determinants of confidence in institutions, the literature is large and often disputed by different schools of thought. Bouckaert et al. (2002) identified two approaches, namely the perspective of "identity" and "performance". Developing this approach, we established three categories to ensure confidence building in institutions: the prospect of "socialization", the perspective of "performance evaluation", and a combined perspective that is reshaping the entire conceptualization of trust in institutions. In the first group, trust in institutions is explained in terms of cultural factors such as social norms, traditions and beliefs, and thus the change is a matter of socialization, education and symbols (Caron-Shepperd, Judy, 1999). In the second category, trust in institutions is primarily derived from the assessment of efficiency and the results thereof. From this perspective, increasing people's confidence in a particular institution is closely linked to the growth of performance and its analysis often highlights the inverse relationship –the corruption perceived is a deterrent to capital development (van der Meer et al., 2009). In most cases, in literature the causality is accepted as a result of both factors, both the cultural and those related to performance, and a new approach to the issue of institutional trust is suggested (Jagodzinski, 1998; Mishler, Rose, 1997).

Offe (1996) discussed two types of trust in terms of how they are generated: *diffuse trust* and *specific trust*. Trust in institutions is diffuse because people have confidence in the underlying structure of the institutions, and analyzes their work from this point of view, because their very nature, responding to social needs, as potential supportive tools in society. Trust in this matter results more from a general adherence to the social and political symbols, rather from the satisfaction with the specific results of the institution. The *specific trust* approach requires that the masses and the elites are rational and respond to how institutions contribute to their wellbeing and the opportunities they offer. Some result of the work of the institution is thus expected, and according to this result, the leaders build a certain pattern on citizens' attitudes towards the institution concerned. If confidence is generated by the institution's ability to have positive results, it will depend on the manner in which the outputs will meet the expectations of masses and elites. A low level of trust will be an indi-

cator of poor performance of the institution and it will reflect on it. The economic crisis and some failures in society can reduce people's trust in institutions, but will not necessarily lead to a desire to change them. (See Jagodzinski, 1998). The first approach is explained by the trust in the general picture of social structure in which institutions work. From the second perspective, the levels of trust in institutions are explained by the way in which their outputs are perceived.

The results obtained in Romania (POB, 2001) indicate a breakdown in terms of attitudes about the institutions. Thus there is a confidence factor that explains the trust in the state and political institutions (e.g. the president, the legal institutions) and another factor, with a lower score, which refers to the non-state institutions, the civil society and the economic sector. Finally there is a 3rd factor that concerns the trust in those institutions that have a high symbolic value for people, such as the Church and the army (Hatos&Saveanu, 2005). Thus, a typology of trust in institutions would include the following individuals: the non-believers, those who trust in national institutions with a high symbolic value (the Church, the military, the school), those who trust in the state institutions and those who trust institutions which are autonomous such as private enterprises and NGOs.

Figure 1. Level of trust in the central intitutions, EVS 2008 source: Tufiş, 2009, p. 4



The parliament, the government, the presidency and the political parties are the main actors in the political system, the central state institutions. The reported trust in these institutions is an indication of support for the political system (Shrubbery, 2009). Romania is placed on a middle position (with an average score of 24%) compared with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of trust in these institutions and the values are lower in Hungary than in Romania for the three. It should be noted that after 2006 the trust of these institutions registered in Romania has embarked on an uptrend (idem. 2009). Low levels of trust in social institutions, low trust in the courts, parliament, etc., increase the non-involvement of the citizens also probably due to a feeling that “we cannot change anything anyway” (Hatos, Saveanu 2005; Badescu, 2001).

Trust is influenced both by individual characteristics and community characteristics. Low levels of trust are explained by: the individual's previous experiences of belonging to a minority group, lower status in terms of income and education, membership in a heterogeneous community (Alesina& La Ferrara, 2000). The study prepared by La Ferrara does not identify significant differences in trust according to the religion and ethnic affiliation.

This paper aims to explore the institutional trust levels for different types of central and local structures. The comparative analysis was performed on both samples included in the study, also stressing the differences between different perceptions of trust on ethnic minorities in both countries.

Analysis and results

The mean values of trust in institutions in both samples are presented in the table below. The scale comprises five values used, where 1 means no trust and 5, complete trust. The lowest level of trust is reflected in political parties and politicians. These values are justified by recent developments in the political climate in both countries. Importantly, the value recorded for trust in the institution of the mayor. The results are representative in the counties of the Romania-Hungary border area. The settlements in this area do not include large metropolitan cities, thus the attitude towards the mayor of

the settlements is a reported one, to the lead person and less to the institution. Together with the Mayor the local authorities also record high levels of trust. We talk about community cohesion in which both inter-personal trust and the local institutional trust are operating.

Table 1. Mean values for trust in institutions

How far do you trust	Mean	Std. Deviation
... the Parliament of Your Country?	2,26	1,165
... the Government of Your Country?	2,29	1,236
... the judicial system?	2,50	1,198
... the police?	2,81	1,217
... the politicians?	2,01	1,042
... the political parties?	1,97	1,023
... the county authorities?	2,67	1,163
... the locality authorities?	2,94	1,262
... the mayor?	3,12	1,318
... the European Parliament?	2,67	1,159
... the European Union?	2,58	1,164

The values recorded for the institutions are presented different depending on the level to which the authority is reported. The figure below shows the groups in terms of levels of trust in local and central level institutions. Such similar values of trust are reflected for politicians, political parties, Parliament, Government and the legal system, in another category the European institutions are found: the European Parliament and the European Union, and the third group contains the values recorded for local authorities: the County Council, the County Council, the Mayor and the police.

Figure 2. Hierarchical cluster analysis

The table below shows the comparative analysis of trust in institutions registered in the two samples:




Table 2. Mean values for trust in institutions recorded in Romania sample and Hungary sample

How far do you trust the...	ROMANIA		HUNGARY	
	Mean	std. dev.	Mean	std. dev.
... Parliament of Your Country?Country?	1,67	0,94	2,74	1,11
... the Government of Your Country?	1,65	0,95	2,81	1,19
... the judicial system?	1,90	1,03	2,98	1,10
... the police?	2,29	1,21	3,24	1,05
... the politicians?	1,60	0,94	2,34	1,00
... the political parties?	1,61	0,93	2,27	1,00
... the county authorities?	2,23	1,16	3,04	1,03
... the locality authorities?	2,43	1,23	3,35	1,13
... the mayor?	2,67	1,34	3,49	1,17
... the European Parliament?	2,26	1,16	3,00	1,05
.. the European Union?	2,26	1,17	2,84	1,09

For all institutions the level of trust measured in Hungary is higher than that registered in Romania, the group previously identified on

maintaining the trust granted being for the most part on the two sub-samples. All differences are statistically significant (Sig.=.000), except for the variable recording the trust in the judiciary system. The biggest differences between the mean values are recorded for the trust in the Government and the Parliament.

In the case of the Romanians, the only institution in which trust is above the average is the Mayor, the local authorities being close to this value. In Hungary, however, only the levels of trust in political parties and politicians are below the average.

A similar situation is obtained also for the differences between the two ethnic groups in the two countries, the Hungarian and the Romanian, no matter where they live. The differences between the means are significant (Sig.<.001) except for the variable trust in politicians. The biggest difference between the average values is obtained for the trust in the Government

Table 3. Mean values for trust in institutions recorded for Romanian and Hungarians from both countries

How far do you trust the...	Ethnicity	Val. medie	Dev. std.	Marja de eroare std.
... Parliament of Your Country?	Hungarian	2,50	1,156	,023
	Romanian	1,79	1,022	,032
... the Government of Your Country?	Hungarian	2,57	1,233	,025
	Romanian	1,74	1,033	,033
... the judicial system?	Hungarian	2,72	1,179	,024
	Romanian	2,05	1,106	,035
... the police?	Hungarian	2,97	1,162	,024
	Romanian	2,56	1,268	,040
... the politicians?	Hungarian	2,19	1,016	,021
	Romanian	1,67	1,030	,033
... the political parties?	Hungarian	2,14	1,017	,021
	Romanian	1,66	,971	,031
... the county authorities?	Hungarian	2,87	1,100	,022
	Romanian	2,27	1,199	,038
... the locality authorities?	Hungarian	3,17	1,193	,024
	Romanian	2,43	1,257	,040
... the mayor?	Hungarian	3,32	1,243	,025
	Romanian	2,70	1,374	,043

... the European Parliament?	Hungarian	2,85	1,099	,023
	Romanian	2,27	1,192	,038
... the European Union?	Hungarian	2,73	1,119	,023
	Romanian	2,26	1,193	,038

In the analysis conducted on the sample in Romania, the situation is different: in most cases the mean values of trust in institutions are higher for Romanian ethnicity citizens, compared with the Hungarians. However the differences are significant only for certain variables (see table below). The situation is explained by reference to the authorities of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Thus, although in this area the political party representing the interests of this minority has its support and is represented by both the Government and the leadership of local public institutions (City and County Council, and other local institutions), the institutions as representatives of the local and central authority for the Hungarian minority are unreliable.

Table 4. Mean values for trust in institutions recorded for Romanian and Hungarians from Romania

How far do you trust the	Ethnicity	Mean	Std. dev	Std. Error Mean.	Levene's Test	
					F	Sig.
... Parliament of Your Country?	Hungarian	1,51	,762	,035	48,669	,000
	Romanian	1,79	1,021	,032		
... the Government of Your Country?	Hungarian	1,54	,811	,037	30,373	,000
	Romanian	1,74	1,033	,033		
... the judicial system?	Hungarian	1,68	,854	,039	23,921	,000
	Romanian	2,04	1,104	,035		
... the police?	Hungarian	1,86	,924	,042	93,429	,000
	Romanian	2,56	1,268	,040		
... the politicians?	Hungarian	1,53	,797	,036	25,563	,000
	Romanian	1,67	1,031	,033		
... the political parties?	Hungarian	1,57	,865	,039	3,628	,057
	Romanian	1,66	,972	,031		
... the county authorities?	Hungarian	2,20	1,110	,050	1,229	,268
	Romanian	2,26	1,198	,038		
... the locality authorities?	Hungarian	2,44	1,154	,052	5,240	,022
	Romanian	2,43	1,256	,040		

... the mayor?	Hungarian	2,57	1,267	,058	3,426	,064
	Romanian	2,70	1,374	,043		
... the European Parliament?	Hungarian	2,24	1,113	,051	1,343	,247
	Romanian	2,27	1,192	,038		
... the European Union?	Hungarian	2,25	1,130	,052	,330	,566
	Romanian	2,26	1,194	,038		

The results based on the residential environment on the two countries also reveal differences: in Hungary, greater trust in the urban rather than in the rural area is recorded for the Government, the judiciary system and the police. In the case of the local authorities in Hungary confidence is higher in rural area compared with the urban area, which is most likely explained by a better knowledge of the actions and a more direct control over their population in rural areas than in the urban areas.

In Romania, trust is higher in the rural areas, regardless of the institution type, the differences being significant in most types of institutions. The exceptions are the local authorities, the mayor and the European Parliament for which trust levels are the highest.

Table 5. Mean values for trust in institutions recorded for rural and urban settlements from Romania and Hungary

Country	How far do you trust the...	Settl.	Mean.	Std. dev.	Std. Error Mean	Levene's Test	
						F	Sig.
Hungary	... Parliament of Your Country?	urban	2,79	1,130	,032	3,597	,058
		rural	2,65	1,077	,040		
	... the Government of Your Country?	urban	2,88	1,239	,035	16,663	,000
		rural	2,71	1,100	,041		
	... the judicial system?	urban	3,07	1,126	,032	5,767	,016
		rural	2,82	1,044	,039		
	... the police?	urban	3,25	1,077	,030	15,003	,000
		rural	3,21	1,000	,037		
	... the politicians?	urban	2,36	1,011	,028	3,390	,066
		rural	2,31	,979	,036		

	... the political parties?	urban	2,24	,988	,028	1,290	,256
		rural	2,33	1,024	,038		
	... the county authorities?	urban	2,99	1,089	,031	20,744	,000
		rural	3,13	,923	,035		
	... the locality authorities?	urban	3,23	1,131	,032	,489	,484
		rural	3,56	1,101	,041		
	... the mayor?	urban	3,34	1,172	,033	8,599	,003
		rural	3,75	1,133	,042		
	... the European Parliament?	urban	2,90	1,135	,032	68,346	,000
		rural	3,17	,851	,032		
	... the European Union?	urban	2,79	1,156	,033	57,114	,000
		rural	2,92	,955	,036		
Romania	... Parliament of Your Country?	urban	1,54	,831	,026	40,770	,000
		rural	1,88	1,061	,044		
	... the Government of Your Country?	urban	1,51	,805	,025	85,711	,000
		rural	1,90	1,125	,046		
	... the judicial system?	urban	1,78	,952	,030	14,715	,000
		rural	2,12	1,127	,047		
	... the police?	urban	2,14	1,112	,035	37,807	,000
		rural	2,56	1,315	,054		
	... the politicians?	urban	1,45	,793	,025	81,159	,000
		rural	1,86	1,116	,046		
	... the political parties?	urban	1,46	,778	,024	87,441	,000
		rural	1,87	1,091	,045		
	... the county authorities?	urban	2,14	1,118	,035	10,235	,001
		rural	2,39	1,207	,050		
	... the locality authorities?	urban	2,30	1,198	,037	,769	,381
		rural	2,65	1,245	,051		
	... the mayor?	urban	2,47	1,283	,040	1,854	,174
		rural	2,99	1,381	,056		

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

	... the European Parliament?	urban	2,19	1,144	,036	1,881	,170
		rural	2,39	1,179	,049		
	... the European Union?	urban	2,20	1,151	,036	3,836	,050
		rural	2,36	1,204	,050		

Regarding the gender differences recorded concerning the trust in institutions, the analysis reveals significant differences only in the sample in Romania. Women have higher levels of trust. Only in the case of the police and the institution of the mayor, men have higher average levels of trust. The differences are significant only in terms of confidence in local authorities, the support for them being thus homogeneous taking into account this variable as well.

Table 6. Mean values for trust in institutions recorded for men / women from Romania


	Gender	Mean	Std. dev.	Std. Error Mean.	Levene's Test	
					F	Sig.
How far do you trust the Parliament of Your Country?	fem.	1,68	,995	,033	11,458	,001
	masc.	1,65	,847	,032		
... the Government of Your Country?	fem.	1,69	1,022	,033	18,607	,000
	masc.	1,59	,848	,033		
... the judicial system?	fem.	1,95	1,091	,036	9,542	,002
	masc.	1,84	,940	,036		
... the police?	fem.	2,28	1,252	,041	10,559	,001
	masc.	2,30	1,141	,044		
... the politicians?	fem.	1,63	1,023	,033	16,312	,000
	masc.	1,56	,823	,032		
... the political parties?	fem.	1,65	1,001	,033	21,321	,000
	masc.	1,55	,808	,031		
... the county authorities?	fem.	2,27	1,194	,039	14,847	,000
	masc.	2,18	1,102	,043		
... the locality authorities?	fem.	2,42	1,249	,041	2,601	,107
	masc.	2,43	1,196	,046		

... the mayor?	fem.	2,64	1,397	,046	15,953	,000
	masc.	2,70	1,265	,049		
... the European Parliament?	fem.	2,26	1,194	,040	9,944	,002
	masc.	2,26	1,114	,043		
... the European Union?	fem.	2,24	1,216	,040	14,890	,000
	masc.	2,29	1,110	,043		

In the following section we will use the factors extracted using the factor analysis: one refers to the items on the confidence expressed to the central level institutions (parliament, government, legal system etc.) and the second factor includes the items on confidence in local authorities (city and county council, mayor, etc.).

The average values of the two extracted factors are presented differently for the two samples. Thus the average values both for the trust in central authorities and the trust in local authorities are higher in the sample in Hungary: the average of trust in the central institutions obtained for Hungary is 0.34, compared with -0.42 obtained for Romania and the values obtained for trust in local institutions is 0.22 for Hungary and -0.27 for Romania. The differences are significant for sig. 000. $F = 47.7$ for central TRUST, respectively 106.4 for local TRUST.


Figure 3. Mean values for trust in central and local institutions, comparative analysis for Hungary and Romania



The situation is similar in the comparative analysis for the two ethnicities. The Hungarians have higher average values of trust in lo-

cal institutions than Romanians: 0.17 compared with -0.32 for trust in central institutions, and 0.12 compared with -0.28 for the local ones (sig. 000, $F = 34.86$, $F = 64.68$).

Figure 4. Mean values for trust in central and local institutions, comparative analysis for Romanian and Hungarians



The results obtained on the sample in Romania indicate higher levels of trust in central institutions in the case of the Romanians (-0.32 for the Romanians, -0.56 for the Hungarians, $F = 21.25$, sig. 000). Regarding the trust in local institutions the differences produced between the two ethnic groups are not significant. The results support the previous claim according to which the Hungarians in terms of the minority status perspective do not have confidence in the national authorities.

Regarding the subjects in Romania, the levels of trust in institutions differ by gender (sig<.005) in the sense of greater confidence in central institutions for women, and greater confidence in local institutions for men.

The relationship with the age of the subjects indicates a greater confidence in local institutions for the elderly persons (Pearson. cor-rel., 057, sig. 033).

The urban environment is characterized by lower levels of trust in local or central institutions ($F = 47.53$, $F = 12.79$, sig. 000).

Synthesis

The analysis presented reveals important differences between the two countries in terms of the levels of institutional trust, indicating that Hungarians are generally more confident both in local and central institutions. However, the order of granting trust in different types of institutions is similar for the two regions included in the study: the highest rates of trust are for the Mayor, the local authorities and the police, followed by the European Parliament, the European Union, the state authorities and the legal system. The lowest rates of trust are registered in both countries for the government, parliament, politicians and political parties, thus identified as the least credible. From the perspective of the specific trust, these institutions do not justify their activity, their results and their image being negatively assessed.

Those who are less confident in institutions as the representatives of ethnic minorities, namely the Hungarians in Romania, the average being significantly different in terms of the national institutions and the local and international ones. This result suggests a possible effect of perceived discrimination of the Hungarian minority in the central institutions (parliament, government and legal system), including the political parties and the politicians. On the other hand, it might be a result of the political discourse of these minorities that sometimes help to decrease even more the legitimacy of the state institutions, or an effect of the participation in the government of the political parties representing the Hungarians. The fact that at a local level the Hungarians' level of trust is not significantly different from that of the Romanians (both being high) suggests on the one hand the effectiveness of a Hungarian political representation in local institutions (City Hall, local council), but also the fact that in this region the situations of discrimination are probably more rare and they do not affect the way in which the institutions are perceived.

From the perspective of the theories on the institutional trust, these results reinforce the difference between the types of institutions analyzed: those closest to the citizen are directly observed and measured – trust being rather specific, while the international ones (the European Parliament and the European Union) are related to the diffuse trust, culturally transmitted through various media channels, which give them legitimacy.

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ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE RIGHTS OF ETHNICAL MINORITIES

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Preamble

In this chapter dedicated to the analysis of the ENRI investigation data, we shall approach the subjects' attitude towards the rights of ethnic minorities. This is a dimension of ethnic attitudes, together with measures like "social distance" or ethnic identity and, at the same time, it allows, together with the measures of national attachment, to make a difference between ethnic nationalism – a form of exclusivist national attachment - and civic nationalism, where the tolerant attitude towards cultural diversity is correlated with the attachment towards the national community which the individual is part of. More precisely, in this chapter I shall compare the measure's averages for the attitude towards the rights of ethnic minorities calculated on different subsamples (Romania versus Hungary, Romanians versus Hungarians, etc.) and pattern the variation of this measure depending on the predictors at individual level and at collectivity level.

Theoretical incursion into the genesis of ethnic attitudes

The theories on the determinants of ethnic tolerance may be classified into individualist patterns, which emphasize individual variables, on the one hand, and contextual patterns, on the other hand, where the explanation of reciprocal attitudes of the minority and majority uses variables that describe the situation where the interaction between minority and majority occurs. The results of recent studies confirm the fact that ethnic tolerance cannot be fully explained, except by considering both individual predictors and collectivity predictors.

Individualist patterns

In the early period of the studies dedicated to ethnical tolerance, Samuel Stouffer had stated (1955) that the intolerance is the natural disposition of individuals. Later on, the theories of social psychology (Tajfel, 1981) have brought important contributions to the comprehension of mechanisms by which the intolerance or, on the contrary, the acceptance of the different individuals, may occur as a product of individual characteristics or of micro-interaction effects.

The studies covering ethnical tolerance have, among their strongest findings, the positive relationship between the ethnical tolerance and the training level (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995). One possible explanation would be that education sets individuals free from cognitive constraints, helping them to harmonize with the liberal-democrat principles of ethnical tolerance. The education's effect may interact with other determinants: according to (Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995), the less educated minority students (immigrants) of Denmark are however more tolerant than those of the majority group who have the same training level, due to their more intense participation in civic organizations, which might have, in their turn, the effect of soothing cognitive constraints.

The theories of social capital make us predict that the individual's richness of social resources is positively correlated with tolerant attitudes towards ethnical minorities. General trust, understood as moral value, according to Uslaner (2002) and correlative with the optimism regarding the relationships with individuals is in contradiction with a conflict perspective of relationships and alterity. On the other hand, we know that generalized trust is correlated with generosity and altruism; therefore we expect this dimension of the social capital to have a positive effect upon the attitude towards the rights of minorities.

As for the effect of civic membership, the theory-based predictions are more subtle. Despite Putnam's theses, strongly arguing that voluntary organizations are veritable incubators for trust and tolerance (Putnam, 1993), more recent theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the type of association is more important than the membership itself (Rossteutscher, 2005). Associative membership may actually be an indicator and even a generator of exclusivist attitudes and practices, of isolation in bonding networks (this is the case of

some ethnical, political or religious organizations). The higher intensity of voluntary membership in Romania than in Hungary, given the lower trust conditions in Romania than in Hungary, suggests that the membership in Romania is specific rather to similarity (*bonding*) networks, probably intensified by the ethnical competition as well, thus having a rather negative relationship with the ethnical tolerance. On the other hand, due to the plausible positive relationship – predicted by Putnamien theoreticians – between voluntary membership and tolerance, it is difficult to elaborate precise predictions concerning the effect of membership upon our dependent variable, as this is a result of the two contrary effects mentioned above.

We assume that the tolerance towards minorities is a modernity clue, on at least two causal chains, which relate the welfare to the attitudes towards alterity. A first causal chain is the one relating the subjective welfare to tolerance, through the already known mechanism of the welfare's cultural syndrome. (Inglehart, 1999). According to this hypothesis, the individuals with good social and economical status and a high subjective welfare will have high levels of adhesion to post-materialist values, including that of tolerance towards ethnical minorities. On the other hand, we also expect the objective welfare to have an effect upon the dependent variable. Therefore, we predict that the score of the attitude towards minorities' rights will also be correlated with other social and economical status indicators, such as the origin environment. Consequently, based on the theory of attitudinal modernization, we expect the residents in urban areas, considered to be more modern, who have access to modern information and attitudes and promote tolerance and diversity acceptance, to have a higher tolerance towards the rights of citizens who are part of minority groups.

We may assume the manifestation of a contextual political socialization effect, perceptible at the individual level, which may differentiate the attitudes of minority subjects – eminently Hungarians – from those of the Romanian majority. For example, the emancipating discourse of the Hungarian elite has strongly insisted on the rhetoric of equality and tolerance between majority and minority. This approach is instrumental for the Hungarian minority, considering the politically inferior statute of the Hungarian ethnical institutions in Romania.

Considering the situation of the Hungarians in Romania, and especially the presumed effect of the exposure to this kind of discourse, the hypothesis that the Hungarians would support more the equality of rights between majority and minority is plausible.

Contextual factors

The appeal to contextual variables is based on famous patterns, such as that of heterogeneity and inequality structural theory of (Blau, 1977) or those of a more operational nature of the ethnical attitudes of (Allport, 1979; Blalock, 1967; Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic, 1999). They approach the nature of the effects of interactions between groups upon reciprocal attitudes and consider that the tolerance between majority and minority is the result of certain population settlements as well as of power distribution, especially if manifested in ethnical enclaves. In 1955, Allport had stated, in his famous work on the nature of prejudice, that one of the premises of the positive effects of contacts between different ethnical-cultural categories is the equal statute of the groups in contact. The meta-analytical synthesis of Mullen (1992) and partners (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) on the tests of Allport's hypothesis shows that the in-group bias increases at the same time with the relative statute in the lab groups, but actually decreases in the field researches. Again a synthesis of the research results elaborated by Pettigrew (1998) suggests that the contact decreases the prejudice, but the results are not, overall, very conclusive for this purpose. While studying ethnical attitudes on a sample with more than 10000 subjects from Yugoslavia, before the outbreak of the ethnical violent acts that generated the destruction of the respective country, (Massey, et al., 1999) has found that the highest intolerance was manifested in ethnical enclaves and the most intolerant individuals were the majority members living in minority dominated enclaves, the exacerbation of the intolerance being explained through the resentment and the restrictions towards the government. The minorities living in enclaves were also more intolerant than when being dispersed among majorities – a reaction to the power caused by the majority situation as well as to the minority anxiety.

All these researches suggest differences in the attitudes towards minorities, depending on the composition of the collectivities includ-

ing majority and minority members. On the one hand, the contact between groups – here we take into account the Hungarians and the Romanians – could, according to Allport or Pettigrew, diminish the tensions. On the other hand, the relatively unequal statute could generate the exacerbation of the intolerance. Therefore, we expect the intolerance to increase among Romanians, as the Hungarians' weighting grows, where, the same as in the Yugoslavian example, the resentment caused by the restrictions of the dominant statute may generate the rejection of the out-group. Analogously, the reaction of the Hungarian subjects of the Hungarian majority collectivities should be less tolerant to the increased power generated by the enclave situation or, their reaction should be more intolerant if we follow the Yugoslavian example above. Important questions also generate the other situations of the possible combinations, which include the ethnicity and composition of the school collectivity.

Quantification

In order to investigate the attitudes towards political, social and economical membership of ethnical groups, especially of the minority groups, we used a scale made of 6 items adapted from the scale of attitude towards minorities, initially implemented in the IEA Cived of 1999, and by us in the investigation of the CNCSIS project "Teenagers – future citizens"¹. The scale's items were: *Here are several statements. Please indicate to what extent you agree with them: The children who are part of certain ethnical groups (Hungarians, Slovaks, Roms, etc.) have smaller chances than other children to a better education in this country; The adults who are part of certain ethnical groups have smaller chances than others to obtain good jobs in this country; All ethnical groups should have equal chances to obtain a good education in this country; All ethnical groups should have equal chances to obtain good jobs in this country; Schools should teach their students to respect the members of ethnical groups; The members of all ethnical groups should be encouraged to participate in elections for public positions.* The agreement or disagreement with these questions was recorded on a 5 stage Likert scale.

¹For an analysis with this scale, used for samples of 8 – 12 grade students of Oradea, see Hatos (2010).

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the items for the attitude towards minority rights (%)

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree and disagree to the same extent	Agree	Strongly agree	DK	DA
1. The children who are part of certain ethnical groups (<i>Hungarians, Slovaks, Roms, etc.</i>) have smaller chances than other children to a better education in this country	23.1	18.3	17.4	19.6	19.4	1.9	.2
2. The adults who are part of certain ethnical groups have smaller chances than others to obtain good jobs in this country	15.0	14.2	22.6	22.6	23.7	1.7	.2
3. All ethnical groups should have equal chances to obtain a good education in this country	1.7	3.1	13.7	32.9	47.7	.8	.2
4. All ethnical groups should have equal chances to obtain good jobs in this country	1.9	3.6	13.8	33.1	46.7	.6	.2
5. Schools should teach their students to respect the members of ethnical groups	2.9	3.1	14.3	32.4	46.6	.5	.2
6. The members of all ethnical groups should be encouraged to participate in elections for public positions	7.2	6.9	25.8	26.7	31.0	2.2	.3

The above table proves the fact that the most generalized agreement is obtained by the statements stipulating principles of chance equality whereas the items containing negative assessments of the current reality have a lower agreement. The 6 item scale is highly accurate ($\alpha > 0.8$) in both subsamples. There are incomplete data of this scale in 61 cases (0.6% of the sample), so the input of missing values is recommendable. They have been replaced by multiple regression. The final score of each subject was determined by adding the values for each item.

Results


Bi-varied comparisons

The comparisons between Romania and Hungary indicate a higher level of the acceptance of ethnic minorities in Romania than in Hungary. Non-parametric tests show that the distributions between the two populations are different²

Table 2. Attitude towards the rights of minorities per countries

GROUP	N	Mean	Stand. dev.
Hungary	998	21.901	5.245
Romania	808	23.271	4.184

Figure 1. Distributions of attitude towards minorities per countries



Several correlations may be indicated for this finding: either that the results are affected by the over-representation of the urban population in the Romanian sample – expecting that the tolerance towards minorities to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas, or that the average attitude in Romania is influenced by the high weighting of the Hungarians in this sample, who are themselves in the situation of

² p(K-S)<0,01; p(Shapiro-Wilks)<0,01

being minorities. The comparisons of the averages for the attitudes towards ethnical minorities confirm the second operational hypothesis: the average scores per countries are not seriously affected by the distributions per averages, in exchange they are affected by the presence of a massive subsample of individuals belonging to an ethnical minority in the Romanian subsample: the Hungarians. Naturally, the Hungarians from Romania have higher scores for the attitude towards ethnical minorities than the representatives of the majority in Romania. Actually, the differences between the Hungarians in Hungary and the Romanians in Romania are insignificant in terms of perception of the desirable treatment for ethnical minorities.

Table 3. Attitude towards minority rights per countries and averages

Country	Settlement type	Ethnic attitude
Hungary	urban	22.87
	rural	20.19
Romania	urban	23.75
	rural	22.43

Table 4. Attitude towards minority rights per countries and ethnicities

Country	Ethnicity	Ethnic attitude
Hungary	Hungarian	21.84
Romania	Other (Romanian)	22.30
	Hungarian	25.55

Multi-varied patterning of the attitude towards the rights of ethnical minorities

To explain the attitude towards ethnical minorities (ethnical ideology), we have made a block patterning, using three blocks of variables: 1) structural individual variables: gender, training level, marital status, ethnicity; 2) individual attitudes and behaviors: social trust, associative membership and life satisfaction; 3) Context characteristics: Harfindahl ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and the type of locality (urban or rural). Some context variables have not been included in the patterning due to the co-linearity risk (the country – strongly correlating with ethnicity and the locality's total population – correlating with the locality type).

The individual predictor patterns have had a low determination level (1.4% for the pattern including 1 and 2 variable blocks), whereas the introduction of the two context characteristics has generated a bounce of the determination coefficient to 9.6%. One may deduce from here that the attitudes of ethnic ideologies have a strong contextual determination. This finding suggests that the interactional hypotheses, such as the contract or conflict hypothesis, could be valid for explaining the ethnic ideologies of the Romanians and Hungarians living at the common border of Romania and Hungary.

Results of the multi-varies patterning

Quite unexpectedly, the gender, the marital status or the age do not seem to have significant effects upon the dependent characteristic.

The patterns consistently indicated negative parameters for Romanians. The parameters' signification increases at the same time with the introduction of the predictors in blocks 2 and 3. This could be the clue for a strong exclusivist, ethnic nationalism type ideology, generalized at the level of the entire Romanian ethnicity population, which affects the representation of the minority rights, irrespective of the social and economical statute or of the context characteristics. The sources of this ideology cannot be credibly investigated with the data used in our study.

Once with the introduction of the 3rd block variables, the training level seems to have a negative effect upon the tolerance towards minority rights: the results suggest that ethnic nationalism is stronger as the individual is more educated. This indicates the persistence of a romantic culture, probably perpetuated by the nationalist pedagogy as well, which reproduces to a great extent, the dominant ethnic nationalist ideology during the modernization period of the two countries.

The variables of the social capital – trust and associative membership – have an unexpected effect on the ethnic ideology. At the verification performed following the context variables, both trust and membership have negative effects, in other words, the stronger the trust and associative membership are, the more the tolerance towards the rights of ethnic minorities decreases. From this result, corroborated with the variation of the signification of the parameters of the two variables to the introduction of the context's measures, we can include the following:

1. The recorded forms of social capital indicate rather exclusive, bonding-type options of sociability. This aspect is obvious in the case of associative membership, where we have already recorded the unexpected result of a more intense membership in Romania than in Hungary, a result which we have attributed, to a certain extent, to the ethnical mobilization in the various ethnical contexts of the N-W Transylvania. As for trust, we can only assume such logic – the generalized trust scale may however measure, to a large extent, the strategic trust.

2. The relationship between the social capital and the dependent variable depends on the context variables: the parameters of trust and associative membership are strongly affected by the introduction of the collectivity's ethnical composition and the collectivity type into the patterning. Consequently, the trust parameter loses part of its signification whereas the membership parameter increases, both of them suggesting that the impact of the social capital is different depending on the social context where it is measured.

An interesting parameter is that of the subjective welfare upon the dependent variable: individuals with high levels of subjective welfare have higher levels of tolerance towards minorities' rights as well. This parameter, together with the ethnical one, probably explains the differences between Romania and Hungary regarding the distribution of the dependent variable.

The patterning results, depending on the context variables, apparently confirm the contact hypothesis. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index has a very strong impact upon ethnical ideologies: the more diverse is a collectivity from this point of view, the more tolerant are the individuals of the respective collectivity, even if verified according to the subject's ethnicity. The reverse effect, predicted by the theory of power and statute, is not confirmed. According to the logic emphasized by the regression pattern, for example, the Romanian ethnicity subjects become more open-minded for granting certain rights to their fellow citizens who belong to ethnical minorities as the communities where they live are more diverse.

On the other hand, the effect of the residence area type is again unexpected: the acceptance of minority rights is inhibited in the urban area, as compared to urban areas. This, together with the effect of

the training level, explains the small aggregated disadvantage of the Hungarian subjects as compared to the Romanian ones.

However, the results of these analyses should be treated prudently, due to their limited validity. The data has been gathered using multi-stage sampling, being thus grouped according to the localities initially selected at the first sampling stage. This aspect raises the issue of intra- and inter-specific variation. If the inter-specific option, quantified through the inter-correlation coefficient, exceeds the 5 % threshold of the total variation, it is necessary to use the hierarchical (multi-level) linear regression for the analysis of the data. In this case, the real impact of the context variables shall be better known, as well as the effect of the interactions between context and individual variables.

Main findings

– The acceptance of minority rights is significantly higher in Romania than in Hungary. This is due to the scores of the Hungarian subjects in Romania. Actually, no differences have been recorded from this point of view between the Romanians in Romania and the Hungarians in Hungary.

– Multi-varied patterns suggest a widespread of a nationalist ethnical ideology, indicated by the negative effects of the high training level and of the urban residency upon the tolerance towards the rights of ethnical minorities.

– The data indicate a negative effect of the civic membership upon ethnical tolerance. Corroborated with the results that show a more intense voluntary membership in Romania than in Hungary, we have the proof for the membership increase due to the reactive solidarity in conditions of ethnical competition. In this case, the membership is of bonding type and encourages the ethnical type exclusivism.

– Multi-varied patterns confirm the contact hypothesis regarding the explanation of ethnical attitudes: the measures of ethnical tolerance increase at the same time with the ethno-cultural (Harfindahl) fractionalization index of the investigated locality.

– The above results should be received from the perspective of the limits of the statistic data and techniques used. More thorough analyses should validate the data of the comparative investigation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand should apply statistic techniques corresponding to the type of available data.

Table 5. OLS regression patterns for the attitude towards minority rights

	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	22,900	0,427		53,668	0,000
Gender (male=1)	-0,325	0,239	-0,033	-1,359	0,174
Education (university diploma=1)	-0,245	0,328	-0,019	-0,746	0,456
Marital status (never married=1)	-0,253	0,317	-0,020	-0,799	0,425
Ethnicity (Romanian=1)	-0,624	0,273	-0,057	-2,286	0,022
Age of respondent	-0,001	0,008	-0,002	-0,070	0,945
Associative membership					
Trust					
Life satisfaction					
% Hungarian					
Urban					
	R ² =0.003				

	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	23,519	0,788		29,860	0,000
Gender (male=1)	-0,346	0,238	-0,035	-1,451	0,147
Education (university diploma=1)	-0,172	0,333	-0,013	-0,517	0,605
Marital status (never married=1)	-0,287	0,315	-0,022	-0,909	0,364
Ethnicity (Romanian=1)	-0,899	0,294	-0,082	-3,060	0,002
Age of respondent	0,000	0,008	0,000	0,008	0,993
Associative membership	-0,065	0,071	-0,024	-0,921	0,357
Trust	-0,188	0,043	-0,117	-4,365	0,000
Life satisfaction	0,044	0,027	0,042	1,643	0,101
% Hungarian					
Urban					
	R ² =0.013				

	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	28,682	0,867		33,068	0,000
Gender (male=1)	-0,303	0,228	-0,031	-1,328	0,184
Education (university diploma=1)	-0,948	0,325	-0,073	-2,915	0,004
Marital status (never married=1)	-0,364	0,302	-0,028	-1,205	0,228
Ethnicity (Romanian=1)	-2,799	0,404	-0,256	-6,933	0,000
Age of respondent	-0,005	0,008	-0,014	-0,601	0,548
Associative membership	-0,143	0,068	-0,052	-2,097	0,036

Trust	-0,084	0,042	-0,052	-1,996	0,046
Life satisfaction	0,090	0,026	0,086	3,434	0,001
% Hungarian	-3,944	0,513	-0,291	-7,690	0,000
Urban	-2,663	0,245	-0,260	-10,878	0,000
	R ² =0.096				

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DISCRIMINATION

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Social groups play a major role in the social structure. The defining characteristics of the groups are reflected in the number of members, the group's culture, the social position, the access to resources, etc.. All these, and in particular the social position and the access to resources, generate a difference between groups, resulting in the discrimination process. Discrimination refers to the deprivation of an individual or group of the access to various resources. According to Giddens, "discrimination refers to the actual behavior to the other group. It can be seen in the activities that deter the members of a group from the opportunities offered to another, as if a black citizen is rejected for job which only available for a white one" (Giddens, 2000, p. 235)

From a sociological point of view, not only the pluri-variability of the groups is important, but also the individual and collective importance attributed to the characteristics that determine the membership to such groups. Regarding the ethnic groups, the characterization is done based on objective factors (language, religion, territory, etc.). And the subjective elements (discourse on the evolution of the community, beliefs and myths about ethnogenesis, subjective representations about the characteristic features of the group) (Horvath, 1996). The approaches that emphasize the subjective dimensions of ethnicity emphasize that it is not the objective differences that lead to the formation of some ethnic boundaries, but certain social meanings related to these differences. In this way, the objective evidence to define the borders of one ethnic group must be attached to a social relevance, and relating to it, the ethnic self-identification and hetero-identification are achieved. What is to be noted on the definition of the ethnic groups is that these common defining characteristics of the individuals included in one group are those that generate and contribute to the cohesion of that group. Closing the groups "refers to the process by which groups maintain their boundaries that separate them from other groups. These boundaries are formed by

means of exclusion, leading to the deepening of the divisions between one ethnic group and another" (Giddens, 2000, p. 237). Regarding the minority-majority relationship, it should be noted that "the members of minority groups often have a strong sense of group solidarity, derived in part from the common experience related to exclusion" (Giddens, 2000, p. 261), and consequently, attitudes and more trenchant views concerning the minority groups.

The defining characteristics of the ethnic groups are typically presented in contrast to other specific groups. These features are those that support the group's unity and the differentiation from other ethnic groups. The individual perception about the ethnicity appartenance of an individual to a particular group is based on the formation of stereotypes and prejudices about the specific characteristics of the group. These collective representations require a process of assessment and marks the formation of a certain attitude towards the individual or the group in question (Horvath, 1996). The continuous discrimination results in the marginalization which requires less access to resources and control.

Regarding the relationship between the Romanian and the Hungarian people, previous studies have identified a positive attitude towards the membership group and the discriminating attitude against the non-membership group (Paul, Tudoran & Chilariu, 2005). Both in the case of the Romanians and the Hungarians ethnocentric tendencies are identified, that is created by the enhancement of the positive image self-created. The Romanians identify themselves and identify the Hungarians predominantly taking into account the national dimension.

Discrimination in Europe and Romania

The data presented in this section are the results of the 296 special Eurobarometer made by the European Commission in 2008. According to the report, the data show positive scores for the ethnic discrimination: 62% of the respondents said that it is common in their country and for the same item in 2006 the score was higher by 2 percent (the data for 2006 refer to EU25, while for 2008 to EU27).

Compared with five years ago discrimination is seen as being less common (in 2006 and 2008) unless the ethnic origin was considered

by 49% of the respondents, more widespread in 2006 and by 48% in 2008.

15% of Europeans say they have been discriminated in the last year, of them 2% say they have been discriminated on an ethnic criteria, while in Romania the percentage of those who feel discriminated was 10%, occupying the second lowest place in Europe. One of the issues raised by the Eurobarometer is that the ethnic discrimination is more common in the case of those who were born outside Europe.

Regarding to the reporting on the discriminatory events, 3 of 10 Europeans said they were witnesses to such situations: if only 2% say they have been discriminated on ethnic criteria, 14% say that they have witnessed an event of ethnic discrimination. In Romania, the percentage of those who claimed to have witnessed a discriminatory event was 18%. Also the witnesses to situations of discrimination are in a higher proportion within those who have friends of another ethnic group: of the 14% who witnessed discrimination on ethnic criteria 21% have friends of different ethnicity.

According to the barometer in Romania, the discrimination of Romanians occurs in the following situations: 6% on the employment in a work place, at the workplace, in relation to the authorities and in public places with a score of 5%, in court and in hospital/ clinic with a score of 4%. Regarding the Hungarians, the situation is as follows: 8% of respondents on the employment in a work place, to the workplace, in relation to the authorities and in public places with a score of 7%, in court and in hospital/ clinic with a score of 6%, in school 5%.


Perception of discrimination in the border region between Romania - Hungary

Section proposes an exploratory investigation of the perception of discrimination recorded in the two regions from the border of Romania and Hungary, aiming to identify differences in the levels obtained in the two countries and the differences obtained in the two groups included in the study: Romanians and Hungarians respectively.

The specificity of the addressed theme determines primarily the highlight of certain aspects regarding the analyzed data. The pre-

sented results are based on the comparative analysis of the perception of discrimination identified in the two countries (Romania and Hungary), the two nationalities (Romanians and Hungarians in the two countries) and the two ethnic groups (Romanians, Hungarians in both countries). Starting from the characteristics that determine the assessment of discrimination, the minority status of the Romanians, or the Hungarians, represents the primary element raised in the explanation of different levels of perceived discrimination. One of the obstacles encountered in the analysis is the structure of the sample from Hungary, where we obtained an under-representation of the Romanians. This aspect determines caution in the elaboration of the statements regarding the assessment of discrimination in general and specially the ethnic discrimination. Thus, although the values obtained in Romania in the comparative analysis between the two countries and the values obtained for the Hungarians in Romania expresses a high level of perceived discrimination, the lack of data for the Romanians in Hungary, from the perspective of a minority group, can contribute to different interpretations.

Do you feel that you belong to a group that is discriminated or marginalized in this country?



The data confirm a significant difference in the perception of discrimination in the two countries ($\chi^2 = 87.7$; sig.000, adjusted residual 9.4), meaning a greater discrimination perceived by the respondents included in the sample in Romania. According to the data presented in the table below, 14.3% of the people in Romania considers as being discriminated, compared with only 2.4% of the people in Hungary.

Returning to the question mentioned above, the values obtained for sample in Romania may be influenced by the lack of evaluation of the minority group of Romanians in Hungary. Without investigating the perception of discrimination reported by this group, overall data obtained for Hungary may present different values than those obtained in this study. We consider that adding this group in the study, the percentages obtained for Hungary would increase significantly.

Moreover, regarding the explanation of the different levels of perceived discrimination for both countries, we should refer to the recent developments of migration of Romanians in the neighbor country, this movement being justified also by the purchase of homes in the border towns. For this population, the Romanian minority group membership is difficult to assess due to lack of a longer living experience in the host country (necessary to develop a sense of belonging) and also the situations in which individuals keep their jobs in Romania, they travel daily, they keep their social relations in Romania and do not invest in new social relations in the host country, so life here is carried out only around the household, without any direct contact with the majority population. These observations may consist to a subject of further investigations, which mainly should aim to assess the level of social integration of the recent migrant Romanian minority in the communities.

Perceived discrimination registered in the two countries

Perceived discrimination	Hungary	Romania	Total
NO	97,6%	85,7%	92,4%
YES	2,4%	14,3%	7,6%

Regarding the differences recorded for the two nationalities, Romanians, Hungarians respectively, the analysis reveals significant relationships: $\chi^2 = 11.4$; sig.000. For the population of the two countries, 3% of Romanians consider themselves discriminated, compared to 7.4% of the Hungarians from Romania and Hungary.

This is an interesting aspect in terms of the inclusion in the analysis of the Hungarians from Hungary, which should not record high levels of perceived discrimination, resulting in a lack of significant differences from the values obtained for the Romanians in

Romania. This result indicates a high self-perception of discrimination in the case of Hungarian population, regardless of which group they belong, the majority or the minority. It should also be noted that the data are recorded for every criterion used in the discrimination, the variable is measuring the perception of the belonging to a discriminated group, regardless of the reason for discrimination.

Perceived discrimination recorded according to the two ethnic groups

Perceived discrimination	Hungarians from Hungary and Romania	Romanians from Romania	Total
NO	92,6%	97,0%	93,8%
YES	7,4%	3,0%	6,2%

The analysis performed on the sample in Romania show the same type of relationship, and the significance value is very strong: the discrimination proves to be different according to the two ethnic groups, Romanians, Hungarians respectively ($\chi^2 = 117.7$; sig.000, adjusted residual 10.9): 31% of the Hungarians in Romania feel discriminated, compared to 3% of the Romanians in Romania. In other words, out of 89 people from Romania who consider themselves discriminated against, 75 are ethnic Hungarians. Regarding these results, it should be noted that the analysis refers to the perception of discrimination of any kind, and not just on ethnic criteria. However values obtained indicate the presence of ethnic discrimination in the border region of Romania.

Perceived discrimination recorded in Romania according to the two ethnic groups

Perceived discrimination	Hungarians	Romanians	Total
NO	68,2%	97,0%	87,4%
YES	31,8%	3,0%	12,6%

As a summary of the outcomes we affirm that between the two countries, in Romania there are many people who consider themselves discriminated and as the differences between the two nations, there are more Hungarians who consider themselves discriminated. Values obtained in Romania show high levels of perceived discrimina-

tion for the case of the minority group of Hungarians. The theme requires a comparative analysis regarding the perception of discrimination in the case of the minority populations in the two countries, Hungarians in Romania compared to Romanians from Hungary. Available data do not allow this analysis, thus such statements must be made with caution.

Characteristics of the persons discriminated

In the following we will analyze certain characteristics that relate to different levels of perceived discrimination: gender, age, education level, household income, marital status, place of residence.

Statistically relevant relations is found only if the sample from Hungary for the gender and age of subjects. Other socio-demographic characteristics do not appear involved in explaining the perceived discrimination.

The differences are recorded on the criteria of gender distribution of the respondents ($\chi^2 = 6.3$; sig.019; adjusted residual=2.5). Contrary to the expectations, the men included in this study consider themselves discriminated in a higher percentage than women, 3.9% compared to 1.4%.

Perceived discrimination recorded for gender (results for sample from Hungary)

Perceived discrimination	Fem.	Masc.	Total
NO	98,6%	96,1%	97,6%
YES	1,4%	3,9%	2,4%

The assessment of discrimination is different based on the age of subjects, meaning a higher average age for people who are not considered themselves discriminated. The relationship is significant only for the Hungarian sample ($F = 4.9$, sig. 027).

To explain the levels of perceived discrimination, the logistic regression model for the sample tested in Hungary does only explain 6% of the variance of the variable included in the analysis (Nagelkerke R Square = . 065). The model is not fully completed due to lack of the ethnicity variable, which turns out to be the main factor for the sample from Romania. Also, the variable related to household income

could not be included in the analysis because of recording errors. Among the variables included in the model, the gender and age of the subjects kept their significance, gender registering the highest values.

Explanatory model tested for the sample from Hungary

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
male01	1,196	,444	7,241	1	,007	3,306
age	-,040	,016	6,466	1	,011	,960
higher_ed01	-,222	,755	,087	1	,768	,801
Constant	-2,563	,707	13,145	1	,000	,077

The proposed model for the sample from Romania has more predictive power, explaining 31% of the variance of discrimination variable (Nagelkerke R Square = .31). Ethnicity recorded the highest values being considered the factor with the highest predictive power. Gender and age of subjects are also factors which are kept in the model, age with a negative value signifying a higher perception of discrimination among young people, and age indicating higher values for men.

These results indicate the presence of both the majority group, as well as the minority, being possible to assess the impact of ethnicity on perceived discrimination. Data indicate the auto-positioning of Hungarians in a discriminated or marginalized group. Regarding this issue, we suggest the need to investigate the real cases of discrimination compared to the perception of discriminatory attitudes, the assessment of the differences between discriminatory attitudes and discriminatory behaviors - actions is important in this context.


Explanatory model tested for the sample from Romania

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
male01	,520	,259	4,025	1	,045	1,681
age	-,021	,008	6,531	1	,011	,980
higher_ed01	,368	,312	1,388	1	,239	1,445
elem_ed01	1,013	,556	3,318	1	,069	2,754
romanian01	-2,964	,321	85,500	1	,000	,052
Constant	-,105	,439	,057	1	,811	,900

Types of discrimination

Both the above data and the results relating to the criteria by which subjects are considered discriminated confirm a discrimination in this region based on the ethnic affiliation and nationality. The three main criteria mentioned by the subjects are the nationality, the ethnicity and the language.

Why is your group discriminated (marginalized)? percent for YES



The data presented in the table below suggests higher levels of discrimination based on the nationality recorded in Romania. Of those who self-assess as part of a discriminated group on grounds of nationality, 76% are in Romania ($\chi^2= 21,5$; sig.000). The results refer to the minority group of Hungarians in Romania, which reported a higher perception of discrimination.

Perceived discrimination based on nationality, values obtained for the two countries

Perceived discrimination	Hungary	Romania	Total
NO	73,9%	23,2%	33,1%
Adjusted Residual	4,6	-4,6	
YES	26,1%	76,8%	66,9%
Adjusted Residual	-4,6	4,6	

The analyses performed on subjects from Romania confirm previous statements. The results obtained on the Romanian sample show high levels of perceived discrimination based on nationality against the Hungarians. 81.7% of them consider themselves discriminated based on nationality ($\chi^2= 6.3$; sig.024).

Values are derived from the total population that considers itself discriminated (133 people). In other words, out of 62 people who declare themselves as part of a group discriminated according to their nationality, 52 were Hungarians. Two aspects shall be mentioned regarding these results. First of all, the values of perceived discrimination compared with the average values obtained for other European countries (Eurobarometer, 2008) places Romania on a middle position, if not to the bottom of the ranking. The data from this study confirms this position with a 7.6 percentage of people who consider themselves discriminated against. However, the percentage recorded for Hungarians from Romania suggests further research to explain this self-assessment. Moreover, such a research could explore how ethnic minorities differentiate attitudes and discriminatory behaviors according to ethnicity or nationality.

Perceived discrimination based on nationality, values obtained for the two ethnic groups

Perceived discrimination	Hungarians	Romanians	Total
NO	18,3%	55,6%	22,5%
Adjusted Residual	-2,5	2,5	
YES	81,7%	44,4%	77,5%
Adjusted Residual	2,5	-2,5	

Compared with the assessment of discrimination based on nationality, ethnic discrimination values are lower. Also for this criterion, the percentages obtained in Romania are higher, so in Romania, comparing to Hungary, most of the respondents consider themselves discriminated on ethnic grounds ($\chi^2= 4.3$; sig.04):

**Perceived discrimination based on ethnicity, values obtained
for the two countries**

Perceived discrimination	Hungary	Romania	Total
NO	65,2%	41,6%	46,0%
Adjusted Residual	2,1	-2,1	
YES	34,8%	58,4%	54,0%
Adjusted Residual	-2,1	2,1	

Tests revealed no significant differences for the sample of Romania regarding ethnic discrimination recorded for the two groups, Romanians and Hungarians respectively. Thus, if discrimination based on nationality is perceived by Hungarians from Romania at a significantly higher percentage than Romanians, ethnic discrimination does not indicate such differences. We return in this sense to the statement that refers to the need to investigate differences in the self-positioning within a marginalized group, evaluation that is made according to ethnic criteria or nationality.

The data obtained following the analysis of the discrimination variable based on the language spoken confirm differences between the two countries ($\chi^2 = 16.9$; sig.000): the population in Romania record in the case of this type of discrimination as well, higher values compared with Hungary.

However the analysis carried out for the population of Romania did not indicate a greater perception of discrimination on the basis in the case of the Hungarian population. These results are interesting from the perspective of the Hungarians exclusion due to language barriers. We refer to studies that explain differences in access to higher Romanian-language education of Hungarian students that graduated Hungarian speaking education (Hatos, Bernath, 2009), but also the degree of engagement of these students in the Romanian-language schools.

Perceived discrimination based on language, values obtained for the two countries

Perceived discrimination	Hungary	Romania	Total
NO	95,7%	48,4%	57,6%
Adjusted Residual	4,1	-4,1	
YES	4,3%	51,6%	42,4%
Adjusted Residual	-4,1	4,1	

Discussion

Compared with the levels of discrimination recorded in Europe, the perception of discrimination in the study conducted in the border area between Romania and Hungary is low, only 7% of the investigated subjects reported the perception of belonging to a group discriminated or marginalized, compared with 15% recorded in Europe (Eurobarometer 296, 2008).

The results indicate a greater perception of discrimination for people in Romania. Whatever the criterion on which discrimination is evaluated, this perception is specific to the population in Romania compared to Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania as compared with the rest of the population. Consistent with the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the results confirm the perception of discrimination more intense in the case of a group with low socioeconomic status or a minor one, this explains the higher levels of perceived discrimination in the sample from Romania.

In terms of behaviors perceived as discriminating, the subjects' reporting is unclear to the social consequences of the assessment of the ethnic group they belong to, namely the negative attitude exhibited towards their own group. What is perceived as discrimination based on nationality or ethnicity may in fact be a manifestation of an attitude of passive avoidance. The responses suggest the self-perception of the situations of discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a minority group. Thus, although they were not real victims of a discriminatory behavior, the subjects responded affirmatively because they belong to a minority group and thus they consider themselves discriminated, even if this perception does not cor-

respond to the reality. So if discrimination implies a certain behavior towards an individual or a group, the results do not identify specific instances of discrimination, but rather indicate the presence of negative attitudes towards the minority group.

We believe that when describing the relations between Romanians and Hungarians in the border region between Romania and Hungary, without ignoring the events in history on the tension between the two ethnic groups, the discussion approach on the forms of manifestation of an attitude of intolerance towards other ethnic groups is not justified. The results support the apparently isolated emergence of the various expressions of prejudices, without major discrepancies between the two groups. Although discrimination occurs occasionally and isolated without causing social inequality with implications on the process of social exclusion, it must further be the subject of sociological investigations because of the potential latent inter-ethnic tensions and future developments in inter-ethnic relations in the border region (Paul, Tudoran & Chilariu, 2005). In this respect a further approach is necessary to describe concrete situations of discrimination and the motivation of perception of discriminatory situations.

The high values obtained for the Hungarian population from Romania indicates the presence of marginalization of this group. However, a comparative analysis of the relationship between perceived discrimination in the case of the two minority groups, both the Romanians (from Hungary) and Hungarians (from Romania), could lead to different interpretations. Is necessary for further investigation to include the evaluation of the Romanian population from Hungary, in order to analyze the phenomenon of discrimination in the cross-border area. We believe that the inclusion of the Romanian minority in the sample from Hungary would lead to an increase in the mean value of perceived discrimination, and a decrease of differences found between the two countries.

The assessment and the analysis of perception of discrimination in the case of different ethnic groups require a comprehensive approach and require the exploration of the factors that contribute to shaping the ethnic identity. Due to the specificity of this process, the empirical results are not always consistent with the assumptions made. Also we suggest further investigations that deepen explanatory

models that bring to light both individual characteristics and individual level processes of construction of discrimination, and a macro level approach that takes into account the characteristics of investigated communities, especially their ethnic composition.

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SOCIAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD RELATIONSHIP OF ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN ETHNICS IN BIHOR-HAJDÚ-BIHAR* CROSS-BORDER AREA

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Preamble

The topic covered generally belongs to the wider study area of social sciences and in particular in the area of sociology, of relationships between ethnical relationships. The specialty literature has developed a large theoretical and research field in this domain, organizing debates on the concepts of ethnical group, ethnicity, interethnic relationships, minority group, ethnical enclaves, etc., each of these concepts being treated from various perspectives while elaborating their own specialized and quite articulated language.

Is it still of interest the issue of minority groups and ethnical groups, the issue of understanding and analyzing interethnic relationships within the new context of the United Europe? Upon a first analysis, the question may seem meaningless. Yet, it seems that the fall of the communist system was followed by "the continuous production of nationalism" to which the "rhetoric of identity" has brought an important contribution (Calhoun, C., 1994, p. 304). Nationalism has placed the issue of ethnical minorities first in the agenda of European countries, during this period. The transition of European countries from the centralized economy to the market economy and multi-party democracy has affected the situation of minorities in two directions. First, by intensifying the self-determination process of minorities and second, by their tendency to separate from the state which they are part of. (Hugh Miall, 1994, apud Chelcea, S.,1998 p.9)

The concept of "ethnicity", although it has been frequently used in anthropology, it is quite recent (Dionisie Petcu, 1980, pp. 18-50).

* I would like to thank my colleagues Lucia Ștef and Adrian Hatos who helped me perform the statistic analyses used in this material.

The first author who has introduced the term of "ethnicity" was George Vacher de Lapouge, in 1896. He used it to designate racially homogeneous populations, which are not changed despite linguistic, cultural and demographic modifications (Cf. *Encyclopedia Universalis*, 1995, p. 971). The term has become essential in ethnologic and anthropologic researches after the second world war, becoming widespread at the end of 1960. Its acceptance is very diverse and the specialty literature assigns multiple meanings. Etymologically, it originates in the Greek word "ethnos", designating a community with common origin, common ancestors, but different from tribes which have smaller sizes.

A category of definitions understand ethnicity starting from the meaning provided by Max Weber (1978), as designating *human groups united through the belief in a common ascendancy, due to the physical similarities of habits, common culture and specific psychology*. As a consequence, it shall favor the cohesion of a group, especially in the political field.

Another category of researchers has explained ethnicity as a result of *a way of life, based on own language, psychology and culture, cumulated with spatial determination, which inevitably creates solidarities*. Therefore, according to Richard Molard, ethnicity is a community of language, habits, beliefs, values, overlapped to the spatial criterion (delimited territorial space) (apud Romulus Vulcănescu, 1979, p. 104.).

Conceived as a "socio-geographical segment of a larger assembly", ethnicity was for Paul Mercier, *a world*, "a close group", *descending from a common ancestor or with the same origin, common language and homogeneous culture*, "a political unit". For the ethnologist S. F. Nadel, ethnicity is a close group, descending from a common ancestor, too (apud *Encyclopedia Universalis*, 1995, pp. 971-972).

Starting from the multitude of perspectives upon ethnic groups, we consider as more adequate the opinions in favor of elaborating descriptive definitions which become even more operational this way for concrete studies (Rotariu, T., Iluț, P., 1996, pp. 346-347). Thus, ethnic groups may be understood as a category of social groups (as the most similar), whose specific characteristics differentiating them from other types of social groups could be certain *objective features*,

such as: common language, similar physical characteristics, habits, homogeneous culture, common origin, overlapped to a common social space, as well as *subjective features*, such as: belief in common ancestors, own discourse for historical origin and destiny, psychological features, beliefs and similar values.

Correlated to the concept term “ethnos”, the term “*ethnicity*” is more widely treated in the global specific literature. The notion of „*ethnicity*” was established in 1953 by the American sociologist David Riesman, using it in order to eliminate the pejorative meaning of particularities related to color, language, religion or even the origin of certain human groups: black, Hispanic, etc. (Guy Hermet, 1997, p. 23). As reference to the classification of people and group relationships (Pierre van den Berghe, 1978, pp. 401-411), the term ethnicity has been intensely used, since the end of the sixties, 20th century, to designate a “type of conflicts and claims qualified as “ethnic”, occurred both in developed societies and in the Third world society. Wallerstein, in 1960, and Gordon, in 1964, have used the term “ethnicity” to designate the feeling of appurtenance to a people or community (*sense of peoplehood*) of the subgroups in American society or the *feeling of loyalty* manifested towards the new urban ethnical groups of detribalized Africans, but which is also valid for other types of society (apud Dinu Bălan, *Ethnos, ethnicity, nation and nationalism. Several terminological mentions*)

The concept of *social identity*, defined as “the consciousness of the individual who is part of a certain social group, together with a certain axiological and emotional meaning related to the fact that he/she is a member of the group (M.A. Hogg și D.Abrams, 1990, p.7, apud Chelcea, S. 1998, p.11) has a special relevance in the analysis of the relationship between the individuals and the ethnical groups which they are part of and which appear as assigned groups for them. It is relevant to note that the identity’s process and assertiveness are performed through the processes of *identization* (by which the social actor is differentiated, he/she tends to become autonomous and to assert his/her individuality) and *identification* (which is the reverse process, by which the actor tends to get integrated into an ampler assembly – social group, community, social class, nation) - (Chelcea, S., 1998, p. 11). Interactionists understand social reality as

a negotiated order which permanently builds social identities which transcend the immediate situation and the individual's biography. *The manifestation of social identity is behaviorally limited by abilities and disabilities, structurally limited by the number and quality of socializing agents and dialectically limited by the social context which prefixes the set of socio-cultural expectations of the reference historic period* (sn.). These identity limitations are conceptualized as identity sources and are socially built by symbolic interaction. Consequently, territorial borders, ethnicity, gender or occupation are both limitations and social identity sources (Weigert, 1986, p. 170).

In order to identify the social factors which act as "limits" in the assertion of identities, we shall underline the theories of identities which are related to the perspective of symbolic interactionism. (namely the one called *inter-group social identity*, issued by Henri Tajfel (1981) and that of *self-categorization*, issued by John C. Turner and his collaborators (1987). Synthetically, we note that the structure of social identity blends the "self" (as a reflection of the society and which needs to be seen as a multi-faced and organized construct), on the one hand, and social structure, on the other hand. People live in networks of relatively small and role specialized social relationships which ensure their participation to these networks. The patterns of interactions and social relationships bring to attention one of the arguments of symbolic interactionism: the probability of entering a concrete social network is influenced by larger social structures which this social network is part of. Therefore, social structures provide the networks with the role of "borders" for potential new participants. Cognitive approach proves that identities are built and determined by structural social contexts. Both approaches have understood that identities are related to social roles or to behavior manifestations by means of significations. The principles of interpretative paradigm have been systematized by E. Morin (apud Mucchielli, 1986, pp. 5-12) in his theory about complexity, in particular for human sciences, emphasizing that: there is no given objective reality: human reality is a meaning (signification) reality and is built by social actors; there is not "one reality", but several realities built by different actors which coexist at the same time, none of them being "more true" than others (they do not exclude or deny each other through

coexistence); a meaning reality does not have a cause or several causes, but several causality assemblies between which the reference reality itself has a contribution (denying the positivist principle of linear causality).

When building intolerant attitudes, it would be good to analyze the stereotype building process as well (as a set of shared convictions regarding personal characteristics, personality and behavior features specific to a group of people) which are used by individuals as *identity strategy* (Liiceanu A., in Bădescu, G. et al, 2005, p.74). the author cited forwards, in accordance with the constructivist perspective, *the thesis of polar stereotyping depending on appurtenance*, according to which, in the social interaction environment, the individual meets concurrent identity offers, launched in accordance with the structure of the social processes which characterize a society at a certain moment. The individual opts for a single combination of identity sources which builds his/her multiple identity at a certain moment. In order to rationalize his/her choice, the individual invokes, together with the multiple affiliation acts, a set of polar stereotyping processes, positive for the appurtenance groups (in-groups) and negative for the out-groups. (Liiceanu, A., idem). We could similarly explain the construction of intolerant attitudes, in our case towards neighborhood.

Social frameworks of neighborhood acceptance in interethnic relationships. Sociologic inquiry performed in Bihor-Hajdú Bihar

Foreword

In this sequence of the analysis of the data obtained by the ENRI inquiry, we shall emphasize the self-placement of respondents as compared to the relevant neighborhood groups. Our investigation seizes the tolerance of the inhabitants in Bihor-Satu-Mare (RO) - Hajdú-Bihar – Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (HU) towards the most frequent ethnical groups in the area and as compared to other three significant social groups. The double perspective, given both by the hetero-identifications of Romanians and by those of Hungarians, all of them living in the cross-border area studied, offers a detailed

image of the interethnic Romanian-Hungarian relationship and reveals the way in which the two communities relate to the neighborhood context.

The objectives aimed have been:

– To grasp the level of ethnical intolerance manifested between Romanians and Hungarians by measuring the acceptance frequencies of the members of these groups (out-groups and in-groups), as neighbors;

– To emphasize significant social factors which relate to the attitudes of ethnical intolerance.

Research methodology

The data included in this study has been collected during the questionnaire based sociologic inquiry, applied to the population at the cross-border area of Bihor, Satu Mare (RO) - Hajdú-Bihar-Szabolcs-Bereg (HU). In order to fulfill the objectives proposed, we have processed and analyzed the question aiming to obtain answers regarding the subjects' acceptance of the neighborhood with the members of inter-relationship out-groups of the social space. *"If your neighbor was a member of one of the following groups, what would you think?"*

We used the question to measure the attitudes of tolerance towards the members of other groups, starting from the ideas of E.S. Bogardus for measuring the social distance by the "social distance scale" or "Bogardus' scale", as it is known in the specific literature. The social distance is defined as the "understanding and affection level which people feel for each other" (apud Chelcea, S., 2001, p. 325). In the version proposed by Bogardus, it is measured by the subjects' answers to seven questions ordered from the intensely positive attitude, (7), to the intensely negative attitude (1), requesting the approval with the statements: to have kinship by marriage, to be in a club as an intimate friend, on my street as a neighbor, as an employee in my profession, just a visitor in my country, I would exclude him from my country (apud Chelcea S., 2001, pp. 325-331). We have considered that expressing the approval regarding the neighborhood of out-group people is an indicator relevant enough for the

attitude of social tolerance, being in the middle of the scale, if we exclude its extremes. Thus, we have calculated the frequency of answers, considering them a tolerance level as compared to the various groups indicated as answer options for the question.

Sample description

The sample used for the research includes a number of 1824 respondents, structured into two sub-samples, in Hungary, made of 1000 respondents (484 respondents in Hajdú-Bihar and 516 respondents in Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg) and 824 respondents in Romania (528 respondents in Bihor, 296 respondents in Satu-Mare).

The sample's structure, from the point of view of the residence environment of the subjects, includes 1156 subjects from the urban environment (63,4%) and 666 from the rural environment (36,5%), and depending on the gender, 1064 females (58,3%) and 760 males (41,7%). According to the training level, the sample includes 1528 individuals without higher education (83,8%) and 296 with higher education (16,2%). According to the ethnical appurtenance, 507 respondents are Romanian (27,8%), 1225 Hungarian (67,2%), 40 declare themselves as both Romanian and Hungarian (2,2%) and 18 respondents from other ethnicities (1,0%).

Research premises

Starting from the theoretical data presented in the context of the theory of identity, according to which personal and social identity is built in the personality forming process under the influence of social frameworks, we postulate that the investigated population shall manifest mostly tolerant attitudes as compared to the out-groups which they have a long relationship history with and which are located in their spatial neighborhood.

We forward the hypothesis that, when expressing the attitudes as compared to neighborhood, Romanians and Hungarians shall most frequently manifest attitudes with a high level of tolerance. The statement's fundament is constituted by long cohabitation experiences of the two ethnical groups, by the adherence to the values of Christian religion and European culture. Despite certain incompatibilities and even acute social conflicts, at certain historic moments,

the ethnical groups of Romanians and Hungarians have developed mostly collaboration relationships, overcoming common difficulties, generated by the experience of communism and other historic vicissitudes.

The study also intends to test several hypotheses which aim the influence of some *factors subsumed to the social environment* where the individuals included in the sample have built their intolerant attitudes as identity strategies:

- The rural *residence environment* of the subjects shall significantly orient the intolerance attitudes as compared to neighborhood as, by definition, the rural environment is characterized by homogeneous groups from the point of view of their occupations, beliefs, habits, language, etc. In the structure of collaboration relationships, of knowing and accepting the other one, kinship was for a long time an important factor and has not lost this role yet. Or, it is well-known that the rule of endogamy is predominant when choosing a life partner, especially in the rural environment, where the informal social control of the community and public opinion emphasizes polar stereotypes (emphasizing positive stereotypes as compared to the in-group and negative stereotypes as compared to the out-group)

- We postulate that women, through the more pregnant statement of the role affective size, shall be more tolerant than men;

- The high education level shall generate more tolerant attitudes as compared to the lower one as it favors to a greater extent the purchase process for the democracy and multi-culture specific values;

- Respondents coming from mixed ethnical families (Romanian-Hungarian) shall state to a greater extent tolerant attitudes, the acceptance of marrying an out-group member, assuming a tolerance level superior to the neighbor acceptance attitude (social distance scale included)

- The high income of subjects, as an indicator of a high social status, shall generate more tolerant attitudes.

Research results

Population's tolerance level as compared to the out-groups referred to in the same social space

What would you think if your neighbor was a member of the following groups?




Diagram no. 1 Tolerance as against neighborhood

It is important to note that the analyzed answers have been expressed by the entire sample, both Romanian and Hungarian.

From a multi-criteria classification processing of the intolerance manifestation as against the mentioned groups, three out-group classes are emphasized, as follows:

- Drug addicts and homosexuals;
- Gipsy, Arabic, Chinese and disabled people;
- The other ethnicities.

This overview indicates that there is a positive correlation between the level of knowledge, interaction and the level of toler-

ance, meaning that the individuals tend to manifest increased tolerance towards similar and known out-groups with whom they have frequent social interaction. Practically, relating to the other one defines social distance within the social context and establishes inclusion and exclusion relationships between individuals and groups.

Social groups concerned which are little known by respondents and with which they do not have interactive social relationships are less tolerated as the defining of these out-groups includes normative stereotypes for the in-group and inter-group behaviors acquire competitive and discriminating features in various degrees, depending on the size of the social distance between groups. Thus, marginal social groups which do not usually declare these identities in daily social interactions, such as drug addicts and homosexuals, less numerous in the ethnical configuration of the region concerned are naturally perceived as being at a greater social distance.

Irrespective of the ethnical group which they belong to, the subjects express the highest level of intolerance (73,6% of the respondents) towards *drug addicts*, who they would not like to interact with in their spatial proximity, but because they probably consider their presence in the proximity of their home as a potential contamination factor for the socializing environment, through the behaviors shown. They may also be perceived as potential danger, through the possibly deviant or criminal behaviors, threatening the neighborhood resources for the purpose of purchasing drugs which they usually become addicted to. The population's intolerance against drug addicts may also be construed as a successful implementation of the policies adopted by competent institutions for the prevention of drug consumption in the two social spaces (Bihor Haidu and Bihar). The fighting message against drug consumption strengthens the own convictions formed by the inculcation of traditional values, generating negative stereotypes against the real or virtual group of drug consumers.

The following group, according to the expression of intolerance attitudes, is the *homosexuals' group*, which records a higher acceptability level than drug consumers, 57,2% of the subjects declaring that they would not appreciate the proximity of the people in this group. Sexual behaviors in conflict with desirable social norms pre-

scribed by the religious communities and, in general by the traditional culture, induce negative hetero-stereotypes against this out-group. The opening towards diversity and multiculturalism crates even more acceptance and tolerance attitudes, including in the neighborhood similar social space, the out-groups of this category not being considered dangerous, even if they share different values on one of the social inter-relationship dimensions (42,8% are not disturbed by gay neighborhood). Probably, in a longer time horizon, the intolerance to such characteristics may diminish as a result of amplifying the claims of own rights by the gay minority groups.

From the *ethnic groups* included in the analysis, *Gipsy* register the highest number of intolerant attitudes from subjects (38,3%) and Hungarians – the lowest number (4,8%). Probably in the structure of Gipsy rejection attitudes, *universal hetero-stereotypes* play an important part regarding this ethnical group which causes, in many situations, inter-group conflicts (Levine, R.A. and Campbell, D.T., 1972, p.183 apud Chelcea, S. (coord.) 1998, p.270)

There is an interesting situation regarding the intolerance attitudes towards *Arabic and Chinese* (22, 2%, respectively 19,7%), placed after Gipsy, in the expression of intolerance and which may be explained in the same register of universal hetero-stereotypes and low knowledge and inter-relationship level. On the other hand, the Arabic may be suspected, especially after the USA September 11 events, for attacks and revenges and Chinese – for the invasion of social spaces of other groups within concurrent economy. To these aspects, the differences of religious beliefs may be added, as compared to the groups of Romanians and Hungarians preponderantly included in the sample.

Tolerance aspects between Hungarians and Romanians

Further on, we shall try to study thoroughly the attitudes expressed only between the two ethnical groups within the sample, respectively that of Romanians and Hungarians, which is the main interest of our study.

As it results from the data listed in diagram no. 1, the total population of the sample (from Romania and Hungary) expresses much more intolerant attitudes towards Romanians (11,7%), than towards Hungarians (4,8%). This is why we are going to try and detail analyses in order to find possible explanations.

Attitudes expressed towards the ethnical group of Romanians


Table no. 1 Romanian neighbors' acceptance by respondents in Romania and Hungary (total sample)

	I would mind	I would not mind
Hungary	20.30%	79.70%
Adjusted residue	12.2	-12.2
Romania	1.50%	98.50%
Adjusted residue	-12.2	12.2

Neighborhood relationship with Romanians is significantly different perceived by Romanians and Hungarians ($\chi^2=149,0$ sig=000). From the 224 individuals who have answered that they would mind having Romanian neighbors (express intolerance towards the group of Romanians), 20,3% are part of the Hungarian sample, as compared to 1.5% from the Romanian respondents living in Romania. The conclusion which may be directly inferred from the data submitted would suggest that the Romanian population (consisting of Romanians and Hungarians, obviously in various weights).

If we consider only the Romanian sample, the data reveals that the two ethnical groups do not manifest significantly different attitudes for the acceptance of the neighborhood with Romanians ($\chi^2=3,43$ sig=0,064). Nevertheless, the data suggests small differences in the detriment of Romanians, in the sense that Hungarians of the Romanian sample manifest several intolerant attitudes as against Romanians (2,5%), as compared to Romanians (0,8%)

Diagram no. 2 Tolerance towards Romanians of Romanian and Hungarian respondents (Romania and Hungary)



In diagram no. 2, we have tried to analyze the signification of the relationship between intolerant attitudes of Romanians and Hungarians or the entire sample towards the ethnical group of Romanians. The signification test ($\chi^2=84,9$ sig=000) indicates a significant relationship between the two variables, in the sense that Hungarians have much more intolerant attitudes (17,0%) towards Romanians, as compared to the Romanians of the entire sample (0,8%).

Attitudes manifested towards the ethnical group of Hungarians

Analyzing the tolerance towards Hungarians of the respondents in Romania and Hungary, we find that the relationship is not statistically significant ($\chi^2=0,8$ sig=0,363). Analyzing only the answers of Romanian subjects, we have recorded a certain intolerance of the Romanians towards Hungarians. From this point of view, the results are similar to the ones obtained for the attitude towards Romanians. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Romanians in Hungary cannot be verified as the number of Romanians in the Hungarian sample is completely insignificant (only 2 Romanians in the entire sample).

Table no. 2 Tolerance towards Hungarians of the respondents in Romania

	I would mind	I would not mind
Romanians	5.80%	94.20%
Adjusted residue	2.8	-2.8
Hungarians	1.30%	98.70%
Adjusted residue	-2.8	2.8

The relationship between the intolerance attitudes towards the two groups

Table no. 3 The relationship between accepting Romanian neighbors (lines) and accepting Hungarian neighbors (columns)

	I would mind	I would not mind
I would mind	41.70%	58.30%
Adjusted residue	6.3	-6.3
I would not mind	3.80%	96.20%
Adjusted residue	-6.3	6.3

The relationship between tolerance/intolerance attitudes reciprocally expressed by Romanians and Hungarian is strongly significant ($\chi^2= 558,3$, sig=000), in the sense that the most intolerant subjects (96,20%) declare that they do not tolerate Romanians but that they do not tolerate Hungarians either. This relationship suggests that the negative stereotypes associated to the intolerance attitudes are not only built as against ethnical appurtenance, as the identity is multi-dimensional. The Romanians and Hungarians from the studied area interact not only within the context of ethnical in-groups, but of professional, political, fun, sports, economic in-groups as well.

The role of social frameworks in building identity

Further on we intend to reveal *social frameworks* susceptible to influence the construction of intolerant attitudes as compared to the members of ethnical groups.

The study begins by testing some *sub-hypotheses* which aim the influence of certain factors subsumed to the social environment

where the individuals included in the sample have built their intolerant attitudes as identity strategies: within this context, the relationship of tolerance was tested regarding the following variables involved in the formulated hypotheses: residence environment, gender, income, training level, occupation, age and ethnicity of the partner.

First of all, we need to mention that, by applying significance tests (chi square), several relationships have proved to be insignificant (for the variables of gender, income and age). The data indicated that these variables do not make a significant difference between tolerance attitudes as compared to the ethnical groups considered, which means that they are not "social limits" in shaping tolerance by ethnical criteria.

The influence of the residence environment variable upon the structure of the intolerance between Romanians and Hungarians

Table no. 4 Respondents' accepting Romanian neighbors according to the subjects' residence environment

	I would mind	I would not mind
Urban	10.00%	90.00%
Adjusted residue	-3.5	3.5
Rural	15.50%	84.50%
Adjusted residue	3.5	-3.5

The attitudes towards the proximity with Romanians differ significantly depending on the residence environment ($\chi^2=11,96$ sig=0,001), 15,5% of the subjects who would not like to have Romanian neighbors are from the rural area, as opposed to 10% from the urban area.

Table no. 5 Accepting Hungarian neighbors according to the respondents' residence environment

	I would mind	I would not mind
Urban	3.30%	96.70%
Adjusted residue	-4.4	4.4
Rural	7.90%	92.10%
Adjusted residue	4.4	-4.4

The intolerance towards Hungarians also differ significantly depending on the residence environment of the respondents ($\chi^2=10,01$ sig=000). Among the recorded intolerants, most of them are from the rural area (7,9%), as opposed to the urban area (3,3%).

The two situations provide us with clues to state that the intolerant groups, which we have identified in previous analyses, are mostly recruited from the respondents of rural areas. For the moment, we forward the working hypothesis for understating this differentiation, by invoking the characteristics of current the rural environment, consisting mainly in the predominance of inter-knowing relationships, of concurrent in-group and out-group setting relationships, which advance polar auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes which they reproduce in order to rationalize their reciprocal intolerance attitudes. The rural social environment also provides concurrent identity offers, out of which the ethnical ones play an important part, maybe even a central one, around which other identity dimensions are configured, such as kinship, professional, religious, political, etc. The saturated discourse of ethnocentrist attitudes of the political leaders during the period of Romanian and Hungarian transition, with visible marks for the reawakening of nationalism and stating of the tendency of ethnical separation, as an inter-relationship way, could be received more efficiently in the rural environment which is appreciated as more traditional. Correlating the data with the data provided by the analysis of distributing ethnical intolerance attitudes between Romanians and Hungarians, we could appreciate that the ethnical groups of the Hungarians in rural areas express attitudes with the highest level of intolerance, constituting into in-groups which tend to build favorable auto-stereotypes, at the same time with negative hetero-stereotypes as compared to the out-groups which they inter-relate with, in the same social and geographical space.

Among the ethnical and racial interaction patterns, the specific literature mentions: *assimilation*, as a modification of the lifestyle and distinctive features of a group in order to comply with the dominant group pattern; *ethnical pluralism*, the pattern where all ethnical and racial groups preserve their distinctive identities and enjoy relatively equal social positions; *segregation*, which involves the physical and social separation of the different racial and ethnical

groups; *domination*, where the dominant group uses its power to keep the control over minority groups. Providing them with reduced power and freedom; *population transfer*, i.e. the displacement of the population of a rival part; *annihilation*, the extreme pattern of relationships between different racial and ethnical groups, where the dominant group eliminates it and annihilates the minority pattern and *genocide*, which consists in having a class of individuals exterminated by another one. (Goodman, N., 1992, pp. 203-2006).

The role of the "education level" variable in the construction of ethnical tolerance attitudes between the Romanians and Hungarians of Bihor- Hajdú-Bihar

The analysis of the above relationship started from the hypothesis according to which a high education level (holding a higher education degree) shall most favor the construction of a tolerant attitude.

Table no. 6 Accepting Romanian neighbors according to the subjects' education level

	I would mind	I would not mind
Without higher education	13.20%	86.80%
Adjusted residue	3.7	-3.7
With higher education	5.60%	94.40%
Adjusted residue	-3.7	3.7

The signification test indicates a significant difference of the tolerance towards Romanians depending on the high education level ($\chi^2=13,35$ sig=000). Out of the total of intolerant subjects, most of them are recruited from those who do not have a high level of education (13,2%), as compared to those with a low education level (5,6%), which is the equivalent of the statement that the high education level favors the construction of more tolerant attitudes.

Although the relationship between the tolerance variables towards Hungarians and the education level ($\chi^2=3,25$, sig=0.071) is not significant, respectively the individuals with a high education level express lower intolerance attitudes (2,8%) against Hungarians, as compared to those which do not have a high education level (5,3%).

Table no. 7 Accepting Hungarian neighbors according to the subjects' education level

	I would mind	I would not mind
Without higher education	5.30%	94.70%
Adjusted residue	1.8	-1.8
With higher education	2.80%	97.20%
Adjusted residue	-1.8	1.8

Ethnic tolerance of ethnically mixed family members (families consisting of Romanian and Hungarian partners)

When building the hypothesis regarding the manifestation of certain high tolerance attitudes by the respondents married with partners of other ethnicity, we started from the assumption that accepting the other one as a life partner implies placing him/her at a social distance lower than within the neighborhood relationship (a presumption implied in building Bogardus' scale as well). Consequently, if someone has accepted someone else as a life partner, it is assumed that the life partner shall also be accepted as a neighbor.

To test the hypothesis, we have analyzed the sample's structure from the point of view of the rules of forming family couples. This way we have found that most of the married respondents have chose their partner according to the ethnical endogamy principle, only 5,6% of the Romanian respondents are married to Hungarians and 2,9% of the Hungarian respondents are married to Romanian partners. In total, in the sample of 1820 subjects, we have 50 Romanian or Hungarian subjects who have a life partner from the other ethnicity. The relationships between the tolerance attitudes expressed towards Romanians and Hungarians and the appurtenance to a mixed Romanian-Hungarian family are significant. All the subjects of mixed families have declared that they do not mind the Hungarian neighborhood.

For the acceptance of Romanian neighborhood, 2 subjects, who are 1.3% from the sample of mixed Romanian-Hungarian families (the subject is Hungarian and the partner is Romanian), have

answered that they would mind the Romanian neighborhood. In all other cases, the subjects of mixed families have manifested tolerance attitudes towards Romanians and Hungarians.

Table 8. Accepting Romanian neighborhood depending on the family's ethnic structure

	I would mind	I would not mind	Total
Not from a mixed family	212	1528	1740
Mixed family	2	48	50
Total	214	1576	1790

In this case as well the appurtenance to a mixed family has the effect of enhancing tolerance towards the Romanians in the neighborhood. The calculated chance ratio (*odds-ratio*) indicates that the subjects of mixed families have a probability 3.38 higher than the subjects who are not from mixed families to accept Romanians in the neighborhood. Obviously, the reverse explanation may also be considered: more tolerant individuals enter ethnically mixed relationships, by a higher probability level than intolerant individuals.

Conclusions

The study's object was to identify the tolerance level of the population living in the cross-border area Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar-Satu-Mare-Szatmár-Szabolcs-Bereg as compared to the out-groups living in the same social space and to figure all the significant social factors which influence the construction of intolerant attitudes. We have measured the tolerance level by quantifying the answers to one question of the questionnaire used, the one which interrogates the subjects' attitudes as against the neighborhood of other groups.

According to the descriptive statistics, the population of the cross-border area manifests mostly high tolerance attitudes, as compared to the out-groups living in the same social area.

Irrespective of the ethnical appurtenance group, the subjects express the highest level of intolerance (73,6% of the respondents) against *drug addicts*, who they would prefer not to interact with in their spatial proximity, followed by homosexuals (57,2%). As compared

to ethnical groups, most part of the intolerance attitudes is expressed against Gipsy (38,3%), and the least against Hungarians (4,8%)

The relationship between the tolerance / intolerance attitudes reciprocally expressed by Romanians and Hungarians is strongly significant in the sense that the most intolerant subjects (96,20%) declare that they do not tolerate Romanians and Hungarians either. This relationship suggests that the negative stereotypes associated to intolerance attitudes are not only built as compared to ethnical appurtenance, as the identity is multidimensional. The Romanians and Hungarians from the studied area interact not only within the context of ethnical in-groups, but of professional, political, fun, sports, economic in-groups as well.

As for the social frameworks of socializing, intolerance attitudes and ethnical stereotypes, we found that the most frequent intolerant attitudes both towards Romanians and towards Hungarians are located in the rural environment and are mainly manifested by the population without a high education level. Moreover, the appurtenance to a mixed family generates a significant decrease of intolerance attitudes.

This work obviously has an exploratory character. The wide theme of explaining identity construction and ethnical attitudes cannot be exhausted by mere bi-varied analyses. The testing of operational hypotheses shall fully benefit from modeling the acceptance or the rejection of Romanian or Hungarian neighborhood by multiple regression.

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SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN THE COUNTIES AT THE CROSS-BORDER BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA

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Preamble

The following pages explore the variations of subjective well-being in the populations investigated by the ENRI survey. Starting with a theoretical discussion on the signification, measures and determinants of subjective well-being, I will examine the psychometric properties of Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) in the context of Hungarian-Romanian border region, exploring comparatively the levels and the determinants of subjective well-being in these regions.

Subjective well-being: theoretical approaches

Subjective well-being is defined as the overall evaluation of life (Andrews & Robinson, 1991). It is the operationalization of the concept of happiness. Among the most important issues in the moral philosophy starting with the Greeks (Annas, 1993), it was rather ignored during the following centuries and reemerged with the philosophy of Enlightenment, receiving a first quantitative approach by the Utilitarian philosophers (Bentham, 2004). The mainstream in the subjective well-being research conceive it as a multidimensional concept, which comprise a cognitive dimension and an affective one (Andrews & Robinson, 1991; E. Diener, 1994). The cognitive dimension is measured by so called "life satisfaction", "or satisfaction with life as a whole" and is defined as a general evaluation of the way the personal life match the personal aspirations, in domains such as work, family, relations, leisure, etc. (Robert A. Cummins, 1996). Life satisfaction is measured either by simple scales (answer to the question "taking all your life into consideration, how satisfied are you with life as a whole?" (Andrews & Withey, 1976)) or by scales with multiple items that will be discuss later in this chapter. Affect, starting

with the works of Bradburn (1965; 1969), was considered bi-dimensional, with a positive and a negative dimension that are considered relatively independent.

The main theoretical debate in the field is centered around the main determinants of happiness, between those that argues that subjective well-being is determined genetically and thus is stable throughout life (the “happiness as a trait” theory (see for example Costa, McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987)) and those who argued that the determinants of happiness are mainly environmental and thus subjective well-being is variable over time (“happiness as a state” theory (R. Veenhoven, 1994)). The sometimes fierce arguments (Stones, Hadjistavropoulos, Tuuko, & Kozma, 1995; R. Veenhoven, 1994; Ruut Veenhoven, 1998) generates endless debates on the policy implications of happiness research and the use of subjective well-being as a social indicator (see the recent one in *The Economist* (Layard, 2011)).

Of course the theoretical assumptions have a strong influence on the measures designed for it. For example, the proponents of the “happiness as a state” assume that happiness is changing according to personal circumstances, thus equating happiness with “satisfaction with life as a whole” (Ruut Veenhoven, 1989) and proposing scales which sum up several domains of life – see ComQol (Robert A. Cummins et al., 2004) and Personal Well-being Index (Robert A. Cummins, et al., 2004). For Michalos (1985), real happiness is the sum of discrepancies between the actual satisfaction with these domains and the aspirations in the same fields of personal and social life. They all agree with the bottom-up approach that supposed that subjective well-being is a sum of domains. On the other hand, “happiness as state” supporters offered an opposite approach, called “top-down” that basically supposes that subjective well-being is a disposition that spill-over to the evaluation of life in different domains (see a comparative discussion in Headey, Veenhoven, & Wearing, 1991). They generally propose single questions or scales that measure the overall satisfaction (C. Diener, Emmons, & Larsen, 1985). Affective measures are decomposed in positive and negative affect, the most important measures being that of the affective balance (Norman M. Bradburn & Noll, 1969) and PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).

Subjective well-being in the post-communist countries

The accounts on the subjective well-being in post-communist transition accumulated gradually, perhaps because of the lack of infrastructure for social research and lack of specialists in this particularly domain of the study in the nineties. Just a few countries (Hungary, Russia, and Romania) produced subjective well-being data early after the fall of the Communism (as information in the World database of happiness is showing). International surveys data are also available, but with rare exceptions they only include a single overall measure of life satisfaction, not allowing the structure of life satisfaction in these countries to be revealed.

Among the common characteristics of the determinants subjective well-being in post-communist countries are that the levels are almost the lowest in these countries. We should expect so, argues Veenhoven (2001), giving the current socio-economic situation in this country. This seems to apply also to countries like Romania, where the fall of the economy in the early nineties, accompanied by the lowest levels of optimism and interpersonal trust had as a consequence the fall to one of the lowest levels of subjective well-being in Europe (Băltătescu, 2002).

While we have no global evaluation of the trends that transition countries after the fall of the communism, we have very good case studies for the transformation that took place in Russia (Saris, 2001; Ruut Veenhoven, 2001; Zavisca & Hout, 2005). They all acknowledged a steady decline after the fall of the communism, at least before 1998, when satisfaction levels seem to slightly recover (Frijters, Geishecker, Haisken-DeNew, & Shields, 2005; Zavisca & Hout, 2005). The same pattern was observed in Hungary (Orsolya, 2002) and Romania (Băltătescu, 2000). Even in countries marked by an increase in GDP after nineties, like China and East Germany, the same decline appears, and is supposedly caused by other economic factors like the increase in unemployment and inequality levels (Garst, Frese, & Molenaar, 2000; Yuan & Brockmann, 2005)

Another remarkable aspect of subjective well-being in transition is that domains satisfaction levels are usually lower. Delhey (2004) observes this regularity when he compare older and newer members (or candidates) of the European Union. It looks reasonable to find

this difference in domains such as income, the general situation in the country, or even housing, giving the lower liveability of these countries. That the same difference applies in case of more intimate domains like satisfaction with family or friends is not so straightforward. A possible explanation is also given by Delhey (2004, p. 28): “economic hardship in the less affluent countries means that everyday life is more stressful and this can have a knock-on effect on social relations, and even family relations”. Another explanatory model is framed in a top-down spill-over effect: dispositional influences on global subjective well-being would affect in this model domain satisfactions.

Concerning the correlates of subjective well-being, in almost all post-communist countries that joined EU, this variable is best predicted by the satisfaction with economic situation (Delhey, 2004). This is consistent with the findings that in low-income countries economic performance of individual matters more for personal happiness (Myers & Diener, 1995; Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999). What puzzles somehow is the low contribution of satisfaction with personal relationships (family and friends), because we would expect that family and friends to be a buffer against adverse living conditions.

Subjective well-being levels in Romania and Hungary

As the data from World Database of Happiness shows, the various measures of subjective well-being have generally higher values in Hungary than in Romania. For the 4 point life satisfaction scale, used in the Eurobarometer surveys from 1998 in Romanian and since 2001 for Hungary, the average for Hungary is 2.5, which correspond to an average of 5 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the average for Romania is 2.23, which corresponds to an average of 4.4 on a 0-10 scale. These results make us anticipate higher levels of interpersonal subjective well-being in Hungary than in Romania.

Yet, the comparison regarding the levels of subjective well-being between Hungarian ethnic individuals in Romania, Hungarian citizens (who have declared themselves as being 98% Hungarian) and Romanians, representing the majority in the Romanian subsample, gives some surprising results, as the following sections will show.

Measures of subjective well-being: life satisfaction and Personal Well-being Index

Life satisfaction is measured by a single question: “How satisfied are you with your life?” with 11 points. For comparability, the answers were linearly converted on a scale from 0 to 100.

Personal Wellbeing Index is a scale composed on 8 items, asking the

1. Standard of living
2. Health
3. Achievements in life
4. Personal relationships
5. Personal safety
6. Community connectedness
7. Future security
8. Spirituality or religion.

While the authors of the Index recommend the use of 0-10 scales, we opted to use the same 5 points verbalized scale ranging from “Very dissatisfied” to “Very satisfied”, considering that the verbalized questions as being more easily understood by the majority of the rural population in the areas of the study.

External validity

As a decomposition of subjective well-being (respectively life as a whole), PWI has a high correlation with it, as the

Table 1. Bivariate correlations between Personal Wellbeing Index and Life as a whole. β coefficients are significant at 0.01 level.

	β
Hungarian in Hungary	.572
Hungarian in Romania	.418
Romanian in Romania	.540

Factorial structure of the index

The items in the Personal well-being Index were introduced in a Principal Component Analysis. Results were rotated using Varimax method with Kaiser Normalization. For the subsample of Romanians in Romania, a single factor emerged.

For the other two subsamples, a 2 factors solution emerged, the second factor explaining just the following answers for the Hungarian in Hungary subsample:

- spirituality or religion
 - the way you are a member of your community
 - personal relationships,
- while “future security” is loading in the both factors equally.

For the Hungarian in Romania subsample, we the second factor explains, in a very similar way, the following items:

- spirituality or religion
- the way you are a member of your community
- personal relationships
- what you have achieved so far in life

However, the second factor eigenvalues just a little above 1 (1.018-1.0123). Ordering a forced one-factor solution, we obtain results the loadings as showed in the next table:

Table 2. One-factor solution for Personal Wellbeing Items

	Hungarian in Hungary	Hungarian in Romania	Romanian in Romania
Standard of living	,760	,725	,753
Health	,724	,724	,744
Achievements in life	,723	,698	,737
Personal relationships	,710	,692	,725
Personal safety	,673	,646	,673
Community connectedness	,607	,637	,652
Future security	,606	,636	,648
Spirituality or religion	,530	,588	,572
Total variance explained	44,98%	44,86%	44,68%

The index shows a very good reliability for all the samples, with Cronbach alpha's over 0.8 (varying between 0.815 and 0.836). The scale PWI was constructed as a sum of unweighted items, and linearly transformed to a range from 0 to 100.

*Unique contribution of domains to life as a whole:
multiple regressions*

We regressed life as a whole against the PWI items, in order to compare the unique contribution of the domain satisfactions to the global subjective well-being indicator. The table 17 shows the results of this analysis for all the items. The overall fit is very good: variations of PWI items explain 59% of the variation of the dependent variable.

Table 3. Regression of personal well-being items against life satisfaction for the three subsamples.

	Hungarian in Hungary		Hungarian in Romania		Romanian in Romania	
	β	Sig(t)	β	Sig(t)	β	Sig(t)
Standard of living	0,35	0,00	0,44	0,00	0,30	0,00
Health	0,02	0,44	0,02	0,73	-0,03	0,58
Achievements in life	0,13	0,00	0,17	0,01	0,17	0,00
Personal relationships	0,03	0,42	0,03	0,63	0,00	0,99
Personal safety	0,16	0,00	-0,09	0,18	0,11	0,02
Community connectedness	0,04	0,20	-0,04	0,60	0,08	0,07
Future security	0,08	0,01	0,13	0,06	0,02	0,71
Spirituality or religion	0,05	0,06	-0,06	0,37	0,10	0,02
Adj. R ²		,381		,321		,327

Satisfaction with the standard of living has the largest contribution to the prediction of life as a whole for, with beta = 0.35 (for Hungarians in Hungary), respectively 0.44 (for Hungarians in Romania) and 0.30 (for Romanians in Romania). Other domains that also predict the independent variable are personal achievements $\beta = .13$ (respectively .17 and .17), personal safety $\beta = .11$ (respectively -0.09 ns. And 0.11), and future security - $\beta = .08$ (.13 and .02 n.s). Three domains (health, safety and community connectedness) have non-

significant independent contribution to life as whole. Spirituality/religion is a predictor only for the Romanian subsample.

As we can see, the samples are rather similar in what concerns the life domains contribution to the satisfaction with life as a whole. Partial similarities are found in what concerns the personal safety (which is sensible for the majority population in both countries) and future security (which is important for the Hungarian ethnics in both countries), and spirituality/religion (that has no importance for Hungarians in both countries). This shows that structure of life satisfaction is rather similar when we compare the ethnic groups.

Levels of personal well-being and life satisfaction

We compared average levels of items that compose by sub-samples. Results are shown in the following tables:

Table 4. Average levels of personal well-being items for the three samples, standard errors and Sign of significant differences between the means (using Bonferoni test)


	Ethnicity by country						Sign of significant differences		
	Hungarian in Hungary		Hungarian in Romania		Romanian in Romania		1-2	1-3	2-3
	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean			
standard of living?	3,19	0,03	3,13	0,06	3,21	0,04			
your health condition?	3,53	0,04	3,35	0,06	3,50	0,04			
what you have achieved so far in life?	3,69	0,03	3,61	0,05	3,51	0,03	+		
personal relationships?	4,05	0,03	3,85	0,04	3,73	0,03	+	+	
personal safety?	3,96	0,03	3,56	0,05	3,54	0,03	+	+	
the way you are a member of your community?	3,90	0,03	3,74	0,04	3,57	0,03	+	+	-
your future safety?	3,47	0,03	3,17	0,05	3,19	0,04	+	+	
your religiousness?	3,74	0,03	3,87	0,05	3,87	0,03	-		

We can see that the samples do not have significant differences in what regards their evaluations of standard of living and health conditions. Also, the ethnic majority in Hungary reports higher satisfaction with achievements and lower satisfactions with religion/spirituality than the ethnic majority in Romania, but the levels of satisfaction are not different between these subsamples and that of Hungarians in Romania.

Significant positive differences between levels found in Hungary and Romania have been proved in the rest of domains. The only item where a difference has been found between the Romanians in Romania and Hungarians in Romania subsamples is that of community connectedness.

Summed, these differences give a significant difference in what concerns PWI. This is in perfect concordance with most country averages in life satisfaction, measured by international surveys. When comparing averages in life satisfaction, however, contrasting differences were found, with Romanians in Romania scoring the highest.

Figure 1. Average levels of life satisfaction and Personal well-being index by samples.



A more detailed examination of the differences shows that there are, indeed, significant differences in life satisfaction between the first and the last subsamples, with Hungarians in Hungary scoring the lowest and Romanians in Romania scoring the highest, while in what concerns life satisfaction the situation is reversed.

Table 5. Average levels of personal well-being and life satisfaction for the three samples, standard errors and sign of significant differences between the means (using Bonferoni test).

	Ethnicity by country						Sign of significant differences		
	Hungarian in Hungary		Hungarian in Romania		Romanian in Romania		1-2	1-3	2-3
	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean			
Personal Wellbeing Index	67,30	0,51	63,41	0,86	62,84	0,61	+	Eh	
Life satisfaction	59,35	0,60	61,95	1,27	66,21	0,82	-	-	

A first explanation would be that there is national factor that lowers the answers to the overall life satisfaction in case of Hungarians. This factor, that can be a more depressive mood or a different interpretation of the life satisfaction question, apparently make the Hungarian ethnics to report lower levels of satisfaction with life as a whole, contrary to the highest evaluation of most life domains. The hypothesis of a "national character", although suggested in the literature, is nonetheless highly disputable (Ruut Veenhoven, 1989).

An alternative explanation is linked with the way Romanian respondents answer to complex life satisfaction scales. Overall, in surveys where 10 or 11 points scales are used, they score higher as we would expect based on other measures. This makes a positive difference towards Hungary. For example, in the second European Quality of Life Survey (2007), Hungary had an average of 5.59, while Romania scored 6.47. In the first EQOLS Survey (2003), Hungary scored 5.94 while Romania 6.19. In European Social Survey (fourth wave, 2008), the same difference appears, with Hungary scoring 5.31 while Romania 5.85 on a life satisfaction scale from 0 to 10. This

may be linked with measurement errors made by a different understanding of large scales.

A positive difference between PWI and 'life as a whole', like in the Romanian subsample, was also found in by Cummins (2003) in Australia. He explained that this is influenced by wellbeing homeostasis: domains with higher degree of specificity does not benefit of the psychological self-serving bias like 'life as a whole'. The contrary result in the both Hungarian subsamples suggests that this relationship is not universal. Further tests are needed.

Summary

- The Personal Well-being Index shows sufficient psychometric proprieties.
- Membership in the three groups influences both the levels and the structure of subjective well-being.
- Generally, Hungarians in Hungary are the most satisfied with life domains.
- They are equally or more satisfied with most life domains (except religiousness) than Romanians and members of Hungarian minority in Romania.
- Romanian and Hungarians in Romania display rather similar levels of life satisfaction.
- The structure of SWB is similar for the three groups.
- Romanians report higher scores than Hungarians to the overall satisfaction indicators, and that can be attributed to national character or to methodological erroneousness.

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SATISFACTION WITH PLACES AT THE CROSS-BORDER BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA

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Preamble

We intend in this chapter to explore the satisfactions that the populations investigated by the ENRI survey have with variations places: personal house, neighborhood, locality, region, country and European Union, and the relationship with personal well-being. We will start with a theoretical discussion on the signification of the relationship that attachments to different groups have to satisfactions. We will then present the measures and finally we will compute and discuss the measures of satisfactions in the context of Hungarian-Romanian border region.

Well-being in places: presentation of the issue

The issue of the relationship that well-being has with places is rather of recent nature. Liberating from the purely psychological point of view which sees well-being as a personal phenomena, not having a correspondence with the environment, the actual social science sees more and more that environment in which we are living has important effects on personal satisfaction. As Morrison, Tay and Diener (2011) put it in relationship with national satisfaction:

“The country where you live has inescapable consequences for your life. It affects your job opportunities, the quality of your health care, and your risk of becoming a victim of crime or war.” (p. 1)

However, people are happy in all sort of adverse circumstances, and refuse to leave their not so well-off countries even if they have occasions to do so. This means, the same authors imply, that there is a national satisfaction that influence their well-being. Indeed, they found that national satisfaction is a predictor of satisfaction with life as a whole, when controlling for socio-demographics.

Living in a certain nation is only a part of the experience that the individual has with what we will call in this chapter “places”. Closer instances such as neighborhoods, localities, regions may have an influence here. People live in a closer or looser network of attachments, which may very well influence their well-being. We should not forget also about the satisfaction with supra-national entities such as European Union or United Nations. This should be linked with the relationship that well-being has with cosmopolitan attitudes (Bălțătescu & Bălțătescu, 2006) or with the identification with humanity as a whole (*allo-identity*)(Leary, Tipsord, Tate, Wayment, & Bauer, 2008).

Personal and social identity: some links

Personal identity is a sum of individual characteristics by which a person is known. Identity is multidimensional and relational, being built by integration of various experiences throughout life (Chelcea, 1998). The opposite (but not unrelated) concept is considered to be the social identity, which is based on the idea that individuals make self-categorizations by including themselves in groups with a smaller and larger scope (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Identity is the result of internalization of external classifications in social roles, by the identification with specific reference groups.

According to Wentholt(1991), identity has a socio-structural (linked with social classification), a cultural (associated with specific behaviors and roles) and an ontological (based on value judgments) dimension. A special kind of identity is constructed by the identification with humanity as a whole (*allo-identity*) (Leary, et al., 2008).

In Europe, individuals have multiple identities, and for some authors the national and the European citizenship are not opposed, but complementary, and constitutes rather “a reservoir of legitimacy for the EU—not a legitimacy crisis” (Koslowski, 1999).

How can we measure the identification with national or supranational institutions? Basically, by asking respondent to prioritize his or her subjective memberships. In World Value Survey, for instance, respondents are asked to what extent they see themselves as autonomous individuals, as members of their local community, as citizen of their country, as citizens of the European Union or as world citizens

Sources of satisfaction: person, house, neighborhood, locality, region, nation and Europe

Personal satisfaction is identified with satisfaction with life as a whole and takes into consideration all individual circumstances (Diener, 1994; Veenhoven, 1996).

Housing satisfaction is an important component of individual quality of life, as for most of the persons housing is the largest consumption and investment item of their lifetime. Determinants of housing satisfaction are not, however, individual: they depend on a whole network of relationships that members of the household develop over time, as well as the characteristics of neighborhood and localities where the house is situated (Vera-Toscano & Ateca-Amestoy, 2008).

Neighbors and neighborhood are the closest instances of communities. Satisfaction with neighborhood is also a very important component of community satisfaction. An array of characteristics determines individual satisfaction with neighborhood, among them being the quality of neighborhood itself (security, utilities), frequency of interaction with neighbors, and also sociological qualities such as social capital of the individuals or families involved, and collective efficacy (Allen, Bentler, & Gutek, 1985; Hur & Morrow-Jones, 2008; Oidjarv, 2010; Sirgy & Cornwell, 2002).

Satisfaction with localities and regions are less discussed in the literature. Here, however, the ethnic differences seem to matter more than for the satisfactions with housing and neighborhood. important.

Measures of satisfaction with places

Personal satisfaction was measured by a single question: "How satisfied are you with your life?" with 11 points. For comparability, the answers were linearly converted on a scale from 0 to 100.

Satisfaction with places scale was measured by 7 items, asking the respondent how satisfied is on a scale from 1 to 5 by:

1. your home
2. your neighbors
3. your neighborhood
4. the locality where you live
5. the region where you live

6. the country of your residence
7. the European Union

We used a 5 points verbalized scale ranging from "Very dissatisfied" to "Very satisfied".

Factorial structure of the index

The items have been introduced in a Principal Component Analysis. Results were rotated using Varimax method with Kaiser Normalization. For the Hungarian in Hungary subsample we computed a simple factor solution. For the rest of the samples, a 2 factors solution emerged, the second factor explaining satisfaction with country (Romania) and satisfaction with European Union.

As a result we computed an index of "regional well-being" from the following four items:

1. your home
2. yourneighbourhood
3. the locality where you live
4. the region where you live

The index shows a very good reliability for all the samples, with Cronbach alpha's varying between 0.797 and 0.816. The scale PWI was constructed as a sum of unweighted items, and linearly transformed to a range from 0 to 100. The index is negatively skewed, with an average of 70.5.

Correlation with PWI and Life as a whole

How the local and regional satisfaction is correlated with subjective well-being? We represented in the following table the correlations between life satisfaction, Personal well-being Index and The Index of Local and regional satisfaction.

Table 1. Bivariate correlations between local & regional satisfaction, Personal Well-being Index and life satisfaction. All correlations are significant at 0.01 level

	Personal well-being Index	Life satisfaction
Hungarian in Hungary	.569	.397
Hungarian in Romania	.543	.375
Romanian in Romania	.491	.376

The coefficients are very similar for the three subgroups considered. Personal well-being has higher correlation with the target variable than life satisfaction.

Correlation of national satisfaction, PWI and Life as a whole

National satisfaction and satisfaction with European Union have been treated separately. They have both positive and significant correlation with the subjective well-being variables.

Table 2. Bivariate correlations between subjective well-being variables and national & EU satisfaction. All coefficients are significant at 0.01 level.

	National Satisfaction		Satisfaction with EU	
	Personal well-being Index	Life satisfaction	Personal well-being Index	Life satisfaction
Hungarian in Hungary	.377	.302	.392	.310
Hungarian in Romania	.256	.183	.278	.261
Romanian in Romania	.288	.217	.304	.248

Unique contribution of domains to life as a whole: Multiple regressions

We regressed life as a whole and Personal Well-being Index against the three satisfactions variables i.e. local and regional, national and EU, in order to compare the unique contribution of these satisfactions with the global subjective well-being indicator. The next table shows the results of this analysis for all the items. The overall fit is

good: variations of PWI items explain around 40 percent of the variation of the dependent variable.

Table 3. Regression of satisfaction with places against life satisfaction for the three subsamples

	Hungarian in Hungary		Hungarian in Romania		Romanian in Romania	
	β	Sig(t)	β	Sig(t)	B	Sig(t)
Local & regional satisfaction	0,32	0,00	0,32	0,00	0,33	0,00
National satisfaction	0,00	0,96	-0,01	0,94	-0,01	0,82
Satisfaction with European Union	0,15	0,00	0,14	0,07	0,13	0,02
Adj. R ²	,418		,395		,394	

A first conclusion is that all sub-samples are very similar in what concerns the structure of the predictors. Local and regional satisfaction has the largest contribution to the prediction of life as a whole for, with beta = 0.32-0.33. The other domain that also predict the independent variable is Satisfaction with European Union with $\beta = .13-0.15$. Contrary to the findings in the cited literature, national satisfaction has no contribution to life as whole.

Levels of well-being with places

We compared average levels of items that compose by sub-samples. Results are shown in the following tables:

Table 4. Average levels of satisfaction with places for the three samples, standard errors and sign of significant differences between the means (using Bonferoni test).

	Ethnicity by country						Sign of significant differences		
	Hungarian in Hungary		Hungarian in Romania		Romanian in Romania		1-2	1-3	2-3
	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Mean	Std. Error of Mean			
Local & regional satisfaction	73,7	0,55	65,1	0,82	55,3	0,89	+	+	
National satisfaction	65,3	0,90	38,3	1,44	47,1	1,31	+	+	-
Satisfaction with European Union	67,9	0,64	52,1	1,07	53,8	0,96	+		-

We can see that the samples have significant differences in what regards their evaluations of satisfaction with places. The ethnic majority in Hungary reports higher satisfaction with all domains than the Hungarians in Romania, and also from the ethnic majority in Romania (with the exception of satisfaction with European Union). Members of Hungarian minority in Romania are less satisfied than the majority population with nation, but also with European Union.

The fact that Hungarians from Hungary are the most satisfied with the majority of the above mentioned domains proves there is a correlation between social well-being and personal well-being. People in richer countries/regions (Hungary, in our case) are the most satisfied with their neighborhood, locality, region, nation and even with European union.

Another line of interpretation of these results is the difference within minority and majority. In the Romanian counties investigated, the minority population reports equal satisfaction with the local & regional places, while they report lower satisfaction with nation while even with EU. The lesser attachment with the nation would explain the lower satisfaction with nation. However their lower satisfaction with EU is somehow less explainable, giving the fact that Hungarian minority in Romania sees European Union as an guaranty for their cultural autonomy.

Summary

- From the factorial analysis, it results three independent levels of satisfaction with places: local®ional, national and European
- Membership in the three groups influences both the levels and the structure of satisfactions with places.
- Hungarians in Hungary are the most satisfied with life domains.
- They are equally or more satisfied with most life domains (except religiousness) than Romanians and members of Hungarian minority in Romania.
- Romanian and Hungarians in Romania display rather similar levels of life satisfaction.
- The structure of SWB is similar for the three groups.
- Romanians report higher scores than Hungarians to the overall satisfaction indicators, and that can be attributed to national character or to methodological erroneousness.

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THE LEVELS OF IDENTITY AND PREJUDICIALITY IN EASTERN HUNGARY

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In this paper we discuss the connection between the local, national and European attitudes and the prejudice against minority groups on the basis of the results of an Eastern Hungarian survey research. The questionnaire research was done on an N=1.000 probability sample of the adult population of two counties (Hajdú-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) in June–July 2010 within the confines of the ENRI project¹ (European, National and Regional Identity – Theory and Practice; Project code: HURO 0801/180; Hungary-Romania Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007–2013.) We intend to answer the following two questions by the use of the database of this thematically diverse research: 1. What are the features of the local, national and European attitudes and of the prejudice against minorities in these two counties? 2. What is the connection between the national attitudes and the prejudice against minorities?

I. The Theoretical Frameworks of Surveying Local, National and European Identities

We consider the theory of social identity (Tajfel, 1978; 1982; Tajfel–Turner, 1979), the theory of social representation (Moscovici 1984; 1988) and Krappmann's theory of balancing identity (Krappmann 1980) to be adequate frameworks for the conceptualization of the three identity types and for their joint sociological research.

The scientific, specifically sociological interpretation of identity cannot disregard the narrative turn of the theory (Olick–Robbins, 1998) and the effect of remembrance theories dominantly present in historiography – Halbwachs, Nora, Assmann, Ricouer – which con-

¹ The participants of the project were: sociology and philosophy teams from the Partium Christian University, the University of Oradea, and the University of Debrecen.

clude that the main function of collective remembrance is creating and preserving identity (Gyáni, 2008). Several scientists consider identity to be a construction in narrative form (Bruner, 1990; Calhoun, 1994), but there are even stronger statements: *"all explanatory attempts of the concept of personal identity [extended to group identity, too] are fated to fail if they are independent and isolated from the concept of narrative."* (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 22).

The Theory of Social Identity

The basis of the psychological and socio-psychological interpretation of the different levels of identity is the interpretation of the concept of personal and social identity. The psychical relationship between the socializing individual and society can be described by the personal and social identity connected to the Ego (Ego-system) and its development. The sense of identity means, on the one hand, to subjectively perceive the continuity and identity of existence (I am identical with myself), on the other hand, the identity with an external aspect (notion, gender, generation, ethnicity or nationality). The sense of national identity *"is a subsystem or aspect of the hypothetical construction called Ego"*, because the selective aquirement of the categorial relations of society is the basis and social frame of self-definition and the idea of personal continuity (Pataki, 1982). The process of accepting the self-defining categories, i.e. the formation of social identity indicates the identification with the continuously expanding milieu (small groups and communities). This identification process is characterised by the diversity created by ending memberships and new ones and the social factors that influence the personal psychic development (Csepeli, 1995). There are two more approaches – among many others – that we consider important to mention. The identity concept that is described in the preface of a recent volume summarizing the results of identity and prejudiciality research emphasizes the role of socialization besides the influence of group psychology: *"We define identity as a general integrative category that has a strong connection to socialization, to emotional, moral and cognitive development, to processes that take place inside*

the group and to relationships among different groups" (Erős, 1996). The definition adopted by András A. Gergely, who approaches the question of historical and regional connections of minority identity from a politological point of view, is the following: "... I take identity to be a system of reference, which means to me an individuality-sphere that extends to social objects, group phenomena and social field, and at the same time it is a reduced, experienced and historically transmitted pattern of the conflicts between 'me' and 'them', respectively 'us' and 'others'." (A. Gergely, 1996, p. 5).

All of the above mentioned interpretations fit into Erik H. Erikson's identity concept that has a defining role in social science. According to this, identity is the existence of the subjective perception of personal identity and continuity, which is combined with the belief of identity and continuity of a common world-view (Erikson, 1991). Applying the concept of identity (considered to be the same as the category of social identity) too generally to all kinds of collective consciousness resulted in the "inflation" of the concept: "...*what previously seemed to be an advantage of the concept has become a disadvantage nowadays. The conceptualization of identity as a social construction makes it impossible to capture what is constant in the ever changing, what the concept of identity originally referred to.*" (Gyáni, 2008, p. 20).

The theory of social identity is based on three socio-psychological processes that define each of the different social identity types: 1. social categorization (people's tendency to perceive themselves and others by means of determined social categories rather than as isolated individuals), 2. social comparison (the appreciation of the relative importance of the group), 3. social identification (people do not generally connect to social situations as isolated observers, but rather their own identity specifically includes perception and reactions to different situations) (van Rekom–Go, 2006). The nature of identity is mostly emphasized by the definition as "social construction". Each individual is a member of different social communities at the same time, in fact the types of social identity reflect on the different domains of social pertinance (Goar, 2007). The theory of social identity constitutes an adequate basis for the different "areal identity" concepts. This is important because the theories of European iden-

tity interpreted as areal identity – isolated from political and institutional identities – assume as parts of the multiple identities – see Risse’s four models: “Russian Matruska doll”, cross-cutting identities, separated identities, ‘marble cake’ (Herrmann et al. 2004, p. 250) – the existence of European, national and regional identities at the same time (Yndigeñ, 2009). The classification of social identity types can be done in several manners: 1. based on the personal or social importance of the Ego (personal or social identity), 2. based on conscious or unconscious features (conscious and uncounscious identity), 3. direct or indirect, respectively full or partial community membership (Ivanova, 2005).

The Theory of Social Representation

The definition of social representation – “*a consensual world of common meanings in which the members of the group communicate and interact*” (Purkhardt 1993: 75) – and its process (anchoring and objectivization) have a strong connection to social identity. We could say that it explains the group members’ interpretation and representation of their significant world. By means of common meanings (social representations) the members of the group can manage to understand the processes of social representation during the development of their social identities. According to this, the theory of social representation assumes a close connection between social representation and group processes, especially between the development and expression of social identity. So far there have been very few attempts to describe in detail the relationship between social representation and identity (Millward 1995). The identity forming function of social representation manifests itself in the fact that each member of the group shares these representations. On the other hand, the group determines the possible connections that can be made between the different representations, so it restricts the freedom of association, thereby it specifies a viewpoint characteristic to the group by means of which the group can distinguish itself from other groups (Vincze–Kőváriné, 2003). Social representations integrate the personal practices and at the same time they present collective social norms, values and knowl-

edge (Meier–Kirchler, 1998). Collective identity can be considered to be a social representation (core) that is present in all groups, because belonging to a group as a community implies an anchoring in the representation of the specific social groups and it expresses the independence, actuality and history of the group. Collective identity combines those aspects of the representational system that are considered the most valuable, historically constant and specific (Asher et al., 2006). The social representations created during interactions inside the group often appear in narrative form, ensuring the historicity and continuity of the group (Vincze–Kóváriné, 2003).

The Theory of "Balancing Identity"

Balancing identity is a process of mechanisms during which the individual distinguishes himself/herself from others' expectations (social identity) in such way that he/she can maintain his/her self-interpretation (personal identity). The balancing takes place between social expectations and personal self-interpretations. When defining the sociological aspects of identity, Krappmann emphasizes the important role of *interactions* and (social) *functions*. This is based on the fact that in modern societies the individual is forced to take part in series of interactions in which he/she has to persistently demonstrate his/her interpretation of the particular situation. Self-representation takes place by means of communication (see Habermas' theory of communicative action). This role-concept permits the existence of discrepancies between norms and needs. According to his theory the institutionalized expectation-system of society can be stable if people accept the differences between social norms and personal needs. The behaviour of balancing between adaptation and preserving personal identity is a manner of handling conflicts between the individual and society. The advantage of this theory is that by presenting the dimensions of interactions, social functions, conflicts and personal balancing strategies it gives the opportunity to interpret the "split" of the Middle European social reality, the multiple modifications of norms by political means, the personal social milieu and the behaviour strategies present in familiar, respectively local socialization (Krappmann, 1980).

II. The interpretation of local, national and European identity

Local identity

In the Hungarian social science literature we cannot find a local identity interpretation that fits an adequate theoretical basis and permits operationalization. The different attempts of definition belong to different disciplines. In the Hungarian literature there are very few examples of treating the problems of local identity defined by historical and geographical features from the point of view of sociology or social geography (Bóhm–Pál, 1987; Köteles–Varga, 1988; Enyedi, 1991; Bóhm, 2000).

According to András A. Gergely's anthropological approach, local identity is part of the personal ("*important means of self-definition*") and the group-level identity ("*the most important self-defining criteria of the local community*") at the same time. He emphasizes the general nature of local identity (it belongs to everyone) and the relativity of its expansion and validity, but he rejects the concept of its consistence because it is concomitant to the actual level of group-consciousness and external influences (A. Gergely, 2002). This interpretation is not surprising since the author did not distinguish the personal and social dimensions of identity in his previous identity interpretation: "*... I take identity to be a system of reference, which means to me an individuality-sphere that extends to social objects, group phenomena and social field, and at the same time it is a reduced, experienced and historically transmitted pattern of the conflicts between 'me' and 'them', respectively 'us' and 'others'*" (A. Gergely, 1996, p. 5). The social geography interpretation considers local identity as being some kind of attitude, an attachment to determined areal dimensions and it also does not distinguish the personal and community levels: "*... we have to interpret the attachment of the individuals and communities to an area and its cultural, emotional and cognitive contents with its manifestations that are mostly related to a specific location, a geographicly delimitable area.*" (Pálné, 2000). Most works on cultural anthropology are about local identity, but we can rarely find any definition of the concept. One of these is Boglárka Bakó's definition which – unlike the previous two

interpretations – excludes the approach related to the personal level: "... it expresses the community's relationship with their hometown, village, street, memorial places and their history, myths, affinities, friendships and neighbouring relationships" (Bakó, 2003). Besides the relationship-based definition, which permits several options of interpretation, the author emphasizes the diversity of the manifestation of local identity (local programs, publications, memorial places, origin myths).

In the Great Plain Research Institute of the HAS Regional Research Center there have been done researches since the middle 80's. These researches mostly deal with the areal elements of geographical identity and they concentrate on minor areas (villages, suburbs, minor ranges) (Csatári, 1989; Nánásiné Tóth, 1996; Hamar–Murányi–Szoboszlai, 1997; Murányi–Szoboszlai, 1998; 1999). The results brought to attention the fact that we use the term identity as a general social scientific and areal concept without realizing its complex local, areal and regional contents. This justified our practice of assigning the categorization of local attachment elements to concrete areas during the empirical large sample research. The strongest attachment is the one to the immediate residence environment and to the location, therefore the positive and/or negative judgement of this connection often reflects unrealistically on the judgement of larger geographic areas and activities. We have defined areal identity for three concrete spatial units: 1. to the area that has areal, historical, productional, cultural and ethno-regional content mapped in the local population's consciousness; 2. to the county as a historically determined formation with a functional administrative institution system that is continuously changing from the point of view of geographical identity; 3. to the region that has been revalued as a consequence of joining the European Union and of the process of social and industrial Europeanization. According to this we have interpreted local identity as a basic component of consciousness of social identity based on which the individual considers himself/herself a member of a social group larger than the personal network, a social group determined by geographic categories. During operationalization we took as an important viewpoint the categorization (residence, minor area, county, region) that is created by the tracing of

the group, but this did not lead to the exclusivity of areal determination. We considered the emotional and cognitive features determining group membership as the basis of local identity. Therefore local or group membership also refers to identification with the traditions and values of the group (Murányi–Szoboszlai, 2000).

National Identity

According to our received definition, national identity, as the modern type of self-definition, is a basic component of identity-consciousness by means of which the individual considers himself/herself to be a member of a nation. Belonging to a nation, being attached to its traditions and values is a communicative ensemble of emotional and intellectual patterns related to attachment and identification, a development of socialization, a result of synchronic and diachronic communication generated and formed by social and historical factors. György Csepeli's phenomenological interpretation of national identity distinguishes spontaneous or natural and ideological or conscious identities. The two types of identity characterize the sociologically different social groups in different patterns. The emotional and stabilized spontaneous national identity which favours the naturalness of self-definition in everyday life is generally present in society. The ideological national identity which is added to spontaneous national identity contains intellectual elements and knowledge, therefore it implies some kind of intellectual consciousness which characterize the social groups with higher education, the groups that have manipulative status from the point of view of public opinion (Csepeli, 1985; 1992).

In conditioning national identity formed during socialization there are three major factors: understanding the concept of nation, developing an attitude towards it and national socialization. The cognitive elements (evaluation, finding reasons, comparison, compensation) serve as means of understanding the individual concerned in the existence of the nation, while the emotional element of national identity intensifies the natural and unambiguous character of the nation. The third factor, national socialization constitutes emotional and intellectual identification with the nation, i.e. surmounting the individual's own unconscious egocentricity (Piaget–Weil, 1951).

European Identity

The Hungarian sociological works on European identity mostly deal with the secondary analysis of the researches done in the confines of Eurobarometer and the International Social Survey Programme. In the theoretical introduction of a very important comparative analysis of European identity, the authors present two theoretical frames. One of these frames treats the problems related to Union membership in the context of national identity, while the other treats the same problems in the context of supranational social integration and globalization. The first approach studies the advantages of European identity compared to traditional national identity and treats the problem based on a possible "symbiosis" with the transforming national identity. The second one approaches the content of the concept based on the global identities related to some new phenomena (human resources market, industry, transfer of knowledge), ignoring the confines of national states. According to this approach, the following dimensions are related to European identity: 1. Personal utilitarian viewpoints (compared to the confines of national states), 2. The identification with norms serving group-cohesion, 3. Personal cognitive mobilization, 4. Connection to the political community and political commitment, 5. Effects of socialization (Örkény–Székelyi, 2006).

The conclusion of another influential analysis emphasizes the dynamic model of European identity: *"During my research I came to the conclusion that the identity of the citizen of the Union can be described most adequately by the dynamic identity network model of the postnational identity structure. This affirms the joint existence of the individuals' multiple identity and also contains time dimensions. In my opinion the individual can be conceptualized as being part of sets that are occasionally isolated or that overlap. All individuals are part of a community or different communities, but not all individuals are members of the same communities. It is possible that he/she is a member of a community at one time, but not at other times. Therefore community membership gets a new interpretation. While in the hierarchical model of national identity the individual is primarily part of his/her nation, in the postnational identity model he/she is a member of local, regional, national, Union and global communities, institu-*

tions and organizations at the same time. In this way this model can describe more adequately the diversity of community membership and the complex system of connections. (Koller, 2006, p. 33).

III. Analysis²

The Dekker–Malova Model

For the description of local, national and European identity we have used a theoretic model elaborated for national attitudes. Several international (Dekker, 1998; Dekker et al., 2003) and national (Kelemen, 1992; Murányi, 2006) researches validate the Dekker–Malova theoretical model which considers nationalism – presented mostly as political ideology, political movement, process of nation building or as political preference in the literature – as a component of national attitudes. As far as personal political orientation is concerned, the term nationalism is used as some kind of synonym of national orientation (national consciousness, national sentiment, national identity, loyalty to the nation, national pride, patriotism), or of faith in the consanguinity and the close relations holding the nation together, respectively of separatist aspirations. The theory assumes that national attitudes can be distinguished based on type and intensity as parts of emotions towards the nation and the country. A neutral and five positive emotional types can be distinguished among the attitudes toward nation and country. A very important feature of the national attitudes that can be described by a hierarchic structure is cumulative organization. The national attitudes built on national sentiments (national pride, national preference, national superiority and nationalism) also include the other ones. Nationalism

² The markers * and ** refer to the following statistical tests: *: significant difference between the averages of two groups, Independent Samples T test, $p \leq 0.05$; significant difference of averages belonging to three or more groups, One-Way ANOVA, $p \leq 0.05$; significant Pearson-correlation between pairs, $p \leq 0.05$; **: significant difference between the averages of two groups, Independent Samples T test, $p \leq 0.001$; significant difference of averages belonging to three or more groups, One-Way ANOVA, $p \leq 0.001$; significant Pearson-correlation between pairs, $p \leq 0.001$. The tables with results of Stepwise method linear regression models contain in all cases significant ($p \leq 0.05$) Standardized Beta Coefficients.

that generates the extremely positive national identity found on top of the hierarchy is some kind of combination of the sentiment of being part of the nation, the common origin and the consanguinity. Besides this it supports the idea of the distinct and independent state and it rejects the existence of national and ethnic minorities and their national co-operation. Similarly to the positive structure, the structuring of national identities can also be imagined as one that is characterized by negative sentiments towards the nation or even by animosity. Both emotional attitudes can also be directed towards regional or international areas (Dekker, 1998).

During the operationalization for the sake of the measurement of local and European attachments, we have renamed the dimensions of the model that was originally elaborated for national attitudes in the following way (the items belonging to local dimensions refer to residence):

Nationalism	–	Localism/Europeanism
National supremacy	–	Local/European supremacy
National preference	–	Local/European preference
National pride	–	Local/European pride
Loving the nation	–	Sense of Local/European love
National sentiment	–	Local/European sentiment

Table 1. Items of the Dekker–Malova model

(average/repartition; averages of 5 stage scales: 1: totally disagrees; 5: totally agrees)

<i>National/local/European sentiment</i>		
I consider myself to be Hungarian.	4.86	0.414
I consider myself to be X.	4.49	0.910
I consider myself to be European.	4.48	0.858
I feel that Hungary is my homeland.	4.71	0.564
I feel that Europe is my homeland.	4.26	0.898
I feel that X is my homeland.	4.06	1.054
<i>Love of the nation/location/Europe</i>		

I love the Hungarian language.	4.69	0.562
I love language X (the way it's spoken here)	4.24	0.958
I love European languages.	4.14	0.962
I love Hungary.	4.64	0.603
I love Europe.	4.35	0.803
I love X.	4.21	0.877
It's good to be Hungarian.	4.50	0.692
It's good to be European.	4.24	0.847
It's good to be X.	4.16	0.931
I generally like the Hungarian nation.	4.51	0.674
I generally like Europeans.	4.22	0.819
I generally like X.	4.19	0.860
<i>National/local/European pride</i>		
I am proud of Hungary.	4.37	0.840
I am proud of Europe.	4.24	0.870
I am proud of X.	4.08	0.949
I am proud to be Hungarian.	4.54	0.710
I am proud to be European.	4.26	0.870
I am proud to be X.	4.11	0.996
I am proud of what the Hungarians have achieved.	4. 17	0.928
I am proud of what the Europeans have achieved.	4. 09	0.925
I am proud of what the X have achieved.	3. 97	1.015
<i>National/local/European preference</i>		
I'd rather interact with Hungarians than with people from other countries.	3.78	1.176
I'd rather interact with Europeans than with non-Europeans.	3.48	1.302
I'd rather interact with X than with non-X.	3.13	1.348
I'd rather spend the greater part of my life in Hungary than in any other country.	4.48	0.819
I'd rather spend the greater part of my life in Europe than on any other continent.	4.29	0.925
I'd rather spend the greater part of my life in Y than in any other place.	3.63	1.359

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<i>National/local/European supremacy</i>		
I generally like the Hungarian people more than other peoples.	4.09	1.016
I generally like Europeans more than people living on other continents.	3.53	1.283
I generally like X more than people living in other places.	3.36	1.323
Generally Hungarians are better than non-Hungarians.	2.96	1.276
Generally Europeans are better than non-Europeans.	2.91	1.256
Generally X are better than non-X.	2.67	1.314
It is best to live in Europe.	3.76	1.053
Hungary is the best country to live in.	3.51	1.219
X is the best place to live in.	3.21	1.294
<i>Nationalism/localism/Europeanism</i>		
I feel that common roots, common origin connects me to Hungarians.	4.40	0.842
I feel that common roots, common origin connects me to X.	3.91	1.161
I feel that common roots, common origin connects me to Europeans.	2.89	1.334
I feel that Europeans form a big family that I belong to.	3.92	1.071
I feel that X form a big family that I belong to.	3.79	1.157
I feel that Hungarians form a big family that I belong to.	4.13	1.021
I think that all Hungarians should live in Hungary.	3.29	1.339
I think that all Europeans should live in Europe.	2.89	1.334
I think that all X should live in Y.	2.83	1.411
Hungarians shouldn't mix with others.	2.85	1.391
Europeans shouldn't mix with others.	2.63	1.362
X shouldn't mix with others.	2.24	1.307
It would be better if the non-Hungarians moved from Hungary.	2.73	1.424
It would be better if the non-Europeans moved from Europe.	2.57	1.326
It would be better if the non-X moved from Y.	2.48	1.336

Similarly to previous Hungarian and foreign researches, the structural model used in our research supported the differentiation of the six national attitudes structured into a cumulative hierarchy related to the nation and the state. In conformity with our expectations the structure of the six dimensions was fulfilled: getting higher and higher in the hierarchy the upcoming stages become less and less preferred.

Table 2. shows that national attitudes are the most supported, while local attitudes are the least supported in each of the six dimensions.

Table 2. The structure of local/national and European attitudes
(contracted average point)

	LOCAL attitudes	NATIONAL attitudes	EUROPEAN attitudes
Localism/Nationalism/Europeanism	3.05	3.48	3.19
Local/national/European supremacy	3.07	3.51	3.39
Local/national/European preference	3.38	4.13	3.88
Local/national/European pride	4.05	4.35	4.19
Love of the residence/nation/Europe	4.19	4.58	4.23
Local/national/European sentiment	4.27	4.78	4.36

The correlational connections of the attitude dimensions of the three identity types are important and significant in all cases. The intensity of connections inside the six dimensions decrease linearly: the greatest coefficients can be found between localism-nationalism and Europeanism, while the smallest one is between local-national and European sentiment.

Table 3. The cumulative structure of local/national and European attitudes
(contracted average point differences)

	National sentiment	Love of the nation	National pride	National preference	National supremacy
Love of the nation	0.201	-	-	-	-
National pride	0.425	0.225	-	-	-
National preference	0.653	0.454	0.231	-	-

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National supremacy	1.267	1.067	0.846	0.593	-
Nationalism	1.299	1.097	0.874	0.632	0.023
	Local sentiment	Love of location	Local pride	Local preference	Local supremacy
Love of location	0.078	-	-	-	-
Local pride	0.220	0.144	-	-	-
Local preference	0.895	0.823	0.685	-	-
Local supremacy	1.189	1.113	0.969	0.283	-
Localism	1.221	1.144	1.000	0.317	0.026
	European sentiment	Love of Europe	European pride	European preference	European supremacy
Love of Europe	0.127	-	-	-	-
European pride	0.173	0.041	-	-	-
European preference	0.483	0.356	0.316	-	-
European supremacy	0.973	0.839	0.794	0.480	-
Europeanism	1.165	1.030	0.990	0.668	0.169

Table 4. Localism/Nationalism/Europeanism connection
(correlation coefficient)

	Localism	Nationalism
Localism	-	-
Nationalism	0.634**	-
Europeanism	0.635**	0.594**

Table 5. Local/national/European supremacy relation
(correlation coefficient)

	Local supremacy	National supremacy
Local supremacy	-	-
National supremacy	0.592**	-
European supremacy	0.529**	0.500**

Table 6. Local/national/European preference relation
(correlation coefficient)

	Local preference	National preference
Local preference	-	-
National preference	0.458**	-
European preference	0.394**	0.470**

Table 7. Local/national/European pride relation
(correlation coefficient)

	Local pride	National pride
Local pride	-	-
National pride	0.523**	-
European pride	0.490**	0.411**

Table 8. Love of residence/nation/Europe relation
(correlation coefficient)

	Love of location	Love of nation
Love of location	-	-
Love of nation	0.544**	-
Love of Europe	0.486**	0.507**

Table 9. Local/national/European sentiment relation
(correlation coefficient)

	Local sentiment	National sentiment
Local sentiment	-	-
National sentiment	0.272**	-
European sentiment	0.329**	0.328**

By taking into consideration the variables of the six dimensions of national attitudes, we have created a contracted national attitude the average of which is 4.139.

The result of the factor analysis of the six attitude dimensions that characterise the three types show the interesting structure of local, national and European attitudes. Besides the factors corresponding to the three levels, the preference of the strongest dimensions of the three levels has also been distinguished (localism, nationalism, Europeanism, supremacy, preference). This means that there

is an identity type in people's mentality in which local, national and European types are not isolated, but their strongest dimensions are accepted at the same time.

Table 10. Structuring of local/national/European attitudes
(Factor analyses, Maximum Likelihood model, Varimax rotation)

	Supremacy factor	Europe factor	Locality factor	Nation factor
Localism	0.780	-0.023	0.401	-0.035
Local supremacy	0.762	-0.042	0.388	-0.095
Nationalism	0.760	-0.017	-0.038	0.253
National supremacy	0.757	-0.012	0.017	0.244
Europeanism	0.745	0.407	0.063	-0.060
Local preference	0.677	0.009	0.420	-0.051
European supremacy	0.655	0.434	0.097	-0.092
National preference	0.573	0.071	0.036	0.366
European pride	0.035	0.843	0.238	0.273
Love of Europe	0.034	0.824	0.176	0.197
European sentiment	-0.049	0.807	0.190	0.333
European preference	0.424	0.558	0.061	0.060
Love of residence	0.144	0.267	0.805	0.262
Local pride	0.229	0.285	0.802	0.327
Local sentiment	0.144	0.159	0.763	0.143
Love of nation	0.077	0.252	0.204	0.866
National pride	0.295	0.197	0.185	0.704
National sentiment	-0.065	0.198	0.159	0.650
Explained variance-proportion percentage	36.27	17.74	8.21	7.23

Regarding the problem of what means to be European, the answers expect two main criteria: on the one hand to be born in Europe, and on the other emotional identification. Much fewer people marked their origin, socialization attachment or civic activity, while Christian identity and knowledge of another European language were considered an important European feature for a small subset of answers.

Table 11. Criteria of European pertinence

(Which of the following two features do you consider most important for someone to be European? The answers – percentage)

Born in Europe	50
Considers himself/herself to be European	50
Grew up in a European country	26
With at least one European parent	21
Shares European cultural traditions	20
Exercises his/her civic rights, eg. votes at European elections	19
Being CChristian	8
Acquires other European languages besides his/her own	7

The answerers considered emotional identification and self-categorization as Hungarian the most important criteria of being Hungarian, but knowledge of the language and of the culture were also emphasized viewpoints. They considered less important only two of the other criteria: the support of the political system and religiousness.

Table 12. Criteria of Hungarian pertinence

(According to your opinion to what extent is important ...

for someone to be Hungarian average:

1: not important at all, 4: very important)

To consider himself/herself Hungarian	3.80
To feel that he/she is Hungarian	3.80
To speak Hungarian	3.71
To know and love the Hungarian culture	3.61
To know and love the Hungarian flag	3.59
To have Hungarian ancestors	3.49
To have at least one Hungarian parent	3.45
To be a Hungarian citizen	3.27
To spend most of his/her life in Hungary	3.15
To respect Hungary's political institution system and justice system	3.11
To have grown up in Hungary	3.11
To be born in Hungary	3.01
To vote during parliamentary elections	3.01
To agree with the Hungarian political system	2.62
To be religious	2.42

One of the possibilities of operationalization of local and areal identity is the measurement of attachment expressing rather emotional than cognitive contents. In the questionnaire there were nine attachment domains from the levels of regional-administrational levels to European areal categories. The averages support that people are primarily attached to the country and county where they live. The attachment to Europe (or to a specific part of it, to Middle Europe) or the region of the country (Eastern Plain region) is substantially weaker, while the European Union as a union of countries is considered even more remote by the answerers. One of the reasons for this is that a quarter of the answerers (24 percent) said that they had formed a negative image about the European Union, while every second answerer (50 percent) had a neutral image about the EU. The intensity of the attachment to the European Union is also influenced by the discontentment with it: the more satisfied people are with the Union, the more they are attached to it. (The features of the linear regression model are: Adjusted R Square: 0.173, Beta: 0.419, $p \leq 0.001$.)

Table 13. Intensity of areal attachments

(People are attached to their hometown or village, region, country or to Europe to different extents. How much are you attached... average: 1: not at all, 4: very much)

to the county of Hajdú-Bihar*	3.61
to Hungary	3.60
to the county Szabolcs-Sz.-B.*	3.53
to some part of the county	3.15
to Europe	2.99
to Middle Europe	2.71
to the region of Tiszántúl [over the Tisza]	2.65
to the region of the Northern Plain	2.63
to the European Union	2.44

*: average of the answers given by people from the county

We measured the intensity of group pertinance regarding residence and bigger and bigger geographical areas by means of another

question. The most frequently marked place of residence is followed by the level the county, then – with much less mention – the level of the country. Marking wider categories occurred only in a few percent of the cases. The tendencies of group-pertainance connections and areal attachments are identical: besides the preferences of direct residence and counties the level of the country is also dominant. On the stage between county and country level (region, country part) and on levels higher than that of the country (a part of Europe, Europe) neither attachment, nor group-pertainance is significant.

Table 14. The extent of geographical attachments

(Which is the geographic unit that you mostly belong to? Which is the next one in line? The percentage of the opters of the first or second one)

	Chosen as the first one	Chosen as the second one
People living in his/her habitat	58	16
People living in the county Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg*	28	42
People living in the county Hajdú-Bihar*	16	43
People living in Hungary	12	23
People living in the region of the Northern Plain	7	3
People living in a particular area of the county	3	7
People living in the region of Tiszántúl [over the Tisza]	1	4
People living in Europe	1	3
People living on planet Earth	1	1
People living in Central Europe	0	2

*: the distribution of those who live in the county

Prejudiciality Against Minority Groups

Similarly to the universal social science literature, the Hungarian researchers of the problem often miss the interpretation of the concept. Nevertheless – even if not explicitly expressed – behind the operationalization there can be observed the two approaches regarding the research of the concept. According to Ferenc Erős' summarizing presentation, normative and descriptive approaches can characterize the functioning and formation of prejudice in an ideal-typical manner (Erős, 2007).

As far as the definition of prejudice among groups is concerned, Tajfel's interpretation – that belongs to the category of the descriptive and contextual (cognitive) prejudice-theories – is very significant. Tajfel defines prejudice as judgement formed during the interaction of different groups supported or rejected by an individual or group (Tajfel, 1981). The terminology (prejudicial temper, prejudicial mentality, discriminative behaviour, prejudicial attitude, intolerance, excluding approach) used in the Hungarian empirical literature captures different but correlated sides of the same phenomena. During the interpretation and measurement of attitudes as behavioural predispositions the operationalization of the three partially independent components – cognitive, affective and conative – is inevitable (Ajzen, 1988), but the interpretation phrased by Tajfel, in a somewhat undifferentiated manner as "judgement", is also acceptable. Using this interpretation we can ignore the operationalization of prejudice as an attitude with respect to all three dimensions. According to this, in youth studies, scientists take as an indicator of prejudiciality the index of negative judgement regarding different ethnical, national, deviant and foreign groups based on a majority-minority relation. Due to this we agree with the statement that most of the Hungarian sociological and socio-psychological methods cannot help us understand discrimination based on ethnicity, the causes and intensity of which have to be explored carefully (Eróss-Gárdos, 2007).

During our research we studied the attitude towards minority groups by means of questions that constitute an adequate indicator of the relation between different groups. Questions related to the disturbing/not disturbing perception of neighbouring relationships and to the method of keeping interpersonal distance are frequently applied. The evaluated groups are not restricted to national and ethnic minorities (gypsies, jews); sexual (homosexual) and stigmatized (handicapped) groups also figure in the questions.

Similarly to the results of previous researches that operationalized identically the adjudication of national, ethnic, sexual and stigmatized minorities, we found that beside the most rejected stigmatized minority groups (drug users, homosexuals) the gypsies are the most rejected, while Finnish people and Transylvanian Hungarians are the least rejected group.

Table 15. Minority outgroup relation

(What would you say if your neighbour belonged to one of the following groups? the percentage of "it would be disturbing" answers)

drog user	75
homosexual	52
Gypsy	48
Arabic	31
Chinese	27
Romanian	20
Jew	19
Serb	19
Russian	19
Ukrainian	19
Slovak	17
Polish	13
Croat	12
handicapped	11
German	11
Finnish	11
Transylvanian Hungarian	5

Similarly to the case of national attitude we created a contracted index based on the adjudication of the seventy groups, the average of the index regarding the whole sample being: 4.08.

Discriminacy and the three joint identities weakly correlate but the correlation is not significant in any of the cases.

Table 16. The correlation of local/national/European attitude and the discriminacy index* (Pearson - correlation coefficients, 2-tailed)

Local attitude	0.033
National attitude	0.009
European attitude	0.054

*: $p \leq 0.05$

National attitude and discriminatory index: socio-cultural features

The joint preference of the three attitudes and the strongest dimensions (Supremacy factor) characterizes in a significantly frequent manner the older and the less educated people. Religiousness that correlates to age and education also has a significant connection with local, national and European attitudes: the intensely religious groups are also characterized by the three attitudes. The groups classified on the basis of the type of settlement inhabited by them are not characterised by the difference of averages, but the two counties give different averages: comparing to the population of the county Hajdú-Bihar, the population living in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg have stronger local and national attitudes.

**Table 17. Local/national/European attitude
– socio/cultural features (average)**

	National	Local	European	Supremacy factor
Gender				
Men	4.11	3.66	3.84	-0.057
Women	4.15	3.67	3.90	0.032
Age				
18-39 years old	4.03**	3.52**	3,8365	-0.109**
40-59 years old	4.14	3.64	3,8824	-0.093
60 years old and older	4.25	3.87	3,9196	0.225
Education				
8 th grade of elementary school at the most	4.28**	3.83**	3,8627	0.178**
Trade school	4.15	3.68	3,8789	0.051
High-school graduation	4.02	3.58	3,8953	-0.081
College certificate	4.01	3.49	3,8627	-0.353
Income¹				
Small income	4.18	3.68	3.85	0.077
Medium income	4.13	3.71	3.90	-0,060
High income	4.09	3.62	3.87	-0,020
Religion				
Catholic	4.16	3.68	3.91	0.020
Reformed	4.13	3.68	3.84	-0.074
Other religion	4.19	3.63	3.92	0.206

Has not been registered/ baptized	4.01	3.69	3.83	0.136
Religiousness				
Not religious (self- classification)	4.02**	3.59*	3.81*	-0.064
Half-religious (self- classification)	4.14	3.76	3.88	0.098
Religious (self-classification)	4.21	3.67	3.93	-0.018
Settlement type				
Chief town of a county	4.08	3.74	3.98	-0.102
Town	4.11	3.59	3.95	-0.322
Village	4.19	3.68	3.73	0.347
County				
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	4.20**	3.62*	3.90	0.016
Hajdú-Bihar	4.07	3.72	3.85	-0.011

¹ The income variable was created based on the following two questions: 1. *How much is your (your family's) monthly net income? Please don't forget to take your own income into consideration too. Take all income into consideration: family allowance, child-support, part-time jobs and all others!* 2. *Which statement is relevant for your (your family's) income situation?* The missing answers related to the net income were replaced with the income averages of income categories. (The income situation in the whole sample: 1. We make our living without any problem of our current income: 2 percent; 2. It is a problem for us to make our living of our current income: 33 percent; 3. We have huge difficulties making our living of our current income: 45 percent; 4. We can hardly make our living of our current income: 19 percent.) We created three equal groups based on the net income of the families: Small income: 80.187 HUF; Medium income: 138.805 HUF; High income: 207.681 HUF.

Unlike in the case of the national attitude index, the discriminatory index averages differ significantly only regarding the groups formed based on religiousness and settlement type: rejection of minority groups mostly characterizes the non-registered, non-religious people and people living in villages.

Table 18. Discriminacy index – socio-cultural features (average)

Gender	
Men	4.02
Women	4.90
Age	
18-39 years old	4,29
40-59 years old	3,72
60 years old and older	4,28
Education	
8 th grade of elementary school at the most	4.03
Trade school	4.21
High-school graduation	4.22
College certificate	3.59
Income	
Small income	3,94
Medium income	4,20
High income	4,15
Religion**	
Catholic	3.46
Reformed	4.16
Other religion	3.48
Has not been registered/baptized	6.10
Religiousness*	
Not religious (self-classification)	4.58
Half-religious (self-classification)	3.84
Religious (self-classification)	3.77
Settlement type**	
Chief town of a county	3.11
Town	3.83
Village	5.03
County	
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	4.00
Hajdú-Bihar	4.17

Cause-effect model I. explanatory variables: socio-cultural background variables; pending variable: national/local/European attitude indices and supremacy factor

Among the attitudes related to the three identity categories the national attitude index is mostly explained while the European atti-

tude index is the least explained by the socio-cultural background variables.³ The significant influences explain the national attitude index by percentage. National attitude is also significantly influenced by gender and age (besides religiousness).

The high rate of the national attitude index is made versimilar by older age, lower education and religiousness. The habitat of the county Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and of villages also have an intensifying influence on national attitude.

Table 19. Linear regression model – pending variable: national attitude index
(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients;
explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables)

	Beta
Age	0.150
Education	-0.133
County	-0.078
Religiousness	0.073
Settlement type	-0.064
Adjusted R Square	7.4

The rate of the local attitude index is increased significantly by low education and living in the county Hajdú-Bihar (besides old age).

Table 20. Linear regression model – pending variable: local attitude index
(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients;
explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables)

	Beta
Age	0.173
County	0.078
Education	-0.079
Adjusted R Square	4.6

³Socio-cultural variables: Gender (1: men, 0: women), Age: number of years, Education (1: high-school graduation at least: highly educated, 0: trade school at the most: low education); Religion1 (1: reformed, 0: other religion); Religion2 (1: catholic, 0: other religion); Religiousness (1: religious, 0: not religious & half-religious), Settlement type: 1: town, 0: village), County (1: Hajdú-Bihar, 0: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg).

Unlike in the case of the other two indices, the European attitude index is significantly influenced only by the two features of the habitat: living in the county Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg or in a town increases the preference of European attitude.

Table 21. Linear regression model – pending variable: European attitude index

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables)

	Beta
Settlement type	0.199
County	-0.088
Adjusted R Square	3.6

The socio-cultural variables can explain in a larger proportion the Supremacy factor which jointly expresses the most powerful dimensions of the three types. Besides settlement type, age has a determinative role but the degree of education and the county are also significant: the types' undifferentiated support is made verisimilar by old age, living in a village, living in the county Hajdú-Bihar and low degree of education.

Table 22. Linear regression model – pending variable: Supremacy factor

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables)

	Beta
Settlement type	-0.324
Age	0.138
County	0.089
Education	-0.080
Adjusted R Square	12.1

Cause-effect model II. explanatory variables: socio-cultural background variables; pending variable: discriminatory index

The socio-cultural variable has a small role in explaining the discriminatory index. Besides being of reformed religion, living in a village makes discrimination against minorities verisimilar.

Table 23. Linear regression model – pending variable: discriminatory index
(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients;
explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables)

	Beta
Settlement type	-0.164
Reformed religion	0.132
Adjusted R Square	4.3

Cause-effect model III. explanatory variables: prejudice against minorities; pending variable: national/local/European attitude indices and the supremacy factor

The three types of attitude can uniformly be characterised by the fact that the adjudication of minorities explain the indices to a negligible extent. Local attitude indices are increased by the factor of accepting Arabic and handicapped people, while they are decreased by rejecting Polish people. In the case of the national attitude index the acceptance of Arabic people – similarly to the case of local attitudes – also makes acceptance verisimilar, but the rejection of gypsies goes with the intensification of national attitude. In increasing the European attitude index negative judgement of handicapped people and acceptance of Transylvanian Hungarians have significant roles (besides rejecting gypsies).

**Table 24. Linear regression model – pending variable:
national attitude index**
(Linear regression, Enter method, Standardized Beta Coefficients;
explanatory variables: adjudication of minorities' variables)

	Beta
Gypsy	0.099
Arabic	-0.161
Adjusted R Square	0.6

Table 25. Linear regression model – pending variable: local attitude index

(Linear regression, Enter method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: adjudication of minorities' variables)

	Beta
Polish	0.158
Arabic	-0.088
Handicapped	-0.074
Adjusted R Square	1.4

Table 26. Linear regression model – pending variable: European attitude index

(Linear regression, Enter method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: adjudication of minorities' variables)

	Beta
Handicapped	0.120
Transylvanian Hungarian	-0.100
Gypsy	0.082
Adjusted R Square	2.1

Taking our previous results into consideration, it is not surprising that the Supremacy factor –which prefers the most powerful attitude dimensions that belong to the three levels – is increased by anti-semitism (rejecting jew people), by the acceptance of Arabic people and by rejecting gypsies. The results related to the linear connection between the positive judgement towards drog users as a stigmatized group and the increasing of supremacy are by all means surprising.

Table 27. Linear regression model – pending variable: Supremacy factor

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: adjudication of minorities' variables)

	Beta
Jew	0.259
Arabic	-0.126
Gypsy	0.112
Drog user	-0.084
Adjusted R Square	5.6

Cause-effect models IV. explanatory variables: national/local/European attitude dimensions; pending variable: discriminatory index

When the discriminatory index is pending in the linear regression model and the coherent local/national/European attitude dimensions figure as explanatory variables, then – among the models – the most powerful explanatory force can be rendered to the national attitude dimensions (7.3 percent), while the European attitude dimensions have the weakest explanatory force (3.3 percent). Each of the three models can be characterized by the fact that the "strong" attitude dimensions (preference, nationalism/Europeanism) increase while the most supported "weak" dimensions (emotion, love, pride) that are low in the attitude hierarchy decrease the discriminatory against minority groups.

Table 28. Linear regression model – pending variable: discriminatory index

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: national attitude dimensions)

	Beta
Nationalism	0.240
National pride	-0.159
National sentiment	-0.103
Adjusted R Square	7.3

Table 29. Linear regression model – pending variable: discriminatory index

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: local attitude dimensions)

	Beta
Local preference	0.218
Love of residence	-0.175
Adjusted R Square	4.2

Table 30. Linear regression model – pending variable: discriminatory index

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standardized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: European attitude dimensions)

	Beta
Europeanism	0.191
European pride	-0.116
Adjusted R Square	3.3

Cause-effect models V. explanatory variables: criteria of being Hungarian; pending variable: national attitude index / Supremacy factor

We have studied the influence of the criteria of being Hungarian in two models in which the national attitude index and the Supremacy factor figured as pending variables. (The study of the effect on the local or European attitude index is logically hard to justify). Our results support the fact that, compared to the national attitude index, the Supremacy factor is explained by the criteria of being Hungarian to a significantly larger extent (3.4, respectively 15.2 percent). The more preferred the criteria of identification with the political system, with the representational-symbolical aspects of Hungarians (flag) and with Christian/religious faith is as criteria of being Hungarian, the more validated the national attitude index is. The support of the Supremacy factor which strongly expresses some identity levels is made verisimilar by the preference of the political system and religious faith as criteria of being Hungarian. As far as political loyalty is concerned, the influence of the adjudication of the system and the institution structure were separated, because respecting the political institution structure does not increase the Supremacy factor. The self-classification criteria have a similar role, while the emphasis on the criteria of Hungarian pertinence increases the joint identification with the different identity types.

Table 31. Linear regression model – pending variable: national attitude index

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: criteria of being Hungarian)

	Beta
Has to agree with the Hungarian political system	0.106
Has to know and love the Hungarian flag	0.105
Has to be Christian/religious	0.075
Adjusted R Square	3.4

Table 32. Linear regression model – pending variable: Supremacy factor

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variables: criteria of being Hungarian)

	Beta
Has to agree with the Hungarian political system	0.284
Has to consider himself/herself Hungarian	-0.157
Has to be Christian/religious	0.174
Has to respect Hungary's political institution system and justice system	-0.180
Has to be born in Hungary	0.078
Adjusted R Square	15.1

Cause-effect models VI. explanatory variables: European pertinance criteria; pending variable: European attitude index / Supremacy factor

The criteria of being European play a less significant role in explaining the European attitude index and the Supremacy factor. European origin is a very important condition in both models, but the Supremacy factor is also influenced in a positive way by the factor of Christian religion which increases attitudes of jointly preferring the different identity levels. Foreign language aquisition has a reverse influence on the European attitude index, while European socialization has a reverse influence on the Supremacy factor: the criteria of aquiring European languages decreases identification with European attitude – similarly to the correlation of the criteria of having grown up in a European country and the Supremacy factor.

Table 33. Linear regression model – pending variable:**European attitude index**

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variable: European pertainance criteria)

	Beta
With at least one European parent	0.105
Born in Europe	0.067
Studies other European languages besides his/her own	-0.063
Adjusted R Square	1.6

Table 34. Linear regression model – pending variable:**Supremacy factor**

(Linear regression, Stepwise method, Standartized Beta Coefficients; explanatory variable: European pertainance criteria)

	Beta
Grew up in a European country	-0.076
Christian	0.129
Born in Europe	0.132
With at least one European parent	0.097
Adjusted R Square	4.5

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SAINT STEPHEN I. WITH HIS HANDS TIED BEHIND HIS BACK: ON THE NATIONAL ATTITUDE AND APPROACH TO HISTORY OF A RADICAL NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION

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Introduction

The picture in the title was described in a humorous way by one of the interlocutors during a focus-group interview with members of a radical nationalist organization. The mummified right hand of Saint Stephen I - one of the most important symbols of Hungarian Christianity and of the state foundation - is kept in the Saint Stephen's Cathedral in Budapest and on August 20th, the national holiday of Hungary, it is carried around in a procession on the streets of the capital. Why someone, who is a member of an organization aiming to preserve and protect its national heritage and its past, would tie this hand?

The goal of the European, National and Regional Identities (ENRI) project is to research the local, national and European identities of the region on the Hungarian-Romanian border. As a part of this project one focus-group and three individual interviews with leading characters of a radical nationalist paramilitary organization were conducted in December 2010 and January 2011. The present paper uses the results of this research. During the discussions the interviewees not only emphasized the importance of the national heritage and that of the national part in order to create a national feeling, but also used stories in depicting their image of the nation. During this they presented an alternative past, different from the mainstream, filled with mythical symbols and stories, which are suitable to express the national character and power, as well as the legitimization of the refusal of and opposition to authority. The aim of the present paper is to identify the strategies the members of the group expressed their identity with and to reveal the viewpoints and approaches based on which they created such a national past that can be successfully

used in presenting their national identity. This approach to history is very close to what Michel Foucault called counter-history (Foucault, 2003).

The aim of this paper is the qualitative analysis of the contents of these interviews, but the results of the questionnaire, as well as the text of the organization's oath and the writings from their web-page will be also analyzed. During this study I tried to outline the past they constructed and the ways it is used in defining the identities of their members. In my opinion simply stating that these stories do not match the results of history or the rules of scientific discourse and are mainly based on falsifications, does not help us understand the ideology behind the organization. The analysis of these stories can lead us closer to understanding how the representatives of this community, the members of this radical nationalist subculture see the world, and how the stories mentioned or told by them represent and transmit all these.

Nationalism and national attitudes

The ENRI research project uses the Dekker-Malova national attitude scale as a theoretical framework in discussing nationalism (Dekker et al. 2003). This theory considers nationalism as a person's mindset, attitude that is feelings towards and approaches to some objects (nation, state). These can be classified based on the type of national attitude (negative and positive), as well as on their strength (weak, strong and radically strong). According to this theory there is one neutral and five positive attitudes:

- neutral national feelings (feeling that one belongs to a certain country and its inhabitants)
- national liking (liking a particular country and its inhabitants)
- national pride (being proud of a country and its inhabitants)
- national preference (preferring one country and its inhabitants)
- national superiority (feeling that a country and its inhabitants are superior to the other ones) and
- nationalism (the individual feels that due to common ancestors he/she belongs to a certain nation, wishes to keep this nation as clean as possible and also desires to create and/or sustain a separate and independent country for that nation).

The authors also assume that a positive national attitude provides

the individual with a (moderate, strong or radical) positive national identity and at the same time a positive self-identity. The theory includes the cumulative hierarchical nature of attitudes, i.e. every level of the scale includes the previous levels as well, thus we cannot have national preference without national pride or national superiority without national preference. The Dekker-Malova scale also determines negative attitudes, which occur when there are no positive national attitudes:

- national alienation (the individual feels uncomfortable among the inhabitants of a country, does not consider the country as being his/her home),
- national shame (being ashamed because of the country and its inhabitants),
- national antipathy (feeling antipathy towards the country and its inhabitants),
- national hate (hates the country and its inhabitants).

An important element of the theory developed by Dekker and his fellow researchers is that the existence of these attitudes is stated not only in connection with the nation, but also regarding other objects, such as locality, region and mankind. With the help of this we can fit the EU feeling, EU preference, EU unionalism, the Slavic feeling, Arabism or even a feeling of internationalism, cosmopolitanism. In connection with the relations of these to one another the authors presume that the moderately positive attitudes can be easily associated with another positive attitude, but strongly or radically positive attitudes (preference, superiority, nationalism) do not mingle with other positive attitudes. That is how a strong local Basque nationalism can be accompanied by negative attitudes towards Spain, or French nationalism can occur by negative attitudes towards the European Union. The theory also considers it possible that the people who have strong positive or radically positive attitudes towards their country or an international region would also accept internationalism and cosmopolitanism. According to this, the theory states that switching from pride to preference determines whether the individual combines the different local, national and international identities (Dekker et al. 2003).

The organization and national radicalism in Hungary

My analysis on the worldview and approach to history of a radical nationalist organization greatly supports and confirms all that has been said about this movement, counter-cultures or generally about radicalism (Weaver, 2006; Mudde, 2005). Still, this analysis provides some unique possibilities, as it offers an insight to the inner structures, identities and approaches to history of a certain determined, depicted community by performing an empirical research using professionally conducted interviews and questionnaires.

The radical organization (in the following: Organization) was founded in 2007 and as it can be definitely established based on the interviews, it is the result of the political events in Hungary from 2006.¹ The Organization, functioning as a civil guard and as a group aiming to preserve traditions, has an approximate number of 160 members, its main area of activity being the counties Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Hajdú-Bihar. One of its aims is the strengthening and transmitting of the national consciousness, preserving traditions, as well as maintaining order and guarding assets. One also needs to mention that as opposed to other organizations, this group remains aloof from politics. From both the text of the oath and the accounts of the interviewees it emerges that members are sent down if they subordinate their organizational activity to their party political aims. The structure of the group is military-like, the uniforms are the ones worn by the national defense soldiers during the Second World War.

Nationalist radicalism has been given a new boost in Hungary due to the events of 2006 (the speech of Ószöd, the siege of the headquarters of the Hungarian National Television, the demonstrations on October 23rd). This was the period when a number of organizations were founded – the best known being the Magyar Gárda (the Hungarian Guard) –, and the Jobbik – the Movement for a Better Hungary – became more and more popular, receiving 14.77% of the votes during the 2006 European Parliamentary elections and 16.67% during the 2010 list-based elections for the Parliament of Hungary. One

¹ “The events of 2006 were the ones that determined me as a person that this needs to be over. If we, as people, let the different governments do this to us, the people they should live and work for, it means all is screwed up...” (focus group interview).

can state without exaggeration that 2006 marks the beginning of a new era in the history of national radicalism. It is hard to say generalities about this trend, as it is organized around several ideologies. A common element is nationalism, the rejection of and the demand to change the existing liberal politics and that of the global economical systems. The rejection of the Treaty of Trianon goes very often hand in hand with revisionism and irredentism. The organizations that define themselves as being radical or right-wing radical usually repudiate the “extreme”, “fascist”, “Nazi”, “neo-Nazi” labels, though in their use of symbols, of language and their presence they are reminiscent of the Nyilas movement of the Second World War. The representatives of nationalist radicalism can often be characterized by anti-semitism, anti-Gypsy attitudes and xenophobia.

The Interviews

The first registered discussion was a focus-group interview recorded at the end of 2010 with the aim of getting to know their view of nation, their sense of the Hungarian spirit, their worldview, as well as the textual analysis of the oath and the code of ethics. The focus-group interview, which five members of the organization took part in, made it possible for the participants to present their thoughts on the topics discussed, to an extent they feel comfortable with, in front of their fellow members – that is why it proved to be a very efficient tool in analyzing their knowledge and representations holding them together. In January 2011 we recorded three individual interviews, in which we asked the interviewees about the story of their life, as well as questions that needed a longer elaboration after the first interview: the national symbols, turning-points of the Hungarian history that they considered important, and also the important historical places. The original research objectives did not include the attitude towards the past, the analysis of the view of the past and the historical memory of the group, but the interviewees considered these to be of a major importance, consequently during the repeated individual interviews the inquirer also formulated questions on the past and history.

What holds a nation together? Its history, that's what it does. Its language, its heritage holds it together. Not the internet, not liberalism, not untruthful democracy, they simply cannot (focus-group interview).

Lost heritage

Related to the question asked in the introduction, that is why would someone, who is a member of an organization aiming to preserve and protect its national heritage and its past, tie Saint Stephen's hand, a clue can be found in the following interview sample:

Interviewer: And if we go a little back in time and play with the thought that I am the Wizard of Oz and I can bring back a time, an age, this age of Horthy?

Interviewee No. 5: This is an interesting question.

Interviewer: Lets' say, I am the Wizard of Oz.

Interviewee No. 1: I would go a little bit further back. The age of Horthy is... I personally would not go back there, but a little bit further back in time. And try to prevent the process which lead the Hungarian Kingdom to these happenings... a little bit further back.

Interviewee No. 2: Hold Stephen's hand back.

Interviewer: I am Stephen, Saint Stephen I.

Interviewee No. 2: So starting with the fact that he melted our Arvisura gold plates, and thus he yielded to the Byzantine Empire, and destroyed a great part of our history, I would go back and kick the old guy's butt (focus-group interview).

The reason for punishing Saint Stephen is the destruction of the sources of a fictitious tradition, a tradition which includes the mythical history of the ages before the settlement and the foundation of the Hungarian state in 1001. The golden plates are mentioned in the *Arvisura*, which is seen by the members of the organization as a key source of this mythical national history. The *Arvisura* texts tell the story of the Hun clan alliances and the history of the Hungarian nation starting from the emigration from the lost ancient continent, *Atais*, the formation of the Hun clan alliances until the discovery of the tradition during the Second World War. These are all included in

the 9000 page legacy of Paál Zoltán, a metallurgist from Ózd, which were published by the Püski Könyvesház (Paál, 2003).

According to the story, during the Second World War, Soviet partisan parachutists of Finno-Ugric origin landed in the area near Ózd and rescued Paál Zoltán, the metallurgist smelter from conscript labor. During their discussions Szalaváré Tura, the Mansi shaman – fulfilling his secret mission – passed on the tradition of the Arvisura to Paál Zoltán, and made him rune-carving shaman of the Hunnish tribe alliance. Thus the traditions of the Arvisura written on golden plates found its way back to the Hungarians, and Paál Zoltán wrote them down, completing them with his own story. Though the author himself calls the text a legend: “Arvisura (true word) – Legends from the Runic Chronicle of the Hun and Hungarian Clan Alliance”, the followers of the Arvisura tradition do not have any doubts regarding their veracity (Kozsdi, 2005; the Arvisura webpage).

The Arvisura fits perfectly in the pseudo-historical nationalist discourse that tries to vindicate the primacy of Hungarians, though it bears some characteristics which make it without precedent in this “genre”. The most important difference is that previous authors re-read existing, documented sources in Hungarian – e.g. cuneiform clay tablets by Badiny-Jós Ferenc (1997), leaving a huge surface for attack against their findings by historians. The Arvisura is however a new source, of a monumental size, thus compensating for the void, for the non-existing reference, the withheld tradition. The Arvisura is also a synthesis, in which several stories that had been known only from sporadic or contradictory sources or papers are worked together as one, such as the kinship of the Hungarians with the Huns, the Parthians and the Sumerians, the Holy Crown, Jesus’ Scythian origin etc. In my opinion, it is not a coincidence that the Arvisura became the bestseller of the nationalist historical discourse in the past few years, and this is also supported by the research done with the Organization: in every interview, in the focus group and the individual interviews, they refer to it, they even name Paál Ferenc’s legend.

In my opinion, the image presented in the title – the punishment of the founder of the state by tying its hand back – is a successful representation of several elements. The first one is the opposition to state, authority and dominant discourse. The state withheld the truth even from its foundations, the tradition bearing the far part, as

it melted down the gold plates it was written on. The second one is the nature of this tradition: this used to be the glorious past of the Hungarians, when its superiority over other nations and true character could be manifested. Of course this is a past that can constitute the base for national pride and superiority.

The Holy Crown

Punishing Saint Stephen I could be contradictory to the emphasized role of the Holy Crown, the relic traditionally associated with Saint Stephen by the members of the Organization. According to the text of the oath the new members make an oath “to the universal and eternal divine laws arising from the Holy Crown”, and the special importance of the crown was also confirmed by the interviewees:

Everyone among us considers the Holy Crown the highest authority there is. We believe, at least I believe, I personally believe that it is such a divine revelation, that is Hungarian, that can be traced all the way back and though its meanings have been distorted, I believe that there is a higher power guiding our small nation, the Carpathian home, that is the natural history, every area of Hungary and the countries of the Holy Crown, which used to be a unified system. And this type of divine revelation – according to my thoughts and my feelings – is going to lead this whole – I am going to be pejorative now – filth we live in into a right direction. This is going to end soon, I am pretty sure. And it regards the Holy Crown and its might, as well as the divine will that refers to the preservation of the Hungarian nation and its calling (Focus-group interview).

This text also includes a clear statement of the supernatural powers of the Holy Crown, which expresses the logic of history, and it leads the nation and the Carpathian mother country. In this context the symbol and theory of the Holy Crown and the independence and territorial integrity of Hungary receive a new meaning. The Holy Crown is a “source of law”, it refers to the unity of the nation and that of the territories belonging to it, and according to the associated meanings Saint Stephen offered the country to Virgin Mary with the goal of preventing any earthly forces from modifying it. There is

though an interesting element, which refers to the fact that this is not only about the traditional interpretations.

The “Carpathian Motherland” refers not only to Great Hungary, but also to an alternative myth of origins, according to which the Hungarians were the first culture-creating nation of Europe, the first high culture of Europe, and it only came back to the Carpathian basin, to the ancient Hungarian homeland, where it used to live before, and the Hungarian ethnogenesis took place. In these writings the Hungarians are identified with the Neolithic linear pottery culture, presenting archeological or even genetic “proof”. Thus, the settlement of Árpád was not a violent invasion, but a *return*. The Arvisura also states that the Holy Crown has a far more ancient origin: the inferior part of the crown was Gilgames’ crown, Attila was also crowned with it, then Ladislaus I of Hungary combined it with a byzantine and a third (Roman) crown (Paál, 2003, pp. 1172-1173), that is how it rules over Eastern and Western Christians and the ones following the ancient monotheist religion. During the interviews the interviewees referred to a similar provenance of the crown:

...the Crown does not originate from where we got it, as it used to be Attila the Hun’s crown as well, it is a much older story. It is from the age of the Parthian, as we have the ‘párta’ (i.e. a woman’s hat), and what happens with covered crowns, the Hungarian Holy Crown is not a symbol of crowning, there is no one standing over it, except for the Lord. Legitimacy is the countries of the Holy Crown, and the protection of the nations under it by the Holy Mother (First individual interview.)

A similar meaning is constituted in the recruiting banner of the Organization (see picture No. 1). We can see Holy Mary on a mountain top with the Holy Crown on her head and – according to the interviewees – in a Parthian dress:

So that you can imagine this banner or this painting, it is beautiful in my opinion, there is a hill, this includes everything in my opinion, the ones we trust is the holy crown and history, the Holy Mother of Hungarians, Parthian princess, and she is painted in a Parthian dress. So from here we can see where we came from, where we are going, and what we want to achieve (focus-group interview).



Picture: The recruiting banner of the Organization (the name of the organization was removed from the flag and the image based on our agreement with the Organization)

The opinion that Virgin Mary and Jesus were not Jews but Scythians or Parthians has a long history behind it (see for example Zajti, 1999; Badiny Jós, 1998), and it is not even a Hungarian peculiarity, as Jesus was considered an Arian in the Nazi Germany (Weaver 2006, p. 124). According to the most common variant in Hungary, Mary was the daughter of a Parthian prince, the crown on her head (Badinyi Jós, 1998) being the 'párta', also confirmed by the Parthian clothing. Thus, the crown was not received from Stephen, as it could have been worn as a monarch, as Jesus was crowned with the Gilgames-crown according to the Arvisura (Paál, 2003, p. 374; see also Badiny-Jós, 1998). The map of Great Hungary behind our Holy Mother is obvious: the countries of the Holy Crown, the Carpathian Motherland – the territorial integrity of the country is protected by divine powers.² The interviewees tried to emphasize the legitimacy of

² The Holy Mother of Hungarians can be understood as not only a Parthian princess,

the rule of Hungarians over the Carpathian basin by the multiple and expressed rejection of the term “settlement”.

Interviewer: So back to the settlement...

Interviewee No. 5: There is no such thing.

Interviewee No. 1: Let's replace this word. It was a homecoming. We came back. Settlement is a dynamic thing, a violent thing, and this is what they want us to believe (Focus-group interview).

We can conclude that nationalism has the demand to create an independent state for a nation, and this is completed with a specific content with the members of the Organization: the Hungarians were the first inhabitants of the Carpathian basin, and the territorial integrity of the country is protected by the Holy Mother of the Hungarians, thus the nation can claim the territories lost after the treaties of the First World War.

Nationalism as a dominant national attitude

As one can sense from the previous quotes, the world view of the members of the organization can be characterized by nationalism and radically strong nationalist attitude: “I live from my sense of nation and I raise my sons to do the same” said one of the interviewees shortly and briefly (focus-group interview). We can also say that besides the positive attitude towards the nation, other positive attitudes were not expressed by the Organization. Europe, the region or the international dimension is the subject of neutral or even negative attitudes:

I can see that the sense of nation, of being Hungarian, feeling Hungarian is missing from the people, as it was extinguished. It was deliberately extinguished. With our counterfeit history, with our educational system, as it is... From that moment on the whole thing is diluted, and we cannot even speak of these. And since then – the present government says that

but also Anyahita-Arvisura from the Arvisura mythology, who came down with a heavenly chariot to Atais as the leader of intelligent beings, and she became mother of the ones chosen by her. Thus her figure unites the Parthian princess and the mother descending from space.

it does not matter, everyone is nationalist, chauvinist, though it is not the case. It is not about that. That they do this incomplete build of national consciousness, that should be the obligation of governments, is not done, because we are European (focus group interview).

We can clearly see the negative attitudes towards Europe together with what Dekker et al. assume in connection with the combination of identities: strong positive attitudes towards given subject (region, nation, Europe) exclude one another (Dekker et al., 2003).

Every so called constitutional democracy is bogus, everything is bogus in this story, what the FIDESZ wants is bogus; they want globalization, Orbán Viktor will do what he is told to do, you cannot expect anything from a free mason.

Nothing is going to change, the FIDESZ now has two thirds, it can make the decisions that could aid the interests of the nation, but it does not want to do that, it just wants that nothingness, which is hidden behind the European mask, and this does not represent the nation. So here, here always, at least for me the problem is that you need to decide whether to support your nation or support Europe (first individual interview).

The revulsions felt against the international, globalized world are present in several instances in our interview: "It is true that we are present in the global world, but the things we do are exactly against this global world" (focus-group interview). Still we cannot trace the attitudes of the interviewees in connection with the local and regional dimensions. They did not express their feelings in connection with their place of residence (except for one interview, where after being asked the person expressed their liking of a new residence as opposed to an old one). These subjects, communities are not present in the stories told by the interviewees, either. When asked about the historical monuments of their residence, the members of the organization mentioned a few events of the national history that had a connection with the local events (the cemetery from the age of settlement in Karos, the place of the abdication of the Secler Division fighting against the annexation of Transylvania to Romania in Demecser, in April 1919).

Based on the interviews we can conclude that the attitude system characteristic of the members of the Organization can be described

in the following way: extreme positive attitudes towards the nation, negative attitude towards Europe and the globalized world and neutral approaches to the region and to local communities. This research also confirmed the hypothesis of Dekker and his coauthors, in which they stated that extreme positive attitudes (preference, superiority, nationalism) do not mingle with other positive attitudes, and it is unlikely that the people showing strongly or extremely positive attitudes towards their countries or any international region would accept internationalism or cosmopolitanism.

Memory and counter-history

Everything the members of the Organization say about the past could be difficultly labeled with the classical opposition of "history" or "counter-history", and it would also be over-simplifying. For long centuries, history and the professional, institutionalized historical research was considered the only authentic method of getting to know the past. In the last decades of the 20th century new viewpoints have claimed ground and the postmodern approaches questioning the exclusive nature of the mainstream discourses all shattered the exclusive, privileged positions of academic history writing. These new approaches mainly tried to find answers to the questions that referred to the ways special groups who were left out the institutionalized discourse of history writing used the past in order to present their thoughts and their identities. This also included the research on social memory (e.g. Assmann 1992) and sites of memory (Nora 2010), which analyze besides (and sometimes even against) history writing the past preserved in the memory and handed over by it, as well as its discourse.

Michel Foucault's notion of counter-history writing is very similar to memory, a notion that he first mentioned in a 1975 lecture (2003). Foucault presented Biblical history and Roman history and created two completely different types of discourse: history writing, which is the discourse of authority, its role being the legitimization and support of power, as well as counter-history, which does not aim at reinforcing power, it is in fact its critique. It is a rebellious discourse, which tries to revive the memory of the oppressed, it describes slavery, exile and defeat and it uses typically Manichean categories (true-false, oppressor-oppressed) (Domanska, 2010, p. 166; Erős, 2010).

Ewa Domanska developed the concept of counter-history writing, and she described the research of new humanities on the American continent with the notion (Domanska, 2010, Erős, 2010). The aim of this politicized, confrontational, critical approach is preparing the ground for change and the sub-mining of the positions of mainstream discourse by following the emancipation efforts of suppressed groups (suppressed from point of view of ethnicity, social class and gender).

In my opinion, based on the interviews, the approach to history of the members of the Organization is similar to this type of discourse in many aspects, though with many differences. The most important of these is that according to Ewa Domanska's theory, counter-history writing and the new humanities are cultivated within the scientific discourse, and their representatives could enter the mainstream discourse. Our interviewees do not have such demands, as they are not historians. In my opinion we can consider counter-history the books that could now make up a whole library, and which were used by the interviewees to construct their past. Some representatives have some kind of scientific degree (prof. Badiny Jós Ferenc), they edit series of books, they organize conferences and they take under assault the institutional constructions of reproducing knowledge (Weaver 2006, 124). Thus, based on the interviews we can state that they bear witness to a successful union of a counter-culture and a counter-history writing tradition. The relationship with the past expressed by the interviewees could be characterized as a memory inspired by counter-history writing. As Homer wrote in his *Odyssey*: "Never yet did any man of himself know his own" (Hom. *Od.* I. p. 216.) – that means that everything that we know of the past is told to us, and that is how we construct it. The stories we choose and we consider as true determine our social attitudes, expectations and anticipations. Even within "official" history writing one can choose from contradicting stories in constructing the past, but the interviewees consistently chose from outside official history writing: "I was never interested in the part of history they taught us, but in the little parts they left out..." – said a participant during a personal interview.

They expressed their opposition not only through the choice of stories, but they also openly attacked the institutional system of professional history writing.

Interviewer: ... the ones who sit in the seats of the Hungarian Academy of Science...

Interviewee No. 5: they can't even speak Hungarian.

Interviewee No. 1: and since the Habsburgs they have been forging our history, so that we do not have anything to speak about. So that we do not have children who shiver after history classes, but, oh, loser, oh, there's nothing to speak about.

Interviewee No. 5: and during language classes they hear that the Hungarian language is a silt, while it is one of the most ancient languages in the world (focus-group interview).

One could conclude from this and from other texts, that the main villain is the Hungarian Academy of Science, which forges history and deprives the people of the history that could constitute the base of national pride. For example, the website of the Organization includes texts with no authors but with internet reference (Who we are, who assess us?). This text personally attacks Glatz Ferenc, the former president of the HAS on an alleged declaration he made.

We should quote Glatz Ferenc's writing from his Chronicle of Hungarians, in which the president of the Academy of Science writes the following about the ancestors of the Hungarian nation:

"These primitive hoards, where killing children and women is an old tradition... murderers with crooked legs, primitive hoards, having no language, they stole the words of the much more cultivated Slav clans" (Who we are, who assess us?)

This "quote" from Glatz is very wide spread, the internet browsers produced more than one hundred word-for-word matches on the different pages (Google for example 182), which quoted this text exactly, though Glatz Ferenc did not write this.³ These web-pages indicate different sources (TV talk-shows, the Chronicle of Hungarians encyclo-

³ On page 8 of the Chronicle of Hungarians one can find the following: "But – similar to other half-nomadic people – they did not know the notion of private ownership. They do not value anything connected to settled life. Human life has no great value either. The total destruction of the enemy, the killing of children and mothers is a natural part of the fight. They appear as brave and ruthless warriors in the Carpathian basin at the end of the 9th century" (Glatz 1996, 8).

pedia), but it is very likely that it is a text they copy from one another (as even the number of points is identical), the wide spread of which indicates what an important role the internet plays in the spreading of these resources. As a final conclusion we can say that in this text one can observe the accusation against the mainstream discourse of forging history, of the abolishing national pride. The symbol of professional and institutionalized history writing is the Academy and its former president.

Based on the interviews, there are two eras of major importance in the history of the Hungarians in the memory and vision of past of the members of the Organization: the mythical past and the 20th century. The ancient past, the (negative) end of which⁴ as well as the establishment of the state includes the glorious elements: Attila's conquests, the introduction of writing and high culture in Europe, the preservation of the ancient culture with runic writing is a source for national pride. As after the establishment of the state they all referred to a previous discussion and the battle of Bratislava as the story of the heroic resistance of Kund, the Diver:

...but I would really like to emphasize the battle of Pozsony, you know, Kund, the Diver, who is hidden in a story – and I mean story sarcastically – in a legend, a huge battle our children know nothing about, they do not feel, oh my God, they do not feel during history classes that I am Hungarian, and there is no such nation in the World (Third individual interview).

The history of the recent past is dominated by defeats (although the role of Horthy Miklós is considered unambiguously positive), during which the enemies of the nation showed themselves: Zionists, Little Entente, Communists, the Nyilas movement, the media, the politicians, the FIDESZ and the MSZP. This binary nature of the historical eras is also reflected in the answers given by the respondents regarding the heritage sites located near their homes: the settlement era regal cemetery of Karos, and the place where the Secler Division standing up against the Peace Treaty of Trianon abdicated in 1919.

The aim of this turning to the historical past is the lack of finding

⁴ “the biggest trouble of the Hungarian nation was caused by our Stephen. With the fact that giving in to Gizella and Byzantium he melted the Arvisura gold plates, which contained the history of the Hungarian nation. Since then they forbid everything and persecuted everyone who found little parts of our runic history in temples or other places, he was the first dog in this story” (First individual interview)

the national authority and heritage, which could constitute the base of national pride or superiority – this is provided especially by this mythical past. Besides this it expresses the overt confrontation of the mainstream historical discourse, considering it tyrannical. The intensive attention towards the happenings of the recent past aims at the identification of the enemies and destroyers of the nation, who force the members of this subculture into a marginal role. This memory inspired by counter-history writing has the function of legitimizing the potential territorial claims referring to the previous area of the Kingdom of Hungary.

Summary

The Organization is the representative of the radical nationalist movement and subculture, which was given a new boost in 2006, and their members organize their identities around extremely positive national attitudes and nationalism. Based on the interviews we can conclude that the strong nationalist attitude of the members of the organization blurs every other potential attitude and identity (local and regional), and it includes negative attitudes in the international dimension (EU, globalization). History plays an important role in representing these attitudes, this view of the past feeds itself from the writings of the old nationalist-romantic counter-history and with the help of this it creates a memory which is able to express the attitudes, identities and representations characteristic to the organization. This memory, this past has two focuses: the lost tradition preserving the mythical past that constitutes the basis of nationalist pride (which also includes an opposition against the mainstream discourse), as well as the history of the recent past that forms the basis for the legitimization of turning against the powers causing defeat and failure, together with the role of the victim implied in this.

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